Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, please, try not to shove opinions down my throat.

I wasn't referring to you at that point.

It's not obvious in any sense, until you tell me what intermediate processes are allowed for by direct realism. I've asked this about half a dozen times. The fact that there is no crisp answer is because direct/indirect realism falls on a spectrum.

I gave you the clearest answer I could. But direct and indirect realism definately do not fall on a spectrum. Direct realism is either true or it is not true.

I have no idea, and if you can't tell me, then we can agree to dismiss it.

No, I don't want to agree to dismiss it. I think it can be made sense of if we overhaul our concepts of mind and matter.

What is disjunctivism?

I explained that earlier:

Disjunctivism claims that the best we will ever be able to say is that EITHER we are directly perceiving an external object OR we are hallucinating said object. Where you go from there, or what this is supposed to mean, is the matter of heated debate amongst a small group of philosophers who are active in this area.

So how about I propose sensory realism? We perceive external objects, whatever ontological status they may have, through our senses, which are a set of brain processes that map external object characteristics onto neural firing patterns. Exactly how firing patterns give rise to feelings and perceptions is yet to be determined. BIV problem solved. Hallucination problem solved.

~~ Paul

This is all muddled.

"We perceive external objects, whatever ontological status they may have"

You have here specified the ontological status of the objects involved (they are external) and then added a qualifier which questions their ontological status. You can't specify them as external and then leave the door open for them not being external at all.

"through our senses, which are a set of brain processes that map external object characteristics onto neural firing patterns."

So what do we percieve? External objects or internal neural firing patterns? Or are you going to say that "external objects are neural firing patterns"?

"Sensory realism" is just a version of indirect realism with a new name, and suffers from all the same problems. There is no sense in which our perception of the objects is direct. It is not anywhere on a sliding scale towards direct realism. It is indirect realism, plain and simple. You just called it "sensory realism" instead of "sense data theory", of which it is a variant.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I gave you the clearest answer I could. But direct and indirect realism definately do not fall on a spectrum. Direct realism is either true or it is not true.

Except that we agree that intermediate process may or may not be involved. So it's not a dichotomy.

Disjunctivism claims that the best we will ever be able to say is that EITHER we are directly perceiving an external object OR we are hallucinating said object. Where you go from there, or what this is supposed to mean, is the matter of heated debate amongst a small group of philosophers who are active in this area.

Is this the actual definition? Of course we are either perceiving a "real" object, or hallucinating it, or seeing an illusion, or probably some other possibilities, too. Why is this an ontological issue?

You have here specified the ontological status of the objects involved (they are external) and then added a qualifier which questions their ontological status. You can't specify them as external and then leave the door open for them not being external at all.

I haven't specified the ontological status. I have simply pointed out the obvious: The objects are "external" to our conscious thought. Either they are really there, or they are being played on our senses, or they are the product of a Metamind, or whatever. But they are external to our consciousness.

So what do we percieve? External objects or internal neural firing patterns? Or are you going to say that "external objects are neural firing patterns"?

It depends how you define perceive. If you mean awareness of something, then it could be the external object or it could be something conjured up in our brains. If you mean perceived through the senses, then it is the external object as mapped by the senses.

One problem here is that perceive is a very complicated word.

"Sensory realism" is just a version of indirect realism with a new name, and suffers from all the same problems. There is no sense in which our perception of the objects is direct. It is not anywhere on a sliding scale towards direct realism.

Sure it is. It's direct realism with intermediate sensory processes. Or perhaps it's indirect realism. I do not know. And hey, I don't care.

~~ Paul

 

[DreadNiK]

Good afternoon to you too.

I couldn't possibly have made my beliefs any clearer than I did in the "woos making us the woos" thread. Indeed, a number of people commented favourably on just how clear the explanations were.

Ok, I probably didn't read that thread closely enough. I'll go have a look. Any chance you could approximate a page/post number for me?

Good afternoon. .

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Why do sense-data needs to be considered objects at all? Are the data in a computer considered objects?

Appeals to computationalism aren't going to help. Unless you can prove a computer is conscious, this is irrelevant. Computers do not have objects of perception.

This is even more muddled because experiences are considered objects. But certainly, neuroscience does have to explain our inner experiences.

They are considered to be things which exist. You are directly perceiving something. You see a monitor before you. Whatever that thing that seems to be in front of you is, you are directly perceiving it. Whether you want to call it "object" or "sense-datum" is the question being asked. Whatever you call it, it is a thing which actually exists.

If defined appropriately, why would a naturalist insist that their existence is incompatible with other science?

Because you mean "defined appropriately for the purposes of science" and this means denying they exist. You want to define "sense data" to be brain processes. But you also want to define external objects to be sense data. So you have ended up defining the objects of perception to be "brain processes". So in fact the only thing which turns out to exist, on the scientifically-appropriate definitions, is the brain process. At which point we appear to have lost the objects of perception, which have been defined out of existence by scientists who don't want to admit this is a philosophical problem.

This is all word-play based on the question of what we should call the feelings and images we obtain through experience. It boils down to the difficult problem of understanding how inner experience arises. No one argues that this problem isn't difficult.

Some people try to.

Yes, this area of philosophy makes the problem of what minds are very clear. Because it starts by trying to explain the "feelings and images we obtain through experience" it is very difficult to then simply pronounce that such things "do not exist", based solely on an argument from scientists which depends on assuming materialism is true. We cannot deny they exist. Not if we are sane, anyway. So we need to call them something, and "brain processes" isn't going to cut it this time. We already have something else called "brain processes" - brain processes. So we need to give the objects of perception a different name, and as soon as we do that, you know what happens next.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ok, I probably didn't read that thread closely enough. I'll go have a look. Any chance you could approximate a page/post number for me?

Good afternoon. .

It starts on the top of page 4.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Except that we agree that intermediate process may or may not be involved. So it's not a dichotomy.

Intermediate processes can still be allowed in direct realism. Just make sure that you aren't collapsing multiple things into one thing indiscriminately. You have to be very careful about what you mean. Your "sensory realism" contains no element of direct realism. There is no sense at all in which the objects you perceive can be the actual external objects.

Is this the actual definition?

Yes. That is why it is called disjunctivism. Its basic claim is a disjunct - "EITHER X OR Y".

Of course we are either perceiving a "real" object, or hallucinating it, or seeing an illusion, or probably some other possibilities, too. Why is this an ontological issue?

Because disjunctivism stops at the either/or statement. It also stops science from ever going beyond it either. It is the end of the line. We can say no more. Ever.

I haven't specified the ontological status. I have simply pointed out the obvious: The objects are "external" to our conscious thought.

How is that obvious? It's not obvious at all. According to your definitions the objects we actually percieve are brain processes (objects of perception = sense data = brain processes). But those cannot be external to conscious thought, because you just defined them as being identical to conscious thought. So those objects, the ones you can actually see, are not external.

Either they are really there, or they are being played on our senses, or they are the product of a Metamind, or whatever. But they are external to our consciousness.

You are still defending indirect realism. There is nothing direct about your position. You need to jump through many more hoops to get to direct realism. You have to find a way to refute the argument from hallucination and so far you haven't even tried. If what a BIV is [edit: directly] experiencing is not an external object (and it can't be, because they don't exist in this case) then what you are currently experiencing is not an external object either, unless you are a disjunctivist.

It depends how you define perceive. If you mean awareness of something, then it could be the external object or it could be something conjured up in our brains.

Are you trying to defend disjunctivism?

If you mean perceived through the senses, then it is the external object as mapped by the senses.

Which is indirect realism.

One problem here is that perceive is a very complicated word.

That is because perception is a complicated business.

Sure it is. It's direct realism with intermediate sensory processes.

No, you've got multiple objects collapsed on top of each other with no explanations or justifications. There is nothing direct about "sensory realism".

Or perhaps it's indirect realism. I do not know. And hey, I don't care.

~~ Paul

It is indirect realism.

 

[Belz...]

No, I have never defended dualism and I'm not defending it now. I am a neutral monist, not a dualist. I do not believe in individuated souls.

Then what ? A unified soul ? Is that your necessary beign ?

He isn't talking about that. He is talking about the origin of religion, the origin of self-conscious awareness. He links these two things with the arrival of language and of symbolic thought.

I thought we were talking about how humanity is doomed.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wow, this subject is tiring. I printed that paper you linked, Jeff, and I'll read it on my holiday over the next few days.

I believe that some of the terms we are using are poorly defined.

How is that obvious? It's not obvious at all. According to your definitions the objects we actually percieve are brain processes (objects of perception = sense data = brain processes). But those cannot be external to conscious thought, because you just defined them as being identical to conscious thought. So those objects, the ones you can actually see, are not external.

I guess I don't understand what an object of perception is. You seem to be saying that it is the feeling we have of an object, the mental image. But if this is the case, then why was direct realism ever invented in the first place? Obviously the mental image we have of the object is not the external object. What is direct realism?

Does object of perception mean the same thing as percept?

You are still defending indirect realism. There is nothing direct about your position. You need to jump through many more hoops to get to direct realism. You have to find a way to refute the argument from hallucination and so far you haven't even tried. If what a BIV is experiencing is not an external object (and it can't be, because they don't exist in this case) then what you are currently experiencing is not an external object either, unless you are a disjunctivist.

I don't care what the official name is. I'm begging you, once again, to stop cramming crap down my throat. Stop it!

What is the argument from hallucination?

I am experiencing, indirectly, an external object. The BIV is experience, indirectly, externals signals played on its senses. What is the problem?

~~ Paul

 

[DreadNiK]

It starts on the top of page 4.

Oh...I was looking way too far down...I'll go back...I did find something though...haven't been in a fit state to see if it really is as silly as it sounds, but either way...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wow, this subject is tiring.

Imagine what it is like to be A.D.Smith. He is a walking encyclopedia of everything ever written on this subject.

I printed that paper you linked, Jeff, and I'll read it on my holiday over the next few days.

Happy reading. And please don't Americanise my name.

I believe that some of the terms we are using are poorly defined.

There are arguments about what they mean and what they entail, sure. Plus lots of people think they know how to use the terms without spending enough time understanding what the positions entail.

I guess I don't understand what an object of perception is.

Don't worry. According to Smith, neither does anybody else.

You seem to be saying that it is the feeling we have of an object, the mental image.

That's what you want to call it. I am happy to call it an object of perception and point to it. I know I am directly percieving something I would naturally call "an object".

But if this is the case, then why was direct realism ever invented in the first place?Obviously the mental image we have of the object is not the external object.

To someone who has never thought about it properly and never taken LSD direct realism is the obvious starting point. It wasn't "invented". It was the default position.

What is direct realism?

In its naive form it is the pre-philosophical position that we start with. It is the natural way of thinking about things. In its philosophically-informed form it is a sophisticated attempt to provide a philosophical defence of something like the naive form. Smith himself has said "Many people will find it easier to assent to my system than to understand it." And he's not wrong. Lot's of people would be very happy to hear a coherent defence of direct realism, but understanding what it means will require reading a book.

Does object of perception mean the same thing as percept?

I don't know what "percept" means. Where did it come from? Was it in the article? Sounds like "sense datum".

I don't care what the official name is. I'm begging you, once again, to stop cramming crap down my throat. Stop it!

I'm sorry. I am not doing it on purpose.

What is the argument from hallucination?

The BIV argument. It's in the article you printed. You've heard it before from me.

I am experiencing, indirectly, an external object. The BIV is experience, indirectly, externals signals played on its senses. What is the problem?

You haven't explained what you are directly perceiving. It's in the article. You've explained what is being indirectly perceived, but that isn't what the argument is about. The argument from hallucination is an argument which tries to sink direct realism - and it does a rather good job of it. Smith's book is a novel attempt to refute the argument from hallucination so he can then pronounce that direct realism isn't necessarily false after all.

There's an extensive review of it available, if you fancy more holiday reading:

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/DRPC.htm

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You haven't explained what you are directly perceiving.

Perception is a process. It operates on data from the senses, which collect information from the external world. Somehow, not yet understood, it gives rise to internal feelings and images. So you tell me: What am I perceiving?

The argument from hallucination is an argument which tries to sink direct realism - and it does a rather good job of it.

I've spent the past hour reading various description of direct realism. I still don't understand it, but I agree that any version of it that does not allow for sensory intermediaries is sunk.

~~ Paul

 

[69dodge]

They are considered to be things which exist. You are directly perceiving something. You see a monitor before you. Whatever that thing that seems to be in front of you is, you are directly perceiving it. Whether you want to call it "object" or "sense-datum" is the question being asked. Whatever you call it, it is a thing which actually exists.
[...]
Yes, this area of philosophy makes the problem of what minds are very clear. Because it starts by trying to explain the "feelings and images we obtain through experience" it is very difficult to then simply pronounce that such things "do not exist", based solely on an argument from scientists which depends on assuming materialism is true. We cannot deny they exist. Not if we are sane, anyway.

Suppose you feel happy. Would you say there's a thing called "happiness", which you're feeling? The same way you say there's a thing called a "monitor-of-perception", which you're seeing?

I can deny that what you call "objects of perception" are things which actually exist, the same way that everyone denies that happiness is a thing which actually exists. Obviously, I do not deny that people sometimes are happy or that they sometimes perceive. But talking about happiness or about objects-of-perception as things that actually exist makes it seem like they are in some way independent of the person who is happy or who is perceiving, which they aren't. Without people who are happy, there is no happiness. Without people who perceive, there are no objects of perception. So it seems clearer to me simply to say "I'm happy" rather than to say ""there exists an emotion of happiness which I'm currently feeling". Unfortunately, there's no analogously clear way to say "I see a monitor". But that peculiarity of English syntax shouldn't prevent us from thinking about seeing a monitor the same way we think about being happy. In neither case is there any object that we are doing anything to, although the verb involved may be a transitive one; there is just us, being conscious.

 

[DreadNiK]

It starts on the top of page 4.

Ok I'm up with the whole synchronicities bit, but do you actually go on to tell us what specific synchronicities happened to you? I'm not going to spend ages trawling for something that isn't there.

 

[Belz...]

You are still defending indirect realism. There is nothing direct about your position. You need to jump through many more hoops to get to direct realism. You have to find a way to refute the argument from hallucination and so far you haven't even tried. If what a BIV is [edit: directly] experiencing is not an external object (and it can't be, because they don't exist in this case) then what you are currently experiencing is not an external object either, unless you are a disjunctivist.

Well, the brain in a vat wouldn't have the ability to tell the difference. Much like, when dreaming, we often have difficulty telling if it's a dream or not, though often some obvious discrepancy tips us off. The brain in a vat doesn't have that ability to make a comparison. We do.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Perception is a process. It operates on data from the senses, which collect information from the external world. Somehow, not yet understood, it gives rise to internal feelings and images. So you tell me: What am I perceiving?

You are percieving intentional objects. When you are veridically perceiving, then you are perceiving an intentional object which is also a real object. When you are hallucinating you are perceiving a merely intentional object.

I've spent the past hour reading various description of direct realism. I still don't understand it, but I agree that any version of it that does not allow for sensory intermediaries is sunk.

The subject of sensory intermediaries and how one might get rid of them is a central theme of Smith's book. Summarising it here is not going to be easy....

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Suppose you feel happy. Would you say there's a thing called "happiness", which you're feeling? The same way you say there's a thing called a "monitor-of-perception", which you're seeing?

I don't percieve happiness in the way I percieve objects. I perceive the happiness to be "internal". It's not "out there". But I percieve objects to be "out there" - seperate from myself. So the two cases are not the same. Equating perceptual objects and happiness is a false equivocation.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ok I'm up with the whole synchronicities bit, but do you actually go on to tell us what specific synchronicities happened to you?

No. There's no point.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, the brain in a vat wouldn't have the ability to tell the difference.

If this is so, then neither can you tell the difference. You could be a brain in a vat right now, and not know it.

Much like, when dreaming, we often have difficulty telling if it's a dream or not, though often some obvious discrepancy tips us off. The brain in a vat doesn't have that ability to make a comparison. We do.

How? How do you know you are not a brain in a vat on alpha centauri?

Dreaming is phenomenologically different to being awake. It feels different and weird **** happens. The brain in the vat would presumably feel normal and we could arrange it so no weird **** happens, since we are feeding it the signals.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You are percieving intentional objects. When you are veridically perceiving, then you are perceiving an intentional object which is also a real object. When you are hallucinating you are perceiving a merely intentional object.

And how does this relate to realism?

From Wikipedia:

Originally a concept from scholastic philosophy, intentionality was reintroduced in contemporary philosophy by the philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano in his work Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte. While often simplistically summarised as "aboutness" or the relationship between mental acts and the external world, Brentano defined it as one characteristic of "psychical phenomena" (psychische Phänomene), by which they could be distinguished from "physical phenomena" (physische Phänomene), using such phrases as "the relatedness to a content", the "direction towards an object", or "the immanent objectivity". Every psychical, or mental, phenomenon, every psychological act, has a content, and is directed at an object (the intentional object). Every belief, desire etc. has an object that it is about: the believed, the wanted. Brentano used the expression "intentional inexistence" to indicate the status of the objects of thought in the mind. The property of being intentional, of having an intentional object, was the key feature to distinguish psychical phenomena and physical phenomena, because physical phenomena lack intentionality altogether.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And how does this relate to realism?

From Wikipedia:



~~ Paul

You seem to have answered your own question.

Brentano and Husserl invented the term "intentionalism". Dennett has his own version, which scrambles it and makes it unintelligable. A.D.Smith has produced a new version of it. Smith is a Husserl scholar. I'm off to the pub.