Merged Pearl Harbor: "Revisionists" vs. "Traditionalists"

Apparently you did not read the article by Wilford and Villa, which I linked in a previous reply and to which I have referred in other replies.

The Lurline antenna array was at the top of the huge luxury liner, nearly 80 feet above the water, and, yes, the ship had direction-finding capability. Grogan mentioned that he was able to get good bearings on the Japanese ships:

"We continue to pick up the bold Japanese general order signals--it can't be anything else. We got good radio direction finder bearings, mostly coming from a Northwesterly direction from our position. The Jap floating units continue their bold repetition of wireless signals, presumably for the smaller craft in their vanguard of ships."

The "mostly come from" statement rings true to my own DFing when I was in the Army. In nearly all cases, we would get one or two bearings that were way off from the others. We were taught in our training that this would happen, and that we should ignore bearings that were so markedly different from most of the others.

The fact that must be faced is that Grogan's DF bearings closely correspond to the route that the task force took. Wilford and Villa:

"Most significantly, Grogan's reports and observations are entirely consistent with the documented movements of the Kido Butai during the period in question. For example, position reports made by the 3rd Battleship Division indicated that the Kido Butai moved about ten degrees east along the forty-second parallel (179°W to 169°W) from 30 November to 2 December, Lurline time." (“Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai,” The Northern Mariner, volume 11, number 2, April 2001, p. 6)

It is worth pointing out that there is yet another piece of evidence that Grogan was tracking the task force: Grogan said he heard larger ships repeat radio messages for smaller ships. This fits in with Admiral Nagumo's radio communications plan, which directed that the Tokyo broadcasts be rebroadcast by larger ships for the smaller warships within the task force.

Former British officer and World War II scholar A. J. Barker studied the Lurline evidence and concluded that Grogan must have been tracking the task force; he also rejected the myth of radio silence with some very sound, common-sense reasoning (Pearl Harbor, New York: Ballantine Books, 1969, p. 81).

I would again recommend Wilford and Villa's article:

“Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai,” The Northern Mariner, volume 11, number 2 (April 2001), pp. 1-17, available at http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf.

Robert Stinnett has a good discussion on the Lurline bearings as well in Day of Deceit, pp. 196-198, available online at http://mailstar.net/pearl-harbor.html#Myth of the radio silence.

This evidence is just a small part of the evidence that debunks the claim of radio silence. Stinnett found archival evidence that there were 129 Japanese naval intercepts to/from the task force obtained by US naval monitor stations between November 15 and December 6, and that over 100 of them came from the task force (Day of Deceit, pp. 208-210).

And then there is the mass of evidence that British and Dutch intelligence heard and tracked the Japanese task force, and much of this evidence comes from men who were senior British and Dutch officers, including the former head of England's Joint Intelligence Committee. Documentation of this evidence can be found in the following sources:

Wilford, Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941 (New York: University Press of America, 2001), pp. 97-102.

Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), pp. 42-47.

Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York: Doubleday, 1992), pp. 280-301, 316-322.

Wilford, "Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth Intelligence Before Pearl Harbor," Intelligence and National Security, 17:4, 2002, pp. 140-142. (You can buy this article here: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/int/2002/00000017/00000004/art00006.)

Rusbridger and Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor (New York: Summit Books, 1991), pp. 137-142, 275-276.

Oh dear.... Fundamentally, single sensor DF in the open ocean gives bearing but not range or course. Multiple DF data *suggests* a course, but range is still a variable so cannot realistically establish anything other than a general direction that the source appears to be heading in.

If we're relying on HF DF, then it's even more dodgy, as the range cannot be inferred by relative signal strength (assuming that was being done).
 
And, of course, Bob still can't answer a question regarding what he says would be so easy.
 
And, of course, Bob still can't answer a question regarding what he says would be so easy.


I'm still trying to figure the bolded out from bobtaftfan's citation:

Stinnett found archival evidence that there were 129 Japanese naval intercepts to/from the task force obtained by US naval monitor stations between November 15 and December 6, and that over 100 of them came from the task force


Why would the Pearl Harbor attack fleet transmit more than one hundred radio messages back to Japan? The fleet left Japan on Nov. 26th, which would mean over the twelve days of its voyage it was transmitting an average of eight messages per day.
 
I'm still trying to figure the bolded out from bobtaftfan's citation:




Why would the Pearl Harbor attack fleet transmit more than one hundred radio messages back to Japan? The fleet left Japan on Nov. 26th, which would mean over the twelve days of its voyage it was transmitting an average of eight messages per day.

It was the equivalent of tweeting.
 
Obviously it was so that DF technicians in Japan could get a bearing on the fleet and make sure it was somewhere over towards Hawaii, and not heading to Dutch Harbor.
 
I'm still trying to figure the bolded out from bobtaftfan's citation:




Why would the Pearl Harbor attack fleet transmit more than one hundred radio messages back to Japan? The fleet left Japan on Nov. 26th, which would mean over the twelve days of its voyage it was transmitting an average of eight messages per day.

'They' were transmitting but that was part of the Japanese Deception plan

http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2009-12/how-japanese-did-it
 
The other problem with this theory is that if even if Roosevelt were willing to take what he was assured would be a minor hit at Pearl Harbour why on earth would they let the rest of the Japanese plan go ahead unmolested? Why create massive strategic headaches by letting the Japanese overrun places like the Phillipines?

Still that can wait until bob satisfactorily answers the DF questions.
 
Obviously it was so that DF technicians in Japan could get a bearing on the fleet and make sure it was somewhere over towards Hawaii, and not heading to Dutch Harbor.

If only the Japanese fleet had someone aboard one of those ships who knew how to figure out what direction the fleet should be going in. That someone would have to have special knowledge about mathematics, geography, map reading, and astronomy among other things. Of course, such a special person would have a special title, but for the life of me I can't think of it.
 
Ships can't just stop and remain in one place at sea, not without anchoring which they couldn't do in deep ocean. If the fleet stopped it's engines it would not be able to steer. the ships would drift about and hit each other, turn broadside to the sea etc. If they were supposed to holda position they still have to keep enough headway to have steerage and keep formation.

Refueling at sea is done between ships on the move either by a line and hose trailed astern from the tanker or one slung between the ships on derricks. Two ships stopped dead in the water will drift and roll, they can't keep station unless they moor up to each other which with any kind of swll is impossible.

A site about Replenishment at Sea.

Techniques haven't changed since the 1930s.

http://www.toysoutofthepram.com/Replenishment_at_Sea/replenishment_at_sea.html

As I think I've indicated, I have no problem with a relative "stop" vs. an absolute, complete, dead-in-the-water stop. Ships can markedly reduce speed and can also go into holding patterns while standing by.

Part of the refueling that the task force had to do involved transferring numerous barrels of fuel onto certain ships. There was concern over how many barrels to transfer onto ships before the weight would become excessive.

Captain Fuchida recalled that by 12/2 (12/3, Tokyo time), the task force was to be at the "rendezvous point . . . where refueling and supply will be carried out as quickly as possible" (Edwin Layton, And I Was There, New York: Quill, 1985, p. 207).

The ships would have had to substantially reduce speed to refuel and to transfer numerous barrels of fuel onto certain ships. So it is entirely possible and plausible that this could have given the appearance of being "bunched up," as Grogan put it. Said Grogan,

". . . tonight's Radio Detection signals have come from a NW by W from Honolulu, and from the signals, the Japs must be bunched up, biding time."

We must also remember that the SS Lurline docked in Hawaii on 12/3, so Grogan's tracking ended late on 12/2. Thus, compared to what he had been seeing, the refueling could have given him the impression that the ships were "bunched up."

The point remains that Grogan had no way of knowing that the task force had been ordered to reach the "standby point" by 12/2. Once at this point the ships he was DFing could indeed have given the appearance of being stopped, or "bunched up," especially given the fact that the task force was such a massive, sprawling target.

We are also left with the fact that what few other ships there were in the North Pacific at that time would not have been using repeat-backs on low-power low frequencies, and especially not at the same time on successive nights.

Another fact that bears repeating is that Grogan knew the repeat-backs could not be coming from Japan because they were only broadcast at night when there was sufficient propagation for low-power LF signals. He knew that the ships that were sending these signals had to be under darkness along with the SS Lurline.

Grogan explained to his friend H. W. Dickow how this realization led him to begin to DF the signals, and Dickow in turn relayed this explanation to Ladislas Farago:

"He was on watch between 8 P.M. until midnight, and from 8 A.M. until noon. It was only because he heard the Japanese signals between 8 P.M. and 9 P.M. that he was able to evaluate, with absolute certainty, that the Japanese had perpetrated a hoax. Signals transmitted from Japan during the daylight hours there can not be picked up by a ship at sea during the hours of 8 P.M. and 9 P.M. (ship's time) in the Pacific. . . . Grogan instinctively knew that he could not pick up a signal from the Japanese homeland between 8 P.M. and 9 P.M. Lurline time, and this aroused him to action. Then he went to his direction finder, and located the Japanese ships. It was only on the second and third nights of his continued search with the D-F that he found he was receiving signals from a moving target, and that the movement was away from Japan and towards the east (Hawaii)." (In Wilford and Villa, "Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai," The Northern Mariner, 11:2, April 2001, pp. 5-6, http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf)

Grogan also knew from many years of experience as a radioman in the Pacific that it was very strange to be hearing so many signals coming from the North Pacific, especially at that time of the year.

When you are trying to prove a negative--i.e., that the task force never transmitted--it is not a good argument to dismiss all evidence of task force signals with the reply that this evidence can't be valid because the task force never transmitted. The evidence must be explained, not answered with circular reasoning.

There is no rational, credible explanation for the DF bearings and the other signals information gathered by Grogan and Asplund except that the signals came from the task force. The task force may have maintained radio silence on HF channels, but they did not do so on LF channels because they thought it was safe to communicate via LF signals. They didn't know that LF signals can "skip" amazing distances.

To those who argue that DFing can't determine a target's position and track, I can only say that this is like arguing that the Earth is flat. During WW II alone, DFing located and tracked innumerable Japanese and German targets, including ships. Just ask any veteran who did DFing from ground or seaborne positions if DFing can determine a target's position and course.
 
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Bob, no one is arguing that radio DF ing cannot determine the location of a transmitter.

What we are saying, and saying pretty consistently, is that a single device like that on the SS Lurline, can only get you a bearing to a transmitter. To get a location you need at least a second device tracking at the same time to get a resection.

All Grogan got was a series of bearings from his location at different days, which is not sufficient to demonstrate location of whatever was transmitting.
 
There is no rational, credible explanation for the DF bearings and the other signals information gathered by Grogan and Asplund except that the signals came from the task force.



Now to really add some weight to that assertion you just need to find some evidence amongst Japanese records which show the task force making such transmissions. Without such corroboration from the other side's documents it's just an assertion, not a fact.


The task force may have maintained radio silence on HF channels, but they did not do so on LF channels because they thought it was safe to communicate via LF signals. They didn't know that LF signals can "skip" amazing distances.


Citation for the bolded, please. On what evidence are you basing that assertion?
 
Part of the refueling that the task force had to do involved transferring numerous barrels of fuel onto certain ships. There was concern over how many barrels to transfer onto ships before the weight would become excessive.


"barrels"??? You just keep coming up with stuff more wrong than your previous post.

The ships would have had to substantially reduce speed to refuel and to transfer numerous barrels of fuel onto certain ships.


No, they wouldn't. They would slow down to a speed that optimizes ship control versus the weather. That is normally 10~12 knots for replenishment at sea.


". . . tonight's Radio Detection signals have come from a NW by W from Honolulu, and from the signals, the Japs must be bunched up, biding time."

Guess what else was bearing WNW from the Lurline's position? That's right: Japan


The point remains that Grogan had no way of knowing that the task force had been ordered to reach the "standby point" by 12/2. Once at this point the ships he was DFing could indeed have given the appearance of being stopped, or "bunched up," especially given the fact that the task force was such a massive, sprawling target.

Was it "rendezvous point" or was it a "standby point"? They are not the same thing. When you're following a track and you meet at your rendezvous point the ship's join formation and sail on their merry way. As previously explained to you, prearranged rendezvous points were required because the fleet was in radio silence. This allowed stragglers to catch up.

The fleet didn't just lazily follow some vague plan. They were in formation and ships in formation maintain their assigned sector unless they need to leave it for some urgent need or forced out by circumstances. "Formation" in navy speak means a very specific thing with tons of rules and procedures, not your obvious layman's understanding of the word as a loose gaggle.


We are also left with the fact that what few other ships there were in the North Pacific at that time would not have been using repeat-backs on low-power low frequencies,


Yet once again you have demonstrated you never did a DF in your life. There is no possible way someone can gauge if a transmitter is low-power and close or high-power and far. That is one of the first things taught to DF personnel: you can not judge a transmitter's range by its signal strength.


The task force may have maintained radio silence on HF channels, but they did not do so on LF channels because they thought it was safe to communicate via LF signals.


Low frequency radio waves travel farther over the ground than high frequency! HF has the advantage of propagating more readily through the ionosphere than LF but LF groundwaves travel much farther than HF. If the Japanese wanted to transmit ship to ship with radios than they would have used a line-of-sight frequency like VHF or UHF. Again, this is basic radio wave propagation that would have been drilled into the head of every aspiring DF operator.
 
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Yet once again you have demonstrated you never did a DF in your life. There is no possible way someone can gauge if a transmitter is low-power and close or high-power and far. That is one of the first things taught to DF personnel: you can not judge a transmitter's range by its signal strength.

He never did take me up on the request to show how it could be done. Merda taurorum flag raised and unchallenged.
 
Why would the Pearl Harbor attack fleet transmit more than one hundred radio messages back to Japan? The fleet left Japan on Nov. 26th, which would mean over the twelve days of its voyage it was transmitting an average of eight messages per day.

Even funnier is Bob can't show that one of those messages came from the Kido Butai, but I can show exactly where Stunnedett found them.
 
The task force may have maintained radio silence on HF channels, but they did not do so on LF channels because they thought it was safe to communicate via LF signals. They didn't know that LF signals can "skip" amazing distances.

Right. That's why amateurs were initially restricted to the "useless" frequencies above 1500 kHz, while the useful low frequencies were kept for shipping, government and commercial service.
In the less than thirty years since 1912, the Japanese had forgotten that LF propagates? Really?
 
AThe task force may have maintained radio silence on HF channels, but they did not do so on LF channels because they thought it was safe to communicate via LF signals. They didn't know that LF signals can "skip" amazing distances.
I've never done any DF, but I was a commo specialist in the U.S. Army, and you have this bass ackwards. VHF and UHF are line of sight and used for short range commo, LF for long range. I also don't believe for one nanosecond that in 1941 the Japanese didn't know all about skip.
 
I've never done any DF, but I was a commo specialist in the U.S. Army, and you have this bass ackwards. VHF and UHF are line of sight and used for short range commo, LF for long range. I also don't believe for one nanosecond that in 1941 the Japanese didn't know all about skip.

Maybe they were too busy mastering Flight and Combustion to bother researching Radio?
 
"Captain, are you sure we should keep radioing our position while trying to sneak across the Pacific?"

"Yep. Don't worry we are reasonably sure the Americans want us to attack them so that they can almost totally destroy our entire culture over the next four years."

".......?"
 
A few months ago, for the first time in my life, I became interested enough in the Pearl Harbor controversy to start doing some reading about it. Back in 2001, I read Robert Stinnett's book Day of Deceit, but I didn't understand half of what I read and had no interest in doing further reading on the subject.

When I started reading on the subject a couple months ago, I approached the matter with no emotional devotion or hardened commitment to any position. I quickly realized that some gigantic battle lines have been drawn and that the two sides rarely if ever engage in meaningful dialogue with each other--and usually yell at and past each other. Given that we're talking about an event that happened over 70 years ago, this seems rather surprising.

One thing that I find somewhat striking is the number of myths that continue to appear in scholarly writings on the topic. For example:

* "The Japanese fleet maintained radio silence from the time it set sail for Hawaii." We know this is a myth because we have copies of two messages that were sent by ships in the task force en route to Hawaii. What is especially odd is that the editors of one of the collections in which these messages appear repeat the radio-silence myth in their introduction to the collection (Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans).

* "FDR never saw the bomb plot messages." Lt. Commander Alwin Kramer delivered a copy of the first, and most important, bomb plot message to FDR on October 9, along with a summary of its contents and a notation that read “interesting message” (“Additional Views of Mr. Keefe,” JCC Pearl Harbor Report, p. 266-E). Incidentally, the summary read as follows:
"Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations."
​
* "The 14-part Japanese diplomatic cable was not a declaration of war, and did not even break off diplomatic relations. Beyond a recapitulation of Japanese complaints against the U.S., the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, there doesn't seem to be any real point to the message at all." This one is especially baffling. The 14-part cable said that all hope of peace in the Pacific was lost and that the negotiations were terminated. The first instruction specified that the 14-part message had to be delivered to the American Secretary of State at exactly 1:00 p.m., Eastern time. The second instruction directed the Japanese ambassadors to destroy the remaining cipher machine and all codes and other classified documents at the embassy.

When Admiral Wilkinson read those messages (the morning of December 7), he urged Admiral Stark to call the Hawaiian commanders immediately. Colonel Bratton recognized the implication of the time of delivery immediately, as did General Miles. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said these messages "clearly indicated" a "surprise move of some kind." Secretary of War Henry Stimson likewise realized the messages indicated a "blow" would be struck that day. And on and on and on we could go.

As you may have guessed by now, I have come down on the revisionist side. One of the first things that caused me to conclude that the Pearl Harbor attack involved foul play in Washington was the same thing that caught John Toland's eye: the actions of General Marshall and Admiral Stark on the morning of the attack. I find it impossible to believe that Marshall and Stark did not know exactly what they were doing. I find it impossible to believe that their utterly bizarre, incomprehensible actions that morning were merely "mistakes" or "bad judgment."

Of course, many of the books that reject the traditional Pearl Harbor story have some errors in them. But, on balance, I find them much more convincing and logical than traditionalist books.
Roosevelt bears responsibility for the outbreak of the war in the Pacific. He sent the Japanese government a war ultimatum. When he found out Republican leader Hamilton Fish was outraged and correctly stated that the US government would not accept a war ultimatum from Japan so why would Japan accept one from the US? Roosevelt made war inevitable by his embargo policy. www.cwporter.com/japanwas.htm A good article on the treachery of FDR at Pearl Harbor. www.whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/pearl/www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html
 

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