Materialists......

[nescafe]

True, but there is something in us that makes us seek out the familiar threads, even if bloated and byzantine. So many promising threads are strewn by the wayside and never seen, while the 28-page juggernauts lumber onwards, making a few salient points, and a lot of useless noise.

... and some of us learned threading etiquette in the scary devil monastery, where topic drift is more of an art form than anything else.

 

[Belz...]

Whatever example I might give, you will find a way to interpret it as not-altruistic.

Well that much should be obvious, especially in light of the fact that I've said that any act you make is done A) for personnal reasons and B) for personnal gain, even if the latter is only the joy of seeing other people happy. If seeing other people happy didn't bring YOU joy, you wouldn't help them. Do you agree at least on that ?

 

[Belz...]

Put it another way: Altruism is logically consistent with my metaphysics. Minds are not logically consistent with materialism. My position is coherent. Materialists who talk about minds are incoherent.

Allright. What's a mind, then ?

 

[Belz...]

But it seems silly to do away with a perfectly useful concept like "altruism" simply because the concept is a little more complicated than it seems at first. I would make a similar statement about the term "free will" (or plain old "choice", as it boils down to.) Upon close inspection, it may appear that there is no actual choice, only cause and effect. But by the time you get to that point, you've thrown out an easy-to-understand concept that has common and universal usage.

I like to think of myself as an altruist. It makes me feel good. I feel even better if I can rationally justify as "enlightened", the self-interest that makes me altruistic.

Oh, don't misunderstand me. I agree with you. I was simply pointing out to Geoff that his idea of free will OR altruism really ISN'T as simple as it seems at first.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Allright. What's a mind, then ?

It's a name for the totality of your subjective experiences. Shrodinger hits the nail right on the head:

"The reason why our sentient, percipient and thinking ego is met nowhere within our scientific world picture can easily be indicated in seven words: because it is itself that world picture. It is identical with the whole and therefore cannot be contained in it as part of it."

That is what a mind is. "Objects" are things which appear in your mind. They are the objects of perception. It is the behaviour of these percieved objects which science analyses. For me, this does not imply idealism in the same way that it does for hammegk and others. For me, the entire phenomenal world - the world of your mind and the objects in it - is not the ultimate reality. Ultimate reality (things as they are in themselves) is called noumenal, and is unknown to us - so there is an external world, it's just not the same as the world of physical objects we percieve. The problem for materialists is that they want to claim that the things-in-themselves are the same as things-as-we-percieve them. It is this claim which sets up all the problems.

As for my claims about free will not being simple: you bet they aren't. It's far from being simple. Trying to understand how free will could possibly exist is possibly the hardest problem in metaphysics. What is widely accepted as the single most important philosophical book ever written was an attempt to solve this problem. So, no, it's not simple.

 

[hammegk]

And to me, every question that can be asked relates directly to one's personal understanding of free will and its' implications.

 

[Tricky]

The problem for materialists is that they want to claim that the things-in-themselves are the same as things-as-we-perceive them. It is this claim which sets up all the problems.

What materialists claim this? I think the position is that it is impossible to know or perceive what things-in-themselves are. We can only understand certain aspects of things-in-themselves and even those aspects we can only know imperfectly. But by diligent inspection, we can know them better.

This problem you suggest doesn't seem like any problem to me.

 

[Belz...]

It's a name for the totality of your subjective experiences.

How can a sane person deny that this exists ? I don't see how it clashes with materialism. Unless you assume that experiences are so distinct from the real world that they can't be reconciled with it, but I happen not to share that sentiment.

That is what a mind is. "Objects" are things which appear in your mind. They are the objects of perception. It is the behaviour of these percieved objects which science analyses. For me, this does not imply idealism in the same way that it does for hammegk and others. For me, the entire phenomenal world - the world of your mind and the objects in it - is not the ultimate reality. Ultimate reality (things as they are in themselves) is called noumenal, and is unknown to us

I disagree (obviously ). I think there are very reliable ways to determine what reality is, independent of subjective perceptions, simply by making sure everyone experiences the same thing.

- so there is an external world, it's just not the same as the world of physical objects we percieve. The problem for materialists is that they want to claim that the things-in-themselves are the same as things-as-we-percieve them. It is this claim which sets up all the problems.

I'm not saying that what you see is what you get. I'm just saying that, if everyone can agree on the results of a particular test or experiment, then we can reach conclusions about the thing that the experiment was about. I don't think anyone would dispute that gravity is just an acceleration, although it's not exactly how we perceive it.

As for my claims about free will not being simple: you bet they aren't. It's far from being simple. Trying to understand how free will could possibly exist is possibly the hardest problem in metaphysics. What is widely accepted as the single most important philosophical book ever written was an attempt to solve this problem. So, no, it's not simple.

Unless randomness and determinism are all that is. In that case, it's very simple.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What materialists claim this? I think the position is that it is impossible to know or perceive what things-in-themselves are..

That's not materiaism. It's transcendental idealism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That's not materiaism. It's transcendental idealism.

Really? Let's look at the definitions of materialism ...

Nope, sorry, can't find any definition of materialism that states we can know what things-in-themselves are. All the definitions I find state that materialism is the belief that reality consists only of the physical. This does not imply that we can know physical things directly.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And to me, every question that can be asked relates directly to one's personal understanding of free will and its' implications.

Ooh, really? Ouch. Then every question relates to a concept that no one seems able to define.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Really? Let's look at the definitions of materialism ...

Nope, sorry, can't find any definition of materialism that states we can know what things-in-themselves are.

Paul......all forms of materialism claim this. That's what materialism is.

All the definitions I find state that materialism is the belief that reality consists only of the physical.

That is exactly the same claim. Ever since Kant, the following terminology has been used:

Transcendental Realism is any ontological position which claims something about the nature of things-in-themselves. This includes materialism, idealism and dualism.

Transcendental Idealism is the claim that we can never know the nature of things-in-themselves.

Materialism, defined as a belief that reality consists only of the physical is therefore a form of transcendental realism. It claims that true reality is physical and nothing else exists.

This does not imply that we can know physical things directly.

Yes it does. It is a belief about the nature of things-in-themselves. If it doesn't imply we can "know" this then it implies that we have simply asserted it based on nothing. Either way, we are making a claim about true reality

 

[UndercoverElephant]

How can a sane person deny that this exists?

I haven't got a ***** clue, but some apparently sane people make this claim.

That's not quite fair. They make the claim because they believe it is logically imposed upon them. They believe there is no alternative.

I don't see how it clashes with materialism.

On its own, it doesn't.

I disagree (obviously ). I think there are very reliable ways to determine what reality is, independent of subjective perceptions, simply by making sure everyone experiences the same thing.

That doesn't tell us anything about things-in-themselves. What it does do is tell us about commonalities between things-as-they-are-experienced-by-us. Science finds consistencies in the behaviour of the world-as-it-appears, and between different people's world-as-it-appears. It can never tell us anything about the things-in-themselves because we never experience things-in-themselves. We've got no data to start from. None.

I'm not saying that what you see is what you get. I'm just saying that, if everyone can agree on the results of a particular test or experiment, then we can reach conclusions about the thing that the experiment was about. I don't think anyone would dispute that gravity is just an acceleration, although it's not exactly how we perceive it.

Space, time and gravity all belong to the world-as-it-appears to us. Space is a sort of "outer sense" and time is a sort of "inner sense". Between them, they form the structure of things-as-they-appear-to-us. The world as we perceive it is spatio-temporal. You cannot imply from this that things-in-themselves are spatio-temporal.

As scientific theories improve, they do not get any closer to the correct description of things-in-themselves. Instead, they get close to the correct description of things-as-they-appear-to-us.

Unless randomness and determinism are all that is. In that case, it's very simple.

Correct.

 

[Tricky]

That's not materiaism. It's transcendental idealism.

Then I guess we don't have any materialists here. Who are you complaining to then?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Then I guess we don't have any materialists here. Who are you complaining to then?

Not anyone who is willing to admit they are a transcendental idealist, that's for sure. Kant's position isn't neccesarily completely correct, but it's a massive improvement of materialism.

 

[hammegk]

Then I guess we don't have any materialists here.

That becomes more and more likely imo too. The question is what are you and your cohorts here who are not idealists, either?

The answer to that seems more and more to favor dualists -- still deep in their closets, but dualists. Yet y'all consider yourselves "logical".

Who are you complaining to then?

Looking for an honest man is complaining?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That becomes more and more likely imo too. The question is what are you and your cohorts here who are not idealists, either?

He's a transcendental idealist, apparently.

 

[hammegk]

Subjective, or objective?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Subjective, or objective?

I take it you aren't actually expecting me to answer that question.

 

[Belz...]

I haven't got a ***** clue, but some apparently sane people make this claim.

That's not quite fair. They make the claim because they believe it is logically imposed upon them. They believe there is no alternative.

Well I don't. If minds are the result of brain processes, it still doesn't mean that minds don't exist.

That doesn't tell us anything about things-in-themselves.

I'm not sure I care about what "things-in-themselves" are. I want to know how they work and why, and how I can use it to my (our) advantage.

It can never tell us anything about the things-in-themselves because we never experience things-in-themselves. We've got no data to start from. None.

Well, that road can only lead to solipsism, so I'll just stick with materialism.

Space, time and gravity all belong to the world-as-it-appears to us. Space is a sort of "outer sense" and time is a sort of "inner sense". Between them, they form the structure of things-as-they-appear-to-us.

Huh ?

As scientific theories improve, they do not get any closer to the correct description of things-in-themselves. Instead, they get close to the correct description of things-as-they-appear-to-us.

I think you mean things-as-they-appear-to-our-instruments.