Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, you have a tendency to bring up complex ideas that we have discussed before as if the discussion never occurred. Do you care to define direct and indirect realism? In your definitions, please deal with this issue mentioned at Wikipedia:

Also, please specify the nature of the internal representations that indirect dualism posits.

~~ Paul

I've no idea what "indirect dualism" is.

Direct realism is simply the claim that the objects of perception and the objects comprising the external world are the same objects. When you point to the monitor in front of you and say "that one", you are pointing to an object of perception. The direct realist claims that you are also pointing to a mind-independent self-existent object of the type which reality is made of.

Indirect realism is the claim that you can never directly percieve mind-independent objects and that instead you directly percieve "sense data" or "mental images". These are claimed to be indirect representations of the real external objects.

The definitions of these terms need to be understood within the context of the argument from hallucination against direct realism. In other words, you need to provide an explanation of in what ontological category you would place the objects perceived by a brain in a vat. You then need to explain how this situation is the same or different from the case of veridical perception. It is important that you think about the implications of this argument rather than just trying to find a way to tinker with the definitions to make direct realism work.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh, it's an equal sign (=). You just shouldn't be using one in your "equation."

~~ Paul

Why not?

 

[Belz...]

Good luck building a wall with nothing but bricks.....

Well you fell right into that one, didn't you ?

Building walls with no mortar HAS been done before, and the wall still stands after, what, a few centuries...

Doomed, yes.

http://www.well.com/~jct/ntbook3.htm

I'm sorry. I didn't realise this guy's opinion made it all true. Seriously, everything is doomed, but I don't see any reason why we're on a path to self-anihilation. If we believed those who said that in 1950 the world would've ended in the 60s.

Them being concious.

Oh. Well, do you agree with me, now ? I'm confused.

Kant isn't superior to all others. He is just superior to large numbers of people at the JREF who don't know anything about philosophy and would benefit from reading about Kant.

Well, that's what I said. I hate it when people do that.

 

[Belz...]

But this is exactly what is necessary - or at least there must be some sort of struggle going on where your will/soul is try to cause yiu to do one thing and your brain is trying to cause you to do the other.

Yes, only one of them can win the struggle. It's usually the brain.

Well isn't that interesting ? Are we talking about dualism, now ? Spirit vs body ?

Back in the middle-ages we go!

 

[DreadNiK]

Kant isn't superior to all others. He is just superior to large numbers of people at the JREF who don't know anything about philosophy and would benefit from reading about Kant.

Perhaps your meaningless ravings that you call philosophy in an attempt to justify your woo beliefs that your refuse to clarify puts people off reading him, since you are so enamoured by him.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Direct realism is simply the claim that the objects of perception and the objects comprising the external world are the same objects. When you point to the monitor in front of you and say "that one", you are pointing to an object of perception. The direct realist claims that you are also pointing to a mind-independent self-existent object of the type which reality is made of.

Indirect realism also says that I am pointing to a mind-independent object, at least according to this discussion:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/perc-obj.htm

The indirect realist agrees that the coffee cup exists independently of me. However, through perception I do not directly engage with this cup; there is a perceptual intermediary that comes between it and me.

I'm not sure the pointing thing is relevant.

Indirect realism is the claim that you can never directly percieve mind-independent objects and that instead you directly percieve "sense data" or "mental images". These are claimed to be indirect representations of the real external objects.

Now, on this page:

http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache...bject+of+perception"&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=5

While the direct realist picture does presuppose the existence of the objects
mentioned in ordinary perception reports, the indirect sense-datum theories
need not, which leads to a further distinction:

--We could suggest that, in perception, though the direct object of percep-
tion is a sense data, that sense data is an experience of a really existing
thing, a dog. This is an indirect or representational realism: the existence
and nature external objects is represented in perception, and inferred
from canonical perceptual experiences. (Price, Grice, Jackson)

--On the other hand, we could claim that external objects are not repre-
sented in perception at all; and hence that the objects mentioned in ordi-
nary perception reports are not external and independent of experience,
as they might seem, but rather are constructed out of the raw material of
the immediate objects of perception. This position is known as phenom-
enalism. (Berkeley, Ayer)

If we consider indirect realism, it makes direct realism seem silly. Of course I am perceiving the external object through my senses and its representation of the object. There is no way to experience the object directly. So I claim that direct realism, if it says there are no intermediates at all, is nonsensical.

I do not understand the definition of phenomenalism given above. However, I think the real distinction here is between direct realism/representationalism and phenomenalism.

Now, what does this have to do with BIVs and hallucination?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why not?

Because you recently stated that the equation is a metaphor, not actual math. The equal sign does not mean "equal."

~~ Paul

 

[Tricky]

Building walls with no mortar HAS been done before, and the wall still stands after, what, a few centuries...

Plus there's Lego blocks...

 

[Belz...]

Plus there's Lego blocks...

Gotta love those.

Geoff, this is the wall I was refering to. I DO believe there's no mortar involved:

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'm sorry. I didn't realise this guy's opinion made it all true. Seriously, everything is doomed, but I don't see any reason why we're on a path to self-anihilation. If we believed those who said that in 1950 the world would've ended in the 60s.

He isn't talking about that. He is talking about the origin of religion, the origin of self-conscious awareness. He links these two things with the arrival of language and of symbolic thought.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well isn't that interesting ? Are we talking about dualism, now ? Spirit vs body ?

Back in the middle-ages we go!

No, I have never defended dualism and I'm not defending it now. I am a neutral monist, not a dualist. I do not believe in individuated souls.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Perhaps your meaningless ravings that you call philosophy in an attempt to justify your woo beliefs that your refuse to clarify puts people off reading him, since you are so enamoured by him.

Good afternoon to you too.

I couldn't possibly have made my beliefs any clearer than I did in the "woos making us the woos" thread. Indeed, a number of people commented favourably on just how clear the explanations were.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If we consider indirect realism, it makes direct realism seem silly. Of course I am perceiving the external object through my senses and its representation of the object. There is no way to experience the object directly. So I claim that direct realism, if it says there are no intermediates at all, is nonsensical.

And many other people, including most of a scientific persuasion, will also naturally be drawn to indirect realism precisely because they cannot find a way to defend direct realism. But if you are going to defend indirect realism then you have to claim that the things which you are directly aware of, the objects of perception are in fact "sense data" or something along those lines - they are not the external objects themselves. Is this the position you would seek to defend? It leads to dualism, as explained in the article you linked to.

I do not understand the definition of phenomenalism given above. However, I think the real distinction here is between direct realism/representationalism and phenomenalism.

Direct realism is incompatible with representationalism. Phenomenalism is something else again. I think phenomenalism is generally accepted to have failed. Not many people try to defend it.

Now, what does this have to do with BIVs and hallucination?
~~ Paul

Because the argument from hallucination against direct realism is a real bastard to refute. A BIV is experiencing a world of objects, but it can be arranged very easily so that the objects the BIV is perceiving are known to be non-existent. Given that the experiences of the BIV are phenomenologically indistinguishable from normal veridical experiences, one might reasonably assume that whatever the ontological status you assign to the objects percieved by a BIV you must also assign to the objects experienced during veridical perception. If the BIV experiences "mental images" or "sense data" then this must also be the case for the veridical perceiver. Hence, direct realism must be false. This is an active area of metaphysics. There is currently a growing number of philosophers defending the truly weird position known as "disjunctivism". Disjunctivism claims that the best we will ever be able to say is that EITHER we are directly perceiving an external object OR we are hallucinating said object. Where you go from there, or what this is supposed to mean, is the matter of heated debate amongst a small group of philosophers who are active in this area. There is one other alternative, which is the one supplied by A.D.Smith in 2002 in the book "The Problem of Perception." This is a revolutionary defence of direct realism, but it's conclusions are even more obscure than those of disjunctivism. Smith defends a new formulation of a position known as intentionalism.

There is a good article on this on the Stanford website which explains what I've been talking about in this post in much more detail.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And many other people, including most of a scientific persuasion, will also naturally be drawn to indirect realism precisely because they cannot find a way to defend direct realism. But if you are going to defend indirect realism then you have to claim that the things which you are directly aware of, the objects of perception are in fact "sense data" or something along those lines - they are not the external objects themselves. Is this the position you would seek to defend? It leads to dualism, as explained in the article you linked to.

I might try to defend direct realism if I understood what it was. What do philosophers mean when they say I am perceiving an object directly? Are intermediate sensory systems allowed?

Indirect realism only leads to dualism if I try to endow "objects of perception" with a separate existence. In fact, the very term implies a separate existence. Do philosophers mean to imply that?

Because the argument from hallucination against direct realism is a real bastard to refute. A BIV is experiencing a world of objects, but it can be arranged very easily so that the objects the BIV is perceiving are known to be non-existent. Given that the experiences of the BIV are phenomenologically indistinguishable from normal veridical experiences, one might reasonably assume that whatever the ontological status you assign to the objects percieved by a BIV you must also assign to the objects experienced during veridical perception.

Why? Would you feel the need to do this in any circumstance where two different things map onto the same target thing?

Disjunctivism claims that the best we will ever be able to say is that EITHER we are directly perceiving an external object OR we are hallucinating said object.

This implies that direct realism allows for sensory intermediates, unless these philosophers are claiming that I experience a chair absolutely directly with no intermediates.

This is all a complete jumble precisely due to philosophers thinking of awareness as being aware of a thing, rather than thinking of awareness as a process.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is what is wrong with indirect realism:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem

Another influential objection to sense-data, rarely explicitly stated, but present in the background of much discussion, comes from the prevailing naturalism of contemporary philosophy. Naturalism (or physicalism) says that the world is entirely physical in its nature: everything there is supervenes on the physical, and is governed by physical law. Most sense-data theorists are committed to the claim that sense-data are mind-dependent: objects whose existence depends on the existence of states of mind. If the sense-data theory is to be consistent with naturalism, then it has to explain how an object can be brought into existence by the existence of an experience, and how this is supposed to be governed by physical law. These entities not only seem to be an unnecessary addition to the naturalistic world picture, but from a naturalistic perspective the mechanisms which determine how these entities behave are obscure. Naturalists may concede that there is nothing actually incoherent in the very idea of these objects, but they will insist that their existence is incompatible with other things we have learned from science about the natural world. Many contemporary sense-data theorists, however, will not be moved by this kind of criticism, since they are happy to accept the rejection of naturalism as a consequence of their sense-data theory (see Robinson 1994, Foster 2000).

Even though naturalistic people are drawn to indirect realism after realising that they can't defend direct realism, as you seem to be, it actually causes all sorts of problems for naturalism. It lays bare the mind-body problem starkly and unavoidably. The bolded sentence is the crux of so many recent arguments here. To preserve the coherence of naturalism, it looks like you have to claim that sense-data can't really exist. In previous discussions this has led to eliminative materialism, but eliminative materialism is now even harder to defend than ever. This branch of philosophy starts from the objects of perception - it is those things you percieve that we set out to look for an explanation of. Eliminative materialism eliminates them. It doesn't explain them at all - it just denies they exist. Not surprisingly, eliminative materialism doesn't get much of a look-in in this branch of philosophy. It is only ever mentioned in in passing and it is dismissed as not worthy of consideration. To accept eliminativism as answer would basically be to dismiss this entire branch of philosophy (the philosophy of perception) as a complete waste of time because it is trying to provide a philosophical explanation of something which does not exist!

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I might try to defend direct realism if I understood what it was. What do philosophers mean when they say I am perceiving an object directly? Are intermediate sensory systems allowed?

In some sense, yes. Since it would be impossible to deny that our eyes are involved somewhere along the line, the must be an implication that whatever is meant by "direct realism" it is capable of being reconciled with the fact that we have eyes. I understand your difficulty with this. In order for us to be directly aware of objects in an external world, some sort of radical reconception of our normal ideas about reality would have to occur. It would require some sort of concept of an "extended mind", where the concept of mind has been expanded in some way, but in a way that avoids outright idealism.

Indirect realism only leads to dualism if I try to endow "objects of perception" with a separate existence. In fact, the very term implies a separate existence. Do philosophers mean to imply that?

See previous post.

Why? Would you feel the need to do this in any circumstance where two different things map onto the same target thing?

How many "things" have we got here?

I don't really understand your question, unless you are defending disjunctivism.

This is all a complete jumble precisely due to philosophers thinking of awareness as being aware of a thing, rather than thinking of awareness as a process.

~~ Paul

See previous post. Eliminativism isn't really an option to people this deeply involved in a philosophical debate about the very things that eliminativism eliminates.

 

[articulett]

Does anyone else understand what he's saying. Is there any evidence anywhere that dualists are more moral than those of us in the rational world? Weren't the 911 hijackers dualists? So many words utilized and played with--so little said. So where exactly is the morality from all this dualism...I am failing to see it. And, more to the point, is there any evidence for this persistent belief--or is it just a mish mash of ideas and words and old articles that are just "philosophy" or "poetry" that seems deep to some people. I would imagine that my moral behavior is on par or perhaps even above par than my fellow humans--I certainly have never purposely hurt anyone--I even don't like bugs to suffer--I take them outside or smash them fast or I feel guilty--even without a soul or a belief in god or any of that. I donate blood regularly and teach people how to teach themselves. I think that's a lot more moral than trying to convince yourself and others that your woo is the true woo. Evidence is what counts here, isn't it? Otherwise, what's to distinguish one claim from another.

The people of North Korea are told their leader is a demi-god born under two rainbows and a star on a mountaintop--they are taught that Americans are evil--and I'm sure this "truth" is as obvious to them as justgeoff's truth is to him. So what. Millions of people have some fairtytale they believe with conviction. But why are people so eager to preach stuff that has not a scintilla of evidence behind it? Is it to convince themselves--or does it make them think they are doing moral "good deeds"?

Heck, Mormons baptize by proxy for the dead--they even baptized Ann Frank. Does it mean anything in the real world? What good is all this conjecture and pontificating if one has faith and conviction in his rightness without evidence? And why should people on this forum care about what justgeoff believes is true? Why is it that those most in need of learning seem to be the ones preaching with such conviction. Faith is a recipe for ignorance, and I'm beginning to think philosophy might be too. I am amazed about how little he comprehends and how sure he is that he is "onto" something deep.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul,

It is interesting that you reject direct realism so forcefully. We all start out as naive direct realists. Many of my loudest and most persistent critics are surely direct realists of this sort. If you don't think about it very hard, it is the default/obvious position to defend. But as soon as you give it some proper thought you find it is not so easy to figure out how direct realism could possibly be true. What on earth could it mean? The next port of call is always going to be indirect realism, but indirect realism has a whole load of problems of its own. The people involved in the current debate and defending indirect realism are not naturalists. They are theists. Where next does the naturalist go? Anti-realism is like the ant-lion at the bottom of the slippery slope, to be avoided at all costs unless you are happy with supernaturalism. We are running out of alternatives......and over the hill come the cavalry, waving a banner saying "disjunctivism!". So most of the current debate revolves around what disjunctivism entails and whether it makes any more sense than the other failed positions. Into this mess then comes A.D.Smith in a book where he confidently announces that he has solved the underlying problem by finding a new way to defend direct realism. The trouble being that understanding the implications of Smith's solution to the problem is not exactly easy either, and may not be any more to the naturalists liking than any of the other positions. My own opinion, for what it's worth, is that A.D.Smith may have provided half of an answer, but that the other half needs to come from somewhere else. Possibly somebody like Penrose may be able to provide the other half of the answer.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Most sense-data theorists are committed to the claim that sense-data are mind-dependent: objects whose existence depends on the existence of states of mind.

Why do sense-data needs to be considered objects at all? Are the data in a computer considered objects?

If the sense-data theory is to be consistent with naturalism, then it has to explain how an object can be brought into existence by the existence of an experience, and how this is supposed to be governed by physical law.

This is even more muddled because experiences are considered objects. But certainly, neuroscience does have to explain our inner experiences.

These entities not only seem to be an unnecessary addition to the naturalistic world picture, but from a naturalistic perspective the mechanisms which determine how these entities behave are obscure.

Then abandon the idea that perception creates entities in the brain.

Naturalists may concede that there is nothing actually incoherent in the very idea of these objects, but they will insist that their existence is incompatible with other things we have learned from science about the natural world.

If defined appropriately, why would a naturalist insist that their existence is incompatible with other science?

This is all word-play based on the question of what we should call the feelings and images we obtain through experience. It boils down to the difficult problem of understanding how inner experience arises. No one argues that this problem isn't difficult.

To preserve the coherence of naturalism, it looks like you have to claim that sense-data can't really exist.

For certainy folksy definitions of sense data, yes. For example, there is no movie screen in the brain.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It is interesting that you reject direct realism so forcefully. We all start out as naive direct realists. Many of my loudest and most persistent critics are surely direct realists of this sort. If you don't think about it very hard, it is the default/obvious position to defend.

Geoff, please, try not to shove opinions down my throat. It's not obvious in any sense, until you tell me what intermediate processes are allowed for by direct realism. I've asked this about half a dozen times. The fact that there is no crisp answer is because direct/indirect realism falls on a spectrum.

But as soon as you give it some proper thought you find it is not so easy to figure out how direct realism could possibly be true. What on earth could it mean?

I have no idea, and if you can't tell me, then we can agree to dismiss it.

... and over the hill come the cavalry, waving a banner saying "disjunctivism!". So most of the current debate revolves around what disjunctivism entails and whether it makes any more sense than the other failed positions.

What is disjunctivism?

So how about I propose sensory realism? We perceive external objects, whatever ontological status they may have, through our senses, which are a set of brain processes that map external object characteristics onto neural firing patterns. Exactly how firing patterns give rise to feelings and perceptions is yet to be determined. BIV problem solved. Hallucination problem solved.

~~ Paul