Materialists......

[nescafe]

So you aren't an epiphenomenalist or supervenience theorist. You do realise that only leaves you one materialist position left to defend, don't you? And you do realise which one it is, yes?

Oooh, I know! It means you get to accuse chriswl of not beliving that minds exist, despite the fact other people have pointed out to you that eliminative materialism doesn't say any such thing! Then we will have that whole heated disagreement about exactly what is eliminated in eliminative materialism again, pushing the post count in this thread above 6,000!

Perhaps I should apply for the $1,000,000 prize.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Oooh, I know! It means you get to accuse chriswl of not beliving that minds exist, despite the fact other people have pointed out to you that eliminative materialism doesn't say any such thing!

Apart from the definition of eliminative materialism, which says exactly that, and the people who actually defend it proffesionally, who, erm, say exactly that.



Yes, "other people" have accused me of not understanding eliminativism. They have no idea what they are talking about.

What is your problem, nescafe? Can you not read?

http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&q=eliminative+materialism&meta=

Early eliminativists such as Rorty and Feyerabend often confused two different conceptions of the sort of elimination that the term eliminative materialism entailed. On the one hand, these early theorists claimed, the cognitive sciences that will ultimately give us a correct account of the workings of the human mind will not refer to common-sense mental states like beliefs and desires; these states will not be part of the ontology of a mature cognitive science. But many critics immediately countered that this view was practically indistinguishable from identity theories. Even Quine himself wondered what exactly was so eliminative about eliminative materialism after all.

Is physicalism a repudiation of mental objects after all, or a theory of them? Does it repudiate the mental state of pain or anger in favor of its physical concomitant, or does it identify the mental state with a state of the physical organism (and so a state of the physical organism with the mental state)" (p. 265)

On the other hand, the same philosophers also claimed that common-sense mental states simply do not exist. But critics immediately pointed out that eliminativists could not have it both ways: either mental states exist and will ultimately be explained in terms of lower-level neuro-physiological processes or they do not.

[size=+2]Modern eliminativists have much more clearly expressed the view that mental phenomena simply do not exist and will eventually be eliminated from our thinking about the brain in the same way that demons have been eliminated from our thinking about mental illness and psychopathology.
[/size]

There is a simple reason why I keep having to repeat this. Some people cannot get it into their skulls that eliminative materialism really is ELIMINATIVE.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

...P1) There is a fundamental conceptual/linguistic dualism between mental and physical concepts/predicates/attributes.
[\QUOTE]
So this is an example of begging the question.

No, because rather like noses being physical, it's obviously true. Unless you think English isn't split into 1st-person and 3rd-person concepts, even though those terms were invented to describe the structure of language.

As I already said, materialists who come up with the linguistic theories based upon the need to defend their metaphysical beliefs rather than an actual analysis of the language are the exact equivalent of creationist geologists. Eliminative materialism is a theory about language. It claims that none of the mental concepts or 1st-person predicates actually refer to anything. But it is motivated by metaphysics, not linguistics - just as creationist geology is motivated by creationism, not geology. The result, in both cases, is rank absurdity.

 

[nescafe]

http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&q=eliminative+materialism&meta=:

Modern eliminativists have much more clearly expressed the view that mental phenomena simply do not exist and will eventually be eliminated from our thinking about the brain in the same way that demons have been eliminated from our thinking about mental illness and psychopathology

There is a simple reason why I keep having to repeat this. Some people cannot get it into their skulls that eliminative materialism really is ELIMINATIVE.

And I am amazed that you consistently manage to miss the point that we will still probably call it "mind" even if our understanding of what causes it changes radically. Some examples for your hopeful edification:

• Sunrise and Sunset: Once thought to be caused by the Sun going round the Earth, now known to be caused by the Earth spinning.
• Heat: Once thought to be caused by an invisible substance known as philogiston, now known to be an indirect measure of the kinetic energy of atoms and molecules.
• Lightning: Once thought to be the wrath of one (or more) gods, now known to be electrostatic phenomena.
• Ulcers: Once thought to be caused primarily by stress, now known to be caused primarily by Helicobacter pylori.
• Planets: Once thought to be (literally!) wandering stars, then perfect spheres of crystal orbiting the earth, now known to be balls of rocks and gas orbiting the Sun.
• Mental Illness: Once thought to be caused by demons, now thought to be caused (mainly) by faulty neural wiring and/or neurotransmitter imbalances.
• Minds: Once thought to be composed of things like Will, Desire, Subjective Experience, Shards of Godhead, etc. etc., now known to be ???

Have I belabored the point enough?

(ed. speling)

 

[chriswl]

So you aren't an epiphenomenalist or supervenience theorist. You do realise that only leaves you one materialist position left to defend, don't you?

I was discussing your beliefs and arguments, not mine. You are arguing for a non-epiphenomenal consciousness via a device (zombies) which supposedly proves that an epiphenomenal conscious must exist. I don't see how the zombie argument has anything to do with the existence of a consciousness that has causal powers.

Even if materialists conceded that the zombie argument showed that materialism was impossible (and I don't think they should) they would have an easy way out. They just need to acknowledge that some kind of epiphenomenal consciousness must exist. They can then safely forget that they ever said such a thing because epiphenomenal things can be quite safely ignored.

You just declared you were not an epiphenomenalist, in order to escape the zombie proof. That makes you one of two things (a) an eliminativist or (b) not a materialist at all.

I am nothing more than a naturalist. I believe in the universe as described by mainstream science. That includes the notion that the physical world is causally closed. Most physicists reckon that quantum mechanics doesn't violate this principle in a way that would affect the operation of "large scale" structures like neurons in the brain.

The causal closure of the physical leaves us two options - physicalism (with or without supervenience) or epiphenomenalist dualism. Choose your poison. Or don't. Because both positions have one thing in common - in neither case is there anything to be said about consciousness that we don't already say when we describe the behaviour of physical human beings. Consciousness as this extra, ineffable something either doesn't exist, or it exists and there is nothing we can say about it. No difference in practice.

 

[hammegk]

And I am amazed that you consistently manage to miss the point that we will still probably call it "mind" even if our understanding of what causes it chages radically. Some examples for your hopeful edification:

• Sunrise and Sunset: Once thought to be caused by the Sun going round the Earth, now known to be caused by the Earth spinning.
• Heat: Once thought to be caused by an invisible substance known as philogiston, now known to be an indirect measure of the kinetic energy of atoms and molecules.
• Lightning: Once thought to be the wrath of one (or more) gods, now known to be electrostatic phenomena.
• Ulcers: Once thought to be caused primarily by stress, now known to be caused primarily by Helicobacter pylori.
• Planets: Once thought to be (literally!) wandering stars, then perfect spheres of crystal orbiting the earth, now known to be balls of rocks and gas orbiting the Sun.
• Mental Illness: Once thought to be caused by demons, now thought to be caused (mainly) by faulty neural wiring and/or neurotransmitter imbalances.
• Minds: Once thought to be composed of things like Will, Desire, Subjective Experience, Shards of Godhead, etc. etc., now known to be ???

Have I belabored the point enough?

(ed. speling)

As soon as you fill in the ??? you will actually have a point.

As to mental illness, let's just say 'it's all your mind' ....

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And I am amazed that you consistently manage to miss the point that we will still probably call it "mind" even if our understanding of what causes it changes radically. Some examples for your hopeful edification:

• Sunrise and Sunset: Once thought to be caused by the Sun going round the Earth, now known to be caused by the Earth spinning.
• Heat: Once thought to be caused by an invisible substance known as philogiston, now known to be an indirect measure of the kinetic energy of atoms and molecules.
• Lightning: Once thought to be the wrath of one (or more) gods, now known to be electrostatic phenomena.
• Ulcers: Once thought to be caused primarily by stress, now known to be caused primarily by Helicobacter pylori.
• Planets: Once thought to be (literally!) wandering stars, then perfect spheres of crystal orbiting the earth, now known to be balls of rocks and gas orbiting the Sun.
• Mental Illness: Once thought to be caused by demons, now thought to be caused (mainly) by faulty neural wiring and/or neurotransmitter imbalances.
• Minds: Once thought to be composed of things like Will, Desire, Subjective Experience, Shards of Godhead, etc. etc., now known to be ???

Have I belabored the point enough?

(ed. speling)

What point?

You have a long list of things which have been successfully eliminated/reduced. All of them consisted of replacing one physical explanation with another physical explanation. Objective things being replaced by other objective things. This situation is fundamentally different because it involves the relationship between subjective and objective. Materialistic science isn't trying solve any old problem here. It is trying to solve the mind/body problem. The claim that materialistic science can solve the mind/body problem by a process it has previously used to replace one physical thing with another physical thing is high fantasy. And all you have actually got to back up the claim is....."???". And you wonder why we laugh at you?

HERE'S WHY:

In all of the cases you listed there was a situation before the reduction where we had:

the Sun going round the Earth BUT NO Earth spinning.
an invisible substance known as philogiston BUT NO indirect measure of the kinetic energy of atoms and molecules.
the wrath of one (or more) gods BUT NO to be electrostatic phenomena.
stress ulcers BUT NO Helicobacter pylori.
wandering stars and perfect spheres of crystal orbiting the earth BUT NO known to be balls of rocks and gas orbiting the Sun.
demons, BUT NO faulty neural wiring and/or neurotransmitter imbalances.

Understand where this is going yet?

Even before the physicalist solution to the MBP about which you fantasise has been provided, we are already in a completely different situation!

You see, we don't just have "minds". WE HAVE BRAIN PROCESSES!!!. Remember? Not only that, but minds and brain processes already look like one of the above pair of "X is eliminated by Y". In this case the sentence would not read:

"Minds: Once thought to be composed of things like Will, Desire, Subjective Experience, Shards of Godhead, etc. etc., now known to be ???"

Oh no. It would read:

"Minds: Once thought to be composed of things like Will, Desire, Subjective Experience, Shards of Godhead, etc. etc., now known to be BRAIN PROCESSES"

Hello?

Do you think we are stupid?

You've already got the only thing you could possibly eliminate minds for. It's BRAIN PROCESSES! But that elimination has already been suggested AND IT DOES NOT WORK. It does not work because one of them is objective and one of them is subjective. So when you try to eliminate minds by replacing them with brain processes you have to turn something subjective into objective, and objective, materialistic science CANNOT do it because it is committed to objectivity

When is the penny finally going to drop?

Having finally figured out "brain processes" doesn't fit in the "???" you are begging us to believe that one day science will find another thing to put in the "???" You are living in a scientistic fantasy. It's not going to happen. And no, that's got nothing to do with me assuming my conclusion or having a psychological need to believe fuzzy woo-woo stuff. It's got to do with good old fashioned LOGIC and EVIDENCE and REASONING and a desire not to believe in fairytales.

The Elephant is back.

 

[Robin]

That's nice, but someone other might have found it useful.

Point taken, comment retracted.

Otherwise agree but I'd use "does exist" instead of "could exist", at least while we are still staying in classical logic.

Yes, I was not doing any of this with a clear mind.

Have you been reading my posts at all?

I'd like to believe that I have been quite consistent in stating that all the p-zombie-proofs that I've seen have been abstracted down to the "garbage in, garbage out" level (including the one that I presented -- it was intended to be an example showing a key feature that the original one left out and I wouldn't even dream claiming that it is accurate enough to capture the real situation).

I suppose I was annoyed that Geoff was taking your comments as evidence of the basic soundness of the zombie argument. It seems to have clouded my judgment about your posts.

Your argument is every bit as valid as was the Geoff's argument. Meaning that the conclusion is really a logical conclusion of the assumptions but the assumptions themselves have no relevance to the Real World.

I still say that either the conclusion does not follow or it assumes it's conclusion. After all Geoff was the first to say "but noses are physical".

I have also been quite consistent in stating that my personal belief is that consciousness is physical. But I don't confuse my personal beliefs with logical proofs.

And my responses to you have been somewhat baiting. I apologise for that - I look back and see that I was misrepresenting you to provoke a response. Very trollish of me.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I was discussing your beliefs and arguments, not mine. You are arguing for a non-epiphenomenal consciousness via a device (zombies) which supposedly proves that an epiphenomenal conscious must exist.

Nope. I am debunking materialism. I'm doing it in a two-pronged fashion. Materialism comes in two main forms. One of them is based on supervenience or epiphenomenalism and claims minds can be reduced to matter. The other is eliminativism and it claims there are no such things as minds. I am now attacking both of them. I attacked eliminativism in the previous post. The zombie argument is an attack on supervenience/epiphenomenalism/reductionism. In order to debunk S/E/R one uses a zombie, which is a creature that implies S/E/R. You then show that such a creature, even though it implies S/E/R, also falsifies S/E/R. At no point do I have to believe in S/E/R. My position is completely different to all of these and will only be seriously considered by the materialists when they have finally realised that materialism is indefensible.

So it's two-pronged. Quite a few people here are now happily flippity-flopping backwards and forwards between the two positions. I have no idea how many times they need to flip-flop before they figure out what is happening. The very fact that they can't hold down a consistent position is ample evidence that they cannot defend any of the positions they are flopping between.

I don't see how the zombie argument has anything to do with the existence of a consciousness that has causal powers.

Because it has established that mind means "mind" and not some materialist b***s*** like "private behaviours" or "brain process". And if you reject epiphenomenalism on the grounds that you are convinced minds have causal power then you've completely abandoned any hope of defending materialism. Mental causality and materialism are contradictory.

Even if materialists conceded that the zombie argument showed that materialism was impossible (and I don't think they should) they would have an easy way out. They just need to acknowledge that some kind of epiphenomenal consciousness must exist.

A non-physical epiphenomenal consciousness? You mean Property Dualism? Fine. I can't argue with you if that's what you want to defend.

They can then safely forget that they ever said such a thing because epiphenomenal things can be quite safely ignored.

Oh boy. So they can admit they are a property dualist to get out of the logical fix and then go back to saying they are materialists.

I am nothing more than a naturalist. I believe in the universe as described by mainstream science.

So do I, and my position does not contradict naturalism,

That includes the notion that the physical world is causally closed.

Sounds like physicalism to me.....

Most physicists reckon that quantum mechanics doesn't violate this principle in a way that would affect the operation of "large scale" structures like neurons in the brain.

And some of them don't. See: Thomas Kuhn.

The causal closure of the physical leaves us two options - physicalism (with or without supervenience) or epiphenomenalist dualism. Choose your poison.

I choose neutral monism, exactly because it tastes much better than either of those.

Or don't. Because both positions have one thing in common - in neither case is there anything to be said about consciousness that we don't already say when we describe the behaviour of physical human beings. Consciousness as this extra, ineffable something either doesn't exist, or it exists and there is nothing we can say about it. No difference in practice.

There's plenty to be said about consciousness.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Not at all. If we can imagine zombies then we can imagine a universe that consists only of zombies but is physically identical to this one. In the zombie universe zombie humans will have evolved in exactly the same way as humans have in this universe and will have come up with exactly the same languages as humans in our universe. But the dualism of the languages in the zombie universe cannot have anything to do with any "experience" of reality as dualistic because the zombies have no such experience. So, the dualism of the languages cannot be evidence of any underlying duality of experience.

And in that universe there will be zombie philosophers promoting the conceivability of zombies. If the argument is sound here, then it is sound in the zombie universe, too. Yet physicalism is true in the zombie universe.

If you can imagine zombies (I can't) then you are viewing consciousness as epiphenomenal. Even if you could prove that such a conscious must exist you would still have proved nothing. Epiphenomenal things don't exist in any important way.

Some say this is not a problem because mental causes may overdetermine physical effects. So they are causal, yet don't cause anything that wasn't already caused by physical causes. I don't understand this argument.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What's wrong with the way its defined? The only times I have ever accused people of begging the question is when they either literally assumed their conclusion or introduced a term which directly implied they had assumed their conclusion (like the term "mental behaviours", where "mental" actually meant "physical.).

I've read about a dozen definitions of begging the question and I remain confused.

Begging the question does not mean to bring up the question. It means to present as true a premise that requires proof--i.e., taking a conclusion for granted before it is proved or assuming in the premises of your argument what is supposed to be proved in the conclusion. (This fallacy is related to the circular argument.)

Taking a conclusion for granted before it is proved does not mean the same thing as presenting a premise as true that requires proof. I'm not sure what the connection is. I understand that including the conclusion in the premises is the issue, but I'm not sure exactly when such an error is committed. I've said this about half a dozen times now.

When somebody says "If materialism is true then minds are brain processes." they are trying to use an unproved/unsupported assumption to override some part of the argument which is supported by evidence/reasoning. They offer no means to support the "materialism is true" claim. Neither to they make any attempt to challenge the reasoning supporting the claim that "minds are non-physical". They just assert that if materialism is true, the claim "minds are non-physical" must be false. That is begging the question.

I don't see why this is begging the question. It's just an incomplete argument.

~~ Paul

 

[DreadNiK]

Not at all. If we can imagine zombies then we can imagine a universe that consists only of zombies but is physically identical to this one. In the zombie universe zombie humans will have evolved in exactly the same way as humans have in this universe and will have come up with exactly the same languages as humans in our universe. But the dualism of the languages in the zombie universe cannot have anything to do with any "experience" of reality as dualistic because the zombies have no such experience. So, the dualism of the languages cannot be evidence of any underlying duality of experience.

JG, you going to concede this refutation?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff wrote:

One can examine ones own experience of reality without reference to metaphysics, and the fact that our languages are naturally dualistic is the result of that experience of reality being dualistic.

I don't see how Chris's reply is a valid reply to the actual statement I made, but....

Chris replied:

Not at all. If we can imagine zombies then we can imagine a universe that consists only of zombies but is physically identical to this one.

Agreed.

In the zombie universe zombie humans will have evolved in exactly the same way as humans have in this universe and will have come up with exactly the same languages as humans in our universe. But the dualism of the languages in the zombie universe cannot have anything to do with any "experience" of reality as dualistic because the zombies have no such experience. So, the dualism of the languages cannot be evidence of any underlying duality of experience.

OK. Very clever. I can appreciate this one. It's also absolutely correct.

However, it refutes two things at the same time:

A) It refutes the zombie argument.
B) It also refutes epiphenomenalism, supervenience physicalism and reductionist materialism.

Everyone happy with that conclusion?

 

[Robin]

No, it's the same argument I've been defending for 3000 posts. The critical part of it (P1 and P2) was what the opening post was about.

For a very large part of that you were refusing defend the claim of the opening post – refusing even to say what you meant by “physical” in it.

I am not sure that you have ever defended the claim in this thread - it appears to have been largely about other subjects.

Actually that sounds more like a Wittgenstein comment.

No, Wittgentstein merely added “what we cannot speak of we should be silent about”

Oh, goody. Are you going to challenge P1?

I see, as usual you are just going to baldly assert P1 and get everybody else to do the work and try to shoot it down.

I merely say that it is a premise based on an assumption and cannot be accepted until there is some reasoning or evidence to support it. I am not going to accept some statement merely on the say-so of some covert pachyderm.

Please feel free to supply such reasoning and/or evidence.

If so, you are challenging the claim that the grammatical difference between 1st-person and 3rd-person is embedded in language. Feel free to try. How much difficulty do you think I am going to have defending that claim?

I am not sure why you think the 1st person, 3rd person divide is relevant.

Do we never use the first person to speak of physical attributes “I am 6 foot tall”, I weigh 81 kilograms” etc?

Do we never use the third person to talk of our own minds – “My mind is not alert today” etc?

So this divide is not really relevant to the concept of mental/physical dualism. Do you have anything else beside this to support the supposed dualistic nature of language?

Can you think of any statement in everyday language that refers to a non-mental entity?

Even Dennett implicitly accepts that this linguistic dualism exists. That's why, in the opening paragraph of "The Intentional Stance", he says that it is justified to "start our enquiries from the 3rd-person, commonsense, materialistic view of the world."

Well I hardly regard Dennett as a serious philosopher.

I'm not sure that this is what is being claimed. What makes you think that it is?

It is pretty much the cornerstone of analytic philosophy throughout the twentieth century. I can’t think of any philosopher in the past 100 years who outright disagrees with this position.

What did any of these people say that contradicts P1 or P2?

I have been demonstrating this throughout the thread. But I will make you a deal. I will give you a complete essay on the subject of analytic/linguistic philosophy after you supply some evidence/reasoning to justify P1.

Certainly we are going to base the zombie argument on a premise gained from an analysis of natural language. This in turn is based upon a naive approach to metaphysics in so much as it is pre-metaphysical or non-metaphysical. This is in fact essential, since we do not wish to assume any actual metaphysics before we start the argument. Being "metaphysically naive" in this case is in fact the same as freeing oneself from metaphysical assumptions. One can examine ones own experience of reality without reference to metaphysics, and the fact that our languages are naturally dualistic is the result of that experience of reality being dualistic

You appear to have the assumption that natural language is metaphysically naïve, or that it is free from metaphysical assumptions. But the everyday world is not insulated from metaphysical thought. “Cogito ergo sum” is an everyday part of our language that affects our worldview. I grew up going to a particular building every Sunday morning where they drummed a particular metaphysical worldview into my head. Can I pretend that my outlook is not affected by that?

From your actual point of view, untainted by metaphysical assumptions, naive dualism is true. There seems to be an external world (naive realism) but you also seem to have a mind.

Again, don’t make assumptions about what “seems” to me because you are inherently unable to make that call, just as I cannot make a call of what “seems” to you.

It seems and has always seemed to me that my mind is an intrinsic part of the world. “External” is a word I get from philosophy, not one I dreamed up myself.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

JG, you going to concede this refutation?

Yes. This is a simultaneous refutation of both the zombie argument and S/E/R.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And in that universe there will be zombie philosophers promoting the conceivability of zombies. If the argument is sound here, then it is sound in the zombie universe, too. Yet physicalism is true in the zombie universe.

Thus disproving both the zombie argument and supervenience materialism, epiphenomenalism and reductionist materialism.

Some say this is not a problem because mental causes may overdetermine physical effects. So they are causal, yet don't cause anything that wasn't already caused by physical causes. I don't understand this argument.

Neither do I.

 

[Robin]

There is a simple reason why I keep having to repeat this. Some people cannot get it into their skulls that eliminative materialism really is ELIMINATIVE.

And some others simply cannot get it into their skull that Wikipedia does not know a philosopher's views better than the philosopher himself.

Colouring it red and enlarging the font does not change this one iota.

Here is the definition from the horses mouth (again):

Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our commonsense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience.

Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
Paul M. Churchland
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Feb., 1981) , pp. 67-90

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Taking a conclusion for granted before it is proved does not mean the same thing as presenting a premise as true that requires proof.

That is correct. There is nothing to stop the question-beggers from trying to support their assumption. They have not attempted to do so. When asked, they will say "All the scientific evidence indicates that materialism is true" or "All the scientific evidence suggests minds are nothing but brain processes". But these statements themselves can only be supported by further question-begging. There can be no evidence from materialistic science to support the claim that materialism is true. So that defence doesn't work. If there was a defence that worked, and it was supplied, then instead of question begging, we would have a valid refutation of the proof.

I don't see why this is begging the question. It's just an incomplete argument.

~~ Paul

I see where you are coming from. The problem is that the anti-materialists are all too well aware that the argument cannot be completed without further question-begging. Have a go. Try to support the claim "materialism is true" without assuming that it is true. I've supported my definition of mind with an argument from linguistics. What argument are you going to use to defend the claim "materialism is true"? without making the assumption "materialism is true" and taking into account there is a linguistic/conceptual argument supporting the claim that we experience the world dualistically.

 

[chriswl]

The zombie argument is an attack on supervenience/epiphenomenalism/reductionism. In order to debunk S/E/R one uses a zombie, which is a creature that implies S/E/R. You then show that such a creature, even though it implies S/E/R, also falsifies S/E/R.

As I recall you did this by just assuming that consciousness must be causally efficacious. But materialist don't believe this - they believe that physical events have only physical causes.

...my position does not contradict naturalism

Your world has minds causing physical action in ways that cannot be predicted from observation of physical phenomena. How is that different from allowing ESP or telekinesis? It is not naturalism.

[the notion that the physical world is causally closed] sounds like physicalism to me.....

That's quite an admission. Do you think that causal closure of the physical world (if true) would imply physicalism was true (or epiphenomenalism)?

Causal closure of the physical world is the absolutely standard position in science. Before quantum mechanics no one doubted it. Einstein never stopped doubting it. Hidden variables, whether local or non-local preserve causal closure. If scientists don't come to your rescue and discover these quantum structures in the brain then your position is indefensible.

I choose neutral monism, exactly because it tastes much better than either of those.

You invent a third thing to glue the physical and mental worlds together and expect us not to laugh when you call this contraption "monism"?

There's plenty to be said about consciousness.

If it's an epiphenomenon then there certainly isn't anything that can be said about it and if causal closure is true then an epiphenomenon is the most that consciousness can be.

 

[Robin]

Yeah, I love the logical progression to become a materialist ...

I think.

I think I am.

I think I am "stuff" that does not think.

That "stuff which does not think" is all that exists.

I love the ridiculous straw man arguments that Idealists are reduced to in desparate attempts to avoid justifying their own metaphysic.