Materialists......

[President Bush]

Begging the question is an informal logical fallacy, so it can show up anywhere.

What the heck was Descartes trying to say if not:

(1) I think
(C) I am.

Maybe this:

At the beginning of the second meditation, having reached what he considers to be the ultimate level of doubt – his argument from the existence of a deceiving god – Descartes examines his beliefs to see if any has survived the doubt. In his belief in his own existence he finds it: it is impossible to doubt that he exists. Even if there were a deceiving god (or an evil demon, the tool he uses to stop himself sliding back into ungrounded beliefs), his belief in his own existence would be secure, for how could he be deceived unless he existed in order to be deceived?

"But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something [or thought anything at all] then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." (AT VII 25; CSM II 16–17)

There are two important notes to keep in mind here. First, he only claims the certainty of his own existence from the first-person point of view — he has not proved the existence of other minds at this point. This is something that has to be thought through by each of us for ourselves, as we follow the course of the meditations. Second, he is not saying that his existence is necessary; he is saying that if he's thinking, then necessarily he exists (see the instantiation principle).

Descartes does not use this first certainty, the cogito, as a foundation upon which to build further knowledge; rather, it is the firm ground upon which he can stand as he works to restore his beliefs. As he puts it:

"Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable." (AT VII 24; CSM II 16)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito_ergo_sum

Here's another definition for begging the question:

egging the question is proving what is not self-evident by means of itself...either because predicates which are identical belong to the same subject, or because the same predicate belongs to subjects which are identical.

http://beggingthequestion.quickseek.com/

Ask Aristotle if what is self evident begs the question.

 

[hammegk]

Answering the (runaway) Robin....

I love it even more when an Idealist, accused of a straw man position, responds with another straw man.

I agree that many of your recent posts don't demonstrate thought, but that wasn't exactly what I meant.

...the worldview you claim it engenders without ever quite explaining how ...

It's easy; Logical Materialist, 100% certain free-will and/or god do not exist.

Dualist, who cares ...

Logical Idealist, it is highly unlikely, but unknown, if free-will and/or god exist.

It is a little like saying that not choosing a footbal team leaves you as a Birmingham United supporter.

But you 'forgot' to explain some other, viable option.

What if you just don't want to assume anything at all? Maybe if we don't know, it is sometimes better just to say "I don't know".

Yes, it is a real shame materialists don't have that option on all things. It works fine for dualists, but their position begins as illogical.

Agree.

Sorry, I must be wrong, then. I'd better re-think neutral monism.

 

[Mercutio]

Dualist, who cares ...

My experience with Dualists here has been that they are desparate to use their dualism to prove the existence of God (see Iacchus for a textbook example). Given the impossibility of interaction between mind and material "stuff", they require a god who is above such petty concerns. (For Geoff, substitute "neutral monism" for "god" and it works pretty much the same.) God allows, dualism, dualism proves god...just so long as you don't care about circular reasoning.

This is vastly different from the pragmatic choice not to chose between monisms, either of which collapses into the other. I hope you can see that.

 

[hammegk]

I agree. I'm just sorry you, in particular, don't accept what should be equally obvious; Materialism absolutely disproves god.

 

[Mercutio]

I agree. I'm just sorry you, in particular, don't accept what should be equally obvious; Materialism absolutely disproves god.

I think you are right...but the problem is, materialism is embraced by scientists*, for whom the process of science has shaped a different sort of belief system; scientists believe provisionally, always subject to new data. Einstein summed it up: "No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong."

It is a peculiar thing--the most successful tool we have invented (science) has uncertainty built into it, while superstition and ignorance can afford the luxury of absolute certainty.

*as you already know, many scientists are pragmatists, and some are idealists (probably some are dualists, but come on....), so this is an admitted overgeneralization.

...and for what it is worth, I will take the "you, in particular" as a compliment.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

"But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies.
...
So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind."

Perhaps he really meant to say "I am, therefore I am"?

egging the question is proving what is not self-evident by means of itself...either because predicates which are identical belong to the same subject, or because the same predicate belongs to subjects which are identical.

Huh?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Perhaps he really meant to say "I am, therefore I am"?


Huh?

~~ Paul

That would be begging the question.

 

[hammegk]

I think you are right...but the problem is, materialism is embraced by scientists*, for whom the process of science has shaped a different sort of belief system; scientists believe provisionally, always subject to new data.

Agreed, yet materialism is as much a choice as is idealism, and imnsho, less defensible.

Einstein summed it up: "No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong."

We can argue about E.'s actual belief's, but I classify him as a ~materialist.

It is a peculiar thing--the most successful tool we have invented (science) has uncertainty built into it, while superstition and ignorance can afford the luxury of absolute certainty.

Which, again, neither adds to nor subtracts from one's choice of monism. Some argue, a scientist who does not deny the existence of god will quit too soon with a goddidit. I suggest no scientist, even as a theist, would ever make such a silly mistake; the scientific effort to delve more and more deeply into "god's mind" (paraphrasing Einstein) will never end.

...and for what it is worth, I will take the "you, in particular" as a compliment.

I meant it as such.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That would be begging the question.

But at least it would be obvious, whereas "I think, therefore I am" is more subtle. It's the implied possibility of thinking without being that makes me suspicious.

~~ Paul

 

[articulett]

I think you are right...but the problem is, materialism is embraced by scientists*, for whom the process of science has shaped a different sort of belief system; scientists believe provisionally, always subject to new data. Einstein summed it up: "No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong."

It is a peculiar thing--the most successful tool we have invented (science) has uncertainty built into it, while superstition and ignorance can afford the luxury of absolute certainty.

*as you already know, many scientists are pragmatists, and some are idealists (probably some are dualists, but come on....), so this is an admitted overgeneralization.

...and for what it is worth, I will take the "you, in particular" as a compliment.

I agree, oh wise one. The thing that bothers me about dualism is that it sticks in the brain and resists all contrary evidence--I think this makes it really hard to comprehend some of the really wondrous discoveries of science today--particularly on the genetic and neurological front. If you need to believe in free will, can you come to understand the various ways the brain, experiences, learning, logical fallacies, hormones, etc. affect that will? To me, free will seems like seeing the world in black and white and paying no attention to the colors and nuances and lighting and the perceptions of others who cannot perceive more or fewer colors than you do--or those who are blind or who perceive colors differently. I worry that such thinking makes people ignorant.

Once people really believe in a god or a hell, they seem to need that belief and be afraid of notions that might change those beliefs. Such beliefs aren't amenable to reason as they are inculcated so as not to be (have faith--don't ask questions...those who believe this way are better, happier, and more moral, etc.) And it becomes almost cruel to educate and liberate people who are eagerly awaiting the next life and all the goodies it is supposed to bring.

I think of those Mormon women in polygamous clans who have a zillion kids by the time they're 20--where will they go and what will they do if people take their heaven away from them...they have no education and tons of kids to take care of...they need eachother and the promise of happily ever after because otherwise they will realize how very much their lives suck.

I think faith and subjective truths are a major cause of ignorance.

And Hammy, I think it's on the burden of the god believer to explain how some all loving entity requires that he not be tested and that people blindly believe something or other without evidence or bad things will happen. Why would people be god-fearing, if this entity is all loving. To me, god is an all purpose manipulation, feel good meme--as is free will (though that is a meme used to punish more than to make people feel good) until proven otherwise. So is the soul. So is justgeoff's "synchronicity". We can explain things and understand them much better without these conundrums--moreover, we can explain why humans believe such things.

 

[hammegk]

Madam you are the person who wants to drag "a loving, theistic god", "souls", "hell", etc. into this discussion. Those are figments of your imagination, not mine. Burn them as you will; your comments continue to have nothing-zip-zero to do with this discussion --choice of monism, or acceptance of dualism.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul,

Chris posted:

If we can imagine zombies then....

This is equivalent to saying "If epiphenomenalism is true then....." Zombies behave exactly the same as normal humans, therefore imagining a zombie is like imagining a world where epiphenomenalism, supervenience physicalism or reductive physicalism is true.

...then we can imagine a universe that consists only of zombies but is physically identical to this one. In the zombie universe zombie humans will have evolved in exactly the same way as humans have in this universe and will have come up with exactly the same languages as humans in our universe. But the dualism of the languages in the zombie universe cannot have anything to do with any "experience" of reality as dualistic because the zombies have no such experience. So, the dualism of the languages cannot be evidence of any underlying duality of experience.

This is another variation on the claims that we cannot imagine zombies on the grounds that we cannot imagine how a something physically identical to a human but without a mind could behave indentically to something the physical but possessing a mind. We cannot imagine how minds could exist and yet not be causal. Chris's reply shows that zombie epiphenomenalism refutes itself. Put it another way - if you are an epiphenomenalist then you should be able to find it very easy to believe in zombies. You have the necessary conceptual seperation. The eliminativist response to the zombie argument claims zombies are inconcievable on the grounds that there are no such things as minds anyway. The epiphenomenalist accepts that there as such things as minds. But it leads to the asburd situation described by Chris, where zombies can be able to talk about minds as if they had one, even though they do not. The problem is another variation of the claim that epiphenomenonalist consciousness could not be a product of evolution because epiphenomanlist consciousness cannot be causal with respect to physical things. It cannot effect physical things in any way. So it could not have been selected for by evolution (because that would be causally effecting physical things) and it cannot be responsible for the dualism in our language for exactly the same reason. Conclusion: causally impotent consciousness doesn't make sense, epiphenomenalism is false.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What we cannot think, that we cannot think; we cannot therefore say what we cannot think. This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth. In fact what solipsism means is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself. That the world is my world, shows itself in that the limits of that language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world. (The microcosm.)

The world and life are one. I am my world. The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing. If I wrote a book "The World as I found it", I should also have therein to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made.

Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The "I" in solipisism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it. There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological "I". The "I occurs in philosophy though the fact that "the world is my world." The philosophical "I" is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit - not part of the world.

---------------

The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. (It is not problems of natural science which have to be solved.)

How the world is, is completely indifferent for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world. The facts all belong only to the task and not to its performance. Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is. The contemplation of the world sub specie aeternii is its contemplation of a limited whole. The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling. For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.

The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered. Scepticism is not irrefutable but palpably senseless, it it would doubt where a question cannot be asked. For doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question where there is answer, and this only where something can be said.

We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, then the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer.

There is indeed the inexpressable. This shows itself; it is the mystical.

The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he has given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other - he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - but it would be the only strictly correct method.

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: He who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)

 

[Apathia]

(Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)

That is lovely!

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That is lovely!

I think so too - and a fitting conclusion to a gargantuan thread.

 

[Mercutio]

remember, in his later works he moved away from the tractatus. Read his blue and brown books...very different. Wonderful stuff.

 

[hammegk]

There certainly are marked changes in Wittgenstein's work, but the differences between his early and late work can be exaggerated. Two central discontinuities in his work are these: whereas the Tractatus is concerned with the general form of the proposition, the general nature of metaphysics, and so on, in his later work Wittgenstein is very critical of "the craving for generality"; and, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein speaks of the central problems of philosophy, whereas the later work treats no problems as central. Another obvious difference is in Wittgenstein's style. The Tractatus is a carefully constructed set of short propositions. The Investigations, though also consisting of numbered sections, is longer, less clearly organized and more rambling, at least in appearance. This reflects Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that there are just a few central problems in philosophy, and his insistence on paying attention to particular cases, going over the rough ground.

On the other hand, the Tractatus itself says that its propositions are nonsense and thus, in a sense (not easy to understand), rejects itself. The fact that the later work also criticizes the Tractatus is not, therefore, proof of discontinuity in Wittgenstein's work. The main change may have been one of method and style. Problems are investigated one at a time, although many overlap. There is not a full-frontal assault on the problem or problems of philosophy. Otherwise, the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations attack much the same problems; they just do so in different ways.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/w/wittgens.htm

 

[articulett]

Madam you are the person who wants to drag "a loving, theistic god", "souls", "hell", etc. into this discussion. Those are figments of your imagination, not mine. Burn them as you will; your comments continue to have nothing-zip-zero to do with this discussion --choice of monism, or acceptance of dualism.

Oh, forgive me...I thought it was you who said this:

"I'm just sorry you, in particular, don't accept what should be equally obvious; Materialism absolutely disproves god."

to which Mercutio responded..."I think you are right...but the problem is, materialism is embraced by scientists*, for whom the process of science has shaped a different sort of belief system; scientists believe provisionally, always subject to new data. Einstein summed it up: "No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong."

It is a peculiar thing--the most successful tool we have invented (science) has uncertainty built into it, while superstition and ignorance can afford the luxury of absolute certainty.

*as you already know, many scientists are pragmatists, and some are idealists (probably some are dualists, but come on....), so this is an admitted overgeneralization."

My response was to him, and if he doesn't understand he is welcome to tell me. I never understand you, but that doesn't seem to bother you or me. I didn't expect YOU to understand. And dualism for you IS about an "intelligent designer"...and dualism to Geoff IS about synchronicity...you need dualism to have the belief you've come to depend upon. But I don't expect you to understand, but thanks for trying.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh, forgive me...

and dualism to Geoff IS about synchronicity...

you need dualism to have the belief you've come to depend upon.

But I don't expect you to understand, but thanks for trying.

Unfortunately, you don't even try.

I am not a dualist. Hammegk is not a dualist. Both of us have been saying so on this board for approximately the last five years.

I made a long post trying to get through to you. You did not reply to it. Did you read it?

This thread is finished. Please stop scribbling on the last page.

 

[Mercutio]

I am not a dualist. Hammegk is not a dualist. Both of us have been saying so on this board for approximately the last five years.

Hammy has been saying so consistently, and acting in accordance with what he says. You, on the other hand...your "neutral monism" arguments can easily be mistaken for a defense of dualism. You insist upon dualistic language, to the point of refusing to frame the questions any other way.

I think articulett can be forgiven for perceiving you according to your actions.