Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

I take it then you concede that LW and I are both correct when we spotted the assumption you have been making all along? In LW's words:

Squawk! Squawk! Squawk!

Reposted in bigger letters so you cannot miss it this time:

[size=+4]Have you read any of the posts I have made this morning? Because several of them address this point directly. There is no hidden assumption. There is an explicit argument from language/concepts. Because it has been declared, it's not hidden. Because it is an argument, it's not an assumption.[/size]

LW's assessment was correct, but only because he joined in in the middle of the thread and was not aware of the wider context of the logical argument. The bit he analysed depended on a "hidden assumption". But in the context that argument was originally supplied, the assumption was replaced by an argument which did not involve any assumptions about zombies, but starts from an analysis of language.

Now, for christ's sake do not just repost LW's original response again or I might just have to post the picture of a pickled parrot instead.

Please use your own brain instead of relying on somebody-else's.

 

[Darat]

Well, (1) is only true if materialism is false. How ISN'T that circular ?

How about this one:

(1) Pink flying unicorns are possible
(2) If pink flying unicorns are possible, then evolution fails
(CO) therefore, evolution fails.

Not quite Belz, it isn't circular given the definition Geoff sets up.

However all he has done is again hid the assumption he makes higher up the chain (that LW has exposed in formal logic and I exposed by offering a different definition for "mind").

He actually isn't making an argument, he is trying to hide his assertion or to be more generous trying to hide his starting premise which is "the mind is not physical".

Work though his little ditty and you will see it can all be summed up as an assertion not an argument that:

"The mind is not physical".

It is hardly surprising that JustGeoff is not able to offer anything more then his assertion that the mind is not physical. After all some of the most brilliant human minds we know about have been trying to "prove" this idea (or disprove it) with logic for at least centuries yet it has eluded them.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

LW's assessment was correct, but only because he joined in in the middle of the thread and was not aware of the wider context of the logical argument. The bit he analysed depended on a "hidden assumption". But in the context that argument was originally supplied, the assumption was replaced by an argument which did not involve any assumptions about zombies, but starts from an analysis of language.

Now, for christ's sake do not just repost LW's original response again or I might just have to post the picture of a pickled parrot instead.

Please use your own brain instead of relying on somebody-else's.

Which is the part of the argument I have been discussing (see this post).

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, (1) is only true if materialism is false. How ISN'T that circular ?

Because it doesn't start from assuming materialism is false. It starts from an analysis of language.

How about this one:

(1) Pink flying unicorns are possible
(2) If pink flying unicorns are possible, then evolution fails
(CO) therefore, evolution fails.

All sorts of problems. First off, there is nothing impossible about pink flying unicorns. They are harder to conceive of than p-zombies, but far from impossible. Second, pink flying Unicorns could also concievably be produced by evolution - let's say the sky has turned pink (so they are pink for camuoflage) and that a descendent of horses grew wings and evolved flight.

So (2) is just false. The possibility of pink flying Unicorns doesn't falsify evolution.

Additionally, (1) is not supported by anything in this case. There is a conceptual/linguistic argument supporting the p-zombie. No similar argument is available for the unicorn. Otherwise stated - the p-zombie is particularly easy to imagine because of a fundamental feature of our language and our ways of thinking about reality. The same doesn't apply to the unicorns. They are simply an example of something which could have existed and evolved, but doesn't because it didn't.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It is hardly surprising that JustGeoff is not able to offer anything more then his assertion that the mind is not physical.

.....apart from the conceptual/linguistic argument that I've now mentioned to you about TEN times.....

 

[Darat]

.....apart from the conceptual/linguistic argument that I've now mentioned to you about TEN times.....

Which is nothing more then the Wizard of Oz pulling the curtain across on the hope no one will look behind it....

 

[DreadNiK]

.....apart from the conceptual/linguistic argument that I've now mentioned to you about TEN times.....

Yeah, conceptual/linguistic arguments...with no empirical backing...

They prove things about how the world works, obviously.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Almost. Nobody has "assumed" that p-zombies are possible. They are instead arguing that they are conceptually very easy to construct, and (Chalmers) that concievability leads to possibility. By this line of reasoning, the possibility of p-zombies has been established by a line of reasoning, not assumed. That line of reasoning is itself dependent on observing that mental and physical predicates are clearly and easily distinguishable, a fact which is true regardless of ontology. So the critical point in the argument is the jump from conceptual possibility to actual possibility.

Yes, and a jump it surely is. First, I have to agree that zombies are conceivable, which requires that I not think about them too hard and expose the problems. Next I have to make a leap from conceivable to possible. Surely the word possible means something like "able to actually exist"? Are you saying that the possibility of zombies is independent of metaphysic? Sounds like a real stretch.

I should note that the section in the Stanford article about whether conceivability entails possibility is loaded with metaphysical considerations.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Sure, if "mind" = "behaviour" then zombies can't be defined. However, it means you are committed to being a behaviourist with respect to philosophy of mind, and if there's an utterly dead position in philosophy of mind, it's behaviourism. NOBODY defends it. So you've escaped the zombie argument by denying materialism is a supervenience theory. Your definition of "mind" is a waste of space. You might just as well declare that it doesn't mean anything at all - it's just "behaviour". P-zombies have behaviour. What they lack is a mind.

2 points.

One, Behaviorism is alive and well. While philosophers of mind have been arguing about how many angels can dance on ~material pins, behaviorism has grown and changed. The behaviorism you have dismissed is one which behaviorists have also dismissed (Watson's methodological behaviorism). The philosophy of Radical Behaviorism is defended; to claim otherwise is either ignorance or deceit.

Two, of course philosophers of mind ignore behaviorism. It actually works. For people who get paid to argue over inconsequential minutia, that is a horrible prospect! To think, real and practical answers to these questions? My god, won't somebody think of the children?

So...yes, behaviorism is dead to philosophy of mind. Fortunately, the reverse is also true, and behaviorism has gone on to make a difference in more practical matters. I do note that you admit that the behavioral view does address the zombie issue, and that your only arguments against it are an appeal to popularity ("NOBODY defends it") or to personal incredulity. If the price of being right is that Geoff does not understand....so be it.

Oh, and "it's just behavior"...what else could it be? Behavior is what we do. We walk, we talk, we think, we remember, we feel...all the things that you and I and m-zombies do. Which of them do p-zombies not do?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I do note that you admit that the behavioral view does address the zombie issue, and that your only arguments against it are an appeal to popularity ("NOBODY defends it") or to personal incredulity. If the price of being right is that Geoff does not understand....so be it.

Oh, and "it's just behavior"...what else could it be? Behavior is what we do. We walk, we talk, we think, we remember, we feel...all the things that you and I and m-zombies do. Which of them do p-zombies not do?

Oh, p-zombies do all of those things (provided you give a behavioural/eliminativist twist to "think" and "feel"). They just don't have minds. But since neither yourself nor Darat believe in minds, the zombie argument is irrelevant to you. It is an argument against supervenience physicalism.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yeah, conceptual/linguistic arguments...with no empirical backing...

They prove things about how the world works, obviously.

No. How the world is. Science answers empirical questions. The zombie issue is a metaphysical issue, not an empirical one. It is not a question about how reality works, it is a question about what reality is.

 

[Mercutio]

Oh, p-zombies do all of those things (provided you give a behavioural/eliminativist twist to "think" and "feel").

It is not the behaviorists who give a twist. For what reason do you assume that because a behavior is observable by only one person, that is follows that it is of a different nature than behavior which can be observed by more than one? Just because you say so? Again, "behavior" is simply "what you do". Unless there is compelling reason to split it up into two (or more?) fundamental things, then public versus private is not a "twist" at all, but simply a choice not to make up some magical difference (which, of course, assumes the conclusions that you wanted in your argument).

They just don't have minds. But since neither yourself nor Darat believe in minds, the zombie argument is irrelevant to you.

So wait, your argument really is dependent on assuming the existence of minds in the first place? I thought you said you did not assume that...

It is an argument against supervenience physicalism.

It is wordplay.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, and a jump it surely is. First, I have to agree that zombies are conceivable, which requires that I not think about them too hard and expose the problems.

Yes, but this is all taken into account by Nagel - who claims that the problem is that they are both conceivable and impossible.

Next I have to make a leap from conceivable to possible. Surely the word possible means something like "able to actually exist"? Are you saying that the possibility of zombies is independent of metaphysic? Sounds like a real stretch.

I should note that the section in the Stanford article about whether conceivability entails possibility is loaded with metaphysical considerations.

Sure, this bit may require a discussion of metaphysics. I think this may be the difference between Nagel's position and Chalmers' position. Chalmers is making a stronger claim than Nagel. Chalmers claim is that zombies falsify materialism. Nagel just claims the ease of their conceivability indicates a problem with our current concepts. He hints that zombies falsify materialism but stops short of actually claiming it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It is not the behaviorists who give a twist. For what reason do you assume that because a behavior is observable by only one person, that is follows that it is of.... Just because you say so? Again, "behavior" is simply "what you do".

Qualia aren't behaviour.

Unless there is compelling reason to split it up into two (or more?) fundamental things......

....like there being a fundamental linguistic/conceptual divide between mental and physical predicates?

So wait, your argument really is dependent on assuming the existence of minds in the first place? I thought you said you did not assume that...
It is wordplay.

I do not believe that my claim that my mind exists is an assumption.

At the very least, if you are going to claim that it doesn't you are going to have to give me a very good reason indeed to accept such a claim. I am quite certain of the existence of my own mind, no assumptions there.

 

[Belz...]

Not quite Belz, it isn't circular given the definition Geoff sets up.

Well, so I saw after writing that post.

My point was pretty much the same as yours, however. I simply haven't worded it properly. (1) was assumed from the start, because other premises were hidden.

It is hardly surprising that JustGeoff is not able to offer anything more then his assertion that the mind is not physical. After all some of the most brilliant human minds we know about have been trying to "prove" this idea (or disprove it) with logic for at least centuries yet it has eluded them.

Maybe the question IS meaningless after all.

 

[Belz...]

Because it doesn't start from assuming materialism is false. It starts from an analysis of language.

Indeed. I stand corrected. However, the first premise WAS based on prior assumptions that were not mentionned.

All sorts of problems. First off, there is nothing impossible about pink flying unicorns. They are harder to conceive of than p-zombies, but far from impossible. Second, pink flying Unicorns could also concievably be produced by evolution - let's say the sky has turned pink (so they are pink for camuoflage) and that a descendent of horses grew wings and evolved flight.

Careful, now. The problem is that, IF pink flying unicorns were found, it would cause serious problems because it doesn't seem to fit within the currently understood workings of evolution. They can't just spontaneously grow wings; yet pink flying unicorns would have no fossil ancestry.

But the mere physical or logical possibility of flying unicorns doesn't REALLY invalidate anything about evolution unless you actually find one. Which was my point about p-zombies.

There is a conceptual/linguistic argument supporting the p-zombie. No similar argument is available for the unicorn. Otherwise stated - the p-zombie is particularly easy to imagine because of a fundamental feature of our language and our ways of thinking about reality. The same doesn't apply to the unicorns. They are simply an example of something which could have existed and evolved, but doesn't because it didn't.

Unless you actually find one

 

[Mercutio]

Qualia aren't behaviour.

Assumes existence of qualia. "I see a tree" is not the same as "I perceive the image of a tree", no? The latter introduces a superfluous concept. Keep eliminating turtles, and you will find the concept of qualia is baseless. It is assumed, not evidenced.

....like there being a fundamental linguistic/conceptual divide between mental and physical predicates?

Our language treats them differently. Yes. This is not evidence that they are, in fact, different. Indeed, it supports my analysis of the problem--it is merely one of language.

I do not believe that my claim that my mind exists is an assumption.

Argument from personal incredulity. As long as you do not believe it is an assumption, you will find your flawed logic persuasive.

At the very least, if you are going to claim that it doesn't you are going to have to give me a very good reason indeed to accept such a claim.

That's not the way it works. You need to demonstrate evidence for the existence of something. All I have done was to doubt what could be doubted.

I am quite certain of the existence of my own mind, no assumptions there.

You see, you feel, you hear, you remember...you behave. From those things, you infer that you have a mind. Great. A mind is behavior. Ah, but if you claim that one must have a mind in order to do those things, then your mind is a circularly defined explanatory fiction. It adds nothing, and the concept can be eliminated without losing anything. Given the metaphysical baggage the word carries with it, I won't miss it much.

 

[Belz...]

No. How the world is. Science answers empirical questions. The zombie issue is a metaphysical issue, not an empirical one. It is not a question about how reality works, it is a question about what reality is.

Well, isn't it just convenient that we'll never have an answer to any question about what reality "is" ?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Careful, now. The problem is that, IF pink flying unicorns were found, it would cause serious problems because it doesn't seem to fit within the currently understood workings of evolution. They can't just spontaneously grow wings; yet pink flying unicorns would have no fossil ancestry.

You are talking about unicorns existing now. There is no reason why evolution could not produce them in the future. Of course they can't spontaneously grow wings. They'd have to evolve them.

But the mere physical or logical possibility of flying unicorns doesn't REALLY invalidate anything about evolution unless you actually find one. Which was my point about p-zombies.

If you found one tomorrow, yes. But now your argument has changed into:

(1) Pink flying unicorns exist.
(2) If pink flying unicorns exist, then evolution fails
(CO) therefore, evolution fails.

Which is a valid argument with a valid conclusion, provided (1) is satisfied, which it isn't. And your point was.....?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's not the way it works. You need to demonstrate evidence for the existence of something.

Oh boy, how circular can you get?

Everybody already knows that if minds exist, empirical science can't verify their existence. If I could demonstrate empirical evidence for the existence of mind, there would be no point in a zombie argument at all!

You see, you feel, you hear, you remember...you behave.

I am *AWARE*. There is something like it is to be Geoff. That is my mind. There is nothing like it is to be a zombie. Zombies don't have minds. What's the problem?

This is a sidetrack anyway. My policy is not to argue with eliminativists but to laugh at them.