Skeptic Ginger
Nasty Woman
- Joined
- Feb 14, 2005
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Previous lab accidents have been mentioned in this thread. There was a reference to the 1977 H1N1 flu pandemic coming from a lab release and that caught my attention. Looking into it I found this report which lays out multiple cases in detail, what went wrong and what happened because of it. These are only a sample of the cases the report outlines.
Remember, this report was written 6 years ago long before the current COVID pandemic.
2015 National Post: A brief, terrifying history of viruses escaping from labs: 70s Chinese pandemic was a lab mistake
Smallpox has escaped from labs more than once. Here is one of the cases discussed in the report:
VEE (Venezuelan equine encephalitis):
SARS accidents have been mentioned upthread:
You think the current government in China is going to admit, oops they did it again? They want to maintain an image of being a modern country rivaling any in the West.
In the main COVID discussion thread the FMD (foot and mouth disease) outbreaks in the UK were discussed.
The report sums up the risk these labs and researchers are taking:
Will we ever learn this lesson?
Clearly no precautions like that were taken at the WIV.
If people find it not credible this was another lab accident, maybe this report will cause them to think again. Try describing why, if it has happened this many times before, there's no way it happened here.
Remember, this report was written 6 years ago long before the current COVID pandemic.
2015 National Post: A brief, terrifying history of viruses escaping from labs: 70s Chinese pandemic was a lab mistake
H5N1 influenza has yet to cause a pandemic. It continues to simmer.The public health danger posed by potentially pandemic-causing viruses escaping from laboratories has become the subject of considerable discussion, spurred by “gain of function” experiments. The ostensible goal of these experiments—in which researchers manipulate already-dangerous pathogens to create or increase communicability among humans—is to develop tools to monitor the natural emergence of pandemic strains. Opponents, however, warn in a variety of recent research papers that the risk of laboratory escape of these high-consequence pathogens far outweighs any potential advance. ...
... If a pathogen appears in nature after not circulating for years or decades, it may be assumed to have escaped from a laboratory where it had been stored inert for many years, accumulating no genetic changes—that is, its natural evolution had been frozen.
... Human H1N1 influenza virus appeared with the 1918 global pandemic and persisted, slowly accumulating small genetic changes, until 1957, when it appeared to go extinct after the H2N2 pandemic virus appeared. ....
Human H1N1 virus reappeared in 1977, in the Soviet Union and China. Virologists, using serologic and early genetic tests, soon began to suggest the cause of the reappearance was a laboratory escape of a 1949-50 virus, and as genomic techniques advanced, it became clear that this was true. ...
The 1977 pandemic spread rapidly worldwide but was limited to those under 20 years of age: Older persons were immune from exposures before 1957. Its attack rate was high (20 to 70 percent) in schools and military camps, but mercifully it caused mild disease, and fatalities were few. It continued to circulate until 2009, when the pH1N1 virus replaced it. There has been virtually no public awareness of the 1977 H1N1 pandemic and its laboratory origins, despite the clear analogy to current concern about a potential H5N1 or H7N9 avian influenza pandemic and “gain of function” experiments.
Smallpox has escaped from labs more than once. Here is one of the cases discussed in the report:
The first recognized laboratory escape, in March 1972, occurred with the infection of a laboratory assistant at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. She had observed the harvesting of live smallpox virus from eggs used as a growing medium; the process was performed on an uncontained lab table, as was then routine. She was hospitalized, but before she was placed in isolation, she infected two visitors to a patient in an adjacent bed, both of whom died. They in turn infected a nurse, who survived, as did the laboratory assistant.
VEE (Venezuelan equine encephalitis):
Genomic analysis identified the 1995 virus as identical to a 1963 isolate, with no indication it had been circulating for 28 years. It was another case of frozen evolution, but unlike the vaccine-related VEE outbreaks, the 1963 virus had never been used in a vaccine. Suspicion fell on an inadvertent release from a virology lab, either by an unrecognized infection of a lab worker or visitor, or escape of an infected laboratory animal or mosquito. The major scientific group working on VEE published a paper in 2001 stating the 1995 outbreak most likely was a laboratory escape, with considerable circumstantial evidence:
SARS accidents have been mentioned upthread:
Not sure but it sounds like the infected researcher went undiagnosed until the nurse became infected.SARS has not re-emerged naturally, but there have been six escapes from virology labs: one each in Singapore and Taiwan, and four separate escapes at the same laboratory in Beijing....
In April 2004, China reported a case of SARS in a nurse who had cared for a researcher at the Chinese National Institute of Virology. ...
Subsequent investigation uncovered three unrelated laboratory infections in different researchers at the NIV. At least of two primary patients had never worked with live SARS virus. Many shortcomings in biosecurity were found at the NIV, and the specific cause of the outbreak was traced to an inadequately inactivated preparation of SARS virus that was used in general (that is, not biosecure) laboratory areas
You think the current government in China is going to admit, oops they did it again? They want to maintain an image of being a modern country rivaling any in the West.
In the main COVID discussion thread the FMD (foot and mouth disease) outbreaks in the UK were discussed.
In 2007, FMD appeared again in Britain, 4 kilometers from a biosafety level 4 laboratory—a designation indicating the highest level of lab security—located at Pirbright. The strain had caused a 1967 outbreak in the United Kingdom but was not then circulating in animals anywhere. It was, however, used in vaccine manufacture at the Pirbright facility.
Investigations concluded that construction vehicles had carried mud contaminated with FMD from a defective wastewater line at Pirbright to the first farm. ...
The report sums up the risk these labs and researchers are taking:
It is hardly reassuring that, despite stepwise technical improvements in containment facilities and increased policy demands for rigorous biosecurity procedures in the handling of dangerous pathogens, potentially high-consequence breaches of biocontainment occur nearly daily: In 2010, 244 unintended releases of bioweapon candidate “select agents” were reported....
Will we ever learn this lesson?
Experiments that augment virulence and transmissibility of dangerous pathogens have been funded and performed, notably with the H5N1 avian influenza virus. The advisability of performing such experiments at all—particularly in laboratories placed at universities in heavily populated urban areas, where potentially exposed laboratory personnel are in daily contact with a multitude of susceptible and unaware citizens—is clearly in question.
If such manipulations should be allowed, it would seem prudent to conduct them in isolated laboratories where personnel are sequestered from the general public and must undergo a period of exit quarantine before re-entering civilian life. The historical record tells us it is not a matter of if but when ignoring such measures will cost health and even lives. Perhaps many lives.
Clearly no precautions like that were taken at the WIV.
If people find it not credible this was another lab accident, maybe this report will cause them to think again. Try describing why, if it has happened this many times before, there's no way it happened here.


