Materialists......

[hammegk]

Well, that road can only lead to solipsism, so I'll just stick with materialism.

In what way do you have faith materialism denies solipsism?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Paul......all forms of materialism claim this. That's what materialism is.

Could you find me a definition that says this? I have systematically checked about eight definitions now, and none of them say that we can know physical things-as-they-really-are. They are just say things are physical, there is no spirit, no supernatural entities, mind is brain function, physicalism makes more sense, etc.

I bet I can't find any definitions of idealism that say we can know ideal things-as-they-really-are, either.

~~ Paul

 

[chriswl]

That doesn't tell us anything about things-in-themselves. What it does do is tell us about commonalities between things-as-they-are-experienced-by-us. Science finds consistencies in the behaviour of the world-as-it-appears, and between different people's world-as-it-appears. It can never tell us anything about the things-in-themselves because we never experience things-in-themselves. We've got no data to start from. None.

Scientific materialists simply don't believe in invisible things-in-themselves that hide behind the phenomena. They make no claims about things-in-themselves. They have no time for such notions. "Physical world" is just a convenient label to apply to the "commonalities between things-as-they-are-experienced-by-us". It makes no sense to ask what these things "really" are. So we don't ask that question. It's that simple.

 

[Tricky]

He's a transcendental idealist, apparently.

Ya'll tack whatever label you want on us, folks, because it is totally unimportant. I don't care if you care if you call me a bimetal transfigured idiophlagillist, but if you try to tell me what I believe, I'll have to correct you.

I call myself a materialist (even if that is incorrect) and I believe that the only things that exist are those which can, at least potentially, have evidence for them.

That's not so hard to understand, is it?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well I don't. If minds are the result of brain processes, it still doesn't mean that minds don't exist.

Yes, but there are logical problems defending this position. You've just using the words "are the result of" to cover up a hole in your position. As soon as you try to define what "are the result of" means, you will have problems. Eliminativism avoids the problem having to define this.

I'm not sure I care about what "things-in-themselves" are. I want to know how they work and why, and how I can use it to my (our) advantage.

You can do that even if materialism is false and transcendental idealism is true (or any other idealism, for that matter).

Well, that road can only lead to solipsism, so I'll just stick with materialism.

Even if it's illogical?

It doesn't lead to solipsism.

Huh ?

Have you ever thought about the possibility of experiencing a world that wasn't spatio-temporal? It is very hard to see how this could be possible. Without time, nothing could change. Without space, there would be nowhere for "things" to exist in. So whatever else they might or might not be, time and space appear to be fundamental conditions of human experience/cognition. They provide the framework for the world-as-we-experiences it. But there is no reason to believe that things-as-they-are-in-themselves are spatio-temporal. Why should the universe itself, independent from our experiences of it, be subject to the same conditions that we require in order to be able to experience anything?

It is very natural to think that the world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-really-is are the same. And please don't respond to this by trying to claim that science helps us to know the differences. It doesn't. All science does is describe the world-as-we-experience it. It can't describe the world as it is. That is what is wrong with lifegazers position. He is calling for a reform of science, based on the argument that everything is just "experiences". His first monumental error is not realising that science already describes the objective component of experiences. He thinks science needs to be "reformed" in order to take account of the fact that it doesn't tell us anything about "the world as it really is". His second monumental error is believing science can tell us diddley squat about a world which is entirely external to our perceptions of it.

If you want me to explain Kant's position (which I'm describing here) in more detail then please ask. I have plenty of time.

I think you mean things-as-they-appear-to-our-instruments.

It doesn't make any difference at this point. Both our instruments and our senses are measuring/sensing the same empirical, phenomenal world. All that matters is that it's not the noumenal world. It's not things-in-themselves.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ya'll tack whatever label you want on us, folks, because it is totally unimportant. I don't care if you care if you call me a bimetal transfigured idiophlagillist, but if you try to tell me what I believe, I'll have to correct you.

I call myself a materialist (even if that is incorrect) and I believe that the only things that exist are those which can, at least potentially, have evidence for them.

That's not so hard to understand, is it?

If you are going to call yourself a materialist, it's best to make sure you are actually a materialist. If you are actually a transcendental idealist, then why not call yourself one?

People claiming to hold metaphysical positions they don't actually hold is not going to make them easier to understand.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Could you find me a definition that says this? I have systematically checked about eight definitions now, and none of them say that we can know physical things-as-they-really-are.

They are just say things are physical, there is no spirit, no supernatural entities, mind is brain function, physicalism makes more sense, etc.

That is the same thing!

When they say "things are physical" they mean things-as-they-really-are. They don't use the terminology "things-as-they-are-in-themselves" because that is Kantian terminology. Transcendental realism existed before transcendental idealism, but it didn't have a name. ALL forms of idealism, dualism and materialism are forms of transcendental realism. The fact that they do not outwardly state "this is transcendental realism" is not a reason to believe they are not transcendental realism. Maybe this is confusing because transcendental idealism is a form of empirical realism. Understand?

I bet I can't find any definitions of idealism that say we can know ideal things-as-they-really-are, either.

~~ Paul

Of course not. Transcendental idealism was an attack on materialism and idealism for not noticing the difference between the phenomenal and noumenal. So why would you expect them to acknowledge Kant's distinction? That's what's wrong with those positions (in their naive form, as universally held on this board) - they simply haven't got as far as Kant yet. There are post-Kantian forms of transcendental realism, but nobody on this board defends them.

 

[chriswl]

Have you ever thought about the possibility of experiencing a world that wasn't spatio-temporal? It is very hard to see how this could be possible. Without time, nothing could change. Without space, there would be nowhere for "things" to exist in. So whatever else they might or might not be, time and space appear to be fundamental conditions of human experience/cognition. They provide the framework for the world-as-we-experiences it. But there is no reason to believe that things-as-they-are-in-themselves are spatio-temporal. Why should the universe itself, independent from our experiences of it, be subject to the same conditions that we require in order to be able to experience anything?

Because it would be astonishingly anthropocentric to think that once we have got a clear idea of how we subjectively experience time and space that we have said everything important there is to say about it. Modern physics tells us that time and space are related in ways that we would not dream of based on our everyday experience. Physicists have made discoveries about space and time that philosophers would never have come up with through introspection. Space and time are clearly part of what is "out there" and independent of our experience of them. In fact I believe that this is an area where it is widely accepted that Kant was wrong.

 

[Tricky]

If you are going to call yourself a materialist, it's best to make sure you are actually a materialist. If you are actually a transcendental idealist, then why not call yourself one?

Because I'm not usually talking to philosophy majors. Most people describe materialist similarly to the way I did. For those of you who scoff at such simplistic labels and prefer your own, then I'll simply tell you what I believe and let you apply the tags.

People claiming to hold metaphysical positions they don't actually hold is not going to make them easier to understand.

No, it is quite easy for most people to understand. General labels are suitable for those of us untrained in the sophisticated vocabulary of graduate-level philosophy.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Because it would be astonishingly anthropocentric to think that once we have got a clear idea of how we subjectively experience time and space that we have said everything important there is to say about it.

I didn't claim that there was nothing else important to say about the subject. Neither did Kant.

Modern physics tells us that time and space are related in ways that we would not dream of based on our everyday experience.

Yes, but physics only describes the phenomenal world anyway - it is a description of the world as it appears to us - not as it is in itself.

Physicists have made discoveries about space and time that philosophers would never have come up with through introspection.

Why does this make a difference to my argument?

Space and time are clearly part of what is "out there" and independent of our experience of them.

That you will have to back up with some very careful arguments. This is not "clear" at all. How could you possibly know that space and time exist independently of our experience of them when nobody has ever experienced or measured anything indepedent of experience? What you are saying is "clear" is only "clear" if you have failed to think about it properly. Sure, if you are a naive realist who thinks his experiences of an "out there" is the same as the actual "out there" then it seems obvious that space and time are properties of "out there". But as soon as you actually think about it, you realise this is far from clear. We know of space and time because they structural components of the frame of our window on reality. It simply does not follow from this that it is obvious that things in themselves are also spatio-temporal. Not only is this not clear, it is not at all clear how you would go about supporting the claim.

In fact I believe that this is an area where it is widely accepted that Kant was wrong.

No, that's not the case. Some people think he was wrong, but they can't just wave their arms and say "it's obvious", because it isn't.

 

[nescafe]

His second monumental error is believing science can tell us diddley squat about a world which is entirely external to our perceptions of it.

I think LG's first error is, by itself, enough to kill his whole argument. There are some interesting things that your "second error" brings up, though -- one that immediatly springs to mind is that if you cannot say anything about noumenal reality other than it exists, all you have done is invented a more sophisticated version of dualism (assuming you care at all about explaining how our intersubjective perceptions are consistent).

ed. speling

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I think LG's first error is, by itself, enough to kill his whole argument. There are some interesting things that your "second error" brings up, though -- one that immediatly springs to mind is that if you cannot say anything about noumenal reality other than it exists, all you have done is invented a more sophisticated version of dualism (assuming you care at all about explaining how our intersubjective perceptions are consistent).

ed. speling

I don't think transcendental idealism should be confused with dualism. Dualism claims that there are two sorts of stuff, and we can know about both of them. For Kant, both mind and matter belong to the phenomenal world.

There are two ways of reading Kant:

1) The two-world intepretation, which sees phenomena and noumena as two worlds. This could possibly be seen as a sort of dualism, but still very different from cartesian dualism or property dualism.

2) The one-world interpretation, which sees phenomena and noumena as two different descriptions of the same world.

I am a (2), with respect to Kant, as are most Kant scholars (which I'm not).

And, yes - LG's first error is enough to sink his position. The first error is the result of an abject failure to critically examine his own arguments. If he actually thought about what he was saying, he'd realise it was stupid. The second error, IMO, is derived from a failure to understand the role/definition of science and he may actually need to read some relevant philosophy (of science) if he's going to avoid making it.

 

[Belz...]

Yes, but there are logical problems defending this position. You've just using the words "are the result of" to cover up a hole in your position.

Please point to the hole.

Even if it's illogical?

It doesn't lead to solipsism.

The way I see it, there are two possbilities: either the world is real or it isn't. Saying it isn't real because it can never be "truly known", when brought to its logical conclusion, can only cause one to doubt his own mind, and the only possible reality THEN could never be known. The only other option is to assume that the observed world is real.

Have you ever thought about the possibility of experiencing a world that wasn't spatio-temporal? It is very hard to see how this could be possible. Without time, nothing could change. Without space, there would be nowhere for "things" to exist in. So whatever else they might or might not be, time and space appear to be fundamental conditions of human experience/cognition.

Of course they are. We're living in a universe that includes them.

It is very natural to think that the world-as-we-experience-it and the-world-as-it-really-is are the same. And please don't respond to this by trying to claim that science helps us to know the differences. It doesn't. All science does is describe the world-as-we-experience it.

I'd agree if only one person did the observing.

It doesn't make any difference at this point. Both our instruments and our senses are measuring/sensing the same empirical, phenomenal world. All that matters is that it's not the noumenal world. It's not things-in-themselves.

What's a "things-in-themselves" ?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Please point to the hole.

You can't explain what is meant by "are", "are the result of", "caused by", etc...

The way I see it, there are two possbilities: either the world is real or it isn't.

What do you mean by "the world"? Presumably the world of objects, yes? If so, it's not that simple and there aren't just two possibilities. The world can be simultaneously empirically real and transcendentally ideal.

Of course they are. We're living in a universe that includes them.

But when you say "Universe" you are talking about the world of objects - the world you percieve.

What's a "things-in-themselves" ?

According to Kant, this is unknowable. The term refers to the world as it really is, entirely independent of our perceptions of a world. Since it is entirely independent of our perceptions, we can no nothing positive about it. We might be able to make some negative claims - claims about what it isn't, but not about what it is. The only things we can say for sure is that it must exist and follow some set of consistent laws, because without it we are left either with solipsism or no explanation for why many people seem to share similar experiences of reality.

The potential confusion for people is this: Because the reality we percieve is full of other humans, we assume they experience the same sort of world that we do. But just because we all share similar experiences of a world, it does not follow that the world itself, independent of experiences, is the same as the world we experience. All it implies is that there is a something holding those experiences together and making things coherent. That something need not even be spatio-temporal, let alone the same as the world of experiences. All we can say is that it exists.

 

[Soapy Sam]

What if the only "free" ability of the mind to decide is a property of the unconscious mind?
Who then makes the decision?

 

[chriswl]

That you will have to back up with some very careful arguments. This is not "clear" at all. How could you possibly know that space and time exist independently of our experience of them when nobody has ever experienced or measured anything indepedent of experience?

But the universe existed long before there were any people to observe it and would carry on existing if we all became extinct. That's a lot of space and time that doesn't need us.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What if the only "free" ability of the mind to decide is a property of the unconscious mind?
Who then makes the decision?

I don't understand the question. How can the unconcious mind be free?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But the universe existed long before there were any people to observe it and would carry on existing if we all became extinct.

That's only true if you've already assumed that space and time are transcendentally real. The line of inductive reasoning you are following is very persuasive, but wrong. You are imagining an early Universe, devoid of life, filled with first generation stars, etc.... But what you are imagining is what a human being would experience if there could have been a human being there to experience it. Additionally, when you are imagining a post-human world, you are imagining it how it would be experienced by a human. That world - the world of human experiences - would have ceased to exist. All that would be left is the noumenal world.

Just in case you were wondering, Kant's position is not incompatible with evolution, but it does raise some questions about the context in which it is understood - the tricky issues being things like randomness and directionality - things which do not directly impact the basic tenets of evolution. Kant actually anticipated evolutionary theory, which followed shortly after him. Kant + Darwin together make for a more sophisticated view on evolutionary theory rather than for contradictions. The whole issue is also related to Kant's philosophy of history. For Kant, evolution and history merge. Evolution is history.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That is the same thing!

When they say "things are physical" they mean things-as-they-really-are. They don't use the terminology "things-as-they-are-in-themselves" because that is Kantian terminology. Transcendental realism existed before transcendental idealism, but it didn't have a name. ALL forms of idealism, dualism and materialism are forms of transcendental realism. The fact that they do not outwardly state "this is transcendental realism" is not a reason to believe they are not transcendental realism. Maybe this is confusing because transcendental idealism is a form of empirical realism. Understand?

Nope. I still don't understand why saying physical things are all that exist is the same as saying we can know those physical things-as-they-are.

~~ Paul

 

[Belz...]

You can't explain what is meant by "are", "are the result of", "caused by", etc...

Of course we can. Check the definitions of the verbs "to be" and "to cause".

Seriously, though. I'm not sure I understand what more you want about all this. Science explains how things work. I'm not sure it is meaningful to ask what things "are".

According to Kant, this is unknowable. The term refers to the world as it really is, entirely independent of our perceptions of a world. Since it is entirely independent of our perceptions, we can no nothing positive about it. We might be able to make some negative claims - claims about what it isn't, but not about what it is.

Since we can only count on our perceptions, I'm not sure we can even say what it isn't.

The only things we can say for sure is that it must exist and follow some set of consistent laws, because without it we are left either with solipsism or no explanation for why many people seem to share similar experiences of reality.

Well, how can you say that the assumption that the world is as perceived is wrong and NOT end up with solipsism, or worse ? If we say that the observed universe exists, then all we have to do is observe it to eventually learn about the way it works. Science has done this very succesfully. As I've said, the other assumption, that the world isn't as perceived and cannot be known, leads to everything beign suspect, short of, according to solipsists, our own minds, though I dispute that last point. That position is useless, as you've noted. What "middle ground" is there ?

The potential confusion for people is this: Because the reality we percieve is full of other humans, we assume they experience the same sort of world that we do. But just because we all share similar experiences of a world, it does not follow that the world itself, independent of experiences, is the same as the world we experience. All it implies is that there is a something holding those experiences together and making things coherent. That something need not even be spatio-temporal, let alone the same as the world of experiences. All we can say is that it exists.

I'm yet to see a coherent hypothesis as to exactly what this something would be