Kid Eager
Philosopher
- Joined
- Nov 5, 2010
- Messages
- 7,296
Apparently you did not read the article by Wilford and Villa, which I linked in a previous reply and to which I have referred in other replies.
The Lurline antenna array was at the top of the huge luxury liner, nearly 80 feet above the water, and, yes, the ship had direction-finding capability. Grogan mentioned that he was able to get good bearings on the Japanese ships:
"We continue to pick up the bold Japanese general order signals--it can't be anything else. We got good radio direction finder bearings, mostly coming from a Northwesterly direction from our position. The Jap floating units continue their bold repetition of wireless signals, presumably for the smaller craft in their vanguard of ships."
The "mostly come from" statement rings true to my own DFing when I was in the Army. In nearly all cases, we would get one or two bearings that were way off from the others. We were taught in our training that this would happen, and that we should ignore bearings that were so markedly different from most of the others.
The fact that must be faced is that Grogan's DF bearings closely correspond to the route that the task force took. Wilford and Villa:
"Most significantly, Grogan's reports and observations are entirely consistent with the documented movements of the Kido Butai during the period in question. For example, position reports made by the 3rd Battleship Division indicated that the Kido Butai moved about ten degrees east along the forty-second parallel (179°W to 169°W) from 30 November to 2 December, Lurline time." (“Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai,” The Northern Mariner, volume 11, number 2, April 2001, p. 6)
It is worth pointing out that there is yet another piece of evidence that Grogan was tracking the task force: Grogan said he heard larger ships repeat radio messages for smaller ships. This fits in with Admiral Nagumo's radio communications plan, which directed that the Tokyo broadcasts be rebroadcast by larger ships for the smaller warships within the task force.
Former British officer and World War II scholar A. J. Barker studied the Lurline evidence and concluded that Grogan must have been tracking the task force; he also rejected the myth of radio silence with some very sound, common-sense reasoning (Pearl Harbor, New York: Ballantine Books, 1969, p. 81).
I would again recommend Wilford and Villa's article:
“Warning at Pearl Harbor: Leslie Grogan and the Tracking of the Kido Butai,” The Northern Mariner, volume 11, number 2 (April 2001), pp. 1-17, available at http://www.thestormunleashed.com/files/docs/warning_at_ph.pdf.
Robert Stinnett has a good discussion on the Lurline bearings as well in Day of Deceit, pp. 196-198, available online at http://mailstar.net/pearl-harbor.html#Myth of the radio silence.
This evidence is just a small part of the evidence that debunks the claim of radio silence. Stinnett found archival evidence that there were 129 Japanese naval intercepts to/from the task force obtained by US naval monitor stations between November 15 and December 6, and that over 100 of them came from the task force (Day of Deceit, pp. 208-210).
And then there is the mass of evidence that British and Dutch intelligence heard and tracked the Japanese task force, and much of this evidence comes from men who were senior British and Dutch officers, including the former head of England's Joint Intelligence Committee. Documentation of this evidence can be found in the following sources:
Wilford, Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941 (New York: University Press of America, 2001), pp. 97-102.
Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), pp. 42-47.
Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York: Doubleday, 1992), pp. 280-301, 316-322.
Wilford, "Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth Intelligence Before Pearl Harbor," Intelligence and National Security, 17:4, 2002, pp. 140-142. (You can buy this article here: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/int/2002/00000017/00000004/art00006.)
Rusbridger and Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor (New York: Summit Books, 1991), pp. 137-142, 275-276.
Oh dear.... Fundamentally, single sensor DF in the open ocean gives bearing but not range or course. Multiple DF data *suggests* a course, but range is still a variable so cannot realistically establish anything other than a general direction that the source appears to be heading in.
If we're relying on HF DF, then it's even more dodgy, as the range cannot be inferred by relative signal strength (assuming that was being done).