Materialists......

[Mercutio]

For the behavorists; you really believe (let's go for the 100%) that 'you' are nothing but a set of behaviors? We both can see the public set, but 'you' are just the private set?

I perform (or "am", if I read your usage properly) both the public and private behaviors. I am a behaving organism. "[N]othing but a set of behaviors" ignores the body doing the behaving, after all. Putting scare quotes around 'you' suggests that you are using the word in a very special sense; if you would care to expand on it, maybe I could answer more accurately.

 

[hammegk]

Yes to the question. I don't understand your second sentence. Maybe that's the source of confusion.

Interesting. That's my definition of a p-zombie, and my second question/sentence no longer has meaning; there is nothing but public behavior.

 

[hammegk]

I perform (or "am", if I read your usage properly) both the public and private behaviors. I am a behaving organism. "[N]othing but a set of behaviors" ignores the body doing the behaving, after all. Putting scare quotes around 'you' suggests that you are using the word in a very special sense; if you would care to expand on it, maybe I could answer more accurately.

How do you distinguish between public and private behaviors? Is it measureable by science? If yes, why would you think so? If no, you also fit my definition of a p-zombie.

 

[Mercutio]

How do you distinguish between public and private behaviors? Is it measureable by science? If yes, why would you think so? If no, you also fit my definition of a p-zombie.

The only distinction between public and private behaviors is the number of observers. If there are other distinctions, they are not yet evidenced. Supposing someone invented a brain-scanner that allowed an outside observer to glimpse what images you were dreaming (for instance), that would make the (currently) private behavior of dreaming public.

Yes, it is measurable by science. Both are, actually--it is just a matter of number of potential observers. How many times a day do you think to yourself "that Mercutio is one smart feller"? I can't put a number on it, but you can (I suspect it is close to zero, but that is a guess). Change a variable in your environment, and see if that number changes tomorrow...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Never mind, Geoff. You're obviously going to take a certain slant on the argument that is of no relevance.

It's relevant because from a logicians point of view, it's the same logical error. I don't understand why the Socrates example didn't do it's job, especially since it came from LW, who both understands logic and is on the materialist's side of the debate. I gave an example of creationist reasoning because it was guaranteed not to cause any problems due to people's personal beliefs around here. Nearly everybody is willing to call foul if somebody bases an argument on the assumption "The Bible is true". But if the assumption in question is "Materialism is true", suddenly a whole new set of logical rules are employed. Except, that is, for LW - who identified the logical error immediately and has since moved on to the actual guts of this argument, which is about modal logic and how it applies to the zombie argument. Creationists are stupid, and believe things which are idiotic. But the reason they are capable of going on thinking idiotic things is partly because they have no idea how to reason logically. As a result, they can end up believing things like "Evolution contradicts the Bible. The Bible is true. Therefore evolution is false." This is logical absurdity, but it works for the creationist. The people at this site are not like creationists. Not even articulett. But sometimes they fall into the same sort of logical fallacies in defence of what they believe, even when they do not need to do so. LW, it should be remembered, is not sympathetic to my metaphysics. But he had no trouble identifiying an assumed conclusion when he saw one, and saw no reason to pretend otherwise.

I am not using a biblical example in order to be insulting. I am using it because it is a useful example, and because Belz already chose to use a biblical example but offered a very simplistic one. What I want most of all is for exactly the same logical standards to be applied to the arguments coming from skeptics as are applied to creationists. This is absolutely critical, not because it want it to lead to sensible people believing in woo, but because the integrity of science and skepticism are dependent on scientists and skeptics making sure that their own standards of evidence and logic are impeccable. If people want to throw logical stones at the cretinists, they'd better make sure their own house is in order, otherwise science itself starts to be devalued and that is an outcome which nobody but the cretinists want to see.

Geoff posted:

Does "Bible says 7 days, Evolution says much longer, Bible must be wrong." assume that the Bible is false?

Paul replied:

Uh, yes, I think it does, since the first two premises don't imply the conclusion. I suspect you meant to word it differently.

No, I meant what I wrote.

1) The Bible says all the species were created in 7 days. (assumption: the bible is true. If this assumption isn't present, there's no point in offering biblical evidence at all.)
2) Evolution says it took billions of years.
3) The Bible must be wrong.

Does this argument assume its conclusion?

edit: (creationist wants to claim it assumes its conclusion, but it doesn't, IMO)

edit (sorry, drunk....) The conclusion is actually valid. But the creationist wants to claim that its wrong. And this particular imaginary creationist wants to defend the claim that the evolutionist has assumed his conclusion.

The point of the example is to show that it is not valid to argue that evolution must be false, simply on the grounds that if evolution is true, the bible must be false. There is no assumption that the Bible is false involved in (2). Instead, (2) is supported by something external to this bit of logic. If you want to challenge the argument (as does our imaginary creationist), you cannot challenge it by claiming that (2) involves an assumption that the Bible is false. You want to challenge (2) alright (if you are a creationist) - but you can't do it by claiming it's an example of assuming ones conclusion. Instead, you have to investigate the claims which support (2), regardless of questions about the Bible. The same is true of the zombie argument. You cannot challenge it by claiming that the definition of p-zombies involves an assumption that materialism is false. Instead, you have to investigate the claims which support the claim "p-zombies are possible" *WITHOUT* resorting to any statement which starts "If materialism is true then....." If you do resort to such statements then just think of the creationist who resorts to "If the Bible is true then.....

This doesn't seem like the same sort of statement as "a p-zombie is physically identical to a human but has no mind." I don't know.

~~ Paul

It's exactly the same.

 

[Apathia]

Gee, thanks a lot. That really clarified things.

Really? or were you just being sarcastic?
"Gee" these days, usually proceeds irony.
If I read through my post quickly, it's counterproductive. LOL
Oh, well. I should stick to story writing.

But to finish this:
One reply to my thread might be:
"Yeah sure, I understood that distinction, but that's not what the OP was saying. he was saying that there are two different substances, mental and physical."

Well, I hope there still isn't someone around continuing to misread it that way.

 

[hammegk]

The only distinction between public and private behaviors is the number of observers.

I see. Why should I think there esists any observer of the private behavior of the p-zombie now communicating publically as Mercutio?

Since I'm not a p-zombie, "I" am observing "my" private behavior. That must be confusing to p-zombie Mercutio.

And you say you are 100% convinced, huh?

 

[Mercutio]

I see. Why should I think there esists any observer of the private behavior of the p-zombie now communicating publically as Mercutio?

Since I'm not a p-zombie, "I" am observing "my" private behavior. That must be confusing to p-zombie Mercutio.

And you say you are 100% convinced, huh?

Do you have someone who walks for you, too?

I look over and I see my dog lying on the carpet, emiting odors. According to you, I also observe myself looking over and seeing my dog... Which might lead one to ask whether I also observe myself observing myself looking over and seeing... and observe the observation of observing myself looking...

You are asking about the existence of things or processes that exist only in your assumptions about what you are doing.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's relevant because from a logicians point of view, it's the same logical error. I don't understand why the Socrates example didn't do it's job, especially since it came from LW, who both understands logic and is on the materialist's side of the debate.

I agree it's an equivalent logical error. I was simply questioning your assignment of motive to Robin.

1) The Bible says all the species were created in 7 days. (assumption: the bible is true. If this assumption isn't present, there's no point in offering biblical evidence at all.)
2) Evolution says it took billions of years.
3) The Bible must be wrong.

Does this argument assume its conclusion?

So we have:

1a) The Bible is all true.
1b) The Bible says all species were created in 7 days.
2) Evolution says all species evolved in billions of years.
C) The Bible is wrong.

The conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, does it?

Instead, you have to investigate the claims which support the claim "p-zombies are possible" *WITHOUT* resorting to any statement which starts "If materialism is true then....."

Are you saying Robin did this? Where?

By the way, you're claiming that you can arrive at "zombies are possible" without consideration of metaphysic. But actually you are talking about "conceptually possible," which has some unclear connection to "conceivable." Nothing I've read in the past few days discusses these ideas without talking about metaphysic.

If you do resort to such statements then just think of the creationist who resorts to "If the Bible is true then.....

But premise (1a) is "The Bible is all true."

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

Do you have someone who walks for you, too?

Walking (and all public) behavior exists per observers that are not the object behaving.

You are asking about the existence of things or processes that exist only in your assumptions about what you are doing.

Isn't language a bitch? "you" "your" "you"

Who or what is assuming that (private behavior) things or processes exist in p-zombie Mercutio? Still at 100%? 99.9999% sounds like a dualist to me. What do you "think", so to speak, or as Mercutio must say, how does Mercutio behave privately, and how will it be decided when to stop that private behavior? Just a maximum perceived benefit computation? Yet that m.p.b. must still privately run ...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Say, what is the definition of begging the question? From http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/begging-the-question.html we have:

Begging the Question is a fallacy in which the premises include the claim that the conclusion is true or (directly or indirectly) assume that the conclusion is true. This sort of "reasoning" typically has the following form.

1. Premises in which the truth of the conclusion is claimed or the truth of the conclusion is assumed (either directly or indirectly).
2. Claim C (the conclusion) is true.

Doesn't that definition include every conclusion of a set of premises? Surely every conclusion is directly or indirectly assumed true in the premises.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Walking (and all public) behavior exists per observers that are not the object behaving.

So, for you the magic number is 2? A behavior that 2 people observe exists, but one which one person observes does not? Why is that a better line to draw?

Isn't language a bitch? "you" "your" "you"

I see no strings, nor no divisions; "you" (second person singular) seems to be the proper pronoun. Are you suggesting that you are more than one you? The one I see, and the one you see?

Who or what is assuming that (private behavior) things or processes exist in p-zombie Mercutio? Still at 100%? 99.9999% sounds like a dualist to me. What do you "think", so to speak, or as Mercutio must say, how does Mercutio behave privately, and how will it be decided when to stop that private behavior? Just a maximum perceived benefit computation? Yet that m.p.b. must still privately run ...

A dualist would propose that private and public behavior be treated as if different. I may be wrong, but it seems that you do this. I know you are not a dualist, though--I suspect inadequacies of language are to blame.

The behaviorist studies behavior as it is influenced by the environment. This includes both public and private behavior. We really do not make a distinction between behaviors as a function of how many people observe it. I don't see how you see that as dualism...

The "who or what is assuming..." question opens the door to infinite regress, you must realize. I take you at your word that you are no dualist, but you are speaking like one here. Stripped of dualistic notions of cartesian theatres and all that jazz, the question is meaningless.

 

[Jeff Corey]

Private behavior is just behavior that others can't observe, at least at this time. Right before I started typing this, my my wife went to bed after Monk, I watched Psych and Home,MD and all my behavior was private. Unless you count 2 dogs and 3 cats as reliable observers. I subvocally talk to myself. A private behavior that helps me rehearse lectures or plan shopping trips. But it's all behavior, that's what I do.
I just don't get what you philosophs term p zombies. We are all p zombies in my book.
Available at Amazon for quite a reasonable price, I might add.
"The Attack of the P Zombies, a Philosophical Digression"
J, Corey (2007) Arkham Press.

 

[Apathia]

I just don't get what you philosophs term p zombies. We are all p zombies in my book.

A P-Zombie is an automoton that behaves like a person but has no consciouness or awareness of itself. It mechanically says and does all the things humans are supposed to, but It has no I-awareness. You are not a P-Zombie.

Where I have difficulty with the P-Zombie argument is that I can't quite imagine the P-Zombie as being conceptionally possible. The P-Zombie by definition is supposed to behave in a fully human fashion. But I doubt an automoton without a sense of selfhood could really measure up. For example it could be programmed to exhibit otherwise ethical behavior ala Asimov's three laws of robotics or the ilk. But it would lack judgement and do right by its programming but flub the situation. It would also have no compassion. Conmpassion is integral to self-awareness. It is a subjective valuing of the other as subject. The P-zombie would only have protocols of reacting to objects. A P-Zombie would not be able to love except in the sense of some kind of programmed attachment. Mature human Love transcends lust and attachment. P-Zombie would be hopeless in intimate relationship.
We already know individuals who have shut down or shut away their iinner lives, and we call them "zombies."

In short P-Zombie would only amount to a Zombie. P-Zombie could look like a human being, but not behave in a fully human way. Most of us would spot after a brief interaction that something was missing.

Ah, what is that something? P-Zombie has all the parts?
Maybe it has all the bells and whistles but isn't fully functional?
To behave in a fully human fashion, it needs selfhood. it needs to see itself and others as persons. By definition P-Zombie doesn't because it doesn't have mind. So I can't see how there could be a P-Zombie. Just a zombie.

My issue isn't about Scarecrow who needed a brain, but Tinman who needed a heart.

Selfhood is subjective. That's nearly tautological.
Is selfhood a physical thing?
Ask your self.

 

[chriswl]

Where I have difficulty with the P-Zombie argument is that I can't quite imagine the P-Zombie as being conceptionally possible. The P-Zombie by definition is supposed to behave in a fully human fashion. But I doubt an automoton without a sense of selfhood could really measure up. For example it could be programmed to exhibit otherwise ethical behavior ala Asimov's three laws of robotics or the ilk. But it would lack judgement and do right by its programming but flub the situation. It would also have no compassion. Conmpassion is integral to self-awareness. It is a subjective valuing of the other as subject. The P-zombie would only have protocols of reacting to objects. A P-Zombie would not be able to love except in the sense of some kind of programmed attachment. Mature human Love transcends lust and attachment. P-Zombie would be hopeless in intimate relationship.

All this is true for something we would think of as an "automaton". When people claim to be able to conceive of p-zombies I think what they are doing is imagining such an automaton, which is obviously not the same as a human, and then assuming that it could be "improved" so that it would be indistinguishable from a human in its behaviour, while assuming that this would change nothing about its having or not having consciousness.

Now, as this is only a thought experiment we don't need to worry about whether such "improvements" are practically possible, but they appear to be logically possible. The human brain is a purely physical system and thus it should be theoretically possible to perfectly simulate it, that is to perfectly recreate its behaviour. The question is, should we continue to think of such a thing as an "automaton" even after we have successfully given it fully human behaviour? As its behaviour is now a perfect copy of human behaviour it would be able to act with compassion (or malice) and be able to handle intimate relationships as well as any human. What reason do I have to think that it is now missing anything that normal humans have? We have tried to create a p-zombie and ended up creating a human.

Ah, what is that something? P-Zombie has all the parts?
Maybe it has all the bells and whistles but isn't fully functional?
To behave in a fully human fashion, it needs selfhood. it needs to see itself and others as persons. By definition P-Zombie doesn't because it doesn't have mind. So I can't see how there could be a P-Zombie. Just a zombie.

You're not really talking about p-zombies here but imperfect copies of humans that can't manage fully human behaviour. It's quite possible that they would not be conscious in the way humans are althought I would be careful about saying they had no consciousness. After all we usually grant even animals some degree of consciousness. But it doesn't follow that what they are lacking is non-physical.

 

[Mercutio]

A P-Zombie is an automoton that behaves like a person but has no consciouness or awareness of itself. It mechanically says and does all the things humans are supposed to, but It has no I-awareness. You are not a P-Zombie.

[snip]

In short P-Zombie would only amount to a Zombie. P-Zombie could look like a human being, but not behave in a fully human way. Most of us would spot after a brief interaction that something was missing.

So you resolve the p-zombie problem by denying the premise in the first place? The whole p-zombie deal is that it is indistinguishable, to any observer, from a human being. (I am pleased to see that the difference between your p-zombie and a human being is...behavior.)

Ah, what is that something? P-Zombie has all the parts?
Maybe it has all the bells and whistles but isn't fully functional?
To behave in a fully human fashion, it needs selfhood. it needs to see itself and others as persons. By definition P-Zombie doesn't because it doesn't have mind. So I can't see how there could be a P-Zombie. Just a zombie.

Ok, now you have to define "selfhood" and "mind". The way I see it, both of these terms are circularly inferred from the behaviors they allegedly give rise to.

My issue isn't about Scarecrow who needed a brain, but Tinman who needed a heart.

Selfhood is subjective. That's nearly tautological.
Is selfhood a physical thing?
Ask your self.

Again, until we have a definition we can agree upon, it is a meaningless question. Why can't the p-zombie utterly behave as if it had "selfhood"? All the things you said that indicate selfhood were behavioral--why can't (and indeed, the premise is that it can) the p-zombie exhibit those behaviors?

Perhaps it is not the concept of the p-zombie that is flawed, but the concept of selfhood.

 

[Mercutio]

Now, as this is only a thought experiment we don't need to worry about whether such "improvements" are practically possible, but they appear to be logically possible. The human brain is a purely physical system and thus it should be theoretically possible to perfectly simulate it, that is to perfectly recreate its behaviour. The question is, should we continue to think of such a thing as an "automaton" even after we have successfully given it fully human behaviour? As its behaviour is now a perfect copy of human behaviour it would be able to act with compassion (or malice) and be able to handle intimate relationships as well as any human. What reason do I have to think that it is now missing anything that normal humans have? We have tried to create a p-zombie and ended up creating a human.

From Descartes' essay on Man:

I assume their body to be but a statue, an earthen machine formed intentionally by God to be as much as possible like us. Thus not only does He give it externally the shapes and colors of all the parts of our bodies; He also places inside it all the pieces required to make it walk, eat, breathe, and imitate whichever of our own functions can be imagined to proceed from mere matter and to depend entirely on the arrangement of our organs.

We see clocks, artificial fountains, mills, and similar machines which, though made entirely by man, lack not the power to move, of themselves, in various ways. And I think that you will agree that the present machine could have even more sorts of movements than I have imagined and more ingenuity than I have assigned, for our supposition is that it was created by God.

Essentially, then, Cartesian Dualism began with an exploration of a p-zombie.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ok well maybe philosophy can't even do that then...?

If philosophy can't answer ethical questions, we're all in trouble.

Science can't answer ethical questions because they are based in a conceptual framework and not reality (that probably isn't the best way of putting it).

We're getting there.....

Yes. You could say that philosophy deals in abstract conceptual frameworks. But you could also say that science does the same thing. It's just they are very different abstract frameworks. The biggest difference is that the framework science works within is neccesarily objective and the frameworks with which philosophy deals are not neccesarily objective. Sometimes, as in metaphysics, philosophy is examining the abstract framework within which we think about things like objectivity and subjectivity. In the case of ethics, the framework neccesarily involves subjectivity. A great deal was written on this topic by philosophers like Sartre and Levinas. Ethics, for them, starts with an understanding of what it's like be a conscious subject living in a world with other concious subjects. An essential part of the process of doing ethics is "putting yourself in the place of The Other".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmanuel_Levinas

After the war, Levinas became a leading thinker in France, emerging from the circle of intellectuals surrounding Jean Wahl. His work is based on the ethics of the Other or, in Levinas' terms, he argues "ethics as first philosophy." For Levinas, the Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics (called ontology by Levinas). Levinas prefers to think of philosophy as the 'knowledge of love' rather than the love of knowledge. In his arrangement, ethics become an entity independent of subjectivity to the point where ethical responsibility is integral to the subject; because of this, an ethics of responsibility precedes any 'objective searching after truth'. Levinas derives the primacy of his ethics from the experience of the encounter with the Other. For Levinas, the face-to-face encounter with another human being is a privileged phenomenon in which the other person's proximity and distance are both strongly felt. Upon the revelation of the face a person's first natural desire is to murder the Other. At the same time, the revelation of the face forces the immediate recognition of one's inability to do so. One must instantly recognize the inviolability and autonomy of the Other. One must then place him or herself in the position of a student, and the Other is recognized as a teacher. Ultimately, morality is recognized through one's relation to the Other.

Among the many works of Levinas, key texts include Totalité et infini: essai sur l'extériorité (1961) and Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence (1974). Both works have been translated into English by the American philosopher Alphonso Lingis.

In Levinas's later thought following "Totality and Infinity", he argued that our responsiblity for-the-other was already rooted within our subjective constitution. It should be noted that the first line of the preface of this book is [paraphrase] "it is of the utmost importance to know whether or not we are duped by morality." This can be seen most clearly in his later account of recurrence (chapter 4 from "Otherwise Than Being"). Therein Levinas maintained that subjectivity was formed in and through our subjected-ness to the other. In this way, his effort was not to move away from traditional attempts to locate the other within subjectivity (this he agrees with), so much as his view was that subjectivity was primordially ethical and not theoretical. That is to say, our responsibility for-the-other was not a derivative feature of our subjectivity; instead, obligation founds our subjective being-in-the-world by giving it a meaningful direction and orientation. Levinas's thesis "ethics is first philosophy", then, means that the traditional philosophical pursuit of knowledge is but a secondary feature of a more basic ethical duty to-the-other.

Can science do that? Of course not. You may disagree with Levinas, but try to do so on the basis of a denial of the relevance of subjectivity and you'll make little sense.

And, no, what it is an example of is someone who doesn't value pointless or imaginary ideas, concepts and wordplay. (again, probably not the best way of putting it, but it certainly has nothing to do with leaving any space for anything)

So is Levinas's work without value or point?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Alright, Geoff, I give up. Besides, I'm too hot and miserable to really put much thought into anything today. This debate seems hopeless since we're obviously working off of different definitions. You say mind is subjective experience. Can you define subjective experience without deploying a circular definition back to mind?

I really do have subjective experiences. I need a word for them. Do you have subjective experiences? I don't care what word we use for those things - "mind", "subjective experiences", "qualia", "floobleboggle". I don't care what the word is. Please tell me what word to use for those things, and I will use it. Will the definition of that word be "circular"?

 

[Mercutio]

I really do have subjective experiences. I need a word for them. Do you have subjective experiences? I don't care what word we use for those things - "mind", "subjective experiences", "qualia", "floobleboggle". I don't care what the word is. Please tell me what word to use for those things, and I will use it. Will the definition of that word be "circular"?

You don't care? And yet you rejected "private behavior", which is neutral about monism/dualism, in favor of any of the terms (save "floobleboggle") you list which each are associated with dualistic baggage. If you insist upon that sort of term when proving that subjective experience is not physical, then yes, you will be guilty of circularity.