Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, isn't it just convenient that we'll never have an answer to any question about what reality "is" ?

You don't have to answer any questions at all. But if you think people are going to stop asking ontological questions, you're going to be disappointed.

 

[LW]

OK Paul,

I have found an article : "Zombies versus Materialists: The Battle for Conceivability".

http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/zombie.html

Nice article. I intended to reply to this already in the morning but decided that I should referesh my memory about the formal definitions of the original model logics (K and its derivations) before doing so.

Here it is with my annotations:

And I add a couple of comments to it.

If Zombies are possible, materialism is false. This was the structure of the argument I supplied and our resident logician has confirmed that this is the case.

Not exactly. I stated that if the do exist, then materialism is false. If it is "possible" that they exist, then the conclusion depends on what we mean with "possible".

I agreed with this, and also stated that I guessed that the argument would need the strongest scheme of modal logic (S5) to push it through. If this article is correct, then so was my guess. We need S5.

This brings us to the first serious issue of the p-zombie proof. Is it reasonable to use S5? In the paper the author states that for the sake of the argument he is willing to concede this to the zombist. And he then goes on to show that even that doesn't result in falsification of materialism. I'm not as willing.

S5 operates under the assumption that "If X is possible, then it is necessarily possible". Let's see what that means formally.

The semantics of modal logics is given with respect to frames. A frame contains a collection of worlds W (states) and an accessibility relation R between them. We get a model by assigning a truth valuation for each world. For example, if we had two worlds s₁ and s₂ and a proposition P, then one valuation would be that P is false in s₁ and true in s₂.

The definition of modal logics usually don't use the terms "possibly" and "necessary" but instead "diamond" and "box". This is because then you can use the same definitions if you want to attach different meanings for the modalities. For example, "diamond" might be "believes" and "box" be "knows".

A formula "diamond P" is true in a state s of W if there exists at least one world that is accessible from s where P is true. For example, suppose that R is defined in the previous example so that s₂ is reachable from s₁ and that is the only accessibility. Then, "diamond P" is true in s₁ but false in s₂ even though P itself is true in it. Conversely, "box P" is true if P is true in all successors of the state. In this example it is true for both states. So, essentially the modal operators chase through the different worlds following the arcs of the accessibility relation.

When it comes to validity, there are three different validities involved. First, a formula may be valid in a model if it is true in all worlds of it. The "box P" is such a formula in our example. Next, a formula is valid in a frame if it is valid in all models that can be created from it. Our "box P" is not valid in the given frame since it is not true in any model where P is false in s₂. Finally, a formula is valid in a set of frames if it is valid in every frame of the set.

Essentially, each different modal logic can be characterized as a set of frames. The idea is that the logic has a characteristic formula, and the logic then corresponds to the set of frames where that formula is valid.

In the specific case of S5 the characteristic formula is "diamond P implies box diamond P". This corresponds with the set of frames where R is an equivalence-relation. Informally, this means that we can divide the worlds into one or more partitions and within each partition all worlds are accessible from each other (and worlds are accessible from themselves, too). The R of the prior example doesn't fulfill this condition so it is not a S5 frame.

Now, after this long-winded introduction I finally can come to the actual problem:

Can we model our intuition of what "possible" means in the Real World using S5 frames?.

I'm not claiming that it absolutely can't be done. But I see enough difficulties in it that I can't take it as given. What are the possible worlds?

A natural candidate would be the idea that every time when there is some choice involved there is a world where each different was choosen. But this doesn't work, because then the accessibility relation is not an equivalence relation and we have to be able to move back and forth between the worlds. If I kill someone, he stays dead no matter what I do. I can't enter the world where I didn't kill him.

If we use "possible" in S5 sense, then we lose its natural language sense. Right now it is possible for me to stand up, walk fifteen steps, and grab a cup of coffee [ETA: eleven steps actually, and I ended microwaving it because the timer had went off] . But in S5 I'm not able to use the word like this. Because I'm often in a situation where I can't do that.

So, before I accept even that it is possible to even formulate the p-zombie proof in S5 [that the article shows is futile in end], I would need to see how the S5 frame is constructed and what is the intuitive meaning of "possible" under that formalization. It won't be the everyday sense in any case.

It all comes down to the quirk in S5 which the zombist relies on to force the proof.

Is there any source where the complete S5 p-zombie proof is presented?

Even without seeing the complete proof I'm quite willing to bet that it is the very same quirk that enabled the zombist to make it in the first place (and this supposing that we could use S5).

 

[LW]

Almost. Nobody has "assumed" that p-zombies are possible.

I was speaking of the simplified version of the proof that you posted here. That one was worded in such a way that the assumption was there.

[Edited to add: And whether the "possibility" is enough to cause problems to materialism depends on what it exactly means to be possible.]

 

[Mercutio]

Oh boy, how circular can you get?

I thought you were the one making no assumptions.

Everybody already knows that if minds exist, empirical science can't verify their existence. If I could demonstrate empirical evidence for the existence of mind, there would be no point in a zombie argument at all!

Everybody already knows this? So you are admitting that your position is purely faith-based? Cool.

I am *AWARE*. There is something like it is to be Geoff. That is my mind. There is nothing like it is to be a zombie. Zombies don't have minds. What's the problem?

What is it like to be Geoff, that is not the behaviors I mentioned before? What is it like to be Geoff, distinct from Geoff's thinking, Geoff's seeing, Geoff's remembering...all the things Geoff does? You had said, earlier, that the purpose of the mind was simply "to be". At this point, I cannot conceive of what a mind's "being" is, apart from behaving. A zombie would see. A zombie would remember. A zombie would think. A zombie would behave identically to a person. All that it is missing is a thing you have labeled but not identified. Unless, of course, you are willing to circularly infer that those behaviors require a mind.

This is a sidetrack anyway. My policy is not to argue with eliminativists but to laugh at them.

I can understand why. It is certainly easier than facing up to the inadequacies in your own philosophy.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

S5 Zombie Proof

Short:

http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/PAI/zombie.short/zombie.short.html

Complete:

http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/zombies.ppr.pdf

 

[Belz...]

You are talking about unicorns existing now. There is no reason why evolution could not produce them in the future. Of course they can't spontaneously grow wings. They'd have to evolve them.

No, really. Evolution is falsifiable. This means there POSSIBLY exist beasties that we could find that could completely invalidate the theory. But the mere fact that they're physically possible doesn't mean they exist. Get it ?

 

[Belz...]

You don't have to answer any questions at all. But if you think people are going to stop asking ontological questions, you're going to be disappointed.

I'm not expecting them to stop asking. I'm expecting them to stop believing that the question has either a real meaning or a useful, objective answer.

Everybody already knows that if minds exist, empirical science can't verify their existence.

An interesting claim.

If I could demonstrate empirical evidence for the existence of mind, there would be no point in a zombie argument at all!

Precisely, which is why that argument assumes :

Everybody already knows that if minds exist, empirical science can't verify their existence.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No, really. Evolution is falsifiable. This means there POSSIBLY exist beasties that we could find that could completely invalidate the theory. But the mere fact that they're physically possible doesn't mean they exist. Get it ?

What if they are NECCESARILY POSSIBLE?

(**Joke**)

 

[Belz...]

A zombie would think. A zombie would behave identically to a person. All that it is missing is a thing you have labeled but not identified. Unless, of course, you are willing to circularly infer that those behaviors require a mind.

Tsk, tsk, Mercutio. You've forgotten the "I", the metaphysical "subject". It's observed, but also has, somehow, causal power. It exists, but doesn't. It's one with the brain, but distinct. And we still don't know what it is, what it does or what it's made of.

 

[Belz...]

What if they are NECCESARILY POSSIBLE?

(**Joke**)

Well, I must be dense. I don't get that.

Still, do you have any response to what I said ?

 

[hammegk]

What is it like to be Geoff, that is not the behaviors I mentioned before? What is it like to be Geoff, distinct from Geoff's thinking, Geoff's seeing, Geoff's remembering...all the things Geoff does? You had said, earlier, that the purpose of the mind was simply "to be". At this point, I cannot conceive of what a mind's "being" is, apart from behaving. A zombie would see. A zombie would remember. A zombie would think. A zombie would behave identically to a person. All that it is missing is a thing you have labeled but not identified. Unless, of course, you are willing to circularly infer that those behaviors require a mind.

M, you do understand this is as irrelevant to the choice of monism -- or escape to dualism -- as the pap people like articulett spew out?

I can understand why. It is certainly easier than facing up to the inadequacies in your own philosophy.

Pot? Kettle? Both?

Of course muddying the issue with this hair-splitting bs about p-zombies keeps everyones' "mind ... so to speak" off the continuing and real question.

 

[Bubo]

I know there will be some groans in the audience when I say this, but, I had thought that this deterministic, Newtonian interpretation was thrown out, or at least, seriously put into question with "quantum mechanics." I shan't pretend to an understanding of all the theoretical applications, but, perhaps somebody here can...

 

[nescafe]

I know there will be some groans in the audience when I say this, but, I had thought that this deterministic, Newtonian interpretation was thrown out, or at least, seriously put into question with "quantum mechanics." I shan't pretend to an understanding of all the theoretical applications, but, perhaps somebody here can...

For the p-zombie argument, the indeterminism that QM may or may not provide is irrelavent, because part of the definition of a p-zombie is that p-zombies are physically indistinguishable from humans.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I was speaking of the simplified version of the proof that you posted here. That one was worded in such a way that the assumption was there.

Yes, but that was because it was a only a part of what I had been arguing - the part that follows the establishment of the conceptual possibility of zombies. Robin originally tried to turn that part into logic, but got it wrong because he assumed his conclusion. I just took Robins section of logic and tried to fix it. So when you joined in you were indeed examining a proof which made no mention of how we established the possibility of p-zombies even though the argument I originally made was clear that this was derived from an analysis of language, not a brute assumption.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, I must be dense. I don't get that.

Never mind, it wasn't all that funny.

Still, do you have any response to what I said ?

Yes. I don't think you understand the point of the zombie argument, or how it works, or why it eventually self-destructs, or what it ends up suggesting even though it doesn't actually work.

 

[Apathia]

I know there will be some groans in the audience when I say this, but, I had thought that this deterministic, Newtonian interpretation was thrown out, or at least, seriously put into question with "quantum mechanics." I shan't pretend to an understanding of all the theoretical applications, but, perhaps somebody here can...

Classical Determinism was brought into serious question. reality is more complex than little billiard balls knocking against each other. Predictability, however, is still the name of the game, and QM is a gem in that regard.

It's more a matter of Interpretation. The Copenhagen Interpretation, the most popular, tends to have the greatest impact on the classical worldview. Bohm's "Implicate Order" Interpretation, as well as others, attempts to salvage as much of Classical Objectivity as possible.

Yes, thre are some people who will groan. Some of us are still living in the 19th Century.

I start groaning when "Bleep" people tell me Quantum Physics proves my ego can shape reality anyway it wants, and I'd have a full time job by now if I only believed.

 

[Bubo]

For the p-zombie argument, the indeterminism that QM may or may not provide is irrelavent, because part of the definition of a p-zombie is that p-zombies are physically indistinguishable from humans.

Apologies, I should have clarified here. I didn't mention this in reference to the p-zombie argument, but rather, to the starkly deterministic proclamations of Belz, Mercutio, et al, who insist that they are little more than "meat-machines." [Edit- though I suppose this could also have bearing on the p-zombie.]

I start groning when "Bleep" people tell me Quantum Physics proves my ego can shape reality anyway it wants, and I'd have a full time job by now if I only believed.

I have avoided that movie after hearing of shadowy connections with the "Ramtha School of Enlightenment."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramtha

 

[UndercoverElephant]

S5 Zombie Proof

Short:

http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/PAI/zombie.short/zombie.short.html

Complete:

http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/zombies.ppr.pdf

OK, I've read this paper now, and it's opened up a new line of attack. It is strong stuff. It may end up being vulnerable to the Marten paper I already posted, but I cannot see why having read through the paper once. It is not clear whether the author of this paper is as dependent on S5 as Marten thinks he is. He does mention S5 (he says he "likes it"), but also suggests it works in T. Anyway, that is an aside. This paper presents a slightly different attack. It is an attack on Dennett-style computationalism and on behaviourist theories of mentality, and I think it works.

Conclusion:

Where does this leave us? Well, if computationalism is true, then (2C), essentially the claim that appropriate computation success for P-consciousness, is as well. If argument AC1 is sound, (2C) falls, as does, by modus tollens, computationalism itself. AC1 , as we have seen, can be formalized as a modal disproof patterned on A1, the argument fashioned from the Dennett-Searle clash on zombie thought-experiments. (A1 is based on gedanken-experiments designed to establish 3V21 and 3V31; AC1 is based on one designed to establish 3V2TM1 .) AC1 is formally valid. As to this argument's premises, they have emerged intact from a dialectical crucible fueled by the best objections computationalists can muster. Finally, attempts to tweak (2C) so as to produce a view not targeted by AC1 fails. (Here we considered zombie stories written (hypothetically) by Kafka to establish 3pV2TM1 and 3pV2NN1 .)

In the end, then, the zombie attack proves lethal: computationalism is dead.

Of course, I personally think Searle had already killed off that particular position with the Chinese Room Argument, but there's always room for some good old-fashioned corpse-mutilation, just to make sure.

 

[Mercutio]

M, you do understand this is as irrelevant to the choice of monism -- or escape to dualism -- as the pap people like articulett spew out?

I think you might have it reversed. It is the choice of monisms (or escape, as you say, to dualism) that is irrelevant.

 

[Belz...]

I know there will be some groans in the audience when I say this, but, I had thought that this deterministic, Newtonian interpretation was thrown out, or at least, seriously put into question with "quantum mechanics." I shan't pretend to an understanding of all the theoretical applications, but, perhaps somebody here can...

I don't think quantum fluctuations have much influence on the macroscopic world. Someone who knows more of this subject can correct me, if I'm mistaken.