Materialists......

[Cuddles]

Cuddles, you'll need to work a lot harder than that. That doesn't even remotely resemble the argument I am currently defending. But since I've only been defending it for past 2100 posts, you'll have to get 900 posts through the thread before you find out how the argument starts. The opening post merely establishes that it is absurd to claim that you cannot tell the difference between a brain and a mind.

That's exactly my point. Until you prove that there is a difference between a brain and a mind there is no point arguing about what that difference is.

 

[hammegk]

The only point you make is that we have another compatibilistic free-will p-zombie posting here.

What stimulii made you do it?

 

[President Bush]

From http://www.sjsu.edu/depts/itl/graphics/adhom/circular.html:

Often, however, circular reasoning is more subtle than this: it depends on an assumption not stated but assumed. Consider the famous argument of the French philosopher, René Descartes: "I think, therefore I am." Descartes has begged the question here, because when he said "I think," he'd already implied "I am" (or how else could he think?). Yet his fallacy continues to persuade people, over three hundred years later.

Wish I could get the link to work, as listing cogito ergo sum as an example of begging the question seems over the top to me.

 

[Belz...]

So let me get this straight. We now have p-thought and m-thought, but we can't distinguish them very easily?

M-thought is conscious experiencing, and this is what a p-zombie lacks. This conscious experiencing, since it cannot be detected by any living being except the one experiencing it (it has no effect on the external world), is therefore epiphenomenal. Is that correct? So consciousness, as Paul has been trying to argue as it relates to the p-zombie, is an epiphenomenon?

Why should we care about it?

Don't you just love stuff that can't be falsified ?

Wrong. We can distinguish between them very easily indeed.

HA! How can we do that, with absolute certainty, and still be sure that we aren't playing tricks on ourselves, eh ?

That was the whole point of the opening rant of this thread. The opening post is a reaction against a materialist who claimed that he truly and genuinely couldn't tell the difference between and brain process and a subjective experience. That is b***s***. We have absolutely no difficulty distinguishing between mental concepts and physical concepts.

Argument from personnal incredulity ? You don't believe the people who tell you that they can't because you think you can ?

The reason we have no difficulty is because the difference between 1st-person and 3rd-person is embedded in our language.

Which is akin to saying that flying pink unicorns exist because the three words that make up the term exist in language.

That's the whole point. That is why the burden of proof falls on to the materialist. Reality appears dualistic.

Objects appear to be solid, but they really aren't. Why would the appearance of dualism imply dualism, even IF I granted that appearance for the sake of argument, which I don't ?

But at some point we need an explanation for why reality appears dualistic to us even though in actual fact it is monistic. Materialism does not (and apparently cannot) provide this explanation.

You apparently aren't all that familiar with materialism, then.

So you are wrong to accuse me of begging the question. I did not merely assume that we work in a conceptual framework which is dualistic. There is powerful evidence to support this claim embedded in the structure of language itself.

If the language is inadequate, use other terms. If you think the mere existence of the term implies the existence of the concept it represents, then you won't have any problem providing us with pictures of flying pink unicorns.

For example....you can't have microtubules in a silicon brain. There may well be something about brain tissue which is very special with respect to conciousness. Put it this way - the only examples we have of verified instances of consciousness was when there was also a brain present. In the abscence of any other evidence, I am going to assume that actual brains are neccesary for consciousness. Do you think that is unreasonable?

Because flapping wings were thought necessary for flying before we made up other means to do so.

When you are caught question-begging for this redefinition of mental to physical, you retreat to claiming "mental actions RESULT from stuff the brain does", wobbling back into ersatz-dualism.

No it doesn't. The beam of light is emitted by and results from the flashlight, but ISN'T the flashlight. They're both "made" of the same "stuff".

 

[hammegk]

.... listing cogito ergo sum as an example of begging the question seems over the top to me.

Yeah, I love the logical progression to become a materialist ...

I think.

I think I am.

I think I am "stuff" that does not think.

That "stuff which does not think" is all that exists.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wish I could get the link to work, as listing cogito ergo sum as an example of begging the question seems over the top to me.

Try this:

http://www.sjsu.edu/depts/itl/graphics/adhom/circular.html

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Yeah, I love the logical progression to become a materialist ...

I think.

Sounds like a reasonable assumption.

I think I am.

That's good, because "I think" implies "I am."

I think I am "stuff" that does not think.

No, stuff does think. It's called a brain. Perhaps you mean "I think I am 'stuff' that does not have inherent mental attributes."

That "stuff which does not think" is all that exists.

There is no "stuff which does not think."

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's exactly my point. Until you prove that there is a difference between a brain and a mind there is no point arguing about what that difference is.

Read the thread. Do you really believe that we haven't progressed past simplistic objections of this sort?

Sorry, I am not going to rewind 2800 posts. I suggest you read at least the last ten pages.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wish I could get the link to work, as listing cogito ergo sum as an example of begging the question seems over the top to me.

According to certain people here, every valid philosophical argument is an example of assuming ones conclusion. They've spent years (in some cases) incorrectly accusing me of begging the question whilst they continually begged the question themselves, now, when they are finally confronted with figuring out what "begging the question" actually means they interpret it to mean "all valid arguments assume their conclusion."

 

[President Bush]

Try this:

http://www.sjsu.edu/depts/itl/graphics/adhom/circular.html

~~ Paul

Thanks.

Describing cogito ergo sum as an example of an argument begging the question seems problematic to me. A logical fallacy (such as begging the question) is a flaw in the structure of such a deductive argument.

Cogito ergo sum was deemed a priori by Descartes, axiomatic. Perhaps a basis for argument, but not a deductive argument in itself. I don't think (by definition) it can beg the question.

 

[hammegk]

No, stuff does think. It's called a brain.

Yeah, that's what the discussion is about. Does brain activity = "mind'.

Perhaps you mean "I think I am 'stuff' that does not have inherent mental attributes."

That sounds like a good materialist.

There is no "stuff which does not think."

That sounds like idealism.

Glad to hear you've decided strings?/leptons?/quarks?/bosons? think. Some might prefer to argue they represent epiphenomena of the underlying reality we might call "intent to exist".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

According to certain people here, every valid philosophical argument is an example of assuming ones conclusion. They've spent years (in some cases) incorrectly accusing me of begging the question whilst they continually begged the question themselves, now, when they are finally confronted with figuring out what "begging the question" actually means they interpret it to mean "all valid arguments assume their conclusion."

Lovely, thanks. Now, can you define begging the question in a useful way?

Describing cogito ergo sum as an example of an argument begging the question seems problematic to me. A logical fallacy (such as begging the question) is a flaw in the structure of such a deductive argument.

Not really, because begging the question is an informal logical fallacy. A formal argument that begs the question can still be valid.

Cogito ergo sum was deemed a priori by Descartes, axiomatic. Perhaps a basis for argument, but not a deductive argument in itself. I don't think (by definition) it can beg the question.

(1) I think.
(C) I am.

I'm not sure how I can think without being, but wordplay is the diet of philosophy. Or maybe there's a missing premise:

(1) I think.
(2) Thinking creatures are.
(C) I am.

Maybe if we state this without using the verb to be?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Yeah, that's what the discussion is about. Does brain activity = "mind'.

We're talking about thinking. If you want to propose that thinking is part of the unspecified set of things that the mind does, be my guest. Then we would agree that a zombie can't think. What then would be the folk psychological term for all the computing that the zombie does?

That sounds like a good materialist.

Good, because your "I think I am "stuff" that does not think." doesn't.

That sounds like idealism.

If you interpret "There is no "stuff which does not think." to mean that all stuff thinks, that's true. That's not what I meant, of course.

~~ Paul

 

[Apathia]

Content removed by poster.

 

[hammegk]

What then would be the folk psychological term for all the computing that the zombie does?

Mindless computation ... just like your pc, albeit more complex.

Good, because your "I think I am "stuff" that does not think." doesn't.

Oh? Why not?

If you interpret "There is no "stuff which does not think." to mean that all stuff thinks, that's true. That's not what I meant, of course.

What do you mean, then? That is the meaning I get from your statement, especially within the context of this thread.

 

[chriswl]

One can examine ones own experience of reality without reference to metaphysics, and the fact that our languages are naturally dualistic is the result of that experience of reality being dualistic.

Not at all. If we can imagine zombies then we can imagine a universe that consists only of zombies but is physically identical to this one. In the zombie universe zombie humans will have evolved in exactly the same way as humans have in this universe and will have come up with exactly the same languages as humans in our universe. But the dualism of the languages in the zombie universe cannot have anything to do with any "experience" of reality as dualistic because the zombies have no such experience. So, the dualism of the languages cannot be evidence of any underlying duality of experience.

If you can imagine zombies (I can't) then you are viewing consciousness as epiphenomenal. Even if you could prove that such a conscious must exist you would still have proved nothing. Epiphenomenal things don't exist in any important way.

 

[DreadNiK]

Not at all. If we can imagine zombies then we can imagine a universe that consists only of zombies but is physically identical to this one. In the zombie universe zombie humans will have evolved in exactly the same way as humans have in this universe and will have come up with exactly the same languages as humans in our universe. But the dualism of the languages in the zombie universe cannot have anything to do with any "experience" of reality as dualistic because the zombies have no such experience. So, the dualism of the languages cannot be evidence of any underlying duality of experience.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Lovely, thanks. Now, can you define begging the question in a useful way?

What's wrong with the way its defined? The only times I have ever accused people of begging the question is when they either literally assumed their conclusion or introduced a term which directly implied they had assumed their conclusion (like the term "mental behaviours", where "mental" actually meant "physical.).

Here:

"What Does "Begging the Question" Really Mean?"

http://www.grammartips.homestead.com/begging.html

Begging the question does not mean to bring up the question. It means to present as true a premise that requires proof--i.e., taking a conclusion for granted before it is proved or assuming in the premises of your argument what is supposed to be proved in the conclusion. (This fallacy is related to the circular argument.)

This is exactly as I have been using it in the zombie argument.

When somebody says "If materialism is true then minds are brain processes." they are trying to use an unproved/unsupported assumption to override some part of the argument which is supported by evidence/reasoning. They offer no means to support the "materialism is true" claim. Neither to they make any attempt to challenge the reasoning supporting the claim that "minds are non-physical". They just assert that if materialism is true, the claim "minds are non-physical" must be false. That is begging the question.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you can imagine zombies (I can't) then you are viewing consciousness as epiphenomenal.

So you aren't an epiphenomenalist or supervenience theorist. You do realise that only leaves you one materialist position left to defend, don't you? And you do realise which one it is, yes?

Even if you could prove that such a conscious must exist you would still have proved nothing. Epiphenomenal things don't exist in any important way.

You just declared you were not an epiphenomenalist, in order to escape the zombie proof. That makes you one of two things (a) an eliminativist or (b) not a materialist at all.

 

[Jeff Corey]

...P1) There is a fundamental conceptual/linguistic dualism between mental and physical concepts/predicates/attributes.

So this is an example of begging the question.