Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, please. Present the entire argument, including Robin's additional conclusion, why you think he added the conclusion, and so forth. Although here you say he added a proposition, not a conclusion.

I'm begging you to give me the entire thing in one post.

~~ Paul

I thought I had done so. I'll try again.

1) We observe that the concepts we use to describe things fall into two distinct categories. One of these is called "mental" and involves descriptions about (changes in) the point of view of an individual concious subject. The other is "physical", and doesn't. Nagel gave a much more detailed explanation of this linguistic difference.

2) Having established that (1) is true, it is possible to be clear about what we mean by "mind". Specifically, we mean the mental things, as described in (1) and we don't mean "brain processes" (because those are clearly physical). We could only mean "brain processes" if we are ignoring or denying(1).

3) We are now in a position to claim that p-zombies are at least conceptually possible. Our current concepts lead to a situation where it is easy to imagine a p-zombie. Also note that none of (1, 2 and 3) involves any assumptions about ontology at all. Regardless of what ontology is correct, (1) is still true based upon a linguistic analysis and nothing else.

The three steps above all come logically before the section of the argument we have been analysing. Their purpose is to establish the conceptual possibility of p-zombies without reference to ontology and to nail down the meaning of the word "mind" so it can't be disputed later.

4) Now comes the bit we've been discussing:

(4a) P-zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless.

(4b) Humans have minds.

Conclusion : Minds are non-physical.

Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning Robin used above, we have, because if we add the sentence:

(4c) Everything is physical.

...we have a contradiction.

Is he correct?

(4c) is the conclusion that Robin wants to reach. When he says "But if materialism is true then....." he is effectively adding a proposition, and it is a proposition which also happens to be the conclusion he wants to defend ("minds are physical"/"materialism is true"). He then correctly observes that there is a contradiction between his additional proposition and the definition of p-zombies in 4a. This, claims Robin, indicates that 4a contains the assumption that minds are non-physical - but it does no such thing. But 4a is not an assumption at all. It is based upon the previous three steps, all of which occured with no reference to any claim about ontology. At no point did any assumption take place that minds are non-physical. So if Robin wants to challenge this argument, it is not valid to do so by accusing me of assuming my conclusion. Instead, he's got to go back to (1, 2 and 3) and attempt to prevent 4a before it is allowed to happen, and what's more he's got to do so without assuming his conclusion. Alternatively he could deny 4b like mercutio does. But he is NOT logically allowed to use a statement/proposition that involves the words "materialism is true" or "minds are physical" (with or without a preceeeding "if"), because as soon as he does so, he's assumed his conclusion.

Geoff

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

1) The bible is the word of God
2) The bible claims that God exists
C) God exists

Yes, that's one, but still fairly transparent. How does one distinguish a valid conclusion from one that was assumed? Can it be done mechanically?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wonderful! Now we're getting somewhere! Since, to you, there is obviously a huge difference between "subjective experience" and "private behavior", would you please let the rest of us know what it is?

Yeah. I don't know what "private behaviour" means. I know what behaviour means, but it's always public (or at least it would be if you had the correct monitoring equipment). The p-zombie has no "private behaviour". It has plenty of behaviour, but I do not see why any of it is "private". On the other hand, everybody, including you, know perfectly well what is meant by "subjective experiences".

That is the very crux of the matter, Geoff. What is "subjective experience" other than the things you do which others cannot, even in principle, see?

Yes, that is the crux of the matter. What is this "subjective experience" that others cannot, even in principle, see? According to you it is something called "private behaviour". Is that your new word for "mind"? Because I can't see what else it means. It's just a crappy word for "subjective experiences". What's wrong with "subjective experiences"? After all - everybody knows what it means.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Could someone give me a nontrivial example of a set of premises and a conclusion where the premises do assume the conclusion?

~~ Paul

1) The Bible is true.
2) It says in the Bible that God made the world in 7 days.
3) Evolution says it took a lot longer.
4) Therefore evolution must be false.
5) Therefore evolution doesn't contradict the Bible.
6) The Bible is has not been shown to be untrue.

1) Materialism is true.
2) If materialism is true then minds are physical.
3) The p-zombie argument concludes that minds are not physical.
3) But if minds are physical then p-zombies are impossible.
4) Therefore the zombie argument fails.
5) Materialism has not been refuted.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't what answer it provides. Maybe you should ask a theoretical society of intelligent computers.

Read "Brave New World".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

(4c) is the conclusion that Robin wants to reach. When he says "But if materialism is true then....." he is effectively adding a proposition, and it is a proposition which also happens to be the conclusion he wants to defend ("minds are physical"/"materialism is true"). He then correctly observes that there is a contradiction between his additional proposition and the definition of p-zombies in 4a. This, claims Robin, indicates that 4a contains the assumption that minds are non-physical - but it does no such thing.

But the reason Robin adds "everything is physical" to check for a contradiction is because he wants to see if the premises imply "there is something nonphysical." Isn't that what he intended to do? By finding a contradiction, he indeed demonstrates that the premises imply "there is something nonphysical." I'm not sure why he thinks this means the premises beg the question, although I don't think my grasp of question begging is solid.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, that's one, but still fairly transparent. How does one distinguish a valid conclusion from one that was assumed? Can it be done mechanically?

~~ Paul

You have to make sure you can actually spot the assumption. Look at the two examples. It is easy to see where the conclusion is assumed. In Robins case it's just as easy. His input is "But if materialism is true then everything (including minds) is physical." It is no different to the creationist adding "But if the Bible is true (including genesis) then the world was made in 7 days..."

You wouldn't allow the creationist to get away with his assumption. You must apply the same standards to Robin. The only difference is that you are more sympathetic to the conclusion Robin is assuming. That makes no difference to the logic of the situation. It's exactly the same maneouvre.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But the reason Robin adds "everything is physical" to check for a contradiction is because he wants to see if the premises imply "there is something nonphysical." Isn't that what he intended to do? By finding a contradiction, he indeed demonstrates that the premises imply "there is something nonphysical." I'm not sure why he thinks this means the premises beg the question, although I don't think my grasp of question begging is solid.

~~ Paul

Apply it to the creationist example:

"But the reason the creationist adds "The Bible is true" is to check for a contradiction is because he wants to see if the premises imply "the Bible isn't true." Isn't that what he intended to do? By finding a contradiction, he indeed demonstrates that the premises imply "the Bible isn't true." I'm not sure why he thinks this means the premises beg the question, although I don't think my grasp of question begging is solid."

See what has happened? You are dead right that the creationist is interested in contradictions between the conclusion of the argument and the belief he wishes to defend. You are also dead right that Robin is interested in contradictions between the conclusion of the zombie argument and the belief that he wishes to defend. But is the creationist's complaint a valid one? No! Of course it isn't! There's a contradiction alright. But according to what you just said, the line "Evolution says it took a lot longer" involves the assumption that the Bible is false! Which is of course a pile of steaming bs. It is also a pile of steaming bs that the definition of a zombie involves the assumption that minds are non-physical. Neither example involves any identifiable instance of the so-called assumption. On top of that, in both cases there is an additional argument supporting the premise which is being accused of containing the "hidden assumption".

In summary, you can't invoke the truth of the bible in order to claim that evolution involves assumptions that the bible is false and you cannot invoke declarations that materialism is true in order to claim that the definition of a zombie involves assumptions about physicalism being false.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You have to make sure you can actually spot the assumption. Look at the two examples. It is easy to see where the conclusion is assumed. In Robins case it's just as easy. His input is "But if materialism is true then everything (including minds) is physical." It is no different to the creationist adding "But if the Bible is true (including genesis) then the world was made in 7 days..."

If you say so. I think he was just doing what I described in post 2726.

You wouldn't allow the creationist to get away with his assumption. You must apply the same standards to Robin. The only difference is that you are more sympathetic to the conclusion Robin is assuming. That makes no difference to the logic of the situation. It's exactly the same maneouvre.

Stop being an ass. I don't understand the argument, so I'm not sympathetic to anyone.

The assumptions are easy to spot in all the examples given so far. I'm wondering about more complex examples. My instinct about question begging is clearly incorrect, because it seems to me that "zombies exist; humans have minds; a zombie is physically identical to a human but has no mind" assumes that minds are nonphysical. Apparently I'm wrong and "minds are nonphysical" is a valid conclusion.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

See what has happened? You are dead right that the creationist is interested in contradictions between the conclusion of the argument and the belief he wishes to defend. You are also dead right that Robin is interested in contradictions between the conclusion of the zombie argument and the belief that he wishes to defend.

You're the one who said that Robin is interested in such contradictions, not me. You go right ahead and assume his motives, but don't cram your assumption down my throat.

In summary, you can't invoke the truth of the bible in order to claim that evolution involves assumptions that the bible is false and you cannot invoke declarations that materialism is true in order to claim that the definition of a zombie involves assumptions about physicalism being false.

You've blown this up into a religious war. The question is simply whether the premises assume "mind is nonphysical." Apparently they do not.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You're the one who said that Robin is interested in such contradictions, not me. You go right ahead and assume his motives, but don't cram your assumption down my throat.

I'm not doing so, Paul. That's why I am discussing Robin's position, and not yours. I am fully aware that you are just trying to understand the logic, and I am grateful for your efforts to do so. It is probably helping other people too.

You've blown this up into a religious war. The question is simply whether the premises assume "mind is nonphysical." Apparently they do not.

I am not turning it into a religious war. I am simply using an example that is clear and easy to analyse. Whether or not a conclusion has been assumed is independent of the subject matter.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you say so. I think he was just doing what I described in post 2726.

Then you're also defending the cretinist's reasoning, because it's the same reasoning.

Stop being an ass. I don't understand the argument, so I'm not sympathetic to anyone.

I don't know what I've said to upset you. I'm not feeling agressive this evening. I've just had a large lump removed from my leg, I can't walk properly, I'm dosed with pain killers and I am not feeling stressed about this thread.

The assumptions are easy to spot in all the examples given so far. I'm wondering about more complex examples.

If there has been an assumption, it is nearly always very easy to spot it. They aren't easy to hide, it's just some people fail to recognise what's right in front of them.

My instinct about question begging is clearly incorrect, because it seems to me that "zombies exist; humans have minds; a zombie is physically identical to a human but has no mind" assumes that minds are nonphysical.

Does "Bible says 7 days, Evolution says much longer, Bible must be wrong." assume that the Bible is false?

Apparently I'm wrong and "minds are nonphysical" is a valid conclusion.

~~ Paul

[edit: Please understand that "you" means "the materialist", not you Paul]

It is, provided you also accept the premises are true. If one or more of the premises is false, then the argument would still be logically valid, but its conclusion would be unsound because one of its premises is wrong. In other words, it's no use assuming the Bible or materialism is true and claiming that this means that evolution assumes it is false. It's also no use trying to justify your assumption that the Bible is true by invoking some sort of external evidence that has nothing to do with the argument ("I experienced God directly!" or "Empirical evidence supports physicalism!")

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Then you're also defending the cretinist's reasoning, because it's the same reasoning.

Never mind, Geoff. You're obviously going to take a certain slant on the argument that is of no relevance.

Does "Bible says 7 days, Evolution says much longer, Bible must be wrong." assume that the Bible is false?

Uh, yes, I think it does, since the first two premises don't imply the conclusion. I suspect you meant to word it differently.

This doesn't seem like the same sort of statement as "a p-zombie is physically identical to a human but has no mind." I don't know.

~~ Paul

 

[Jeff Corey]

I thought I had done so. I'll try again.

1) We observe that the concepts we use to describe things fall into two distinct categories. One of these is called "mental" and involves descriptions about (changes in) the point of view of an individual concious subject. The other is "physical", and doesn't. Nagel gave a much more detailed explanation of this linguistic difference.

2) Having established that (1) is true...
Geoff

Not so fast, Abernathy. You haven't establish 1 is true, you just asserted it. I, for one, don't observe that. The rest of your logical house of cards falls like a bad metaphor.

 

[I less than three logic]

Alright, Geoff, I give up. Besides, I'm too hot and miserable to really put much thought into anything today. This debate seems hopeless since we're obviously working off of different definitions. You say mind is subjective experience. Can you define subjective experience without deploying a circular definition back to mind?

 

[Apathia]

Not so fast, Abernathy. You haven't establish 1 is true, you just asserted it. I, for one, don't observe that. The rest of your logical house of cards falls like a bad metaphor.

This is one of the things that facinates me most about this thread: the number of people who don't get the simple destinction between ones subjective experience of him/herself (I) and his or her objective experience of he, she, and it.

I suggest that when Justgeoff says "experiencing ones own mind," or I, a number of people look at their bodies, because they identify themselves mostly with their bodies. The body is an it they can objectively point to. Then in their imaginations they also have an image of a physical thing they identify themselves with and say represents their physical reality. The subjective awareness or apprehension of their own "I" is not a mental activity they consciously engage in, though the doing of such is behind their self-consciousness.

For some posters who don't get the Original Post there is an additional disallowing of subjective experience in the contect of an intellectual argument. Some have a worldview in which Subjectivity is seen as flawed, delusional, valueless, and just productive of all kinds of woo-woo.

Could it be with do have some P-Zombies here?
No, that's just a joke, even in the context of Merc's claim he's a P-Zombie.
It's just a bit of personality difference (The old Introvert-Extrovert spectrum). and a bit of the classical not being able to see the forest because of the trees or the tress because of the forest.

Subjective experience vanishes because you objectify it.
Or perhaps your intellectual tookit excludes the Subjective and is ready to accept whatever consequences come of that in Philosophy.

Your approch to JustGeoff's argument then would be: Yes, I know that in conventional language we don't talk about Objective and Subjective experiences the same way. But this is just another example of common sense gone wrong. The way we experience and/or the way we talk do not correspond to reality.
We can only talk about "I" in the same objective sense as we talk about he, she, and it. saying "I" is just a shortcut. We use the shortcut word, "sunset." and the shortcut word "I" is just as incorrect as saying the sun sets. There is no "I." it's merely a contraction for "it." JustGeoff's argument merely shows that since we speak of mind as a Subjective mentality, then to be consistent, we must say mind (our subjective experience) is not Objective physicality. But if you assume this is false speech. ignorant old wives tales, foolish country hick language, and if furthermore you assume Subjectivity is an illusion while the material world is a reality, then of course, you have "bad metaphor."

 

[Jeff Corey]

Gee, thanks a lot. That really clarified things.

 

[hammegk]

For the behavorists; you really believe (let's go for the 100%) that 'you' are nothing but a set of behaviors? We both can see the public set, but 'you' are just the private set?

 

[Mercutio]

Yeah. I don't know what "private behaviour" means.

Too bad, really. It is a very simple definition, and for someone who claims to be making no assumptions at all, I would think that it would appeal to you. Obviously, you have not read the behaviorism tutorial I linked in other threads. Or did, but did not understand.

Behavior is defined simply as "what you do". Period. Not "what your body does", or "what your mind does", or "what both your mind and body do". It does not require you to dissect yourself...it is simply what you do. No assumptions about nature of mind or body or any of that. It is what you do. Do you walk? Do you think? Assuming yesses to both of those, they both pass the test for behavior. I know it is a highly technical definition (sarcasm), but there it is. If you have problems with it, perhaps it is time for you to reexamine the assumptions your definitions hold.

Ok, next you split your behavior in two. So does the behaviorist. You, however, assume that this split is between two completely different realms, perhaps (depending on your assumptions) mutually incompatible, perhaps independent, perhaps parallel, perhaps illusory manifestations of a single neutral entity...all depending on what you assume. So, let's take a look at the evidence. One thing we know for certain. There is a split between behavior that anyone can (at least in principle) observe, and behavior that cannot even in principle be observed by more than one person. (You may quibble on the "even in principle", but oddly enough it is not important to the behaviorist. You'll see.) Here, let me put in one of your own sentences...

I know what behaviour means, but it's always public (or at least it would be if you had the correct monitoring equipment).

All you are doing here is taking behavior from one (observable by only one) column to the other (observable by more than one); this would be a problem if they were indeed different sorts of stuff, but if we don't make that assumption (and it is only an assumption--note that the evidence does not require us to make that assumption at all), all the silliness that comes from the assumptions dissappears. Again, for someone who claims not to make assumptions, you should love this. You say behavior is "always public"; this was the same dualistic assumption that Watson made, and which behaviorism abandoned when Radical Behaviorism came to the fore.

The p-zombie has no "private behaviour". It has plenty of behaviour, but I do not see why any of it is "private".

Ah, ok. This is a new definition of p-zombie, and this is the reason I suggested the m-zombie (which does have private behavior, but no "consciousness", whatever that is). You have already been shown a few examples of why this seems extraordinary: If, for instance, you show a p-zombie a red card and ask what color it is, it says "red". I would personally infer from this that the p-zombie had engaged in the private behavior of seeing, but maybe only an m-zombie would do that. I cannot see how the p-zombie would be able to do that without engaging in private behaviors, but perhaps you will enlighten me. Is it simply magic? Another example...you tell the p-zombie something at time A, then ask it about it some time later at time B, at which time it answers accurately. I would, again, infer a private behavior of remembering (note, I cannot know, because it is private and I am not that particular p-zombie; of course, the same problem arises with any other person, and I also must infer that you think, feel and remember).

On the other hand, everybody, including you, know perfectly well what is meant by "subjective experiences".

Dictionary.com defines subjective (def 1) as "Proceeding from or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world: a subjective decision." Experience (def 1) is "The apprehension of an object, thought, or emotion through the senses or mind: a child's first experience of snow." So, yeah, everybody knows that "subjective experiences" means mental (the adjective form of mind) stuff. And there we have, implicit in the assumptions, dualism.

Yes, that is the crux of the matter. What is this "subjective experience" that others cannot, even in principle, see?

Note, your definition contains assumptions. What is it? How much of "what it is" is there, and how much is assumed to be there by your metaphysic?

According to you it is something called "private behaviour". Is that your new word for "mind"?

I hope by now you can see that it is a much better term than "mind", because it does not make the dualistic assumptions that "mind" does. Beyond a doubt, seeing, feeling, thinking...are things that you do. They are indeed private behavior. Whether they are of some fundamentally different stuff than public behavior is not something that, so far, we have evidence for.

Because I can't see what else it means.

Argument from ignorance.

It's just a crappy word for "subjective experiences".

It is a term that makes fewer assumptions than you do. You should admire that.

What's wrong with "subjective experiences"? After all - everybody knows what it means.

And, conveniently enough, the baggage that "subjective experiences" comes packaged with is exactly what you need in order to assume the conclusions you are after. Sure, after a lifetime in your language community, you don't see it as a loaded term, but it most certainly is. Otherwise, you would have no problem with "private behavior". If you really made no assumptions, the two terms would be the same. But they're not.

 

[Jeff Corey]

For the behavorists; you really believe (let's go for the 100%) that 'you' are nothing but a set of behaviors? We both can see the public set, but 'you' are just the private set?

Yes to the question. I don't understand your second sentence. Maybe that's the source of confusion.