Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Summary: Your stream-of-consciousness is not you.

It is yet another text on Buddhist-style enlightenment by someone who is hopelessly confused by what Buddhist-style enlightenment means.

I couldn't disagree more.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, if p-zombies were possible, I suppose that would bring some things into question, wouldn't it ?

Yes, it would.

True, but he can't tell you whether it's coherent or not.

So long as he knew what I meant, that is enough.

 

[articulett]

Nothing in this post has actually got anything to do with the post it is supposedly responding to.

You keep saying that materialism makes no sense because materialists say the mind is the brain. That is not the case. Materialism makes complete sense in science--it's not redundant...life and "consciousness" is a continuum...certainly you understand that. Some things lie on the borderline. You are the one claiming that consciousness is not material or measurable--that it's separate from the brain or can exist independently of the brain--that life...particularly human life is something "beyond" the material--you are the one defining mind and saying materialism makes no sense and playing word games to make sure it can't make sense to you. If this post doesn't make sense to you it's because you have developed a "truth" that doesn't allow such things to make sense. In science we have no problem with the term mind--we don't call it p-zombies or redundant or a "thing"--rather we use it to distinguish what is perceived via the brain from the brain itself. Simlarly the way you might distinguish sound and it's characteristics (wave, tone, decibles etc.) from what any particular sound receiving device perceives-- I don't know of any materialist who says there is no such thing as a mind or that the mind IS the brain...just as doctors don't say the respiration is lungs--respiration is not a redundant word for lungs--you keep promoting this goofy notion that materialists have a redundant view of the mind and the brain...that is either dishonest or a complete misunderstanding or purposeful ignorance on your part. Paul tries to pin you down on terms and you dash off with more self defined concepts that you say materialist must adhere to and then declare those concepts "impossible"--

And I have no idea what Hammy is saying. Free will is a religious concept. Everybody's choices are limited by the environment, natural laws, the body they are born into, the brains they have, the experiences they endure, the temptations they confront, etc. Dualism just seems like an egotistical trick to make oneself feel important and eternal and above all other life forms. In that way, it seems to be a good evolutionary strategy--being self centered can certainly aid survival, eh? But that doesn't make it true. No matter how you've convinced yourself that materialism is impossible, redundant, or makes us all "zombies" akin to machines--that does not mean any of the above true.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You keep saying that materialism makes no sense because materialists say the mind is the brain. That is not the case. Materialism makes complete sense in science--it's not redundant...life and "consciousness" is a continuum...certainly you understand that. Some things lie on the borderline. You are the one claiming that consciousness is not material or measurable--that it's separate from the brain or can exist independently of the brain--that life...particularly human life is something "beyond" the material--you are the one defining mind and saying materialism makes no sense and playing word games to make sure it can't make sense to you. If this post doesn't make sense to you it's because you have developed a "truth" that doesn't allow such things to make sense. In science we have no problem with the term mind--we don't call it p-zombies or redundant or a "thing"--rather we use it to distinguish what is perceived via the brain from the brain itself. Simlarly the way you might distinguish sound and it's characteristics (wave, tone, decibles etc.) from what any particular sound receiving device perceives-- I don't know of any materialist who says there is no such thing as a mind or that the mind IS the brain...just as doctors don't say the respiration is lungs--respiration is not a redundant word for lungs--you keep promoting this goofy notion that materialists have a redundant view of the mind and the brain...that is either dishonest or a complete misunderstanding or purposeful ignorance on your part. Paul tries to pin you down on terms and you dash off with more self defined concepts that you say materialist must adhere to and then declare those concepts "impossible"--

And I have no idea what Hammy is saying. Free will is a religious concept. Everybody's choices are limited by the environment, natural laws, the body they are born into, the brains they have, the experiences they endure, the temptations they confront, etc. Dualism just seems like an egotistical trick to make oneself feel important and eternal and above all other life forms. In that way, it seems to be a good evolutionary strategy--being self centered can certainly aid survival, eh? But that doesn't make it true. No matter how you've convinced yourself that materialism is impossible, redundant, or makes us all "zombies" akin to machines--that does not mean any of the above true.

This hasn't got anything to do with my post either. I was talking about the difference between eliminative and non-eliminative materialism. Whatever you are talking about, it's not the difference between eliminativism and non-eliminative materialism. You are trying to redirect the argument somewhere else entirely, somewhere that has already been debated to death and is of no interest. Further attempts to derail the current debate will be ignored.

 

[nescafe]

I couldn't disagree more.

I figured you would say that, which is why I edited that post do give you something substantial to disagree with.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

(ed: I am rather suprised Geoff used that source to buttress his argument, as it is chock-full of new-age woo.

As usual, I've been accused of posting a link to buttress an argument when I have done no such thing. I was just answering Belz's question the best way I could. I do not need Eckharte Tolle to support an ailing position. I just cannot be bothered to do Tolle's job when I can simply post a link to his description of what Belz was asking about.

Zen and the Brain would have been a much better reference (albeit one that takes much longer to read), because it contains actual, informed speculation as to how brain processes and neural structures tie in to our emotions, perceptions, and experiences (including no-mind). )

Whatever.....the subject is not the content. You are splitting hairs. The basics of what Tolle is saying are not different to the basics of Buddhism. The fact that it is new-age and not archaic makes little difference. Did you expect me to link to the Heart Sutra?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why? You've not proved this. All you have done is shown that minds can't exist without having some sort of content. That does not falsify idealism, it merely shows that a completely empty mind is indistinguishable from the void.

We need to distinguish between an individual mind and the Metamind.

We can distinguish between an individual mind and its objects of perception. Therefore it is logically possible to have an individual mind (not the Metamind) with no objects of perception. But idealism says this is impossible. Thus idealism must reject either individual minds or objects of perception. You are suggesting that idealism can salvage this by declaring that a mind without objects of perception becomes something else, namely is absorbed into the Metamind.

So what is the equivalent gambit for non-eliminative materialism? It would be to say that a brain without subjective experience becomes something else. How about a nonconcious person, a person with no conscious function. But that is not a p-zombie, because we can distinguish such a person from a normal person. Does this salvage non-eliminative materialism?

I just explained that I reject that the claim that the correct neural configurations would be present in a p-zombie, because of an argument from QM. The p-zombie cannot attain the same microtubule state as the normal human, therefore p-zombies are impossible. I have not assumed neutral monism is true. I have used an argument from QM, related to Penrose, as to why I believe p-zombies are impossible. I can still concieve of them, but they can't actually happen.

But we're talking about logical possibility here, not natural possibility. If you want to use natural possibility, then I can just say that p-zombies are naturally impossible under materialism.

The fact that I can concieve of p-zombies has less implications for the neutral monist because the neutral monist has already accepted that the world as it manifests to us is neccesarily dualistic. It would be very strange to then claim that p-zombies are inconcievable. But I can still claim they cannot happen in the real world.

I claim the same for materialism.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

We need to distinguish between an individual mind and the Metamind.

We can distinguish between an individual mind and its objects of perception.

Can we? How?

Therefore it is logically possible to have an individual mind (not the Metamind) with no objects of perception.

???

Still don't understand how you got here.

But idealism says this is impossible. Thus idealism must reject either individual minds or objects of perception.

Hold on soldier.....I'm not following you at all. I didn't agree with the first sentence and I don't understand how the rest follows from the sentence I didn't agree with.

You are suggesting that idealism can salvage this by declaring that a mind without objects of perception becomes something else, namely is absorbed into the Metamind.

Actually I said it is equivalent to the void.

So what is the equivalent gambit for non-eliminative materialism? It would be to say that a brain without subjective experience becomes something else. How about a nonconcious person, a person with no conscious function.

That's what a p-zombie is.

But that is not a p-zombie, because we can distinguish such a person from a normal person.

Of course it is a p-zombie and we cannot distinguish them.

Does this salvage non-eliminative materialism?

I didn't understand half of it, and no.

But we're talking about logical possibility here, not natural possibility. If you want to use natural possibility, then I can just say that p-zombies are naturally impossible under materialism.

Sure you can, but that won't save it.

I claim the same for materialism.

~~ Paul

That won't save it. Their mere logical possibility is enough for materialism to fall over. The only reason it doesn't cause a similar problem for neutral monism is that neutral monism allows for reality to appear dualistic to us. Materialism does not allow for this. Do you see the difference? There's no reason for a neutral monist to worry about the logical possibility of p-zombies because p-zombies are naturally dualistic beasties and neutral monism allows for such things in the phenomenal world. It just denies they are actually dualistic in the world of neutral-stuff.

 

[nescafe]

As usual, I've been accused of posting a link to buttress an argument when I have done no such thing. I was just answering Belz's question the best way I could.

You are correct -- I should have said "that reference is horrible -- the information you are trying to refer Belz to in that link is buried under layers of new-age woo".

Whatever.....the subject is not the content. You are splitting hairs.

Mr. Kettle, Mr. Pot has a message for you. Most of the argumentation in this thread has been of the hair-splitting variety, and you are no exception to that.

The basics of what Tolle is saying are not different to the basics of Buddhism. The fact that it is new-age and not archaic makes little difference.

Anyone who says:

Humans have been in the grip of pain for eons, ever since they fell from the state of grace, entered the realm of time and mind, and lost awareness of Being.

and apparently means it is confused.

Did you expect me to link to the Heart Sutra?

No, we do not appear to be in the "mystical idea X proves that my position is correct" phase of the thread, although we appear to be drifting that way (again).

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Nescafe,

I am not going to have an argument with you about whether Buddhism or Tolle's "New Age Classic" is the best at communicating why the content of a mind and the observer of a mind is not the same thing. Regardless of which flavour icing you put on it, the claim is basically the same: You are not your mind.

Geoff

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Can we? How?

Because an individual mind and its objects of perception are separate concepts. That's what you said was the case under materialism concerning brain and mind.

Still don't understand how you got here.

Same way you got to a brain without mind under materialism.

Hold on soldier.....I'm not following you at all. I didn't agree with the first sentence and I don't understand how the rest follows from the sentence I didn't agree with.

Materialism: We can distinguish brain from mind. Therefore a p-zombie is logically possible. Therefore materialism is false. We can salvage it by declaring there is no such thing as mind.

Idealism: We can distinguish individual mind from objects of perception. Therefore it is logically possible to have an individual mind without objects of perception. Therefore idealism is false. We can salvage it by declaring there is no such thing as objects of perception (or, instead, individual minds).

That's what a p-zombie is.

I don't think so. A p-zombie is a person with no consciousness. I'm talking about a person with a broken brain and thus abnormal or no consciousness.

Of course it is a p-zombie and we cannot distinguish them.

We can distinguish them because their brains are broken and we can tell.

That won't save it. Their mere logical possibility is enough for materialism to fall over. The only reason it doesn't cause a problem for neutral monism is that neutral monism allows for reality to appear dualistic to us. Materialism does not allow for this. Do you see the difference? There's no reason for a neutral monist to worry about the logical possibility of p-zombies because p-zombies are naturally dualistic beasties and neutral monism allows for such things in the phenomenal world. It just denies they are actually dualistic in the world of neutral-stuff.

I don't understand why the mere logical possibility of p-zombies causes non-eliminativist materialism to fall over, especially since you tell us that all materialisms are metaphysically equivalent. Since they are equivalent, the p-zombie argument is just a linguistic argument.

Why doesn't materialism allow reality to appear dualistic? If that is true, then the fact that reality does appear dualistic to lots of people is a logical proof that materialism is false. That's worth publishing, I think. Perhaps you mean to use a word other than appear.

You're saying that neutral monism logically allows for p-zombies because one human can be conscious and another have identical brain structure yet not be conscious. And this is because QM/Being/Zero/Nothingness can choose not to manifest consciousness in the second human?

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

Idealism: We can distinguish individual mind from objects of perception.

Well, an objective reality exists wrt to 'individuals'.

Therefore it is logically possible to have an individual mind without objects of perception.

Not as I see it. Of course, what 'individual mind' is supposed to refer to is part of the problem. Neural systems seem necessary for introspective minds.

Without at least one object of perception nothing could be said to exist. That is an interesting statement, huh?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Not as I see it. Of course, what 'individual mind' is supposed to refer to is part of the problem. Neural systems seem necessary for introspective minds.

What? I thought everything was mind. Why should the mind need to conjure up a neural system just so it can function?

Without at least one object of perception nothing could be said to exist. That is an interesting statement, huh?

No, no, don't say that. We agree that "thinking exists." That don't say nothing 'bout no object of perception.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

And I have no idea what Hammy is saying.

As your posts continue to demonstrate; I'll try again.

Do you know what "epistemology" means?

Do you know what "ontology" means?

Do you contend epistemology answers onotological questions in any way?

If so, how?

If not, why do you continue to post the same irrelevant nonsense vis-a-vis this thread?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Because an individual mind and its objects of perception are separate concepts. That's what you said was the case under materialism concerning brain and mind.

You are making a false equivocation. Objects of perception are not related to individual minds in the same way that minds are related to brains. Your argument depends on the relationship being the same, but it quite clearly isn't.

Materialism: We can distinguish brain from mind. Therefore a p-zombie is logically possible. Therefore materialism is false. We can salvage it by declaring there is no such thing as mind.

Idealism: We can distinguish individual mind from objects of perception. Therefore it is logically possible to have an individual mind without objects of perception. Therefore idealism is false. We can salvage it by declaring there is no such thing as objects of perception (or, instead, individual minds).

Your description of idealism is wrong, and you are making a false equivocation. The description of materialism is correct.

Perhaps....:

Idealism: We can distinguish brain from mind. Therefore a p-zombie is logically possible. But p-zombies aren't incompatible with idealism. Therefore....this isn't helping much.

I don't think so. A p-zombie is a person with no consciousness. I'm talking about a person with a broken brain and thus abnormal or no consciousness.

eh?

"A p-zombie is a person with no consciousness."
"I'm talking about a person with ..... no consciousness.

I'm not quite following you.

I don't understand why the mere logical possibility of p-zombies causes non-eliminativist materialism to fall over, especially since you tell us that all materialisms are metaphysically equivalent. Since they are equivalent, the p-zombie argument is just a linguistic argument.

Not quite. Non-eliminativist materialism allows enough of a definition of a mind to make the concept of a p-zombie coherent, so it is vulnerable to p-zombie arguments.

All arguments are linguistic. Ever tried having an argument that wasn't in a language?

Why doesn't materialism allow reality to appear dualistic? If that is true, then the fact that reality does appear dualistic to lots of people is a logical proof that materialism is false.

Yes, when it comes down to it, it is that simple. As soon as you admit that reality appears dualistic to us, the form of transcendental realism called "materialism" is in trouble, and it never recovers.

That's worth publishing, I think. Perhaps you mean to use a word other than appear.

No, I meant exactly what I said. And it's not worth publishing, because Kant and those who followed him got there first.

You're saying that neutral monism logically allows for p-zombies because one human can be conscious and another have identical brain structure yet not be conscious.

No. I am saying it allows them conceptually/logically, because it accepts that reality manifests in a dualistic way. Materialism accepts no such thing. The argument I gave as to why I didn't think they could exist in reality was not dependent on neutral monism, and probably not relevant.

And this is because QM/Being/Zero/Nothingness can choose not to manifest consciousness in the second human?

My own particular position would imply that this is not the case. It cannot choose not to manifest consciousness in the second human, and therefore p-zombies are not "naturally possible" to use your term. But they remain conceptually possible in their own right. It is only when I introduce other elements of my system that they become impossible.

 

[Belz...]

ROFL. If you ever discover what "Belz...'s Really Me" is, fame and fortune await as you ecucate the rest of humanity.

Dammit, Hammy. That wasn't even a sentence.

In the interim, does the Thought "I, Belz..., think I, Belz..., Thinks" exist?

Dammit, Hammy. You must either think every single one of your posts is SO profound, or SO obvious.

 

[Belz...]

So long as he knew what I meant, that is enough.

Other example: "How is your soul" is not a meaningful question in the context of materialism. Even if you understand what "soul" means.

 

[Belz...]

Yes, when it comes down to it, it is that simple. As soon as you admit that reality appears dualistic to us, the form of transcendental realism called "materialism" is in trouble, and it never recovers.

Why would the APPEARANCE of dualism cause problems for ANY monism ?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You are making a false equivocation. Objects of perception are not related to individual minds in the same way that minds are related to brains. Your argument depends on the relationship being the same, but it quite clearly isn't.

Ah, then I don't understand the proof that p-zombies mean materialism is false. All you required was that I agreed minds weren't brains. You didn't explain that there had to be some special relationship between the two.

Could you present the entire proof, please?

Idealism: We can distinguish brain from mind. Therefore a p-zombie is logically possible. But p-zombies aren't incompatible with idealism. Therefore....this isn't helping much.

So under idealism I can have a brain without a mind? What does that mean when everything is essentially mindstuff?

eh?

"A p-zombie is a person with no consciousness."
"I'm talking about a person with ..... no consciousness.

I'm not quite following you.

A p-zombie is identical to a person, except that it has no consciousness. It is a theoretical construct, since there doesn't appear to be any way to create one.

A person with brain damage has lost some or all consciousness, because his brain is broken. He is most certainly distinguishable from a normal person. Otherwise we would declare a brain dead person to be a p-zombie, materialism would allow for p-zombies, and this conversation would never have occurred.

All arguments are linguistic. Ever tried having an argument that wasn't in a language?

No, they aren't. Of course they are in a language, but that doesn't make all of them purely linguistic.

Yes, when it comes down to it, it is that simple. As soon as you admit that reality appears dualistic to us, the form of transcendental realism called "materialism" is in trouble, and it never recovers.

Then why haven't philosphers abandoned materialism and idealism completely? Why do they still live?

No. I am saying it allows them conceptually/logically, because it accepts that reality manifests in a dualistic way. Materialism accepts no such thing. The argument I gave as to why I didn't think they could exist in reality was not dependent on neutral monism, and probably not relevant.

Now you are using the word manifests instead of appears.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Why would the APPEARANCE of dualism cause problems for ANY monism ?

Because it has to explain how something that is actually only one type of thing appears to us as two. It's not a problem for dualism because a dualism explicitly says that reality is dualistic. So the problems for materialism, idealism and neutral monism is to explain how what seems like two things is really only one thing. Each of them is in a different situation when faced with this question. The idealists have to try to find a way to explain why material doesn't really exist, or can be said to be "mental things, really". This is at least supportable by the claim "I am 100% certain my mind exists". He then has to go about explaining how minds can seem to be dependent on matter even though it's actually the other way around. The materialists have to try to find a way to explain why minds don't really exist, or how minds can said to be "material things, really". The materialist, unlike the idealist, is also in the unenviable position of having to find a way to get rid of the one thing they are 100% certain exists.

Materialism ends up claiming that the only thing which exists is something you can never actually be aware of, and that the only thing you can ever be aware of doesn't actually exist. Which is silly.