Materialists......

[Robin]

Because without it, everything remains static. Without evolution, there could be no change.

Are you saying that everything that changes evolves????

Are you saying that it is logically impossible for something to change but not evolve?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Are you saying that everything that changes evolves????

Are you saying that it is logically impossible for something to change but not evolve?

I'd never really thought about it like that, but I think my position may well imply this, yes. Maybe it's a bit like riding a bicycle. You can't stay upright without continually making ajdustments?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If God exists then God is by definition accidental.

Please explain. ??

You are also a materialist atheist by any standard theistic definition.

That depends on how you define "theistic". Certainly by many western theists, I'd probably be called atheistic. But there are other forms of theism, such as Tillich's and various monotheistic variations on Hinduism. In the end, this is an argument about terminology. I was never trying to defend the mainstream Christian notion of God.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Of course, kids don't know that, so we can stuff 'em full of lies as much as we want!

Mwhahahaha! They are putty in our hands! The fools!

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It would seem to me that increasing entropy ensures 'death' of anything more complex than the smallest irreducible part (whatever that might be ... I'll say a Higgs boson just for kicks).

In the long run, probably so. And that's why everything else is an emergent property.

~~ Paul

 

[Lord Muck oGentry]

Exactly.

The following link is very highly recommended to anyone genuinely interested in this.

http://www.ditext.com/russell/debate.html

Thanks for the reference.

I hope you won't think it churlish of me to say that I've known it for decades. Russell's reply to Copleston is, in my view, hard to meet. Russell suggests that the conclusion Copleston wants can be reached only by a fallacious argument ( part/whole fallacy). It is no answer to this to say that parts and wholes may share properties: the question is whether, in the case under consideration, they must. Copleston needs a sound argument ( premisses true, inference valid): he hasn't got one.

As for my question ( what are contingent universes contingent on?), you may want to reflect on C S Peirce's observation: "Universes are not as plentiful as blackberries." What can (what could) we do to find out what universes get up to?

Regards

 

[hammegk]

In the long run, probably so. And that's why everything else is an emergent property.

~~ Paul

The question is: "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions that lead to an 'emergence' and then sustain it?".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The question is: "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions that lead to an 'emergence' and then sustain it?".

We'd better define emergent property first. Is it just a pattern arising from simpler components of the system?

~~ Paul

 

[chriswl]

So it's not logically contradictory.

Not if we define "necessary being" as:

"A necessary being is one that if it exists, it cannot cease to exist, and correspondingly, if it does not exist, it cannot come into existence."

But this means that your "necessary being" doesn't have to exist. Which means it cannot answer the question "why is there something rather than nothing", which is, I thought, what you were claiming for it. If not, what are you claiming?

 

[hammegk]

We'd better define emergent property first.

Feel free. It's your terminology of choice.

Is it just a pattern arising from simpler components of the system?

Back to the question I asked.

Let me know when you have The Answer all will agree on.

 

[Robin]

Please explain. ??

I think you should answer my questions, before I answer yours.

Gods are necessary for what? Who was it necessary to that God existed?

I simply point out that because these questions cannot have an answer then God is necessarily accidental. There can be no reason for God to exist.

That depends on how you define "theistic".

As I said - the standard notion of theistic. You know - Christianity, Judaism, Islam and most of their variants. It would also include Confucianism.

Any religion that believes in a purposeful supreme being and an afterlife. That certainly accounts for overwhelming majority of theists.

Certainly by many western theists, I'd probably be called atheistic. But there are other forms of theism, such as Tillich's and various monotheistic variations on Hinduism. In the end, this is an argument about terminology. I was never trying to defend the mainstream Christian notion of God.

I know of no Hindu variant that makes God subservient to the laws of physics or in which any such idea would make sense. In fact Hinduism is essentially an Idealistic metaphysic, and in such a metaphysic the laws of physics could be altered as easily as they are in a dream.

As for Tillich, well basically he waffles around the idea - but his idea appears to be that God is Being itself.

It is something I have said for a long time - if you define God to mean "the sum total of existence" then it is easy to show that God exists. But what properties does "the sum total of existence" have that identify it as God?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Feel free. It's your terminology of choice.

Oh, I thought you cared when you made that statement that I misinterpreted. If not, then the hell with it. It's just a rat-hole.

~~ Paul

 

[Robin]

Nothing comes from Nothing

This is just a line from a Rogers and Hammerstein song, not an axiom.

We cannot be certain that nothing can come from nothing. How would you possibly justify such an assertion?

If there is something outside of space-time, what makes everybody so damn sure that it will be something that we can intuitively understand?

So if you are demonstrating that "something came from nothing" is an illogical idea, how would you start?

For example how would you describe the alternative? You could use words like "eternal" but you would have to describe what you meant by that word.

You could say "atemporal", but atemporal does not in itself imply indestructible or uncreated.

Even if you attempted to describe the alternative you would be forced back into temporal concepts. "God always existed" is a popular example.

"No beginning and no end" is a better one.

So we have two alternatives (at least that we can think of):

1. At least one thing came from nothing
2. At least one thing had no beginning and no end.
(edit), OK there is another alternative "At least one thing had no beginning"(/edit)

I don't even know that we can be 100% certain that these are the only alternatives, but the concept of God is irrelevant in any case.

If something could have come from nothing, some non-God thing could have come from nothing.

If something could have no beginning or end, some non-God thing could have no beginning or end.

And as I say, there is always the possibility of an alternative that we are incapable of thinking about.

 

[hammegk]

Oh, I thought you cared when you made that statement that I misinterpreted. If not, then the hell with it. It's just a rat-hole.

I care about the question, and answer. If you understood and could define "emergent property" w.r.t. necessary and sufficient conditions there woulg be nothing left to discuss. We do know the answer a materialist should logically defend.

As to "rat-hole"; a fair amount of interesting, and in cases germane imo, discussion has been accomplished and is on-going.

 

[hammegk]

It is something I have said for a long time - if you define God to mean "the sum total of existence" then it is easy to show that God exists.

A nice tautology.

But what properties does "the sum total of existence" have that identify it as God?

Er, yes, this is the Question. Materialists if logical have a different set of possible properties than do ~Materialists.

Geoff if I understand him asserts god is the set of {possible Materialist properties} plus {possible ~Materialist properties}. An Idealist might assert both groups are equal, except that the ~Materialist group has a feature that could be termed 'will' or 'intent'.

 

[nescafe]

We'd better define emergent property first.

how about shorthand for "modelling all the components of this system mathematically/computationally is intractable, so we will just model the behaviour of the system as a whole", or "huh, interesting -- the patterns of interaction between the parts comprising this system are stable enough that we can use those patterns as building blocks for a layer of abstraction".

Is it just a pattern arising from simpler components of the system?

Works for me.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I care about the question, and answer. If you understood and could define "emergent property" w.r.t. necessary and sufficient conditions there woulg be nothing left to discuss. We do know the answer a materialist should logically defend.

Seems to me that if you have a property/ characteristic/ pattern of something that you can explain in terms of "simpler" properties, then the property is emergent. Sounds like you think this concept is much more complicated. If so, you'll have to enlighten us.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

Did you read #875?


nescafe just presented the Materialist stance, ignoring, as one must, the sufficiency question.

 

[nescafe]

nescafe just presented the Materialist stance, ignoring, as one must, the sufficiency question.

Indeed, although I would not consider myself a materialist. If I was forced at gunpoint, I would adopt computational naturalism as a metaphysical stance, and use the metastance of pancritical rationalism when evaluating the various metaphysical stances.

I think the concept of a logical necessary ground of being is ignorable -- things exist, and QCD defines "things" to the current limits of accuracy.

The set of logical bases for existence I have seen discussed on this thread, while entertaining, are pointless unless they have something falsifiable and testable about them -- otherwise, pick the one you like as a matter of taste, but do not pretend that yours is the only one.

 

[Robin]

A nice tautology.

I would call it a circular definition. God = everything. Something exists therefore God exists. True I suppose, but not very useful.

Er, yes, this is the Question. Materialists if logical have a different set of possible properties than do ~Materialists.

It is not clear that this is the case at all.

Geoff if I understand him asserts god is the set of {possible Materialist properties} plus {possible ~Materialist properties}.

God = X+~X ???? Is this any different to "God = everything"?

An Idealist might assert both groups are equal, except that the ~Materialist group has a feature that could be termed 'will' or 'intent'.

I would have to see your reasoning. Why would will and intent be possible under ~materialism but not possible under materialism? It seems that will and intent could not exist without some kind of underlying order. So why not the underlying order of the material world?

But since nobody has any knowledge of such will and intent, the metaphysical niceties are moot.