Materialists......

[Bubo]

[deleted repeat post]

 

[lifegazer]

Neti, Neti, Neti.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neti_neti

So, after all that arguing, you believe the same thing as me.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's physical. If I am in the room with you when you respond then I can see and hear your response.

So whether an attribute is physical or mental is just a question of whether someone else can see it? Then I can attach instruments to someone and make mental attributes into physical ones. Cool!

"Changed my mind" is NOT an idiom. It still means what the words mean.

No, it doesn't. I didn't replace my mind. I just changed my opinion. And I sure hope that "picking someone's brains" is an idiom.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So, after all that arguing, you believe the same thing as me.

The basic core of your belief system is no different to hindu idealism. However, the details of your belief system are about as coherent as those of David Icke. David Icke is not helping. Neither are you. You need to go away and actually read some literature about mysticism instead of thinking you already understand it. You don't. You've merely got the basic idea and added all sorts of bells and whistles that don't fit it. The people you argue with never get anywhere near the basic idea because they are too busy pulling off your badly-attached bells and whistles.

 

[Darat]

At least we've finally arrived where the argument actually is now, rather than where it was in 1780. It only took 61 pages.

Really? I thought this was where the argument was almost a thousand years ago! I.e.:

Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109)

We have a concept of a Perfect Being:
Such a Perfect Being must necessarily exist.
Why? If he did not exist, then he would not be perfect.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So whether an attribute is physical or mental is just a question of whether someone else can see it? Then I can attach instruments to someone and make mental attributes into physical ones. Cool!

You can attach all the instruments you like, but you won't turn any mental predicates into physical ones. What you will do is replace mental ones with physical ones.

No, it doesn't. I didn't replace my mind. I just changed my opinion. And I sure hope that "picking someone's brains" is an idiom.

Me too.

 

[chriswl]

1) Are zombies conceptually possible? Answer: Yes.

Why are we asking this? Because we are establishing that our current conceptual scheme allows us to think of minds and brains as not neccesarily connected.

2) Are real zombies actually possible? Answer: Almost certainly no.

That's pretty much what Nagel said. Both points are incredibly weak.

P-zombies are not conceptually impossible like "the parents of the number 327" but then they would make a pretty poor thought experiment if they were, if they could be instantly dismissed as incoherent from a cursory reading of their definition.

I'm still none the wiser as to why you or Nagel think p-zombies will turn out to be logically impossible, and Nagel admits he has no real argument here. It's just a hunch, like his very dubious hunch that a brain constructed from electronic circuitry could never be conscious.

So Nagel is asaying that:

1) The idea of a p-zombie cannot be instantly dismissed as nonsense in an analytical sense (whoever said it could?)

2) Because the idea is problematic he is going to assume it is logically wrong in some way that has yet to be discovered.

He's entirely dodging the question which is this: can we really conceive of p-zombies? It is easy to say, let something exist that is an exact physical duplicate of a human but has no consciousness. But put us in front of a real alleged p-zombie and we would find it just as impossible to deny its consciousness as we find it impossible to deny the consciousness of other humans around us. We couldn't help but relate to it as a human, assuming it was given the chance to interact with us in the same way a human would. We could say the words "he might not be conscious" but we wouldn't mean them. Why is my intuition that he is conscious not to be trusted? What better method of judging consciousness do you have?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Really? I thought this was where the argument was almost a thousand years ago! I.e.:

Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109)

We have a concept of a Perfect Being:
Such a Perfect Being must necessarily exist.
Why? If he did not exist, then he would not be perfect.

Actually, this just about sums you up, Darat.

That was a very good rendition of Anselm's ontological argument. It has nothing at all to do with this thread, but thanks anyway.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

To all:

I think I should take a break from this thread to allow the various other contributors to catch up.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

For or against their natural possibility or their concievability?

I was thinking neither, but rather for or against their logical possibility. From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/:

"Unfortunately the vocabulary of possibility and necessity has become rather slippery. Kripke in this context uses ‘logical possibility’ and ‘metaphysical possibility’ interchangeably; some apply ‘logical’ to a kind of possibility that others prefer to call ‘conceptual’ (Chalmers 1999, 477); others use ‘logical’ for ‘metaphysical or conceptual’ (as noted by Yablo 1999, 457n.; Latham 2000, 72f.). In what follows these adjectives will be avoided except in quotations: when the word ‘possible’ is used without qualification it is to be taken to mean just that the worlds, situations or states of affairs in question involve no contradiction. Perhaps this use explains why the metaphor of God's creation seems so apt: God can do anything short of what involves a contradiction. We can also say that if a contradiction would be involved in the idea of a zombie world, then in the relevant sense the facts of consciousness ‘supervene’ on the physical facts. Now let us examine what has become the chief line of argument for the possibility of zombies: the ‘conceivability argument’."

But now I'm just confused.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You can attach all the instruments you like, but you won't turn any mental predicates into physical ones. What you will do is replace mental ones with physical ones.

What does that mean?

Are you saying that answering a question about the redness of apples involves lots of attributes, some mental and some physical? That's certainly true, and if we dive down into the precise process that occurs when a person answers a question about redness, I think we will find it difficult to locate the mental/physical boundary.

~~ Paul

 

[lifegazer]

The basic core of your belief system is no different to hindu idealism. However, the details of your belief system are about as coherent as those of David Icke. David Icke is not helping. Neither are you. You need to go away and actually read some literature about mysticism instead of thinking you already understand it. You don't. You've merely got the basic idea and added all sorts of bells and whistles that don't fit it. The people you argue with never get anywhere near the basic idea because they are too busy pulling off your badly-attached bells and whistles.

The problem with your judgement is that my "belief system" is a conclusion of my "bells and whistles".
I never believed in the existence of God until then.
Guess I just fluked it then.

By the way, what happened in the belief that 'nothing' was the essence of everything, including experience?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

By the way, what happened in the belief that 'nothing'

"Neti, Neti, Neti"

Do you think the relationship between the word "neti" and "nothing" is accidental, Darren?

Enough. See you all tomorrow.

 

[Darat]

Actually, this just about sums you up, Darat.

That was a very good rendition of Anselm's ontological argument. It has nothing at all to do with this thread, but thanks anyway.

But it has everything to do with something you posted in this thread:

At this point we seem to be thrashing around with the ideas of conceivability, logical possibility, and natural possibility. Good luck.

~~ Paul

At least we've finally arrived where the argument actually is now, rather than where it was in 1780. It only took 61 pages.

 

[Darat]

"Neti, Neti, Neti"

Do you think the relationship between the word "neti" and "nothing" is accidental, Darren?

Enough. See you all tomorrow.

I think it will take you a lot longer then just a day to catch-up....

 

[lifegazer]

"Neti, Neti, Neti"

Do you think the relationship between the word "neti" and "nothing" is accidental, Darren?

Enough. See you all tomorrow.

I see. So the essence and culmination of everything is absolute nothingness.

You'll never sell it Geoff. But good luck.

 

[Belz...]

Your three assumptions amount to a claim that direct realism is true. You cannot defend direct realism from the argument from hallucination. So they are a set of contradictory assumptions. You could be a brain in a vat. Therefore, your assumptions are not safe. This doesn't mean you are a brain in a vat, or even likely to be so. But it does mean we can safely dismiss your assumptions as not safe.

As far as metaphysics go, Geoff, NO assumption is safe.

Might as well go with the one that follows the evidence.

And my assumptions allow for hallucinations. Perhaps you've missed the "to a degree" part.

 

[Belz...]

No, simply trying to point out that there is more to introspection than a flawed methodology from the origins of psychology.

But only barely. Introspection is what gave us religion. And that alone is enough to discredit it.

 

[Belz...]

I wasn't referring to the philosophical versions at all. There is a very practical (and quite ancient) science of introspection, most often called yoga, but I do hate using that term as it is laced with so many "new-age" connotations.

The only yoga I like is the one practiced by Dhalsim. The rest is just woo.

Correct. Minds and brains are not neccesarily "two different things". But they are distinguishable. Mount Everest viewed from Nepal is called Sagarmatha. Any picture of Sagarmartha is distinguishable from a picture of Everest. But Sagarmatha and Everest are one and the same mountain, even though once upon a time, people thought they were different.

But they ARE one and the same, in the end.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

At least we've finally arrived where the argument actually is now, rather than where it was in 1780. It only took 61 pages.

Not bad, considering that it took real philosophers 225 years, give or take.

~~ Paul