Materialists......

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Equivalent? If you care to define mind=body, life=death, energetic=inert, etcetc.

Yes, equivalent! Can you propose an experiment to distinguish them? The fact that we use different words to describe them does not make them different.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

I nominate that post as the silliest I've seen in years.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Thank you, thank you. Perhaps an extra word might make it clearer for you:

The fact that we use different words to describe them does not necessarily make them different.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You just said: Physicalism is okay unless you start including things in it that aren't materialistic. What does that mean?

It means that the further you drift away from the materialistic bits of physics it is less and less clear what "physics" means. It can come to mean all sorts of things, with no apparent limit. As such, I am not sure what it means anymore. Relativity is just about compatible with materialism. QM is not.

I think you must be using a definition of materialism that means something other than "everything is material." What's an example of something in a QM interpretation that isn't "materialistic"?

Henry Stapp's idealistic version?
Amit Goswami's idealistic version?

"Some recent popularizers of Bell's work when confronted with [Bell's inequality] have gone on to claim that telepathy is verified or the mystical notion that all parts of the universe are instantaneously interconnected is vindicated. Others assert that this implies communication faster than the speed of light. That is rubbish; the quantum theory and Bell's inequality imply nothing of this kind.

Indeed. Just as it is rubbish to imply that QM suggests synchronicity. It does not imply any such thing.

As anybody who had read the philosophical writings of Schrodinger would confirm.

QM DOES NOT JUSTIFY MYSTICISM.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, I can see you eating your cake at the same time you're trying to lock it in the safe. Either metaphysics and science do not intersect, or they do.

Perhaps it is just that I am trying to defend a position which is complicated?

Science does not answer metaphysical questions. Science does inform metaphysical enquiry because metaphysics needs to take account of science. Quantum mechanics is stuck right in the middle of the debate at one of the points where science and metaphysics meet. Poland meets Germany and Russia, but they remain seperate, apart from the odd occasion when the border is moved because one of its neighbours defeated another of its neighbours in a war.

Also, when it is said in the link I gave that "at this point the question about reality became science instead of philosophy" it is not quite accurate. Bell's theorem is mathematics, not science. But what could be better than mathematics to provide the meeting point between metaphysics and physics?

You have placed all of science except QM in the irrelevant pile.

That is not fair. You are talking to a person who still goes to Christian boards to defend Darwin.

You keep QM because it's mysterious and so possibly useful in the promulgation of mysteriousness.

No comment.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It means that the further you drift away from the materialistic bits of physics it is less and less clear what "physics" means. It can come to mean all sorts of things, with no apparent limit. As such, I am not sure what it means anymore. Relativity is just about compatible with materialism. QM is not.

This problem is solved by dropping materialism. Here is where physicalism distinguishes itself from materialism, because it defines physical things as those things dealt with by physics, wherever they may lead. You're right that the interpretation of QM is a bear. We may have to settle for just the mathematics. Wouldn't that be liberating?

Henry Stapp's idealistic version?
Amit Goswami's idealistic version?

Interpretations. Cheaper by the dozen.

Indeed. Just as it is rubbish to imply that QM suggests synchronicity. It does not imply any such thing.

Who suggests that it does?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ah yes, I do remember this one now that you mention it.

The problem is, as various people pointed out, that it all hangs off some pretty dodgy mathematics.

Except it's not really mathematics. It's just a mathematical metaphor for something else. Unlike the creator of "symmettry mathematics" I am not actually trying to invent a new physics.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, equivalent! Can you propose an experiment to distinguish them? The fact that we use different words to describe them does not make them different.

~~ Paul

On the level you are looking at them they are equivalent. But what do you mean by equivalent?

Equivalent like 1, 1 and 1 are equivalent?

Or is their relationship more like 1, 0 and -1?

There are three of them. Two of them look suspiciously like opposites (they are the two halves of Descartes' dualism) and the other is explicitly neutral. Therefore, their relationship is much more like 1,0 and -1 than 1,1 and 1. For me, this is a statement of the blindingly obvious.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Science does not answer metaphysical questions. Science does inform metaphysical enquiry because metaphysics needs to take account of science. Quantum mechanics is stuck right in the middle of the debate at one of the points where science and metaphysics meet. Poland meets Germany and Russia, but they remain seperate, apart from the odd occasion when the border is moved because one of its neighbours defeated another of its neighbours in a war.

If you're honest about science informing metaphysics, then I'm happy. In that case, it's going to inform the hell out of the philosophy of perception. In fact, there isn't a damn thing that informs the philosophy of perception except the science of perception. Now that I mention it, there isn't much other than science to inform metaphysics at all. Surely it's not informed by introspection.

That is not fair. You are talking to a person who still goes to Christian boards to defend Darwin.

I meant that you have placed all of science except QM in the irrelevant pile as far as metaphysics is concerned. Perhaps I was too harsh. How does idealism account for evolution?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

On the level you are looking at them they are equivalent. But what do you mean by equivalent?

Equivalent in the sense that they all describe (or fail to) the world we see, cannot be distinguished by experiment, and are equal under Occam.

There are three of them. Two of them look suspiciously like opposites (they are the two halves of Descartes' dualism) and the other is explicitly neutral. Therefore, their relationship is much more like 1,0 and -1 than 1,1 and 1. For me, this is a statement of the blindingly obvious.

I'm sorry, but none of these monisms have been developed sufficiently to decide whether they are correct, let alone equivalent (if it is even possible to develop them to that degree). For example, no metaphysic yet describes how consciousness works. As it stands, I proclaim them equivalent in their incompleteness.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you're honest about science informing metaphysics, then I'm happy. In that case, it's going to inform the hell out of the philosophy of perception. In fact, there isn't a damn thing that informs the philosophy of perception except the science of perception. Now that I mention it, there isn't much other than science to inform metaphysics at all. Surely it's not informed by introspection.

That paper was the technical coalface of the [.......] that is being played out in this thread.

I meant that you have placed all of science except QM in the irrelevant pile as far as metaphysics is concerned.

That is because the rest of it makes no difference. Kant anticipated Darwin.

Perhaps I was too harsh. How does idealism account for evolution?

I am not defending idealism. Kant's position (transcendental idealism) allows of evolution by claiming there is a noumenal reality where "stuff can happen". Whether Berkeley can successfully account for evolution is a slightly different issue. I think Peter Lloyd's version of Berkleyenism does, but only by being more like Kant than Berkeley. I am guessing Berkeley may have rejected Darwin if he had lived to see him.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'm sorry, but none of these monisms have been developed sufficiently to decide whether they are correct, let alone equivalent (if it is even possible to develop them to that degree). For example, no metaphysic yet describes how consciousness works. As it stands, I proclaim them equivalent in their incompleteness.

~~ Paul

You made no attempt to answer my question. I'm going to bed.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That paper was the technical coalface of the [.......] that is being played out in this thread.

Say what?

That is because the rest of it makes no difference. Kant anticipated Darwin.

As I said, you appear to elect QM as something special because it is mysterious and seems to offer some sort of nexus with the supernatural. How can the findings of neuroscience not make a difference?

"I'm studying philosophy of mind, but I don't think neuroscience is relevant."

I am not defending idealism. Kant's position (transcendental idealism) allows of evolution by claiming there is a noumenal reality where "stuff can happen". Whether Berkeley can successfully account for evolution is a slightly different issue. I think Peter Lloyd's version of Berkleyenism does, but only by being more like Kant than Berkeley. I am guessing Berkeley may have rejected Darwin if he had lived to see him.

How does neutral monism account for evolution of the brain? Were microtubules just fortuitous?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You made no attempt to answer my question. I'm going to bed.

I precisely answered your question:

Equivalent in the sense that they all describe (or fail to) the world we see, cannot be distinguished by experiment, and are equal under Occam.

~~ Paul

 

[Robin]

This one is so far from out of left field, it throws me.

I have pointed out the logical problems so far with Idealism, Materialism and (Geoff’s) Neutral Monism. You have already alluded to the logical problems of the various dualisms. What is left – let me know and I will have a go.

Followed by an insult.

And your tactic of insistently ascribing views to me that you know I do not hold and I insistently tell you I do not hold is not insulting?

There is a good rule here – if you can’t take it, don’t dish it out. If you throw a bomb, watch out for incoming.

Equivalent? If you care to define mind=body, life=death, energetic=inert, etcetc.

Sure, glad to oblige. Take each item on your list. If it is reducible reduce until it is no longer reducible. If you do not now have a set of equivalents then monism is not true.

Well, not exactly, but ok; and applicable to any logically defensible monism.

I defined it roughly – sure. If the term had not already been nabbed I would call it Neutral Monism. As it is it might be termed Generic Monism. So that is my position – every monism is equivalent to Generic Monism.

What an odd juxtaposition of words having opposite meanings.

Sorry, which terms have opposite meanings? “will, intention, complex accidental”. Which are opposites? Generally speaking the opposite of accidental is necessary – the opposite of complex is simple. My intuition, and it is no more than that, is that fundamental substances are more likely to be simple than complex.

And I'd say we are in ground untrod -- in fact, unimagined -- by either Mach or The Positivists.

Untrod certainly. Unimagined no. In fact even the Physicalists eventually relented and said that statements about the reality of external objects might be meaningful.

Strange. Materialists don't seem compelled to do so, nor have I called it "better". I state, again, either position is a logical one, but I don't agree with the final implications materialism forces one to accept and defend.

The only Materialist philosophers (newer than d’Holbach) I know are the Churchlands and David Lewis. It seems that they all give reasons by the truckload why they believe their monism is better than others. Not that I accept any of them. But you can’t say they haven’t stated their case.

And I respond that not all questions worth asking are necessarily answered, or even clarified, by mathematization.

I did not say that they are. I did not mention mathematisation. “Determine” has a meaning outside of mathematics and philosophy has in general used this meaning.

If there is some change that was not determined by will from an intent then will and/or intent are accidental and Idealism is false.

Again an unwarranted attempt at mathematization.

No, as I have explained above.

I disagree. Our perceptions of the macro world at human scale suggest the opposite.

I am not sure what you mean. Our perceptions of the macro world at human scale suggest that most change is not the result of intent. If we were to trust such a perception then we would discard the notion of Idealism straight away.

I agree a very very very large amount of the activities of reality interacting with reality are deterministic.

For Idealism to be true all of them must be. If any event could be absolutely undeterministic then we would have found an exception to will and intent. Since these are supposed to be necessary in Idealism then we would have found an exception to Idealism.

What part of materialism do you consider unmathematizable?

What part of Idealism do you consider to be unmathematisable? (Give reasons).

Atman=Brahman.

I am not sure that Wittgenstein said that. I was thinking of “what we cannot know we should not speak of”.
On the other hand I am getting a bit sick of “neti neti” so I would happily assent to “tat tvam assi”

You apparently enjoy a more ordered 'mind' than most ...

Probably not, but I still can’t see anything in the concept of mind that implies indeterminism. I don’t see that I am freer when my thoughts are more disorganised – rather the opposite.

Disorganisation allows my life to be determined by external factors. Organisation at least allows my life to be somewhat determined by internal mental factors.

Again, what part of materialism do you consider unmathematizable?

Again, what part of Idealism do you consider to be unmathematisable? I am not sure what your position is here, there is still a debate about whether physics has demonstrated real indeterminism in the universe. But all physicists at least take the possibility seriously. So why would you assert that materialism implies determinism when no modern materialist would make such a claim? Is there something you know that they don’t?

Nope. Your math does that for you. No need for me t

My maths? What would that be?

 

[articulett]

No, YOU'RE the one who keeps hinting that there's SOMETHING out there that's supposed to explain stuff, but you just stubbornly refuse to explain what that is, how it would work or what it could mean. Either back up your assertions or don't make them at all.

This is just like Interesting Ian--the insistance that materialists are close minded because they won't accepts the nebulous mystical unsupported quantum flapdoodle and all the implications therein. They truly believe that they have a "higher truth" that we are just too blind to see--(or maybe we're not taking enough hallucinogens)--they see hard headedness in others while utterly failing to notice it in themselves. (Their beliefs are "convictions"...materialist beliefs (supported by facts) are due to close-mindedness.--incredible.) Is there anything--evidence or "whatever" that would change their mind?--since they can't provide that for us due to the subjective and anecdotal nature of the "evidence", is there any proof other than "intuition" that could get them to consider the alternative....or are they too afraid of becoming "p-zombies"--the evil materialists. They speak of us fearing having our view shattered...as if we wouldn't welcome dualism, but aren't they really afraid of having their cherished but unlikely delusion dashed by reality?

 

[Robin]

Except it's not really mathematics. It's just a mathematical metaphor for something else. Unlike the creator of "symmettry mathematics" I am not actually trying to invent a new physics.

Fair enough, but it seems that a probably impossible mathematics is not a good metaphor for your neutral entity - it makes it sound like a probably impossible metaphysic.

It seems it might just be better to describe the qualities that the metaphoric mathematics must have, show that it is reasonable or even necessary that such a mathematics exists and leave it at that. Linking it to a candidate like you did would seem to invite the criticism that I made.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

As I said, you appear to elect QM as something special because it is mysterious and seems to offer some sort of nexus with the supernatural.

And that is standard skeptic-speak rhetoric in place of an argument. It is a lie, trotted out with astonishing regularity by skeptics. Every time somebody offers QM as an example of anything at all that they might not want to believe it, they trot out this response, regular as clockwork. No thought is given as to whether or not is true or justified, it just spews forth from their mouths, with no actual thinking getting done.

I am NOT just citing QM, saying its weird, and saying it therefore explains other weirdness. So stop giving me your thought-lite knee-jerk skeptic-speak.

Sorry, but I am sick of hearing this particular line.

How can the findings of neuroscience not make a difference?

"I'm studying philosophy of mind, but I don't think neuroscience is relevant."

Who said that?

There are certain specific questions to which it makes no difference. The relationship between the three monisms is one of them.

How does neutral monism account for evolution of the brain?
~~ Paul

How does materialism account for the evolution of the brain?

Answer to both questions: It doesn't.

Evolutionary theory accounts for the evolution of the brain. Materialism and neutral monism do not.

The only position that causes problems for evolutionary theory is the sort of outright subjective idealism that leads to things like creationism and gazerism i.e. rampant anti-realism that has lost the plot.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I precisely answered your question:

~~ Paul

I don't think you did......

I will repeat it:

You said the three monisms were equivalent.

Equivalent like 1, 1 and 1 are equivalent?

Or is their relationship more like 1, 0 and -1?

There are three of them. Two of them look suspiciously like opposites (they are the two halves of Descartes' dualism) and the other is explicitly neutral. Therefore, their relationship is much more like 1,0 and -1 than 1,1 and 1. For me, this is a statement of the blindingly obvious.

Your previous attempt at a response....

"Equivalent in the sense that they all describe (or fail to) the world we see, cannot be distinguished by experiment, and are equal under Occam."

....does not answer the question I asked. I did not ask "are they all equal under Occam?". I asked how they were related to each other. Are they really all just equal, or is their relationship more complex than that?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Fair enough, but it seems that a probably impossible mathematics is not a good metaphor for your neutral entity - it makes it sound like a probably impossible metaphysic.

That does not follow.

It seems it might just be better to describe the qualities that the metaphoric mathematics must have, show that it is reasonable or even necessary that such a mathematics exists and leave it at that. Linking it to a candidate like you did would seem to invite the criticism that I made.

From some people. Other people appeared to understand.