Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Damn it, Geoff, I can't find one. I'm happy for you to show me one.

~~ Paul

I just did. The important bits were in bold and in red.

 

[Belz...]

Which definition are we using?

1 a : having material existence : perceptible especially through the senses and subject to the laws of nature *everything physical is measurable by weight, motion, and resistance Thomas De Quincey* b : of or relating to material things

2 a : of or relating to natural science b (1) : of or relating to physics (2) : characterized or produced by the forces and operations of physics

Ooh, I like that second one. It might be useful in a description of scientific naturalism.

~~ Paul

Well, I was thinking about "physical" meaning something whose behaviour can be described by science and physics in particular.

From Dictionary.com:

1. a) Of or relating to the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit. See Synonyms at bodily.

1. b) Involving or characterized by vigorous bodily activity: a physical dance performance.

1. c) Slang. Involving or characterized by violence: “A real cop would get physical” (TV Guide).

2. Of or relating to material things: our physical environment.

3. Of or relating to matter and energy or the sciences dealing with them, especially physics.

Number 3 would be closer to my understanding of the word in the current context. #2 is very interesting, however, as it equates physical with material.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Modern eliminativists have much more clearly expressed the view that mental phenomena simply do not exist and will eventually be eliminated from our thinking about the brain in the same way that demons have been eliminated from our thinking about mental illness and psychopathology.

This does not imply that there is no mechanism in the brain for the acquisition of statements we accept as true ("beliefs").

Are you saying that there is no brain process X at all, such that X was misinterpreted as the folk psychological belief mechanism? There is, in fact, no mechanism to acquire statements we accept as true?

From http://artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/eliminativism.html:

Misunderstanding is also encouraged by the fact that the Churchlands alternately emphasize two different aspects of their message, which can sometimes create an illusion that they believe that folk psychology is already on the way out. On one hand, they admit that our current neurological language has a long way to go before it could eliminate mental language, and that it is purely an empirical question whether folk psychology will actually be eliminated. But they also insist that folk psychology does have some very serious problems, and that current developments in neuroscience appear to be on the way to solving those problems. This is why they see eliminative materialism not as a mere logical possibility of interest to no one but philosophers, but as a genuine empirical possibility that deserves serious scientific attention. Many of the Churchlands' critics actually accept that the elimination of folk psychology is possible, and attack only the claim that elimination is probable. (such as Horgan and Woodward 1985, Horgan and Graham 1990). The Churchlands have less at stake with respect to these kinds of criticisms, and have in fact softened their position in response to some of them. But this should not be taken as an abandonment of the core principles of eliminative materialism.
...
Furthermore, the philosophical implications of the neuroscience which support the Churchlands' current position are very different from the more purely theoretical considerations that originally inspired their eliminativism. When Paul Churchland wrote "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes" (chapter one of Churchland 1989.), one of the main arguments in that paper was that folk psychology was a likely candidate for elimination because it was different from physics in several crucial ways. As their neurologically-inspired alternative has actually developed however, it has lead to a pluralism which has changed the significance of their original claim that "active coherence with the rest of what we presume to know is a central measure of credibility to any theory." (Churchland and Churchland 1998 p.6.) The need for scientific theories to eliminate folk theories is no longer as compelling when scientific progress is produced by a dynamic and coevolutionary process, rather than a monolithic bottom-up reduction to physics. Active coherence is still to be strived for, but it is more likely to be a regulative ideal than an obtainable goal.

~~ Paul

 

[Belz...]

No we do not. We can ask whether they are coherent in their own right. We can also ask whether they are compatible with various metaphysical positions. But it is not valid to assume a metaphysical position, decide that p-zombies are inconsistent with that metaphysical position, and then claim that the concept of a p-zombie is itself incoherent.

But that's not what we're doing. We're saying (as am I, now) that p-zombies are incoherent relative to materialism. On their own, they are nothing at all. We must have a context.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Same way you arrived at "If materialism is true, then p-zombies should be logically impossible. They aren't, so materialism must be false." You said we can distinguish between minds and brain function, so it is logically possible to have a creature with a brain but no mind. We can also distinguish between minds and objects of perception, so it is logically possible to have a creature with a mind but no objects of perception. But that should be logically impossible under idealism.

~~ Paul

Well, I'm still not sure about your reasoning, but since I agree with your conclusion this doesn't really matter much. I don't think it possible to have a mind which is not aware of anything. All consciousness is consciousness directed towards something. This is what "intentionalism" means. The "mark of the mental" is intentionality - "aboutness" - directedness towards the objects of experience. A consciousness which is conscious of nothing at all has ceased to exist.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Bolding mine.

I cannot sense or even conceptualise such a thing. You're going to have to help me out on this.

http://www.ecomall.com/greenshopping/powerofnow.htm

 

[articulett]

Paul,

I've explained this before but I will try again. I think I know why you are confused about eliminativism. You seem to be under the impression that there is a metaphysical difference between eliminativism and other materialist positions. There is not. Both eliminativism and reductive/emergentist materialism make exactly the same metaphysical claim : everything is made of matter/energy.

That is why I keep insisting I am correct on this one. The people who say they can't understand what eliminativism is claiming, and trying to say they are eliminativists but continue trying to use words like "mind" in debates like these simply do not understand that eliminativism only differs from other forms of materialism because of a linguistic claim, NOT a metaphysical one. It is a claim that other materialists are using words that are redundant, NOT a claim that their metaphysical position is wrong.

WOO! 2000 posts......

You are going to have to stretch your thinking a bit here...in science mind does not exactly mean "brain"--brain is used to refer more to the organ itself...mind refers more as to what the organism with the brain is experiencing. Saying your heart is racing...refers to an organ that is beating faster and a state of mind you might call excitement or anxiety. Stimulants act upon brain matter and brain chemicals and the transmission of brain signals causing a state of mind that might be perceived as sharp, or speedy, or that the "mind" is racing--not the brain--mind is what the individual with a brain perceives...just like sound is waves that the brain perceives (via auricles) and translates...in scary movies...this alters the "state of mind"--it's not redundant...you seem to misunderstand the finer points of neurology on purpose to have this notion that "thought" is something "mystical". Sound is just waves--but that is not to say that brains can't interpret them and get meaning and information from sounds. You wouldn't say that the meaning that pavlov's dogs got from the bell (dinner was about to be served) was a "something" that existed outside or independent from the brain. It's not 'mystery" that makes them salivate...in an assocation in the brain.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This does not imply that there is no mechanism in the brain for the acquisition of statements we accept as true ("beliefs").

You are correct. In the end, the refutations or eliminativism do not work logically, they just poke fun at the sheer idiocy of the claim that minds do not exist. Eliminativism is immune to conclusive logical refutation.

Are you saying that there is no brain process X at all, such that X was misinterpreted as the folk psychological belief mechanism? There is, in fact, no mechanism to acquire statements we accept as true?

I have no idea. I cannot take the basic premise seriously. Everything which follows is absurd, IMO.

 

[hammegk]

And, presumably all other animals, right? Plants that turn toward the sun are p-zombies...my dog is a p-zombie, Terri Schiavo was a very low functioning p-zombie...because these things don't seem like programmed machines to me...life forms tend to show interaction and adaption to their environment and preferences and tendencies that enhance their survival--machines don't...though we can program them to "learn".

Remember this is assuming materialism=true; then yes. BTW, we have a couple strong behavorists here; Mercutio and Jeff Corey.

And you identify another struggle for the materialist; what the heck is the difference between "life" and "not-life". Unless you accept -- like Zeno and Einstein's math -- that "what-is" is infinitely divisible, "what-is" is not a continuum, and there must be a discrete addition, wow! look! now it's "alive".


And I ask you, directly, again. What do you not understand about the fact that epistemology (you seem hung up in particular on neural systems) does not answer ontological concerns. Ontology is what this thread is trying to discuss.

Neuroscience works equally well no matter what ontological choice is assumed.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But that's not what we're doing. We're saying (as am I, now) that p-zombies are incoherent relative to materialism.

What is the difference between your statement and the following one:

"Materialism is incoherent relative to p-zombies."?

On their own, they are nothing at all. We must have a context.

That is not true. We need no metaphysical context. I could describe a p-zombie to an illiterate egyptian peasant living in the year 4000 BC. As long as the peasant has a word for "mind", I can describe a p-zombie.

 

[Belz...]

Not true. Without philosophy, you have no idea what you mean by "truth."

The word has a clear definition. Even a computer can tell you if something's true or not, just with mathematics. Something either is or isn't, excluding your "doesn't and doesn't not exist" thingy.

Yes. And unlike the materialist, the idealist has got a decent case.

Only if you make one of two assumptions. As I've said before, you have to make an assumption in order to progress. The idealist just makes an assumption opposite to mine. I don't see why his case is better.

The nature of those debates were very much like the nature of the debates in this thread. You seem to be able to prove anything is true by assuming your conclusion, which doesn't help. Assume something else and you get a different result. The arguments go on and on forever, either oscillating between two positions or going round and round in endless circles.

Unfortunately, there kinda HAS to be one circular assumption to start with. Otherwise you're left with the idea that knowledge is impossible.

Then comes Kant. Kant claims that all of the people arguing before him were engaged in "the metaphysics of illusion" and that they were never going to make any progress unless they gave sufficient thought to what they were trying to do and how they were trying to do it. Ultimately, he claimed, they were all asking questions which could never be conclusively answered.

He's not wrong, but I think it's because a lot of those questions are meaningless, as I said before.

"Things as they really are" are forever unknown to us.

That's a good example of a meaningless question.

HOWEVER, this all held only until the arrival of QM. On some interpretations of QM, science has given us a glimpse of the noumenal.

That's in part because QM is notoriously difficult to grasp by non-specialists. But it doesn't entail mysticism or anything of the sort. Lots of stuff in QM is (seems to be, at least) modelisation. When a wave function "collapses", for example, it doesn't mean the particle suddenly moved or changed shape. It's just a mathematical probability that suddenly became certainty.

 

[Belz...]

I've explained this before but I will try again. I think I know why you are confused about eliminativism. You seem to be under the impression that there is a metaphysical difference between eliminativism and other materialist positions. There is not. Both eliminativism and reductive/emergentist materialism make exactly the same metaphysical claim : everything is made of matter/energy.

A slight correction: space-time is not made of matter/energy, so it's a little more complex than that.

The eliminativists make an additional claim on top of the metaphysical claim of materialism, and that claim is a very specific claim about language, namely that the word "mind" and all of the terms in folk psychology which appear to refer to things which resist being reduced to matter, do not refer to anything at all.

I do believe it's been shown wrong to you, several times.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The word has a clear definition. Even a computer can tell you if something's true or not, just with mathematics.

Sure, but that refers to a micro-world or to pure maths, not anything in reality. Mathematical truth and "Truth" are not the same thing.

Something either is or isn't, excluding your "doesn't and doesn't not exist" thingy.

So said Aristotle. That view is a little dated now.

Only if you make one of two assumptions. As I've said before, you have to make an assumption in order to progress. The idealist just makes an assumption opposite to mine. I don't see why his case is better.

He knows directly that his mind exists. TThe materialist has to simultaneously rely on an inductive inference and deny the evidence of his own direct experience.

Unfortunately, there kinda HAS to be one circular assumption to start with. Otherwise you're left with the idea that knowledge is impossible.

Perhaps transcendental knowledge is impossible. That was Kant's (official) position.

He's not wrong, but I think it's because a lot of those questions are meaningless, as I said before.

But you think they are meaningless because you believe your own transcendental claims are the correct ones. That doesn't help the situation. The arguments will continue. Every time you assert that materialism is true, hammegk will say you are wrong, and he'll have a point.

That's in part because QM is notoriously difficult to grasp by non-specialists. But it doesn't entail mysticism or anything of the sort.

I never said it did. Indeed, I explicitly denied that QM entails mysticism. But it does open a window onto the noumenal world, at least according to some interpretations.

Lots of stuff in QM is (seems to be, at least) modelisation. When a wave function "collapses", for example, it doesn't mean the particle suddenly moved or changed shape. It's just a mathematical probability that suddenly became certainty.

That is one of many interpretations.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

A slight correction: space-time is not made of matter/energy, so it's a little more complex than that.

It's still in the same ball-park, though.

 

[Belz...]

http://www.ecomall.com/greenshopping/powerofnow.htm

Summary, please ?

It this article going to help me realise that what I experience isn't really me ?

 

[Belz...]

What is the difference between your statement and the following one:

"Materialism is incoherent relative to p-zombies."?

Well, if p-zombies were possible, I suppose that would bring some things into question, wouldn't it ?

That is not true. We need no metaphysical context. I could describe a p-zombie to an illiterate egyptian peasant living in the year 4000 BC. As long as the peasant has a word for "mind", I can describe a p-zombie.

True, but he can't tell you whether it's coherent or not.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Well, I'm still not sure about your reasoning, but since I agree with your conclusion this doesn't really matter much. I don't think it possible to have a mind which is not aware of anything. All consciousness is consciousness directed towards something. This is what "intentionalism" means. The "mark of the mental" is intentionality - "aboutness" - directedness towards the objects of experience. A consciousness which is conscious of nothing at all has ceased to exist.

So then idealism is false. In order to salvage it, the idealist has to do something equivalent to what the materialist has to do: He has to deny that there is any such thing as objects of perception.

And neutral monism has a similar problem. There is some configuration of neural components that allows QM to do its thing producing consciousness. We can distinguish between the neural configuration and the consciousness. Therefore it is logically possible that a p-zombie can exist with the neural configuration but not the consciousness. But neutral monism claims this is impossible, right?

Seems to me there is a problem regarding logically possible vs. naturally possible.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

It this article going to help me realise that what I experience isn't really me ?

ROFL. If you ever discover what "Belz...'s Really Me" is, fame and fortune await as you ecucate the rest of humanity.

In the interim, does the Thought "I, Belz..., think I, Belz..., Thinks" exist?

 

[nescafe]

Summary, please ?

It this article going to help me realise that what I experience isn't really me ?

Summary: Your stream-of-consciousness is not you.

It is yet another text on Buddhist-style enlightenment by someone who is hopelessly confused by what Buddhist-style enlightenment means.

(ed: I am rather suprised Geoff used that source to buttress his argument, as it is chock-full of new-age woo. Zen and the Brain would have been a much better reference (albeit one that takes much longer to read), because it contains actual, informed speculation as to how brain processes and neural structures tie in to our emotions, perceptions, and experiences (including no-mind). )

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So then idealism is false.

Why? You've not proved this. All you have done is shown that minds can't exist without having some sort of content. That does not falsify idealism, it merely shows that a completely empty mind is indistinguishable from the void.

But since I'm not defending it anyway......

In order to salvage it, the idealist has to do something equivalent to what the materialist has to do: He has to deny that there is any such thing as objects of perception.

No he doesn't. He just denies they have any existence beyond his perceiving of them.

And neutral monism has a similar problem. There is some configuration of neural components that allows QM to do its thing producing consciousness. We can distinguish between the neural configuration and the consciousness.

Correct.

Therefore it is logically possible that a p-zombie can exist with the neural configuration but not the consciousness. But neutral monism claims this is impossible, right?

I just explained that I reject that the claim that the correct neural configurations would be present in a p-zombie, because of an argument from QM. The p-zombie cannot attain the same microtubule state as the normal human, therefore p-zombies are impossible. I have not assumed neutral monism is true. I have used an argument from QM, related to Penrose, as to why I believe p-zombies are impossible. I can still concieve of them, but they can't actually happen. The fact that I can concieve of p-zombies has less implications for the neutral monist because the neutral monist has already accepted that the world as it manifests to us is neccesarily dualistic. It would be very strange to then claim that p-zombies are inconcievable. But I can still claim they cannot happen in the real world.

Seems to me there is a problem regarding logically possible vs. naturally possible.
~~ Paul

Yes, there is. I hope I've started to clear that up in the previous paragraph. I gave a different defence of why p-zombies are impossible which did not depend on an assumption of a metaphysical position. It depends on an argument from QM.