Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

For the benefit of those new to the thread, let me repeat that I see no such apparent duality

For the benefit of those new to the thread, please read the opening post.

Belz, please read the opening post.

 

[Bubo]

Sorry, man. I simply call it the way I see it. Once you get evidence for the existence of the soul or karma or whatever, let me know.

Call it the way you see it. There's that implicit observer at work again. Anyway, karma is the eastern equivalent of determinism; general cause-and-effect, all 'things' being "dependently arising." But it is said that if one intends to further his understanding, he might, say, meditate in a cave for a decade or so, and will then come to see that these macroscopic, seemingly immutable laws give way to a subtler realm of potentiality. Which sound more than vaguely "linked" to QM (consider the "luminous" aspect of consciousness which is mentioned in a large chunk of religious writings). Seguing to Mercutio.

Heh...unless you suppose that quantum mechanics influences people differently than other arrangements of particles, the meat machine metaphor still works.

Quantum mechanics isn't just about people; it's about the foundation of everything in the physical universe. And, according to the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, particles and their behaviors are, at the subtlest levels, fundamentally indeterministic. It is this billiard-ball universe you seem so content with that is illusory. At least, according to the (dominant) Copenhagen interpretation...

There is only one world. Unus Mundus.

Presumably ignoring the alternative "Many Worlds" interpretation...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You misunderstand. Your analogy is flawed because "microevolution" IS "macroevolution" (in small parts) when talking about evolution. They all stack up to produce situations that would not otherwise occur if evolution was false. However, quantum mechanics is pretty much fully equivalent with other theories in describing the macroscopic world (pretty much meaning that part of it that isn't complete). Unlike micro to macro, which stacks, quantum to macro is a cancelling effect. All the quantum events, at least as I understand it, seem to cancel out to classical effects in the macro world. Micro makes it's presence KNOWN in macro evolution. Quantum seems to hide itself FROM the macro world.

Bolding mine.

Anything quantum that did happen at that scale would, by definition, be very uncommon....

But not impossible.

the brain simply would not be designed to deal with that.

Indeed.

If anything it is more likely to do harm than to provide some subtle unexplained thing.

Potentially.

And why exactly would this only apply to the brain? Why wouldn't it apply to everything else in the universe?

Why not indeed.

I ask only because the brain is NOT operating on a quantum scale, that is to say none of the pathways, the means by which a brain seems to work, operate on a quantum scale. If the source of conciousness is random background quantum effects that the brain isn't even designed to detect or deal with, then why wouldn't this apply to other systems?

Who says evolution could not have taken advantage of such effects?
Who says quantum evolution is not possible?

You might as well say that there's a possibility of a computer suddenly gaining some other magical quality, or maybe an entire new program, due to quantum effects.

No, that would not be the same.

In both cases, despite how small components have gotten, they aren't nearly small enough, nor do they work with, quantum events.

As you have already said, macroscopic quantum effects are unlikely, but not impossible.

So in other words the idea that somehow a complete model of quantum physics will yield some sort of answer is silly. And, by the way, the observer's role in a lot of quantum physics seems to be incidental.....

 

[Robin]

Consider this final example that is perhaps THE standard example of valid reasoning:

(a) All men are mortal.
(b) Socrates is a man.

And the conclusion that we get is "Socrates is mortal". Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning you used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Nothing is mortal

to the set we get an inconsistency.

One thing you appear to have missed is that p0..p2 was not the argument - it was the definition of a zombie. So if the logical consequence of the definition of a zombie is that Z(p)->~P(c) then is it not true to say that the conclusion is inherent in the definition?

Similary if (a) and (b) above formed the definition of Socrates, then it could not be validly used to argue to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal.

What if I had defined a zombie as "a being that has all the physical characteristics of a human being except for consciousness"?

Then I would have been assuming the conclusion that consciousness was physical.

If I define a zombie as "a being that has all the physical characteristics of a human being and is not conscious" then I am assuming that consciousness is not a physical characteristics.

The genuinely neutral definition of a zombie would be "a being that has all the characteristics of a human being except for consciousness". A perfectly adequate definition that conveys all we need to know about zombies.

What, after all, is the purpose of the P predicate?

 

[Robin]

So, to recap, the problem with the p-zombie "proof" is that it has a hidden assumption that there are p-zombies.

There is no such hidden assumption since it is not a proof but a definition. Definitions do not assume the existence of the thing they describe, only the characteristics they would have if they did.

The argument about whether the p-zombie exists is separate to this definition and normally revolves around conceivability and logical possibility. (Although I have shown that a p-zombie can be demonstrated to exist)

So with the clarification that this is a definition and not a proof, do you still contend that this definition of a zombie does not contain the assumption that consciousness is not physical?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

can be demonstrated to exist)

So with the clarification that this is a definition and not a proof, do you still contend that this definition of a zombie does not contain the assumption that consciousness is not physical?

LW posted:

Consider this final example that is perhaps THE standard example of valid reasoning:

(a) All men are mortal.
(b) Socrates is a man.

And the conclusion that we get is "Socrates is mortal". Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning you used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Nothing is mortal

to the set we get an inconsistency.

So.......

--------------------
(a) P-zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless.
(b) Humans have minds.

And the conclusion that we get is "minds are non-physical". Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning you used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Everything is physical.

to the set we get an inconsistency.
-------------------------------------

Do you see a logical difference? I don't. Neither would my logic lecturer.

Geoff

 

[DreadNiK]

(a) P-zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless.

Is an incoherent statement.

 

[hammegk]

Rolling around laughing and getting dirty won't help you learn anything.

Neither will listening to you.

What don't you understand about my position -- objective idealism -- that accepts all scientific results, can state the probability of god and/or free will existing is not 100%, yet have a fully logical position, whereas materialists who are not willing to go with 100% no god and/or free will are not, and are most likely wannabe materialists who are really illogical dualists?

 

[Dark Jaguar]

As you have already said, macroscopic quantum effects are unlikely, but not impossible.

...Yes, but it is that very unlikelyhood that is my point. BECAUSE they are so unlikely even if they did occur it would be like only one small instance at some point in the entire history of humanity. "Unlikely" doesn't mean "eh, there's only a small chance that it occurs in every single human being continuously from birth to death", it means unlikely PERIOD, meaning it may happen just once and then vanish, and it is not likely to EVER happen to any human. What you are suggesting would mean conciousness happened for like a split second to Abraham Lincoln and then never again and to no one else. We're talking rare here. You might as well humor the idea that your hand will randomly turn into gold.

Evolution could not take advantage of such effects if they are that exceedingly rare. If however they are NOT nearly that rare, you may be on to something. What reason do you have to believe they are common and continuous macroscopic and noticable nonharmful, and strangely predictable, effects happening in all human brains?

Any why wouldn't it be the same for a computer gaining some new effect? It really is exactly the same to expect a quantum effect to provide conciousness as it is to provide some other quality, whether a new program randomly appearing in a computer, a person randomly being able to be concious of their daily life, a rock randomly exploding, or a slipshizzle randomly ferdandoodling.

And about your laughing dog. I bring this up because there are explanations of quantum physics that relegate the observer to being irrelevant. Multiple worlds is one, but for some reason you can't stand that one. Maybe because it throws a wrench into your ideals so you have to remove it as quickly as possible?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Is an incoherent statement.

If you are an eliminativist.

 

[Robin]

LW posted:




--------------------
(a) All men are mortal.
(b) Socrates is a man.

And the conclusion that we get is "Socrates is mortal". Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning you used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Nothing is mortal

(a) P-zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless.
(b) Humans have minds. Minds must be non-physical.

And the conclusion that we get is "minds are non-physical". Have we now committed the fallacy of assuming our conclusion? By the reasoning you used above, we have. Because if we add the sentence:

(c) Everything is physical.

to the set we get an inconsistency.
-------------------------------------

Do you see a logical difference? I don't. Neither would my logic lecturer.

Well I would be interested to hear what your logic lecturer would have to say. They don't appear to be anything like each other, but if your logic lecturer and LW can't see the difference ...

But I absolutely agree that if LW is right and I am wrong then you have proved conclusively and beyond any shadow of a doubt that the mind is non-physical.

You dont need to prove a zombie exists, only that a human exists.

LW just needs to add a P3 to his set of statements "exists h exists a (A(a)&P(a)&H(h,a)&H(h,c)" to include your (b) in this syllogism.

He should then try the theorem of negating the conclusion and see if he still gets a consistent set of statements to confirm this - I have not tried this yet.

But after all his model for a consistent set had "H: 0".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

...Yes, but it is that very unlikelyhood that is my point. BECAUSE they are so unlikely even if they did occur it would be like only one small instance at some point in the entire history of humanity.

Something along those lines, yes.

"Unlikely" doesn't mean "eh, there's only a small chance that it occurs in every single human being continuously from birth to death", it means unlikely PERIOD, meaning it may happen just once and then vanish, and it is not likely to EVER happen to any human.

Yes, that's the sort of thing. Although there must be a distribution curve of some sort.

What you are suggesting would mean conciousness happened for like a split second to Abraham Lincoln and then never again and to no one else. We're talking rare here.

I think you should be thinking distribution curve rather than binary logic at this point, but I get your meaning.

You might as well humor the idea that your hand will randomly turn into gold.

No. I think that is too rare.

Evolution could not take advantage of such effects if they are that exceedingly rare.

Agreed. I wasn't sure about that one when I posted it. We need "Quantum Evolution".

If however they are NOT nearly that rare, you may be on to something.

We are talking distribution curves. The shape of which would have to be determined by a currently non-existent branch of science.

What reason do you have to believe they are common and continuous macroscopic and noticable nonharmful, and strangely predictable, effects happening in all human brains?

Too complicated a question. The answer is "I don't know" crossed with "Roger Penrose" and "Did I imply I believed all that?"

Any why wouldn't it be the same for a computer gaining some new effect?

It would have to be a quantum computer. Brains are likened to quantum computers by the Penrose people.

It really is exactly the same to expect a quantum effect to provide conciousness as it is to provide some other quality, whether a new program randomly appearing in a computer, a person randomly being able to be concious of their daily life, a rock randomly exploding, or a slipshizzle randomly ferdandoodling.

I don't agree. I think there are specific issues to do with the interpretation of quantum theory that demand answers to questions that cannot be answered without reference to the history of metaphysics and epistemology.

And about your laughing dog. I bring this up because there are explanations of quantum physics that relegate the observer to being irrelevant. Multiple worlds is one, but for some reason you can't stand that one. Maybe because it throws a wrench into your ideals so you have to remove it as quickly as possible?

I spent about six months trying to get other people to believe MWI. I fully sympathise with anybody tending in that direction. Compared to some other positions (such as eliminativism, behaviourism, creationism and gazerism), MWI is a very reasonable suggestion as the solution to a very difficult problem.

I just think its wrong.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

They don't appear to be anything like each other

What is the difference between them, in logical structure?

 

[Robin]

What is the difference between them, in logical structure?

Where do I begin????

OK, the Socrates argument is the classic MP arguing from a universal to a particular - it's logical structure is as follows:

X=man
Y=mortal
S=Socrates

1 all X are Y
2 S is X
S is Y


Now your conclusion is "minds are non-physical", so maintain the same logical structure

S=Minds
Y=Non-physical

So to keep the same logical structure the premise must be all X are "non-physical", so it can only be:
X = "human attributes that are minds"

So to retain the same logical structure of the Socrates argument your argument should be:

(a) All human attributes that are minds are non-physical
(b) The mind is a human attribute that is a mind
C: The mind is non-physical

Actually this (a) is pretty much what your (a) says.

(edit)Actually we're not quite there yet:

(a) All attributes that are found in humans that are minds are non-physical
(b) The mind is an attribute that is found in humans that is a mind
C: The mind is non-physical
(/edit)

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Where do I begin????

OK, the Socrates argument is the classic MP arguing from a universal to a particular - it's logical structure is as follows:

X=man
Y=mortal
S=Socrates

1 all X are Y
2 S is X
S is Y


Now your conclusion is "minds are non-physical", so maintain the same logical structure

S=Minds
Y=Non-physical

So to keep the same logical structure the premise must be all X are "non-physical", so it can only be:
X = "human attributes that are minds"

So to retain the same logical structure of the Socrates argument your argument should be:

(a) All human attributes that are minds are non-physical
(b) The mind is a human attribute that is a mind
C: The mind is non-physical

Actually this (a) is pretty much what your (a) says.

(edit)Actually we're not quite there yet:

(a) All attributes that are found in humans that are minds are non-physical
(b) The mind is an attribute that is found in humans that is a mind
C: The mind is non-physical
(/edit)

Except that wasn't the argument.

What you have ended up with does indeed assume its conclusion, but it isn't the argument that was offered. The argument that was offered was:

(a) Zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless (assumes zombies are possible.)
(b) Humans have minds.
(c) The mind is non-physical.

How you got from that to:

(a) All attributes that are found in humans that are minds are non-physical
(b) The mind is an attribute that is found in humans that is a mind
C: The mind is non-physical

...is quite beyond me.

The argument is not from a universal to a particular. It is from the possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism. LW's example was to demonstrate to you the difference between assuming your conclusion and not assuming your conclusion. Apparently, you missed the point.

Geoff

 

[Jeff Corey]

.)
(b) Humans have minds.
(

And that's the problem. Your assumption is not true.

 

[Mercutio]

And that's the problem. Your assumption is not true.

Sorry, Jeff. As a behaviorist, you simply do not exist. NOBODY defends behaviorism, you know.

 

[Beerina]

Wrong. We have already granted, for the purpose of the argument, that we can establish a perfect set of neural correlates for consciousness. At this point, we are still in exactly the same position that we are right now. We are not one millimetre closer to explaining why there are two correlates.

Well part of Crick's point was that, until we do this and see if there's any indication of what might be going on, it's all pointless philosophyzing.

I don't think there are any building blocks for consciousness, physical or otherwise. Such a position sounds like panspychism, which, IMO, suffers from an inverted mind-body problem. All there is is a brain process and a mystery ingredient to explain the apparent duality. You do not need any new building blocks because all of the complexity and information required for conscious experience is there in the brain process. All that is missing is some explanation of why there are two correlates/perspectives on the same set of building blocks.

Perhaps I phrased it badly. These building blocks might be aspects of "out there" physics we haven't discovered or realized yet, and not necessarily something separate.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

And we've gone full circle. You say that just because we perfectly corrolate brain functionality with conciousness, it doesn't mean we are even an inch closer, and never can be, to saying "this is the cause of conciousness".

And I say with that in mind you might as well say that just because you can break down a beam of light, see the magnetic part and the electric part and the constant creation of one into another and see that this ALWAYS occurs every single time a light beam is present with every single test we've done and doesn't occur when light is not present, we are still not even an inch closer to saying "this is what causes light".

Just because, as a concept, conciousness is different from something like "light" or "love" or "rock" doesn't mean it is somehow magically above the rest of it. Corrolation does not equal causation, but enough of it done under stringent scientific conditions sure does strongly indicate it. Why is conciousness somehow immune to it? What reason is there to believe there's more unless there's evidence that there IS more to it, or we somehow establish a p-zombie or something like that? Your question, as I have also said before, is the same as "why does the universe exist at all, and why does it behave with the specific rules it has rather than some other set of rules?". It's still perfectly valid to say "brains cause conciousness" in the same way that "electromagnetic waves cause light". (And on further look it is more accurate in both cases to say one IS the other, even though you can think of both as two seperate ideas.)

I mean yeesh, what are you trying to say? Yes conciousness is great, I like it, and I'd rather not be without it, but it's not above science as something that can be studied. Can we observe it? Yes (obviously). Can we make testable predictions about it? Again, the answer seems to be yes. Can it affect the real world, and can the real world affect it? Seems that way to me. How is it immune to science then? You did in fact directly claim not just that conciousness is "hard to study" but that is it literally IMPOSSIBLE for the scientific method to ever study, immunity from the method because it has "nothing to do" with the method in it's very nature. But, if it's nature is something that is observable and can be predicted and tested, then no it is NOT immune, no matter it's nature.

And oh yes, what is it about quantum mechanics that makes it "not physics" anyway? Even if you did have some new field of study that said "oh, it's this particular wave form collapse that makes things aware of themselves", would that actually be satisfactory? I can see some future philosopher say "no! All you did was CORROLATE the two! You are still not even a centimeter closer to actually explaining conciousness. Why? Because I can think of your quantum waves as seperate from conciousness! We need a new field of study to find out what ACTUALLY does it and science as it is just can't do it.". All you are doing is substituting existing physics for some hopeful new physics. Even if true, it would still just be yet another physical explanation for conciousness.

I'm really not sure what sort of distribusion curve you'd even expect to find. Something that corrolates entirely with human awareness and only seems to happen within the confines of an ape skull? I don't know much about quantum mechanics, and you are free to correct me if I'm wrong, but I highly doubt something like what we define as where our bodies begin and end would actually have any bearing at all on quantum events.

And lastly, I have to say that everything I've read about how the brain operates does not in fact say it is a "quantum machine". I've yet to read anything about quantum events determining if a neuron fires. Perhaps you've read more than that though? Everything I've read says that while the scale a brain operates on is smaller than our visual resolution, it is still epically larger than the scale at which quantum interactions matter. The brain seems to operate on the same scale (relative to quantum mechanics) that my computer operates at, so the expectation that it would be effected by quantum irregularities in any meaningful way is about as likely as it affecting my computer in any meaningful way.

 

[Jeff Corey]

Sorry, Jeff. As a behaviorist, you simply do not exist. NOBODY defends behaviorism, you know.

When I was a lad, they always told me to behave myself. At that time my response was. "Who else?'
And NOBODY expects the Spanish Inquisition.