No, the question is whether there is a "you" which is capable of choosing what "you" do.
What do you mean by "you"? Your brain or your "I"/soul?
No, that is not the question at all, unless my brain could cause me to do one thing and my soul simultaneously cause me to do the opposite. There was clearly only one thing I did.
Or unless my brain could believe one thing and my soul could believe the opposite. When I say "I believe" I am clearly referring to the "me" that believes. When I say "I do" I am clearly referring to some empirically verifiable action.
So the question still stands:
"Say I believe x is the right thing to do, but y is the thing that benefits me the most. Say that I believe that I ought to always do the right thing.
I might do x or y. But the question is, would there be a reason why I did one and not the other? "
If yes, then the will is deterministic.
If no, then the will is arbitrary.
If the belief is different then the moral framework is different.
It is still the same as what I said. If the moral framework is different then the action will be different.
What causes a wave? The wind, the water, the shape of the shore or the laws of physics?
In fact all together are the causes.
So the moral framework is a partial cause, as is the will.
The voluntary act is an act of will, the rational mind determines whether or not it was moral.
Rational minds do more than just determine morality. If an act is not what I have chosen to do using a rational process then it can hardly be called voluntary - can it?
Say I intend to drink my coffee and instead tip it over my head - would that be an act of free will? Not unless my hair just caught fire.
The empirical/deterministic one.
So just a hypothetical world then?
Depends what you mean by deterministic. I never lose. I am the duracell bunny.
Well then you have a problem because I am not Eveready Heavy Duty. I am the Energiser battery - I always win.
I mean by deterministic that there is potentially some mathematical expression (or process) that could always predict the result of the process, given sufficient variables with sufficient accuracy. Note that the mathematics might be beyond anything a human was capable of defining.
You see? When I use a word I know what it means.
I cannot establish a consistent meaning of it because the physicalists themselves use it in more than one way.
So you can use a word as part of your argument, but you don't have to define it because there is somebody somewhere in the world that uses it in more than one way. Right?
You don't need to establish a consistent meaning of it, you only need to tell me what meaning it has when
you use it.
I have my own understanding of what "physical" means - it is the world of the objects of perception.
And is this the sense in which you are using it in your replies to me? Is this the sense in which you are using it in the OP?
OK, "materialism" refers to the objects of perception. "physical" means whatever the physicalist means by "physical".
I have given you chapter on verse. You are always setting us homework - I have set you some. You are not telling me that your University does not have Ayer's "Philosophy in the Twentieth Century" in it's library?
But as I always point out it would make no sense for a materialist to pre-define what "physical" means. A materialist would presumably regard science as the best method of describing reality and science is constantly redefining what physical means - that is essentially what science does.
Rather it is you - who are suggesting that there is some sort of definable border for what science can and can't do, who should provide a definition of physical.
Again, you are suggesting that the mind/body problem is in a whole different category to problems like, for example, gravity. You cast this in terms of experience being something other than physical. So it is in your court to define what you mean by physical.
If physical has no meaning then there is no mind/body problem.