Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Gods are necessary for what? Who was it necessary to that God existed?

I dont understand either question. They suggest a continuing misunderstanding about the meaning of the word "necessary". I keep explaining what this term technically means, and it has been repeated by chriswl. Put that meaning of the word into your questions and they become meaningless. If necessary means "something which if it exists, it cannot stop existing" then "Who was it neccesary to that God existed?" simply doesn't mean anything.

No Gods are not necessary beings, they are necessarily accidental beings.

I have no idea what this means, either.

And how do you know a God can't stop existing?

Because then it wouldn't be a God.

If God exists then God is by definition accidental.

Again, no idea what this means or why you are saying it.

So if I build a thermonuclear device in my back yard, it would be sufficient reason for me to say "existence (of my bomb) is better than non-existence".

No. You are talking about the existence of a particular object, which can be good or can be bad. I am talking about existence as opposed to non-existence.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is just a line from a Rogers and Hammerstein song, not an axiom.

We cannot be certain that nothing can come from nothing. How would you possibly justify such an assertion?

Very easily. How could you possibly deny it?

If there is something outside of space-time, what makes everybody so damn sure that it will be something that we can intuitively understand?

#1: "Outside of space-time" is meaningless, even in the context of the cosmological argument. There is no "outside of space time" because without time there is no space.
#2: Nobody is claiming we can intuitively understand the Infinite.

So if you are demonstrating that "something came from nothing" is an illogical idea, how would you start?

I can think of few things which are more obviously self-explanatory than this. If you have nothing - absolutely nothing - then there is nothing to act as a cause (either temporally or logically) for anything else to come into existence. If nothing can either temporally or logically cause new things to come into existence, no new things will come into existence. QED.

For example how would you describe the alternative? You could use words like "eternal" but you would have to describe what you meant by that word.

I use the word "necessary". "Eternal" or "indestructable" or "infinite" will all also suffice.

You could say "atemporal", but atemporal does not in itself imply indestructible or uncreated.

Then say indestructible and uncreated.

Even if you attempted to describe the alternative you would be forced back into temporal concepts. "God always existed" is a popular example.

And it is correct, from our point of view (if God exists, that is). There was no point in space or time where God did not exist. The only thing that is wrong with this statement is if it is taken to imply that time continues indefinately backwards instead of ceasing at the big bang.

So we have two alternatives (at least that we can think of):

1. At least one thing came from nothing
2. At least one thing had no beginning and no end.
(edit), OK there is another alternative "At least one thing had no beginning"(/edit)

Correct. Except that (1) doesn't seem to make sense, for the reasons given above. So you are left with (2) by a process of elimination.

If something could have come from nothing, some non-God thing could have come from nothing.

0 = 1 + -1?

If something could have no beginning or end, some non-God thing could have no beginning or end.

OK...you are assuming God is "thing". Did you see the Tillich thread? God is not a "thing". Also, God didn't "come from nothing". I haven't suggested either of those things.

And as I say, there is always the possibility of an alternative that we are incapable of thinking about.

This is a little too defeatist for me. Even Kant, who denied we could have knowledge of the noumenal, still allowed that we could think about it coherently.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Not if we define "necessary being" as:


But this means that your "necessary being" doesn't have to exist.

That is why this is not the ontological argument.

Which means it cannot answer the question "why is there something rather than nothing", which is, I thought, what you were claiming for it. If not, what are you claiming?

Actually, the question "why is there something rather than nothing" merely came up as an example of questions that empirical science can't answer. In fact, what I actually asked (originally) was "How can something come from nothing?", and I suggested the answer was "like this: 0 = 1 + -1". But it remains the case that IF a necessary being exists, THEN it is an explanation as to why contingent beings exist. What it does not do is attempt to prove the existence of God by defining God into existence simply on the basis that if a perfect being is concievable then it must also exist. That would be (a version of) the ontological argument.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Perhaps I need to make extra-clear the difference between the notions of necessity in the ontological and cosmological arguments.

The ontological argument is unique in attempted proofs that God exists in that it attempts to prove that God exists on the basis of pure logic, without any recourse to empirical facts whatsoever. The cosmological argument, by contrast, starts from some sort of claimed fact about the Universe (e.g. it must have had a beginning, or it must be contingent) and then attempts to reason backwards to the existence of God (as first cause or as a non-contingent being).

The ontological argument is based on claiming that God must be perfect and that a perfect being must exist, since not-existing would be an example of imperfection. This argument leads to a God having to exist as a matter of of logical necessity. This is called "ontological necessity" which I will shorten to "O-necessity". This argument is ineffective for a number of reasons, not least because many people have claimed that God is beyond existence or that existence is itself not a property.

The cosmological argument works in a completely different way, logically speaking. It does not depend on claiming God is perfect. What it does do is make the claim that it would be senseless to think of a God which exists but could also stop existing. This is a much more reasonable claim than the one made by the ontological argument - surely something which only exists contingently couldn't possibly be God. Otherwise state - God can't depend on something else for its existence. This is known as metaphysical necessity (M-necessity) and is sometimes stated as "God exists in all possible worlds" where "possible worlds" means "logically possible worlds". To further clarify, this means that "IF God exists in this world, THEN God exists in all possible worlds". Some modern forms of the ontological argument end up combining both sense of necessity and attempt to reach the conclusion "O-Necessarily, God exists M-necessarily". These modern forms are called "Modal ontological arguments". "Modal" is the branch of logic which deals with things like possibility and necessity.

Just for fun....here's the basic structure of the modal ontological argument.

Premise 1: It is possible that that God exists.

Surely it is at least possible that God exists? If you think otherwise, then no argument will convince you and there is no point in having a debate or looking at logical arguments.

Premise 2: God is not a contingent being.

In order to be God, God's existence cannot be dependent on anything else and cannot be contingent. i.e. Either it is not possible that God exists, or it is necessary that God exists.

Conclusion (from 1 & 2): Hence, it is necessary that God exists. (Unless God's existence is impossible, God's existence is necessary. Since it's not impossibe (premise 1) then it must be necessary.)

Hence, God exists.

The argument is actually trickier than you might think. To deny it, you either have to claim that God could exist contingently or you have to claim that it is absolutely impossible that God could exist.

Reminder: This is just for fun. I'm not actually defending the modal ontological argument because I know it leads to a debate about various different schemes of modal logic (the argument only works in what is called "S5 modal logic" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/)) and I have no intention of getting lost that discussion.

 

[Soapy Sam]

Perhaps I need to make extra-clear the difference between the notions of necessity in the ontological and cosmological arguments.

The ontological argument is unique in attempted proofs that God exists in that it attempts to prove that God exists on the basis of pure logic, without any recourse to empirical facts whatsoever.

But Geoff is this not incredibly unlikely to be correct? Such an argument must assume that human logic and by implication human language is "perfect" -ie capable of analysing and describing the entire universe perfectly.

We hardly need drag Godel in to know that this is not the case.

Any argument which does not rely on empirical evidence is essentialy supposition. The ontological argument is pure supposition, using fallible instruments in the hands of fallible beings. I know you say this is just fun, but you seem to imply that it is fun which deserves to be taken seriously.
I don't see anything to justify that. Copleston's argument is purest nonsense, for example.


Reminder: This is just for fun. I'm not actually defending the modal ontological argument because I know it leads to a debate about various different schemes of modal logic (the argument only works in what is called "S5 modal logic" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/)) and I have no intention of getting lost that discussion.

. .

 

[Belz...]

Premise 1: It is possible that that God exists.

Premise 2: God is not a contingent being.

In order to be God, God's existence cannot be dependent on anything else and cannot be contingent. i.e. Either it is not possible that God exists, or it is necessary that God exists.

Conclusion (from 1 & 2): Hence, it is necessary that God exists. (Unless God's existence is impossible, God's existence is necessary. Since it's not impossibe (premise 1) then it must be necessary.)

Hence, God exists.

That's fine word-play. But we don't even have a coherent definition of "God" from you. What is "God" ?

Because then it wouldn't be a God.

Gods aren't invincible by definition. Look at Cronus!! And Balder!

Very easily. How could you possibly deny it?

Well, I don't know. But I'm not sure we can conclusively exclude the possibility for now. Just because everything we know comes from something else doesn't mean the whole does as well.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Er, yes, this is the Question. Materialists if logical have a different set of possible properties than do ~Materialists.

What does this mean? If we study the world around us, we should come up with the same set of properties. We are studying the same world, right?

Perhaps you mean fundamental, nonemergent properties. Yes, different metaphysics might assume different ones. But if the fundamental ones explain everything we see, then they are equivalent. Any argument over which are "better" would be silly.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

. But Geoff is this not incredibly unlikely to be correct? Such an argument must assume that human logic and by implication human language is "perfect" -ie capable of analysing and describing the entire universe perfectly.

Possibly. I personally believe that the strongest version of the modal ontological argument does demonstrate something, though I doubt many people here would agree with me and I don't think it neccesarily demonstrates what it is supposed to demonstrate. All ontological arguments a generally employed by Christians but even if it is accepted as sound and valid I don't think it gets remotely close to proving that the Christian God exists. It's only a threat to the hardest of hard atheists and of little comfort to most Christians.

Any argument which does not rely on empirical evidence is essentialy supposition. The ontological argument is pure supposition, using fallible instruments in the hands of fallible beings. I know you say this is just fun, but you seem to imply that it is fun which deserves to be taken seriously.

I wanted people to at least take seriously the two different senses in which "necessary" is being used.

I don't actually believe that any of the analytical attempts to prove that God exists have much real mileage in them. I doubt any of them have ever really convinced anyone. When this thread turned to a discussion of the philosophy of religion I started an offshoot thread explaining the works of Paul Tillich. That, I want people to take seriously - but it does not consist of an analytical argument. Instead, it is purely descriptive. It is trying to explain something, not prove it.

 

[hammegk]

I would have to see your reasoning. Why would will and intent be possible under ~materialism but not possible under materialism?

What is the difference between something alive, and something dead? To me any useful definition of "life" begins with "will and intent".

It seems that will and intent could not exist without some kind of underlying order. So why not the underlying order of the material world?

That underlying order, if material, finesses 'will and intent' with the term compatible; the pc you are using demonstrates compatible 'free-will'.

But since nobody has any knowledge of such will and intent, the metaphysical niceties are moot.

I'd say that is one of the very few things you do have actual knowledge of. I suppose one to can "choose" to believe one doesn't.

 

[Robin]

Very easily. How could you possibly deny it?

I didn't deny it. I just said that I have seen no argument justifying it. And I don't assume that my intuitive understanding would be sufficient in this context.

#1: "Outside of space-time" is meaningless, even in the context of the cosmological argument. There is no "outside of space time" because without time there is no space.

Err... yes. Think about it. "outside of space-time" would be outside of space as well as time. If there is such a thing as the infinite then space-time cannot exhaust existence.

#2: Nobody is claiming we can intuitively understand the Infinite.

Check your comment at the end of this post.

I can think of few things which are more obviously self-explanatory than this.

My first rule of critical thinking. When something appears obvious and self-explanatory then start to doubt it.

If you have nothing - absolutely nothing - then there is nothing to act as a cause (either temporally or logically) for anything else to come into existence. If nothing can either temporally or logically cause new things to come into existence, no new things will come into existence. QED.

If you think that is QED, you should find yourself a better university. You are simply assuming your conclusion.

Your last sentence "If nothing can either temporally or logically cause new things to come into existence, no new things will come into existence" is the very proposition you are trying to justify so you can't use it as your justification.

You are simply saying "Nothing comes from nothing because nothing can come from nothing".

You need to show that non-contingent implies necessary. For example if:

A non-contingent unnecessary x would mean (updated):
{
  x has no cause
  if x did not exist x might exist
  if x existed x might not exist
}

You need to demonstrate the logical inconsistency in that definition.

I use the word "necessary". "Eternal" or "indestructable" or "infinite" will all also suffice.

You might also use "Thumper" or "Mrs Tiggywinkle". Using other words does not explain a concept.

Then say indestructible and uncreated.

And yet we would still not be there. Something uncreated might still have a beginning. Something indestructible might still have an end. In fact something might exist, have no beginning and no end and yet be capable of not existing. We do not know that beginnings and ends are the only possible ontological transitions or whether beginnings and ends are always distinguishable from each other.

And it is correct, from our point of view (if God exists, that is). There was no point in space or time where God did not exist. The only thing that is wrong with this statement is if it is taken to imply that time continues indefinately backwards instead of ceasing at the big bang.

No, what is wrong with it is that it is applied as a description of God.

Correct. Except that (1) doesn't seem to make sense, for the reasons given above. So you are left with (2) by a process of elimination.

But as I showed, your reasons were based on incorrect assumptions.

OK...you are assuming God is "thing".

No, I clearly assumed no such thing. I very clearly said that something "non-God" could be a thing.

As I don't accept the concept of God I obviously have no originating opinion about God's nature, I will accept any definition you give.

Incidentally by "thing" I mean a non-abstract reality, which clearly could include being itself.

This is a little too defeatist for me. Even Kant, who denied we could have knowledge of the noumenal, still allowed that we could think about it coherently.

Even if I were to accept argument from authority I would not accept Kant as the authority.

You are assuming that if a position is defeatist then it must be wrong. It is defeatist of me to say that if I jump off a tall cliff I will probably plummet to a horrible death rather than soaring up with the birds. Unless I have a hangglider with me I should probably go with the defeatist argument.

I would say that I am thinking about it coherently when I suggest that there is an alternative that we are incapable of thinking about.

And no, I am not assuming that there is no hang glider.

 

[Robin]

What is the difference between something alive, and something dead? To me any useful definition of "life" begins with "will and intent".

Not a scientific definition then.

That underlying order, if material, finesses 'will and intent' with the term compatible; the pc you are using demonstrates compatible 'free-will'.

A word cannot finesse will and intent. What would differentiate a material order from an immaterial order?

I'd say that is one of the very few things you do have actual knowledge of.

I cannot think of any will and intent that I know of that spans more than a single individual.

 

[hammegk]

Not a scientific definition then.

Tacit perhaps, but any definition that misses that quality is a poor one imo. This seems to be an ultimate dead-end for scientific reductionism.

A word cannot finesse will and intent.

Humans attempt to, using words.

What would differentiate a material order from an immaterial order?

If you choose to believe what I'm calling "will and intent" do not exist, nothing imo.

I cannot think of any will and intent that I know of that spans more than a single individual.

Er, yes. That's my point.

 

[Robin]

Tacit perhaps, but any definition that misses that quality is a poor one imo. This seems to be an ultimate dead-end for scientific reductionism.

I merely mean that there are things that we think of as alive that have no will or intent. Trees for example.

Humans attempt to, using words.

Well do not argue with me the opinions of an unspecified third party with which apparently neither you nor I agree.

If you choose to believe what I'm calling "will and intent" do not exist, nothing imo.

I choose to believe no such thing. I only ask what would differentiate the order of a material world from the order of an immaterial world that would allow will and intent to exist in one, but not the other.

Er, yes. That's my point.

It is?????

If there is no will and intent that encompasses existence then there is no God.

Trifling argument about materialism vs ~ materialism etc is inconsequential if you do not agree that will and intent are the minimum definition for a God.

 

[hammegk]

I merely mean that there are things that we think of as alive that have no will or intent. Trees for example.

As an idealist, I can't agree that trees, for example, do not demonstrate rudimentary 'will and intent' -- to 'live' first of all.

It is?????

If there is no will and intent that encompasses existence then there is no God.

Trifling argument about materialism vs ~ materialism etc is inconsequential if you do not agree that will and intent are the minimum definition for a God.

Should God exist I would agree that would seem to be a minimum definition.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Your last sentence "If nothing can either temporally or logically cause new things to come into existence, no new things will come into existence" is the very proposition you are trying to justify so you can't use it as your justification.

You are simply saying "Nothing comes from nothing because nothing can come from nothing".

That's because there is no other way of expressing it. Are you asking me to prove that nothing is really nothing? Because it sounds like it. If something can come from it, it isn't nothing - by definition. Instead, it is something that something can come from. You are asking me to prove something which is already true because it is a tautology. Then you complain when I give you a tautology as my means of explaining why it is true!

You need to show that non-contingent implies necessary.

Robin......non-contingent means necessary!

http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&q=define:+contingent&meta=

Definition of "contingent": Opposite of ‘NECESSARY’. Something is contingent if it could have been different. A contingent truth is a proposition which, though true, might have been false, eg, ‘Mary owns an ice-axe.’

For example if:

A non-contingent unnecessary x would mean (updated):
{
  x has no cause
  if x did not exist x might exist
  if x existed x might not exist
}

You need to demonstrate the logical inconsistency in that definition.

That is very simple. "x exists but x might not have existed" means "x is contingent". But you are claiming it is non-contingent.

"Mary as an-ice but may not have had an ice-axe". Mary having an ice-axe is a contingent state of affairs. If God exists, it is not a contingent state of affairs. It necessary.

And yet we would still not be there. Something uncreated might still have a beginning.

How?

Something indestructible might still have an end.

HOW?

In fact something might exist, have no beginning and no end and yet be capable of not existing.

???

:

As I don't accept the concept of God I obviously have no originating opinion about God's nature, I will accept any definition you give.

What do you mean "I don't accept the concept"?

Are you saying the word "God" doesn't mean anything?

 

[Robin]

That's because there is no other way of expressing it. Are you asking me to prove that nothing is really nothing?

No, I am clearly not, I am asking you to justify your assertion that we can be 100% certain that something cannot come from nothing.

Quite clearly I am asking you to show that this definition:

x has no cause
if x exists then x might not exist

Is logically inconsistent.

If a circular argument is really the only way of expressing your assertion then your assertion must be deemed to be unjustified.

Because it sounds like it.

Then clearly I have expressed myself poorly or you are misreading.

If something can come from it, it isn't nothing - by definition.

Fine so far

Instead, it is something that something can come from.

Fine so far.

You are asking me to prove something which is already true because it is a tautology.

Here is where you go wrong. "Something that something can come from" is clearly not equivalent to "something that came from something".

Neither is it equivalent to "something must come from something". So this step is simply a non-sequitur.

Then you complain when I give you a tautology as my means of explaining why it is true!

Petititio principii is not a tautology it is a fallacy.

Robin......non-contingent means necessary!

Are you talking about necessity and contingency in logic? If so, this refers to truth and falsity rather than existence and non-existence. Necessary as in "necessary being" is a different term. You even posted a link to the debate between Russell and Copleston where this distinction is made clear.

There are two ways contingency is used in this context:
1. Contingent: if x exists then x might not have existed
2. Contingent: x has a cause

Coplestone's argument would fall at the first hurdle if he used definition 1, instead he uses "beings ... which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence." which is more like the second.

Definition 1 of contingency says nothing at all about causality and no logical path to causality.

That is very simple. "x exists but x might not have existed" means "x is contingent".

As I have shown, if you use this definition then it says precisely nothing about causes.

So using this definition, how do you claim that a contingent being must have a cause?

But you are claiming it is non-contingent.

I am simply saying that "x might not have existed" and "x had a cause" are not equivalent statements. Clearly they are not.

If God exists, it is not a contingent state of affairs. It necessary.

You mean that if God exists and is necessary then God is necessary? True, but tautological.

If you are simply defining God as "necessary" then your argument is simply trivial.

But you cannot support that definition with logic - there is no way of demonstrating that a "God" implies "necessary", or vice-versa.

And yet we would still not be there. Something uncreated might still have a beginning.

How?

What are you asking? To show that I am not 100% certain that all beginnings are creations? Or that you are not 100% certain?

The equivalence of "creation" and "beginning" is inherent in your assertion. So the burden is upon you to defend this, which you should easily be able to do, given your 100% certainty on the subject.

Or are you relying on the logic that since all creations are beginnings then all beginnings are creations?

Something indestructible might still have an end

HOW?

For example if the existential scope of something were part of it's intrinsic properties. Then it might cease to exist as part of its nature.

An object might be indivisible and yet still have boundaries. Similarly an object might have intrinsic and yet unchangeable ontological boundaries.

In fact something might exist, have no beginning and no end and yet be capable of not existing.

???

:

Again you are making the mistake of assuming that the infinite must be intuitively comprehensible - that "jaw-dropping" is equivalent to "false". It is not.

If something was capable of not existing and did not have a cause and did not exist in time then the transition between existence and non-existence would not be so clear cut as a beginning and an end. It would mean that there was a possible state in which x existed and a possible state in which x does not exist.

There would be no intuitive way of saying which state preceded the other if you do not have time or causation as a reference point. In fact there might be no precedence.

It is obviously difficult for a human mind to think atemporally and acausally. It is even more difficult to find language in which to express these concepts.

Thus the idea appears counter-intuitive - jaw dropping even.

You are merely assuming that beginnings and ends are the only possible ontological transitions. You are assuming that something that is capable of existing and not existing must have a cause.

But you have not shown this to be the case.

What do you mean "I don't accept the concept"?

Are you saying the word "God" doesn't mean anything?

I am saying that it means many, many things to many, many people. You do not accept the concept of God as defined by, say, St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, Pope John Paul II among others in that you have stated there are internal contradictions in the definition.

In order to accept a concept I would first have to be reasonably satisfied that it is sufficiently defined and does not have internal contradictions.

I do not accept the concept of "God" in that it has no fixed meaning. You can argue with somebody using a definition received from mainstream Christianity and some Christian will come along and deny that any such definition exists. Even accuse me of inventing the definition as a sort of straw man.

So "God" is just a catch all term that might mean "the manifestations of a set of political and social views to which I subscribe". It might mean "the imagined focus of a shared psychological attributes". It might mean "a being possessing will and intent who created all things". It might mean "being itself". It might mean "some object that if it exists would not be capable of non-existence".

Some of these definitions might overlap, but it would be nonsense to assert that they all refer to a single concept.

 

[MRC_Hans]

That would only be true if I'd presented an argument from first temporal cause, but I have specifically stated I am not doing this. I am arguing about a sustaining cause, which is critically different with respect to your comments:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument



Sustaining causes are not like temporal causes. They are more like logical causes, and they must continue indefinately. In other words, if God (viewed as a sustaining cause) were to stop existing, then the Universe would also stop existing.

You have not argued for a sustaining cause. You argued that nothing can come from nothing. Since I assume you agree that something can come from something, once there IS something, everything else can come from what is already present, thus the original cause is no longer necessary.

Hans

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You have not argued for a sustaining cause. You argued that nothing can come from nothing.

Do you think there is something incompatible about those two positions? Because there isn't. I have actually argued for both of them.

Since I assume you agree that something can come from something, once there IS something, everything else can come from what is already present, thus the original cause is no longer necessary.

That assumes that the non-contingent cause exists within time/space. You appear to be making the same mistake as people who ask "What happened before the big bang?" If the Universe is existentially dependent on the non-contingent thing, then it continues to be so, quite independent of time. You cannot argue that only the beginning of the Universe is dependent on the non-contingent thing, because this assumes both

a) that the Universe had a temporal beginning (it didn't - because if you go back early enough then time itself ceases to exist)

and

b) that the necessary non-contingent cause of the Universe was itself temporal (which it couldn't have been - because time is a property of this universe)

The universe has no temporal cause. Therefore whatever was its logical cause cannot cease to exist. If it could cease to exist, it would be temporal and therefore couldn't be the logical cause.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hi Robin, thanks for the detailed reply.

Geoff: If something can come from it, it isn't nothing - by definition.

Robin: Fine so far

Geoff: Instead, it is something that something can come from.

Robin: Fine so far.

Well, that's all there is to it. "Nothing" and "something that something can come from" aren't equivalent. The first is the total abscence of anything at all and the second is something more like the Hindu "Brahman" (the ground of all being) or the Buddhist "Sunyata" (pregnant void).

Geoff: You are asking me to prove something which is already true because it is a tautology.

Robin: Here is where you go wrong. "Something that something can come from" is clearly not equivalent to "something that came from something".

I'm not saying these are the same. The former is (or could be) necessary and the latter has to be contingent. Perhaps it would be clearer if we changed "came from" to "depends upon (existentially)".

Are you talking about necessity and contingency in logic?

No. I am talking about metaphysical necessity.

"All bachelors are unmarried males" is an example of logical necessity.
"If God exists, then God exists necessarily" is an example of metaphysical necessity.

If so, this refers to truth and falsity rather than existence and non-existence. Necessary as in "necessary being" is a different term. You even posted a link to the debate between Russell and Copleston where this distinction is made clear.

There are two ways contingency is used in this context:
1. Contingent: if x exists then x might not have existed
2. Contingent: x has a cause

Coplestone's argument would fall at the first hurdle if he used definition 1, instead he uses "beings ... which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence." which is more like the second.

According to your (1) and (2) we then have two senses of necessary:

1. Necessary: if x exists then x cannot have failed to exist.
2. Necessary: x has no cause

Maybe clearer (again) if we change "cause" to "depends upon".

2. Contingent: x is dependent on something other than x
2. Necessary: x is not dependent upon anything except x

I am not interested in temporal causes because we don't know what time is, but there are at least two reasons for thinking it does not apply outside of space-time - Einstein (it's part of the Universe) and Kant (it's a condition of experience). So there is confusion here about the meaning of the word "cause". I do NOT mean "temporal cause".

Definition 1 of contingency says nothing at all about causality and no logical path to causality.

It does say something about sustaining causes. If something could not have failed to exist, then it cannot have been contingently caused. This needs a slight clarification - it could have been caused, but only via a necessary chain of causation. In other words, if the thing which caused it had to cause it then it is itself necessary, but only because it was necessarily caused by something which exists necessarily.

So using this definition, how do you claim that a contingent being must have a cause?

Because the very fact that it might not have existed means that there must be some reason, external to itself, why it does it exist.

Geoff: If God exists, it is not a contingent state of affairs. It necessary.

You mean that if God exists and is necessary then God is necessary? True, but tautological.

If you are simply defining God as "necessary" then your argument is simply trivial.

It would be trivial if I were defining God as logically necessary. That would be the ontological argument, as I already explained. And yes, I am simply defining God as being metaphysically necessary. I've already explained what this means, and why it is justified. It does not mean that God neccesarily exists in the same way that all bachelors are neccesarily unmarried men. It simply means that if God exists then God is metaphysically necessary - i.e. God cannot stop existing. This is entirely legitimate. It does not attempt to define God into existence. It merely points out that if God does exist, then God would have to be metaphysically necessary. Contingency is not a property one would expect God to have. God can't die.

What is wrong with: "Either God doesn't exist, or God can't stop existing."

But you cannot support that definition with logic - there is no way of demonstrating that a "God" implies "necessary", or vice-versa.

No. But I don't see why I have to. "Necessary" is one of the most basic metaphysical attributes attached to both western and eastern concepts of God. Without this attribute, the things being described couldn't be God.

Robin: Something uncreated might still have a beginning.

Geoff: How?

Robin: What are you asking? To show that I am not 100% certain that all beginnings are creations? Or that you are not 100% certain?

Neither. I am asking you how something uncreated could have had a beginning.

The equivalence of "creation" and "beginning" is inherent in your assertion. So the burden is upon you to defend this, which you should easily be able to do, given your 100% certainty on the subject.

Or are you relying on the logic that since all creations are beginnings then all beginnings are creations?

OK....maybe there is a problem here with the term "created". Life on Earth had a beginning, but I wouldn't want to say it was "created". The term "created" is taking on a meaning of "deliberately created, with intent, designed" or something along those lines. Life on earth was not created in this way, but it still had a cause.

So perhaps the question should be "How can something uncaused (logically) have had a beginning?" Do you believed that something which has no logical cause could still have had a beginning?

Originally Posted by Robin :
Something indestructible might still have an end

HOW?

For example if the existential scope of something were part of it's intrinsic properties. Then it might cease to exist as part of its nature.

An object might be indivisible and yet still have boundaries. Similarly an object might have intrinsic and yet unchangeable ontological boundaries.

I don't understand this. I don't really know what you are trying to say.

Originally Posted by Robin :
In fact something might exist, have no beginning and no end and yet be capable of not existing.

???

:

Again you are making the mistake of assuming that the infinite must be intuitively comprehensible - that "jaw-dropping" is equivalent to "false". It is not.

If something was capable of not existing and did not have a cause and did not exist in time then the transition between existence and non-existence would not be so clear cut as a beginning and an end. It would mean that there was a possible state in which x existed and a possible state in which x does not exist.

But I still don't understand why you think that something capable of not existing could also be causeless. If it is capable of not-existing, then if it exists there must be a reason why it exists. There has to be, because if it is capable of not existing then there must be a reason why it failed to exist (the abscence of the reason why it exists, if it exists).

There would be no intuitive way of saying which state preceded the other if you do not have time or causation as a reference point. In fact there might be no precedence.

From my perspective, this is just confused terminology. If one assumes that time is a property of the universe or of cognition then talking about "which state precedes which state" when refering to things external to space-time/cognition is simply meaningless. But it does not follow that logical causes don't exist. Even in the abscence of time, Y can still be metaphysically dependent on X. This was demonstrated by Kant. Just because on the level of "things as we perceive them" Y appeared to cause X, X may still be the metaphysical cause of Y.

In other words, you still seem to be mixing up temporal dependence/causality, logical dependence/causality and metaphysical dependence/causailty.

It is obviously difficult for a human mind to think atemporally and acausally. It is even more difficult to find language in which to express these concepts.

Sure, this is part of the problem here. Difficult, but not impossible.

You are merely assuming that beginnings and ends are the only possible ontological transitions. You are assuming that something that is capable of existing and not existing must have a cause.

I'm not. I am not the one trying to apply temporal concepts where they do not belong. I am talking about metaphysical necessity and metaphysical contingency and metaphysical dependence. I am NOT talking about temporality (at all) and I am NOT talking about logical/analytical necessity.

Geoff: What do you mean "I don't accept the concept"?

Geoff: Are you saying the word "God" doesn't mean anything?

Robin: I am saying that it means many, many things to many, many people. You do not accept the concept of God as defined by, say, St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, Pope John Paul II among others in that you have stated there are internal contradictions in the definition.

Of course. But various people (such as the first two on your list) provided different arguments for believing God has different attributes. In terms of this debate, all I am trying to show is that there must be something which exists necessarily. Many Christians then expect everyone to assume that this necessary being must be their God. The is a basic fallacy. In fact, a whole raft of other arguments are required to establish the other properties of God - some of which turn out to be logically inconsistent themselves, despite the best efforts of theists to show they aren't. But that doesn't give you the right to say to me that you "reject the concept of God". You have at least two concepts of God to work with - the mainstream theist concept - which is internally contradictory, and mine - which is coherent but rather minimal.

In order to accept a concept I would first have to be reasonably satisfied that it is sufficiently defined and does not have internal contradictions.

So what is the problem? Nobody here is trying to defend the mainstream conception of God. There is nothing internally contradictory about a metaphysically necessary being.

I do not accept the concept of "God" in that it has no fixed meaning.

Neither do lots of other words/concepts. But you still use them. As long as it is clear how it is being used in a specific situation, I don't understand why there is a problem.

So "God" is just a catch all term that might mean "the manifestations of a set of political and social views to which I subscribe".

But Robin......we all know exactly what I mean in this thread by "god". I mean a metaphysically necessary being. THAT IS ALL. Every time I write "God", just read "metaphysically necessary being". Would it be easier for you if I explicity wrote MNB instead of GOD???

Geoff

 

[DreadNiK]

What I'm wondering is where this is going...

Is there a point to this?