Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Ok, well, I made a slight misreading of this earlier, I read it as 3 => materialism is false, rather than 3 => materialism might be/seems to imply materialism is false.

It pretty much does, IMO. It falsifies one half of the naive materialist's two conceptions of "matter".

But then seem is a tricky word:

I agree...it makes it SEEM less implausible

Good.

1700 posts, now the second longest R&P thread on the database, and still the juggernaut keeps rolling on its inevitable journey to nowhere at all.....

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Bell's theorem forces us to accept one of four things:

1) Quantum theory is wrong.
2) Logic is wrong.
3) Local Realism is wrong.
4) Some form of ontological idealism is true.

There are no other options. I don't know anyone who defends (1), I am not going to seriously consider (2) and that leaves (3) and (4), both of which seem to imply that materialism is false.

5) Counterfactual definiteness is wrong (and the MWI gets points).

Materialism is false, since the idea that everything is material is silly. So you really mean physicalism here. Physicalism proposes that everything is physical, as described by physics. How is physicalism affected by (3) or (5)?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

5) Counterfactual definiteness is wrong (and the MWI gets points).

Where did you get that one from?

I was going to add "5) Some version of MWI might get us out of the situation".

But MWI is hardly a better option than the others. It was a brief stopping point for me.

Materialism is false, since the idea that everything is material is silly. So you really mean physicalism here. Physicalism proposes that everything is physical, as described by physics. How is physicalism affected by (3) or (5)?

Provided you are generous enough with your definition of "physical" then it isn't. If you are generous enough with your definition of "physical" to include the other branches of the MWI Megaverse and non-local connections in this reality, then it's no problem. I think physicalism is not a particularly helpful term, especially if you start stretching it to include things which only exist interpretations of QM which clearly aren't materialistic.

 

[Belz...]

That's what the rest of the same post was about.......the bit you didn't respond to.....

I didn't respond to it because it didn't answer the question you just didn't answer : How so ?

It's rather an important bit to ignore.

Really ? How is "To claim it exists is to deny it" not self-contradictory ?

I meant that it is worthy of interest simply because so many different people from so many different cultures over such a long period of time said such strikingly similar things.

By that, do you mean: "it is worthy of analysis just like any subject" or "it is worthy of analysis because it may give us real answers to real questions about reality that science can't provide" ?

 

[Belz...]

5) Counterfactual definiteness is wrong (and the MWI gets points).

Materialism is false, since the idea that everything is material is silly. So you really mean physicalism here. Physicalism proposes that everything is physical, as described by physics. How is physicalism affected by (3) or (5)?

~~ Paul

I'm still having problems with the term "material", actually. I think this thread has busted my previous definition.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

There is a CSICOP article here attempting to debunk the realist interpretation of MWI you mentioned as just about the least Occam-friendly theory one could imagine:

http://www.highbeam.com/library/docFree.asp?DOCID=1G1:77757761

It is true that the MWI, in this realist form, avoids some of the paradoxes of QM.

I find it hard to believe that so many academics take Lewis's possible worlds seriously. As poet Armand T. Ringer has put it in a clerihew:

David Lewis is a philosopher who is Crazy enough to insist That all logically possible worlds actually exist.

Alex Oliver, reviewing Lewis's Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, in The London Times Literary Supplement (January 7, 2000), closes by calling Lewis "the leading metaphysician at the start of this century, head and beard above his contemporaries."

The stark truth is that there is not the slightest shred of reliable evidence that there is any universe other than the one we are in. No multiverse theory has so far provided a prediction that can be rested. In my layman's opinion they are all frivolous fantasies. As far as we can tell, universes are not as plentiful as even two blackberries. Surely the conjecture that there is just one universe and its Creator is infinitely simpler and easier to believe than that there are countless billions upon billions of worlds, constantly increasing in number and created by nobody. I can only marvel at the low state to which today's philosophy of science has fallen.

COPYRIGHT 2001 Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal

But you can include it as an option if you like.

Personally, I'll invoke Occam and reject MWI as crazy-talk.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I didn't respond to it because it didn't answer the question you just didn't answer : How so ?

Like I said.

Really ? How is "To claim it exists is to deny it" not self-contradictory ?

Because it transcends the existence/non-existence dichotomy. It neither exists nor doesn't exist. You might try to say "It is existence", but that's no use either, unless you think "X is isness." makes sense.

By that, do you mean: "it is worthy of analysis just like any subject" or "it is worthy of analysis because it may give us real answers to real questions about reality that science can't provide" ?

Both.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'm still having problems with the term "material", actually. I think this thread has busted my previous definition.

Well, perhaps it was worth the 43 page ramble after all then.

 

[Robin]

EEEEEK!

You have two very different question marks mixed up. There is a very specific ontological question mark hanging over quantum mechanics. It has been there right from the very start and it is still there today. But this is in no way the same "question mark" that drives science in general. There was nothing inevitable about science leading to quantum mechanics. Far from it.

That is an odd assertion - do you care to explain? If QM is the correct view then the alternative would have beent that science got it wrong, which is always possible, but not, I think, what you meant.

No, I do not agree. We have a fairly clear idea what we mean by "material" or "substance". The notion of "material" does not even change when we arrive at 20th century physics. If anything, it begins to break down when applied to relativity and breaks down completely with Schroedingers wave mechanics.

You might have a clear idea of what you mean by material but know physicist does.

What if God is not material?

What if God transcends the distinction between existence and non-existence, as suggested by the Tao Te Ching and the Upanishads from antiquity and by modern theologians such as Paul Tillich and philosophers such as Hegel and Heidegger?

It does not make any difference. If God is real and this could be demonstrated, science could not say "there is no God", whether or not God is matter. Science does not say "everything is matter".

What if libertarian free will is not material?

Same answer.

Materialism is not dependent on science.

Do you mean that there is some materialist somewhere that would see some development of science that challenged a prior definition of "material" and say "BS"?

I think you need to name names here. Any materialist I have heard of cites science as the best way of investigating our universe and (if applicable) beyond. It follows that a materialist is, by definition, bound to accept any firm finding of science.

I believe your claim breaks down with the arrival of Bell's theorem and the implication that the Universe is non-local and that non-local connections exist.

On the contrary it only reinforces what I have been saying. An observation comes along that undermines a prior theory we have for matter then science does not say "the observation is wrong", science says "the theory is wrong". So as I said before, there can be no definition of "matter" as long as there is still science to do.

The ironic thing is that "physicalism", if taken to include QM and Bell's theorem, is heading towards the position that I defend. The only way that people avoid agreeing with this is by making all sorts of uninformed comments about how QM has got nothing to do with metaphysics or consciousness. From the point of view of science, all that is needed to fatally undermine materialism is the proven existence of non-local connections that cannot be consistent with naive materialism.

I don't see anything there that would preclude the possibility that conscious mental states might arise from non-conscious states.

 

[Robin]

It's like Franko speaking from the grave.....

Would you say that something could appear ordered from one perspective at the same time as appearing disordered from another?

The "appearance of disorder" is not the same as "disorder". Apparent disorder can be one of two things. Undetected order or real disorder. What else could it be?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That is an odd assertion - do you care to explain? If QM is the correct view then the alternative would have beent that science got it wrong, which is always possible, but not, I think, what you meant.

I meant that quantum mechanics, even though it is a product of science, turned out to be the final nail in the coffin of the worldview initiated by Galileo and Newton, which reached its peak in the positivist movement which only 100 years ago believed that we were close to a complete physical description of the whole of reality. Then came quantum mechanics, and it rewrote the script.

It does not make any difference. If God is real and this could be demonstrated, science could not say "there is no God", whether or not God is matter. Science does not say "everything is matter".

No. Materialism says that.

Do you mean that there is some materialist somewhere that would see some development of science that challenged a prior definition of "material" and say "BS"?

No, I mean that materialism does not depend on science. Materialism is metaphysics. Science is science.

I think you need to name names here. Any materialist I have heard of cites science as the best way of investigating our universe and (if applicable) beyond. It follows that a materialist is, by definition, bound to accept any firm finding of science.

Sure. But that does not mean that materialism depends on science. At the risk of being accused of resorting to "isms" I think you are confusing Science, Scientific Realism and Scientific Materialism.

I don't see anything there that would preclude the possibility that conscious mental states might arise from non-conscious states.

I think this thread has gone beyond any further responses to that statement. I have nothing to add.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The "appearance of disorder" is not the same as "disorder". Apparent disorder can be one of two things. Undetected order or real disorder. What else could it be?

Right then....there is an alternative to what looks like disorder, and it is undetected order.

 

[Robin]

ROFL. Weak, indeed. Materialism and/or physicalism have much graver problems to overcome. DCQE stuff is fascinating, don't you think?

That is right. Idealism is not the only metaphysic with deep logical problems. They all do.

And imo you are an interactive dualist and wannabe materialist.

It must be nice to be able to form beliefs without evidence or reasoning. Stupid, but nice.

If you have actually declared a position, I missed it.

Certainly I have stated often enough that all monism are equivalent. Once you accept the very reasonable assumptions "thinking exists" and "I am not the Solipsist" it follows logically that the objects we observe have an independent existence to our mental representations of them. Since I don't think anybody here disagrees with any of this then I will not present the reasoning.

Will and intention, being complex, are most likely accidental attributes.

And that, metaphysically speaking, is just about all you can say. Otherwise we can only orient ourselves using a Machian or Positivist stance.

Unless you are a dualist, there is no mind/body problem. There is a choice of monism, acceptance of all the logical implications of that choice, and its' defense.

Certainly. For example if you accept Idealism you must give some reasons why it is better than some other monism.

And you must accept the implications. For example if will and intention are necessary attributes then Idealism implies determinism.

Any change that occurs through the agency of will and intent is by definition a determined event.

If there is any change that does not occur fully through will and intent then these are simply accidental properties and Idealism is false.

So if you accept Idealism you must necessarily subscribe to strong determinism.

Nothing, other than people who make that argument being unwilling to examine their stated and tacit assumptions underlying their position.

Like the assumption that determinism is necessary in materialism, but impossible in Idealism?

I agree we have entered the realm where language fails ala Wittgenstein.

Then I suggest that we accept his dictum.

At some point for any communication to be possible we must accept some shared meaning that words like "mind" and "matter" bring with them.

A definition is even better. I see nothing in the concept of "mind" that implies "indetermism".

Yeah, mathematics does appear to have to limits. Sorry.

Certainly, but that applies equally to a materialist metaphysic.

Or mention of the Higgs Field ....

What is your point? Is the Higgs Field your candidate for a phenomenon that is not ordered but also not disordered?

Or are you presenting it as evidence for your contention that a material universe must be necessarily deterministic?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Where did you get that one from?

Lots of places.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_definiteness

Provided you are generous enough with your definition of "physical" then it isn't. If you are generous enough with your definition of "physical" to include the other branches of the MWI Megaverse and non-local connections in this reality, then it's no problem. I think physicalism is not a particularly helpful term, especially if you start stretching it to include things which only exist interpretations of QM which clearly aren't materialistic.

You just said: Physicalism is okay unless you start including things in it that aren't materialistic. What does that mean? I think you must be using a definition of materialism that means something other than "everything is material." What's an example of something in a QM interpretation that isn't "materialistic"?

But you may have hit on an important point here. I have no problem extending physicalism to include things that physics discovers, wherever they may lead. But I sense that you want me to have a problem with such things, and so, as usual, will confine me to a strawman version of materialism that I wouldn't hold even if I cared to hold a metaphysic at all.

So what is it about possibilities (3) and (5) that I should salivate over?

"Some recent popularizers of Bell's work when confronted with [Bell's inequality] have gone on to claim that telepathy is verified or the mystical notion that all parts of the universe are instantaneously interconnected is vindicated. Others assert that this implies communication faster than the speed of light. That is rubbish; the quantum theory and Bell's inequality imply nothing of this kind. Individuals who make such claims have substituted a wish-fulfilling fantasy for understanding. If we closely examine Bell's experiment we will see a bit of sleight of hand by the God that plays dice which rules out actual nonlocal influences. Just as we think we have captured a really weird beast--like acausal influences--it slips out of our grasp. The slippery property of quantum reality is again manifested." ---Heinz Pagels

 

[hammegk]

That is right. Idealism is not the only metaphysic with deep logical problems. They all do.

It must be nice to be able to form beliefs without evidence or reasoning. Stupid, but nice.

Certainly I have stated often enough that all monism are equivalent. Once you accept the very reasonable assumptions "thinking exists" and "I am not the Solipsist" it follows logically that the objects we observe have an independent existence to our mental representations of them. Since I don't think anybody here disagrees with any of this then I will not present the reasoning.

Will and intention, being complex, are most likely accidental attributes.

And that, metaphysically speaking, is just about all you can say. Otherwise we can only orient ourselves using a Machian or Positivist stance.

Certainly. For example if you accept Idealism you must give some reasons why it is better than some other monism.

And you must accept the implications. For example if will and intention are necessary attributes then Idealism implies determinism.

Any change that occurs through the agency of will and intent is by definition a determined event.

If there is any change that does not occur fully through will and intent then these are simply accidental properties and Idealism is false.

So if you accept Idealism you must necessarily subscribe to strong determinism.

Like the assumption that determinism is necessary in materialism, but impossible in Idealism?

Then I suggest that we accept his dictum.

A definition is even better. I see nothing in the concept of "mind" that implies "indetermism".

Certainly, but that applies equally to a materialist metaphysic.

What is your point? Is the Higgs Field your candidate for a phenomenon that is not ordered but also not disordered?

Or are you presenting it as evidence for your contention that a material universe must be necessarily deterministic?

And for a moment I thought we were actually communicating. Based on that mish-mash of unconnected and/or off-topic thoughts, obviously not.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The only way that people avoid agreeing with this is by making all sorts of uninformed comments about how QM has got nothing to do with metaphysics or consciousness.

...

No, I mean that materialism does not depend on science. Materialism is metaphysics. Science is science.

Geoff, I can see you eating your cake at the same time you're trying to lock it in the safe. Either metaphysics and science do not intersect, or they do. You are contradicting yourself when you say that QM is important to consciousness, while at the same time saying that the philosophy of mind is metaphysics and not science.

You do not hesitate to draw QM into the conversation, yet when I suggest that neuroscience will have an influence on the philosophy of perception, you constantly tell me that philosophers need not concern themselves. Interesting Ian did the same thing.

You have placed all of science except QM in the irrelevant pile. You keep QM because it's mysterious and so possibly useful in the promulgation of mysteriousness.

~~ Paul

 

[Robin]

Whew...then it's not me. I can understand philosophy just fine when you or Dennet speak it. I feel like geoff is saying, "if it feels like deja vu, it is deja vu"--and others are saying, "well, we know the brain mechanism behind deja vu and sometimes the "re-remember area" hits the bell so-to-speak before the "make a memory area does"--"some people even have permanent deja vu". And geoff responds "whatever--that doesn't mean my deja vu isn't real true deja vu of the mystical kind. Science can't explain my deja vu...because if you look at reductivism and monism and whateosreisfwism then it's both redundant and illogical, not to mention epistemontologicromulent...so it can't be true".

Is that what he's saying basically?

That's what it boils down to, right? Except substitute "dualism" for deja vu--or substitute "synchronicity" for deja vu--or even "woo", right? And what about hammy--can you translate him for us?

I don't think I can translate hammy. I don't think hammy can translate hammy.

 

[Robin]

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=54825

Ah yes, I do remember this one now that you mention it.

The problem is, as various people pointed out, that it all hangs off some pretty dodgy mathematics.

Not that there is anything wrong, in principle, with inventing a mathematical language and then drawing metaphysical conclusions from it.

But the inventor of this mathematics blithely alters the first Peano axiom and then uses other mathematical concepts as though they were not fundamentally invalidated by this step.

If he wants to monkey with the Peano axioms then he must create a completely new axiomatisation and I cannot see where he has done this.

I doubt that he could, it seems that his atomics are composites and in any case have circular definitions.

For example “1” is defined as {….-3,-2,0,1,2,3,…} so what does the “1” in that definition refer to?

So if your entire philosophy depends on this undefined (and probably undefinable ) mathematics then it is in pretty deep trouble.

 

[Robin]

And for a moment I thought we were actually communicating. Based on that mish-mash of unconnected and/or off-topic thoughts, obviously not.

Well of course they will look unconnected if you paste them in all together without the comments they were connected to.

What deep, deep trouble your position must be in to resort to such a dishonest tactic. I must have hit a nerve somewhere.

 

[hammegk]

I don't think I can translate hammy. I don't think hammy can translate hammy.

I apologise for my previous, unwarranted, response. Perhaps you were actually trying.

So....

That is right. Idealism is not the only metaphysic with deep logical problems. They all do.

This one is so far from out of left field, it throws me.

It must be nice to be able to form beliefs without evidence or reasoning. Stupid, but nice.

Followed by an insult.

Certainly I have stated often enough that all monism are equivalent.

Equivalent? If you care to define mind=body, life=death, energetic=inert, etcetc.

Once you accept the very reasonable assumptions "thinking exists" and "I am not the Solipsist" it follows logically that the objects we observe have an independent existence to our mental representations of them.

Well, not exactly, but ok; and applicable to any logically defensible monism.

Will and intention, being complex, are most likely accidental attributes.

What an odd juxtaposition of words having opposite meanings.

And that, metaphysically speaking, is just about all you can say. Otherwise we can only orient ourselves using a Machian or Positivist stance.

And I'd say we are in ground untrod -- in fact, unimagined -- by either Mach or The Positivists.

Certainly. For example if you accept Idealism you must give some reasons why it is better than some other monism.

Strange. Materialists don't seem compelled to do so, nor have I called it "better". I state, again, either position is a logical one, but I don't agree with the final implications materialism forces one to accept and defend.

And you must accept the implications. For example if will and intention are necessary attributes then Idealism implies determinism.

And I respond that not all questions worth asking are necessarily answered, or even clarified, by mathematization.

Any change that occurs through the agency of will and intent is by definition a determined event.

Again an unwarranted attempt at mathematization.

If there is any change that does not occur fully through will and intent then these are simply accidental properties and Idealism is false.

I disagree. Our perceptions of the macro world at human scale suggest the opposite.

So if you accept Idealism you must necessarily subscribe to strong determinism.

I agree a very very very large amount of the activities of reality interacting with reality are deterministic.

Like the assumption that determinism is necessary in materialism, but impossible in Idealism?

What part of materialism do you consider unmathematizable?

Then I suggest that we accept his dictum.

Atman=Brahman.

A definition is even better. I see nothing in the concept of "mind" that implies "indetermism".

You apparently enjoy a more ordered 'mind' than most ...

Certainly, but that applies equally to a materialist metaphysic.

Again, what part of materialism do you consider unmathematizable?

What is your point? Is the Higgs Field your candidate for a phenomenon that is not ordered but also not disordered?

In some sense, an inside joke, although some physicists refer to the Higgs boson as the 'god particle'.

Or are you presenting it as evidence for your contention that a material universe must be necessarily deterministic?

Nope. Your math does that for you. No need for me to.