Materialists......

[DreadNiK]

Your three assumptions amount to a claim that direct realism is true. You cannot defend direct realism from the argument from hallucination. So they are a set of contradictory assumptions. You could be a brain in a vat. Therefore, your assumptions are not safe. This doesn't mean you are a brain in a vat, or even likely to be so. But it does mean we can safely dismiss your assumptions as not safe.

Brain in vat possibility is perfectly in keeping with his first two assumptions...I suspect this will lead to a semantic argument...but then what else is new...

 

[DreadNiK]

It is a natural reaction to all the condescending and arrogant materialists he had to argue with.

So, the answer is yes then.

 

[Mercutio]

Here we go:

Premise: We can clearly, consistently and easily distinguish between mental and physical concepts/predicates/characteristics.
[snip]
1) The idiotic response:

Try to claim that we cannot distinguish between mental and physical concepts, the absurdity of which provoked the original rant in the opening post.

Absurd because you say so? Because you will not

Private and public events differ in the number of potential observers. Do you claim there is another way to distinguish? Why use the terms physical and mental, with their inherent dualistic baggage, when there is no reason to assume that these events are of two different fundamental natures?

This underlying premise of yours clearly contains your conclusion. I am sorry you do not see it.

 

[lifegazer]

No they do not. One of them claims that there seem to be two of them... The other one denies that there even seems to be two of them. The first is reductionism. The second is either insanity or intellectual dishonesty.

M1: "subjective experiences and brain processes are one and the same thing".
M2: "I cannot tell the difference between subjective experiences and brain processes. They are identical, and indiscernable.".

"One and the same thing" is not two different things.
It seems to me that those that reduce subjective experience to brain processes (M1) are really saying that only the brain and it's activity exists... as do those that utter M2. Essentially (reductionism), M1 = M2.

Your position is every bit as stupid as theirs is, lifegazer. You are arguing the non-reality of brains, they for the non-reality of minds.

Are you a dualist? What reality are you arguing for?

Anyway, I stand by what I said - you cannot "reduce" experience to brain activity and then claim that there is a difference between the brain and experience.
One is the brain, the other the brain-in-motion.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I can't at the moment think of a sentence where I wouldn't swap 'brain' for 'mind' and keep the meaning, although there would be different connotations. However, I'm easily knocked down on this point, all you have to do is provide an example, and since I haven't been trying to find one myself for more than a few minutes, I suspect there is.

Obviously not 'mind' as in 'object to' and 'brain' as in 'hit someone in the head'.

There's plenty of sentences where you couldn't swap brain for mind.

"I have to go to hospital to have a tumour removed from my mind." ???

How about the reverse :

"I was thinking of selling my house, but now I've changed my brain." ???

You cannot freely swap mental and physical predicates. They are clearly distinguishable. They have different characteristics and consequently get used differently in speech.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Brain in vat possibility is perfectly in keeping with his first two assumptions...

....but not the third.

 

[Bubo]

Are you making an argument from longevity ?

No, simply trying to point out that there is more to introspection than a flawed methodology from the origins of psychology.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

At least we've finally arrived where the argument actually is now, rather than where it was in 1780. It only took 61 pages.

Now if someone can explain to me how we derive a logical argument for or against zombies without assuming a metaphysic, I'll be a happy camper.

A physical attribute: I have eyes that can see a tomato.

A mental attribute: I perceive redness.

Another attribute: I respond "yes" when asked if the tomato is red.

Is that last attribute physical or mental?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Absurd because you say so? Because you will not

Private and public events differ in the number of potential observers. Do you claim there is another way to distinguish? Why use the terms physical and mental, with their inherent dualistic baggage, when there is no reason to assume that these events are of two different fundamental natures?

This underlying premise of yours clearly contains your conclusion. I am sorry you do not see it.

See post #2407.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

"One and the same thing" is not two different things.

Correct. Minds and brains are not neccesarily "two different things". But they are distinguishable. Mount Everest viewed from Nepal is called Sagarmatha. Any picture of Sagarmartha is distinguishable from a picture of Everest. But Sagarmatha and Everest are one and the same mountain, even though once upon a time, people thought they were different.

Brain and minds are words for different perspectives on one and the same thing. That is a contentious claim, but does not equal the rank stupidity of claiming that it is impossible to distinguish between them.

Are you a dualist? What reality are you arguing for?

Neutral Monism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectical_monism

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There's plenty of sentences where you couldn't swap brain for mind.

"I have to go to hospital to have a tumour removed from my mind." ???

How about the reverse :

"I was thinking of selling my house, but now I've changed my brain." ???

Oh yeah, let's use idioms to partition attributes. They always make a clear distinction between mental and physical:

Lend me an ear.

Off the top of your head.

Pick someone's brains.

Rack your brain.

Brain drain; brain trust.

He's got a good head on him.

Mental illness.

I agree that people have different ideas about what mental and physical attributes are. But the partition is not clear by any stretch of the imagination.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Now if someone can explain to me how we derive a logical argument for or against zombies without assuming a metaphysic, I'll be a happy camper.

For or against their natural possibility or their concievability?

We have plenty of arguments against the former and for the latter.

A physical attribute: I have eyes that can see a tomato.
A mental attribute: I perceive redness.
Another attribute: I respond "yes" when asked if the tomato is red.

Is that last attribute physical or mental?

It's physical. If I am in the room with you when you respond then I can see and hear your response.

A physical predicate: I respond "yes" when asked if the tomato is red.
A mental predicate: I feel overcome by a sense of fear when asked if the tomato is red, and do not know how to respond.

 

[Mercutio]

No, simply trying to point out that there is more to introspection than a flawed methodology from the origins of psychology.

But the introspection of Wundt and James was vastly different from the philosophical version that preceded it. It was an attempt at a systematic, scientific investigation into the elements (Wundt) and functions (James) of consciousness. As such, it was much more focused (less broad), methodical, and controlled than the earlier introspection.

Besides, the point was simply that we cannot treat this evidence as the foundation of our investigation; it is simply not reliable.

 

[DreadNiK]

There's plenty of sentences where you couldn't swap brain for mind.

"I have to go to hospital to have a tumour removed from my mind." ???

How about the reverse :

"I was thinking of selling my house, but now I've changed my brain." ???

You cannot freely swap mental and physical predicates. They are clearly distinguishable. They have different characteristics and consequently get used differently in speech.

Ok, I'm still thinking this all through, so I could end up backing myself into a corner, but let's see where logic takes us...

Firstly, I'll grant you and thank you for the first example.

The second, however, when you switch the words, results in 'mind' being used in a 'figure of speech'. Rather than disagree, could you think of another example that doesn't use a figure of speech such as 'changed my mind', ideally one where 'mind' isn't a redundant word, as in this case where it could better be replaced by 'position on the matter' or 'opinion' or be easily rephrased: "...now I don't want to". I'm not sure that is necessary or even possible though.

Back to the p-zombie thing briefly...

1.Is 'brain' necessary, and all that is and can be necessary, for 'mind'?
2.Does the existence of 'mind' necessitate brain?

1. Yes
2. Yes

3. Does the existence of brain necessitate mind?

 

[Mercutio]

See post #2407.

...which addresses the "mind = brain" argument, which I have not made. It does not apply to my argument at all. Once again you fail to demonstrate that you understand.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh yeah, let's use idioms to partition attributes. They always make a clear distinction between mental and physical:

Idioms are a special case of language use. They are cases where words don't mean what they seem to mean. "Changed my mind" is NOT an idiom. It still means what the words mean. "Kicked the bucket" does not mean "kicked the bucket".

I agree that people have different ideas about what mental and physical attributes are. But the partition is not clear by any stretch of the imagination.

~~ Paul

Then feel free to provide an example of an ambiguous predicate. Literally interpreted idioms don't count.

 

[lifegazer]

Neutral Monism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectical_monism

... "Dialectical monism is an ontological position which holds that reality is ultimately a unified whole, distinguishing itself from monism by asserting that this whole necessarily expresses itself in dualistic terms. For the dialectical monist, the essential unity is that of complementary polarities which, while opposed in the realm of experience and perception, are co-substantial in a transcendent sense. In simpler terms, the view can be summarized thus: "All in two, two in one, one in All."

Define what you think this unified reality is Geoff.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The second, however, when you switch the words, results in 'mind' being used in a 'figure of speech'. Rather than disagree, could you think of another example that doesn't use a figure of speech such as 'changed my mind', ideally one where 'mind' isn't a redundant word, as in this case where it could better be replaced by 'position on the matter' or 'opinion' or be easily rephrased: "...now I don't want to". I'm not sure that is necessary or even possible though.

OK, that may have not been a particularly helpful example. The problem is the word "mind", which is so readily turned into "brain" by materialists.

If I say "I feel euphoria", how can you replace the mental predicate with a physical one? I think you can only say "My body/brain was in the physical state we associate with feelings of euphoria". This hasn't replaced the mental predicate. It has just associated it with a physical one.

Back to the p-zombie thing briefly...

1.Is 'brain' necessary, and all that is and can be necessary, for 'mind'?

According to who?

The materialists: Brain is neccesary and sufficient for mind.
Geoff/hammegk: Brain is neccesary but insufficient for mind.
Lifegazer: Brains don't exist.
Zombie argument: Not specified at the outset because this assumes the conclusion.

2.Does the existence of 'mind' necessitate brain?

Yes, unless you are lifegazer. If theres a mind around, there's going to also be a brain.

3. Does the existence of [fully functioning] brain necessitate mind?

Empirically, it seems so. We just can't explain why this connection is neccesary.

 

[Bubo]

But the introspection of Wundt and James was vastly different from the philosophical version that preceded it. It was an attempt at a systematic, scientific investigation into the elements (Wundt) and functions (James) of consciousness. As such, it was much more focused (less broad), methodical, and controlled than the earlier introspection.

Besides, the point was simply that we cannot treat this evidence as the foundation of our investigation; it is simply not reliable.

I wasn't referring to the philosophical versions at all. There is a very practical (and quite ancient) science of introspection, most often called yoga, but I do hate using that term as it is laced with so many "new-age" connotations. As to the scientific systems of Wundt and James, I can't comment too much for admitted ignorance, but the mention of William James, to me, brings up a reputation for certain, shall we say, chemical endeavors. And the admission that subjectivity can be interfered, or even interrupted, by certain objective conditions is not, I think, a reason to write it off altogether from having any scientific validity. It is, truly, all that we have to work through. Which is the point I was getting at. If a tree falls in the woods and noone is around...

... obviously not so simple, but it gets to the root of what I'm suggesting.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Define what you think this unified reality is Geoff.

Neti, Neti, Neti.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neti_neti