Anyhoo, I am off
Let me leave you all with what I regard as some of the more important texts of physicalism/positivism regarding the problems of using analytic linguistics to reason about real world entities.
The first is from the father of physicalism, Rudolf Carnap -
"Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology"
For example Carnap here appears to be suggesting that not only are questions about the reality of external entities "pseudo-questions", the questions about the abstract entities (like real numbers) needed to reason about physical things, are also pseudo questions. For example:
Rudolf Carnap said:
On the other hand, the external questions of the reality of physical space and physical time are pseudo-questions. A question like: "Are there (really) space-time points?" is ambiguous. It may be meant as an internal question; then the affirmative answer is, of course, analytic and trivial. Or it may be meant in the external sense: "Shall we introduce such and such forms into our language?"; in this case it is not a theoretical but a practical question, a matter of decision rather than assertion, and hence the proposed formulation would be misleading. Or finally, it may be meant in the following sense: "Are our experiences such that the use of the linguistic forms in question will be expedient and fruitful?" This is a theoretical question of a factual, empirical nature. But it concerns a matter of degree; therefore a formulation in the form "real or not?" would be inadequate.
And he makes clear what acceptance of any kind of entity (abstract or physical) means:
Thus it is clear that the acceptance of a linguistic framework must not be regarded as implying a metaphysical doctrine concerning the reality of the entities in question.
Quine on the other hand seems to be saying that Carnap is taking much too simplistic an approach. Here is his
Two Dogmas of Empiricism which is often regarded as the paper that finally buried reductionism (and reductionism is essentially the task Geoff has in establishing the new P1 - ie making positive statements about physical realities from linguistic structures). I will let you get at it for yourself.
I have already cited Mach's Analysis of Sensation often enough - it is easy enough to find on the internet.
From J.S Mills'
"Auguste Comte and Positivism" (my underlining)
The fundamental doctrine of a true philosophy, according to M. Comte, and the character by which he defines Positive Philosophy, is the following:—We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our knowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phaenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phaenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us.
M. Comte claims no originality for this conception of human knowledge. He avows that it has been virtually acted on from the earliest period by all who have made any real contribution to science, and became distinctly present to the minds of speculative men from the time of Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, whom he regards as collectively the founders of the Positive Philosophy
I think there is a thread here - "Positivism Galileo - Hawking" - again more evidence, if any was required, that Science works implicitly or explicitly within the framework of Positivism, not Materialism (See OP for relevance).
But what I really wanted this for was the argument against the idea that our "everyday" concepts are metaphysically neutral.
Here J.S Mill presents Comte's argument that everyday concepts are in fact influenced heavily by metaphysical philosophy, for example:
In whatever mode, natural or supernatural, we choose to account for the early Monotheism of the Hebrews, there can be no question that its reception by the Gentiles was only rendered possible by the slow preparation which the human mind had undergone from the philosophers.
These are only a few of the fairly substantial issues that could be raised even establishing that there is in fact an inherent dualism in "everyday" language, never mind whether there might be any possible way of reasoning from that point to a metaphysical position.
Good luck to anybody who wishes to do so.
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Some bits and bobs I had intended to post at some time:
Broad's definition of libertarian free will might be of interest to some
http://www.ditext.com/broad/dil.html - it is the only case I know of that such a definition has been attempted.
I note along the way that John Stuart Mills said:
John Stuart Mills said:
It must be granted that in every syllogism, considered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a petitio principii.
System of Logic, Book II, ch. 3, § 2
So
that particular argument appears to have been around for a long time. Here is an extract from Hamblin's "Fallacies" about it:
http://www.ditext.com/hamblin/7.html
