Materialists......

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If this is taken as an identity statement, then it can only be interpreted as meaning "materialism is true". It logically entails that materialism is true. If any other ontological position is true, you cannot make this claim. So, yes, it is an implied (logically) ontological claim.

It seems to me it implies a monism, but not a specific one. (I agree it rules out dualism, at least of the classic mind/material sort.) Even under idealism, mind might be a brain process. The question is: What is a brain process?

No. Not if the answer was "brain processes are interactions of chemicals and electrical charge in squishy grey meat." That's just another identity statement like the weather example. It doesn't imply any ontological position. It's true under all of them.

Yes, but that just pushes the question down to: What are chemicals and electrical charges? Which ultimately pushes down to: What are things? And that's the ultimate ontological question, isn't it?

The ultimate question about monism is: What is the essential, fundamental existent? All this chit-chat about mind, brain, electrical charges, rocks, etc., are just categorizations in terms of the fundamental entity.

That is, unless you insist that ontology = philosophy of mind. Unless you insist that mind is the only category of thing that really matters.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It seems to me it implies a monism, but not a specific one.

In that case you should be equally happy with the statement "brain processes are nothing over and above minds"

(I agree it rules out dualism, at least of the classic mind/material sort.) Even under idealism, mind might be a brain process. The question is: What is a brain process?

I already answered that.

Yes, but that just pushes the question down to: What are chemicals and electrical charges? Which ultimately pushes down to: What are things? And that's the ultimate ontological question, isn't it?

Something like that. Sooner or later you end up asking "what does it mean to be?" "What is existence?" "How do the different things which exist relate to each other?" "How does beingness relate to nothingness?"

 

[hammegk]

It seems to me it implies a monism, but not a specific one.

I agree 100%.

Unless you insist that mind is the only category of thing that really matters.

No one is insisting anything, just pointing out that for some of us, idealism is a more logical "choice" to defend than is materialism. Either position can be defended logically, but materialism at less than 100% certainty is dualism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

In that case you should be equally happy with the statement "brain processes are nothing over and above minds"

No, because there are brain processes that have nothing to do with mind, for just about any definition of mind we could conjure up.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No one is insisting anything, just pointing out that for some of us, idealism is a more logical "choice" to defend than is materialism. Either position can be defended logically, but materialism at less than 100% certainty is dualism.

I think if you really ponder it, you'll find that idealism can slip into dualism just as easily. You have to come up with the mechanism that differentiates minds and keeps the "external world" consistent for everyone. Once you do that, it's pretty easy for your individual mind to split apart from the external world and dualism slithers in.

In fact, it's easier for me to keep out dualism with materialism than with idealism. That's because materialism has nothing like a "disembodied mind" to begin with, whereas idealism does. So then idealism has to fold the external world into the mind to make sure it doesn't end up with two fundamental existents. Tough work if you can get it.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

I think if you really ponder it, you'll find that idealism can slip into dualism just as easily.

Sorry, but no. The most basic attribute of choosing the monism idealism is that dualism becomes impossible.

What we perceive as matter/energy is the meaningless epiphenomena of ~material 'thinking' (and we agree that 'thinking' becomes more complex when a neural system is involved).

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Sorry, but no. The most basic attribute of choosing the monism idealism is that dualism becomes impossible.

So you say, yet you cannot describe the mechanism that keeps the "meaningless epiphenomena" consistent for everyone. The very use of the term "meaningless epiphenomena" seems to be contradicted by that consistency.

(and we agree that 'thinking' becomes more complex when a neural system is involved).

Well sure, if you try to explain how thinking works, it will seem more complex than if you just elide the entire explanation by claiming it's a fundamental existent.

Stating that something is a fundamental existent does not explain it, nor does it explain the associated details.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I agree 100%.


No one is insisting anything, just pointing out that for some of us, idealism is a more logical "choice" to defend than is materialism. Either position can be defended logically, but materialism at less than 100% certainty is dualism.

This demonstrates the situation quite clearly. Idealists have no problem being 100% idealists. They have no need to keep sneaking materialistic concepts in. They simply state that physical things at things which occur in minds. But the materialists can't do this. Nearly all of them, when pushed, start wobbling on their absolutism.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No, because there are brain processes that have nothing to do with mind, for just about any definition of mind we could conjure up.

~~ Paul

Not true. If idealism is true, all brain processes are really things in minds. Does that sort of reasoning sound familiar?

 

[Belz...]

Correctly stated: brains are a neccesary condition for minds. There can be no mind without a brain. "first" usually implies temporal priority - you mean logical prioirity.

Very well. We're in agreement.

Then I have to respond that I'm not sure what you mean by "minds ARE brain processes". If "ARE" doesn't mean anything, then neither does that statement.

I'll take that as a dodge. Obviously, I didn't mean that the verb "to be" means nothing, but that the QUESTION "What IS this" might very well be.

That is an over-simplistic view of the situation. Philosophy is capable of discussing topics like "Being" at great length, and giving answers worth considering. It is capable of analysing concepts and how they relate to each other.

Yes, but it can't give any objective answer to empirical questions.

If you think that that is its logical conclusion, then I think it can be rejected as a reductio ad absurdum.

Perhaps. However, I'd like someone to explain to me why, if the observed universe is suspect, the mind itself isn't.

But you are still mixing up what we percieve with what self-exists.

No I'm not. I'm pointing out that you MUST have a working assumption in order to go anywhere. The thought that the universe isn't real leads to nothing, therefore the only other alternative is materialism, unless you can propose some other assumption.

We do not necessarily percieve the self-existent universe. The claim that we do is a claim of direct realism. Direct realism is very, very hard to defend. You have to figure out how to respond to the argument from hallucination against direct realism.

Of course, but that's not what I'm saying. I'm not saying that what you see is what you get. I'm just saying that the observed universe exists, that there are ways to figure out how it works, and that questions such as "why" or "what" might not be meaningful.

Imagine a brain in a vat, being fed data exactly the same as your nerves are feeding you data now. You would be experiencing exactly what you are experiencing now - perceiving a world of objects. However, none of those objects would actually exist. So if in the case of the brain in a vat, the objects being perceived are mere "sense data" or "mental images" what justifies you in saying that right now you are perceiving anything more than "sense data" or "mental images"?

Leading back to choice A) assuming that the universe doesn't exist, which leads us nowhere. It's a bare possibility, but it's a worthless assumption.

 

[Belz...]

No, that's not true either. It suffers from a similar, but less serious, problem. It's an over-simplification, and it raises all sorts of questions. Where are colours? In your mind? In the object? In the light waves?

All of the above. The "mind" interprets it in a certain way, but that is wholly dependent of the light waves emitted BY the object, along with other environmental conditions, in addition to the brain processes themselves.

It's not that they have a hard time, Belz.

Don't they ? I know _I_ do! It's hard to accept that your mind is really just a deterministic chemical process. But follow the evidence we must.

The scientists tend to reject the philosophy without understanding the relevance of that philosophy.

That's because the philosophy doesn't fit well into their equations, and for good reasons.

 

[Belz...]

Something like that. Sooner or later you end up asking "what does it mean to be?" "What is existence?" "How do the different things which exist relate to each other?" "How does beingness relate to nothingness?"

Maybe it doesn't. Maybe nothingness is impossible.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'll take that as a dodge. Obviously, I didn't mean that the verb "to be" means nothing, but that the QUESTION "What IS this" might very well be.

It is not meaningless to ask what the word "is" means in a situation when you are saying "X is Y". It should be possible to clearly specify what is meant by "is" in this case.

Yes, but it can't give any objective answer to empirical questions.

Generally, it doesn't even try to.

Perhaps. However, I'd like someone to explain to me why, if the observed universe is suspect, the mind itself isn't.

Because the mind is directly known to you. You can only infer the existence of an external world. You do this via a process of apparently perceiving other humans, reasoning that they are like you and must have minds of their own. You do not need to infer that your own mind exists. It is a brute fact if ever there was one.

No I'm not. I'm pointing out that you MUST have a working assumption in order to go anywhere. The thought that the universe isn't real leads to nothing, therefore the only other alternative is materialism, unless you can propose some other assumption.

I can propose neutral monism. I can propose transcendental idealism. Both positions imply empirical realism. Both deny materialism.

Of course, but that's not what I'm saying. I'm not saying that what you see is what you get. I'm just saying that the observed universe exists, that there are ways to figure out how it works, and that questions such as "why" or "what" might not be meaningful.

Well, this statement is compatible with all sorts of positions, not just materialism.

Leading back to choice A) assuming that the universe doesn't exist, which leads us nowhere. It's a bare possibility, but it's a worthless assumption.

I think you are underestimating the wealth of non-materialistic positions and how they relate to empirical realism. You seem to have dismissed everything but materialism as not worth consideration on the grounds that if you reject materialism you have no other option but solipsism.

 

[Belz...]

It is not meaningless to ask what the word "is" means in a situation when you are saying "X is Y". It should be possible to clearly specify what is meant by "is" in this case.

But You're the one who asked the question "what IS it?". I'm telling you the question is meaningless, and now we're playing semantics with the word "to be". Well... now that I think about it, I don't think the verb "to be" has any real meaning. It connects words together, but it doesn't really mean much, does it ? Unless you take it to mean "exists", but then you can't just switch them in the sentence (What is it), can you ?

Because the mind is directly known to you.

No... my mind is experienced by me. For all I know, my very thoughts and my consciousness could be part of the simulation. Again, SOMETHING has to be real, but doubting the universe leads me to doubt my mind as well. Personally, I've never thought of my mind as distinct from material things.

I can propose neutral monism. I can propose transcendental idealism. Both positions imply empirical realism. Both deny materialism.

Too many terms. Care to define the first two ?

Well, this statement is compatible with all sorts of positions, not just materialism.

How so ? Because you think materialism claims to be able to tell you what something "is" ?

I think you are underestimating the wealth of non-materialistic positions and how they relate to empirical realism. You seem to have dismissed everything but materialism as not worth consideration on the grounds that if you reject materialism you have no other option but solipsism.

Something must exist.

 

[hammegk]

Something must exist.

Why yes, it must. Thought exists, for example, even if The Solipsist is The Answer, or if "we" are brains-in-vats, or, under any and every possibility -- except for 100% materialism under which "thought" is a verb just like "walking"..

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But You're the one who asked the question "what IS it?". I'm telling you the question is meaningless, and now we're playing semantics with the word "to be". Well... now that I think about it, I don't think the verb "to be" has any real meaning. It connects words together, but it doesn't really mean much, does it?

From the point of view of philosophy, it is the single most important word in the english language. But in a way, you are right. According to Hegel, pure undifferentiated being is indistinguishable from absolute nothingness. So he sort of agrees with you about the concept of beingness. However, this is a long way from being an irrelevant minor observation. This is crucial for understanding lots of other problems.

It is used to connect words together in all different manners - and most of the time the connection can be specified using some other word. That is what E-Prime is about - a version of english which abolishes all forms of the verb "to be". In the case of "minds are brains", you aren't going to be able to translate it into E-Prime without running into difficulties. This usually indicates that you've said something unclear or meaningless.

No... my mind is experienced by me.

Which is why you can hardly deny it exists.

Too many terms. Care to define the first two ?

Neutral monism is the claim that everything exists is of one type, but that it is neither mind nor matter. It merely manifests to us in a way that seems dualistic.

Transcendental idealism is the claim that we can never know the nature of "things in themselves", we can only ever know the world as it is experienced by us. It therefore denies both materialism and idealism as attempts at transcendent knowledge - claims to have knowledge which transcends the world of experience. Materialism, idealism and dualism are all forms of transcendental realism. Neutral monism is in a slightly different category, since it is a form of transcendental realism which can be viewed as descended from transcendental idealism.

Any clearer?

Empirical realism is the claim that the empirical world is real. EMPIRICALLY real, not transcendentally real. It's real to us.

How so ? Because you think materialism claims to be able to tell you what something "is" ?

Correct. Materialism is claim about the nature of "ultimate reality". It is a claim that "what really is" is the world of matter.

Something must exist.

Sure.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Not true. If idealism is true, all brain processes are really things in minds. Does that sort of reasoning sound familiar?

Yeah, that's fine. But we were talking about monisms in general. Under any monism, it could be the case that minds are brain processes. That does not make minds the same thing as brain processes, because under some monisms (materialism) there are brain processes that have nothing to do with minds (however that word might be defined).

This demonstrates the situation quite clearly. Idealists have no problem being 100% idealists. They have no need to keep sneaking materialistic concepts in. They simply state that physical things at things which occur in minds. But the materialists can't do this. Nearly all of them, when pushed, start wobbling on their absolutism.

Bah humbug. They can state that physical things are things that occur in minds, but not things that occur in conscious minds. So now we have the split between conscious experience and the nonconscious "external world." Both idealists and materialists have to be careful not to let this split lead to dualism.

The reason that materialists may appear to wobble more than idealists is because materialists are generally trying to figure out how things work, while idealists are dumping all the complicated stuff into the sewer of Mind.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why yes, it must. Thought exists, for example, even if The Solipsist is The Answer, or if "we" are brains-in-vats, or, under any and every possibility -- except for 100% materialism under which "thought" is a verb just like "walking"

But here you are lumping so much under "thought" and then blithely ignoring the details. Thoughts exist. So do experiences of what appears to be things external to the thinker. So does a consistency among the experiences of the thinkers. And that consistency does not require thinking on the part of the thinkers.

It sounds so simple if you don't actually try to explain it.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Neutral monism is the claim that everything exists is of one type, but that it is neither mind nor matter. It merely manifests to us in a way that seems dualistic.

So we have the world as we experience it. Some things seem material, other things seem mental.

materialism: it's all material
neutral monism: it's all foo
idealism: it's all mental

Either we need empirical evidence in favor of one of these, or we need a logical argument. We ain't getting the first. The second hasn't appeared after millennia of cogitation on the matter.

I call equivalency.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So we have the world as we experience it. Some things seem material, other things seem mental.

materialism: it's all material
neutral monism: it's all foo
idealism: it's all mental

Either we need empirical evidence in favor of one of these, or we need a logical argument. We ain't getting the first. The second hasn't appeared after millennia of cogitation on the matter.

Perhaps it has appeared repeatedly, but didn't get noticed in the heat of the battle going on around it? You can reach the answer, IMO, via a process of elimination. Materialism is absurd because it effectively denies that minds exist. Idealism is absurd because it effectively denies that matter exists. That only leaves one option. Neutral monism recognises both, but resists the temptation to claim either of them are themselves the ultimate reality. This is not absurd.