Materialists......

So what you are saying boils down to:

"boils down to"???

I am saying what I am saying. I've already had Robin "interpreting" what I am saying (which translates into: twisting what I am saying into something else I wasn't saying and then attacking the something else instead of what I actually said).

Assume minds are non-physical, even though there is no evidence for this besides the rather ill-defined concept of mind having non-physical connotations.

No, DreadNik. I neither said that nor meant that nor does my argument depend on that statement. You are attacking a straw man. Please address the argument supplied, not what you claim it "boils down to." You have to SHOW why it is logically equivalent, and you can't, because it isn't.

Therefore p-zombies are possible.

Therefore materialism is false.

Which in turn reduces to: Assume minds are non-physical. Therefore materialism is false/wrong.

However, playing with words does not make minds non-physical or physical. So you're going to need some decent evidence to base your assumption on. If that evidence is impossible, then by all means continue with your wordplay, but don't make the mistake of thinking it means anything about anything.

I am sorry that your grasp on logic and the structure of philosophical arguments is as weak as Robin's. :(

We should pursue this more. If people like yourself and Robin finally end up understanding the difference between assuming ones conclusion and not doing so then we will have achieved something. I see this error over and over again on this forum. This time we are going to nail it.
 
You're getting there, but this is still wrong. It's a better response, in that it does not falsely accuse the zombist of assuming his conclusion. But it fails because you cannot claim that minds are clearly physical in the same way that you can claim that noses are physical. There is no argument about noses. Everybody agrees they are physical. But claiming that it is "clear that minds are physical" is plain false. You might want to claim that empirical evidence leads you to believe they "must be" physical, somehow - but that is a far cry from "minds are obviously physical."

The correct response to the argument is to deny one of the premises, but not the way you have done it.

I'll respond in whatever manner I see fit and I won't give two hoots whether you deem it 'the correct response' or not, you condescending navel-gazer.

Also, 'everybody agrees' suggests appeal to the gallery.

I wasn't claiming "it is clear that minds are physical", although I accept it may have seemed like I was. What I claim is: "there is no evidence for minds being non-physical, and there is lots to the contrary"
 
Tell you what, why don't we just forget about empirical evidence altogether and go on learning about the universe through introspection, religion and woo. Perhaps THAT'll work better. Otherwise, I advide we stick with what we can actually verify.

Why can't both sit side by side? Why do you think that by admitting that science can't answer everything you might as well abandon science completely? It just doesn't follow.
 
"boils down to"???

I am saying what I am saying. I've already had Robin "interpreting" what I am saying (which translates into: twisting what I am saying into something else I wasn't saying and then attacking the something else instead of what I actually said).



No, DreadNik. I neither said that nor meant that nor does my argument depend on that statement. You are attacking a straw man. Please address the argument supplied, not what you claim it "boils down to." You have to SHOW why it is logically equivalent, and you can't, because it isn't.



I am sorry that your grasp on logic and the structure of philosophical arguments is as weak as Robin's. :(

We should pursue this more. If people like yourself and Robin finally end up understanding the difference between assuming ones conclusion and not doing so then we will have achieved something. I see this error over and over again on this forum. This time we are going to nail it.

Whatever....
 
I'll respond in whatever manner I see fit and I won't give two hoots whether you deem it 'the correct response' or not, you condescending navel-gazer.

If you cannot accept that you might be wrong about something without getting upset, you shouldn't be here.


I wasn't claiming "it is clear that minds are physical", although I accept it may have seemed like I was. What I claim is: "there is no evidence for minds being non-physical, and there is lots to the contrary"

Which is also an incorrect statement. There's NONE. There is not even a scientifically-useful definition of "minds", let alone evidence that minds are physical. Consciousness isn't even on the scientific map.

***DreadNik, if there is "plenty of evidence that minds are physical" then why on earth do you think people like Mercutio deny it exists?***
 
If you cannot accept that you might be wrong about something without getting upset, you shouldn't be here.


Quite so. Good thing I don't have that problem. So why do you post here given that a) you refuse to accept you might be wrong about certain things b) if you aren't actually upset, you at least attempt to make it seem like you are via your use of emotes, font, layout etc.



Which is also an incorrect statement. There's NONE. There is not even a scientifically-useful definition of "minds", let alone evidence that minds are physical. Consciousness isn't even on the scientific map.

Again with the refutation of neuroscience and your own insistence that your definition of mind is only possible one. 'Scientifically-useful' means useful in the real world, not in your make-believe world of synchronicities, qm, zombies and mysticism.



***DreadNik, if there is "plenty of evidence that minds are physical" then why on earth do you think people like Mercutio deny it exists?***

If by 'deny it exists' you mean it is an incoherent, redundant or ill-defined concept, then so do I....
 
Beerina said:
Advanced scientist pokes/floods chemicals at 13,000 well-defined points in a person's brain. Person reports a sensation of a red flower. Then what?

We do have a problem -- we still have not explained how the sensation "in the mind" arises out of (what appears to be) physical processes out there. For all we know, the physical process is just a reporting process to some other type of realm with completely different physics (which is why I reject calling it a spiritual realm -- a spirit realm, whatever that is, would operate according to its own, scientifically-discernable, rules.)
So you're saying that this advanced scientist has discovered the stimulation points for the memory of a red flower, but has not made any progress toward understanding how the memory is experienced. Why did you choose this particular future history? Do you think it is necessary that things will go this way?

Some anti-materialists, which I think includes Geoff and certainly included Interesting Ian, insist that no possible scientific progress will be able to explain inner experience. The conclusion is assumed in that claim.

~~ Paul
 
Quite so. Good thing I don't have that problem. So why do you post here given that a) you refuse to accept you might be wrong about certain things b) if you aren't actually upset, you at least attempt to make it seem like you are via your use of emotes, font, layout etc.

I hope I don't make it seem like I am upset. Emoticons and font changes help communication, IMO. When I post bowls of petunias instead of words, it isn't because I am upset but because I can't think of a better way to communicate what I mean.

Again with the refutation of neuroscience and your own insistence that your definition of mind is only possible one.

I said it was the only useful one, and that if it is not given then something else must be given instead. You can redefine mind to mean "brain process" if you like, but you must then be prepared for somebody-else to come along and provide a new name (such as "qualia") for the thing that used to be called "mind".

'Scientifically-useful' means useful in the real world, not in your make-believe world of synchronicities, qm, zombies and mysticism.

There is no "scientifically useful" definition of "mind". Even defining minds to be brain processes is not scientifically useful. It has no explanatory value. It does not tell you how minds are related to brains.

If by 'deny it exists' you mean it is an incoherent, redundant or ill-defined concept, then so do I....

In that case, stop claiming there is "loads of evidence that it is physical". Either it doesn't exist, or it does exist and there's loads of evidence it is physical. Please decide which is your position and maintain it consistently.


And I am sorry if my previous post seemed a bit agressive. I have spent years having to tolerate people (materialists on this board) who continually assumed their conclusion telling me that I was assuming my conclusion when in fact I was doing no such thing. I have become accustomed to just letting it go, because I was sick of banging my head against a brick wall. This time I'm not going to let it go.
 
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Interesting. When a "materialist" is less than 100% sure, you claim they are really dualists, and when they ARE 100% sure, you (or at least Geoff) claim that the position is impossible to defend. It's a win-win scenario.
You have misread Geoff's position; both he and I agree a 100% materialist position is logical, and defensible.

What he and I also agree is that we find that position "odd" in that one who makes that choice denies the most objective data point any of us have or will ever have so far as facts are available -- thought (I prefer 'intent') exists.


... What I claim is: "there is no evidence for minds being non-physical, and there is lots to the contrary"
There is no evidence either way. All any of us will ever have is our own 1st person perceptions.
 
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Geoff said:
We should pursue this more. If people like yourself and Robin finally end up understanding the difference between assuming ones conclusion and not doing so then we will have achieved something. I see this error over and over again on this forum. This time we are going to nail it.
I'd love to nail it. Nothing would make me happier than understanding who has been assuming conclusions and why. I'd be tickled never again to make the mistake of assuming my conclusion.

Unfortunately, this conversation has not helped me. I still do not understand when conclusions have been assumed. I do not even understand whether a consequence of premises can be said to be assumed or not.

~~ Paul
 
Paul,

You are making the same mistake as Robin. The non-materialists start from an argument about language/concepts. They then arrive at a conclusion that we do indeed have a meaningful usage of the word "mind" and that it is fundamentally distinguishable from our meaningful usage of the word "matter". Providing an argument from conceptual/linguistic facts is not the same as assuming your conclusion. That goes for Ian as well as myself.

Geoff
 
Geoff, that has nothing to do with my confusion.

LW said that the problem was not that the zombie proof was assuming its conclusion, but that the existence of zombies was built into the formulation. What was the conclusion that we thought it was assuming? Was it that physicalism is false?

~~ Paul
 
I'd love to nail it. Nothing would make me happier than understanding who has been assuming conclusions and why. I'd be tickled never again to make the mistake of assuming my conclusion.

Unfortunately, this conversation has not helped me. I still do not understand when conclusions have been assumed.

Then we'll take it slowly because this is important. It is absolutely fundamental to the way that philosophical arguments operate.

Did you understand the Socrates example?

(a) All men are mortal.
(b) Socrates is a man.

And the conclusion that we get is "Socrates is mortal".

Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning you used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Nothing is mortal

then we get a contradiction.

(a), (b) and the conclusion constitute a perfectly valid (and sound) argument. Its conclusion follows from its premises. It's premises are also true (so it is sound as well as valid.) It has not assumed its conclusion. According to the line of reasoning Robin was using to claim that I was assuming my conclusion, the Socrates argument assumes its conclusion. He did not, however, believe that adding (c) involves an assumption of a conclusion.

First - do you think the Socrates arguments assumes its conclusion? If so, why? If not, why not?

Second - do you see how the Socrates example relates to the portion of the zombie argument which it is being compared to?

Third - do you think that adding (c) involves an assumption of a conclusion in either case?


Here is the zombie argument from Robins POV, as a reminder:

(a) P-zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless.
(b) Humans have minds.

And the conclusion that we get is "minds are non-physical". Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning you used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Everything is physical.

to the set we get an inconsistency.

Paul wrote:

I do not even understand whether a consequence of premises can be said to be assumed or not.

The answer to this question is "not". You can only challenge the claim that the premises are true. "Consequences of the premises" could easily be a name for "the conclusion". But the conclusion of the argument is exactly what you aren't allowed/supposed to assume.




Geoff
 
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Geoff said:
(a), (b) and the conclusion constitute a perfectly valid (and sound) argument. Its conclusion follows from its premises. It's premises are also true (so it is sound as well as valid.) It has not assumed its conclusion. According to the line of reasoning Robin was using to claim that I was assuming my conclusion, the Socrates argument assumes its conclusion.

First - do you think the Socrates arguments assumes its conclusion? If so, why? If not, why not?
Not, it does not.

Second - do you see how the Socrates example relates to the portion of the zombie argument which it is being compared to?
No, because I can't remember the comparison. Too many posts.

The answer to this question is "not". You can only challenge the claim that the premises are true. "Consequences of the premises" could easily be a name for "the conclusion". But the conclusion of the argument is exactly what you aren't allowed/supposed to assume.
Never mind. I was using a different meaning of assume. Of course you can assume a consequence of premises, but you are not begging the question in doing so. Silly me.

~~ Paul
 
Geoff, that has nothing to do with my confusion.

LW said that the problem was not that the zombie proof was assuming its conclusion, but that the existence of zombies was built into the formulation.

No. What LW said was that the logical argument, as it was shown to him, assumed that zombies were possible (exactly what is meant by possible and whether this applies to all things which are concievable is another part of the argument and not relevant here - that's what the modal logic is for). What LW was not aware of was that there was another part of the argument, logically prior to the bit we are examining here, which establishes the conceptual possibility of p-zombies. So LW was correct - that portion of logic contains the unexamined assumption the p-zombies are possible. But in the complete argument, the assumption is replaced by an argument.

What was the conclusion that we thought it was assuming?

According to Robin, the conclusion being assumed was "minds are non-physical". This is not the case.


Was it that physicalism is false?

~~ Paul

Yes, effectively.
 
***DreadNik, if there is "plenty of evidence that minds are physical" then why on earth do you think people like Mercutio deny it exists?***
Um...once again, you fail to demonstrate any understanding of my position whatsoever. DreadNik's statement is consistent with the idea that "mind" (that is, the phenomenon we refer to with that label) is a summary label for a set of private and public behaviors. My position is independent of monism; DreadNik's statement appears to adopt a material monism, though it need not.

Once more: I see, I feel, I think, I remember, I muse, I question...I behave. Tell me what it is that I deny, that makes up this thing you call the mind. Or could it be that mind simply is behavior?

As for (earlier):
When you talk about "causation", you are refering to empirical, physical causation. In such cases, there is a cause (X) and an effect (Y). X always precedes Y. But in the case of brains and minds, do you think this law holds? Do you think that the brain processes that supposedly "cause" minds temporally precede the mental experiences the supposedly cause? Or do you think they occur simultaneously?
I am sure you are familiar with Libet's experiment and its replications. Given that operationalization, the brain processes do precede the mental experiences.
 
If ANYBODY does not follow this, please say so. We are going to nail this.

(a) All men are mortal. (assumes that men can exist, and that we can agree what "mortal" means)
(b) Socrates is a man. (assumes that Socrates is a man).

Conclusion: "Socrates is mortal".

Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning Robin uses, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Nothing is mortal (assumes that nothing is mortal).

to the set we get an inconsistency.

There is no assumption of conclusion in a,b and the conclusion. However, adding (c) does assume the conclusion "nothing is mortal". There is an inconsistency between (c) and the previous argument. But this (quite clearly in this case) does not mean that the previous argument has assumed its conclusion. It may just mean that (c) is wrong. If (c) is correct, then it means that there must be something else wrong with the argument. Either not all men are mortal or Socrates isn't a man.

So.......

--------------------
(a) P-zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless. (assumes p-zombies are a meaningfull concept - that they can exist or are possible)
(b) Humans have minds. (assumes humans can agree that they have minds, assumes "mind" to mean "subjective experiences". Most people would accept both of these.)

And the conclusion that we get is "minds are non-physical". Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning Robin used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Everything is physical. (assumes that physicalism is true - this is an assertion of the truth of physicalism).

...then we get a contradiction.
-----------------------------

There is no assumption of conclusion in a,b and the conclusion. However, adding (c) does assume the conclusion "physicalism is true". There is an inconsistency between (c) and the previous argument. But this does not mean that the previous argument has assumed its conclusion. It may just mean that (c) is wrong. If (c) is correct, then it means that there must be something else wrong with the argument. Either p-zombies are a meaningless concept and cannot sensibly be defined or are impossible, or the claim "humans have minds" is incorrect. [edit] And just for the record, anyone thinking of denying the possible existence of zombies based on the argument "If materialism is true, zombies can't exist", they would STILL be assuming their conclusion. It would be no different to saying "If nothing is mortal, Socrates cannot be a man".

Overall conclusion:

LW is correct. Robin is assuming his conclusion ("everything is physical"). Geoff is neither assuming his conclusion (as claimed by Robin) nor is he assuming p-zombies are conceptually possible (as originally claimed by LW, but only because he hadn't been followng the whole thread).
 
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