Lockerbie: London Origin Theory

[Rolfe]

Post the 1983 Brink's-MAT robbery it seems unlikely that anyone would have considered Heathrow's repuation for a lack of security as something worth defending.

Not necessarily so. That was five years previously. Not only would they not have wanted it revealed that things were just as bad, BAA was privatised by Thatcher in 1986.

There's a bit in Hansard where some MP or other pontificates in the House about how it's really impossible for the bomb to have gone on board at Heathrow, because no terrorist would have been silly enough to try to get anything past Heathrow's world-renowned and impenetrable security. All bluster of course, but that's the line they wanted to emphasise.

Of course, the airport with the actual impenetrable security was Malta, surprisingly enough, and it was pretty much shown it was impossible to have got a bomb on that plane, but the investigators just shrugged and assumed it must have happened anyway, because it suited their pet theory.

I don't insist anyone was deliberately ignoring evidence they recognised showed for sure the bomb went on at Heathrow, it's just that the evidence is so in-your-face that I find it hard to swallow the concept that they simply missed it.

Rolfe.

 

[jargon buster]

I don't insist anyone was deliberately ignoring evidence they recognised showed for sure the bomb went on at Heathrow, it's just that the evidence is so in-your-face that I find it hard to swallow the concept that they simply missed it.

Then what are you saying?
If they didnt see it and ignore it, or couldnt have missed it then whats left?
They either saw it and ignored it or missed it.

 

[Rolfe]

Yeah, I'm still up Rolfe, so fire away.

I sent you an email.

No much to say recently as I've been trawling through the Heathrow statements to see if anything else cropped up. Apart from the remarkable series of statements by Sidhu obviously, but I've not spotted anything of great significance.

I haven't yet found the statements from the baggage handlers who were in the hold of the 727 throwing the luggage either to the guys taking the bulk to the terminal building, or to Sidhu packing AVE4041 for the transatlantic connection. I doubt if there's anything signficiant there, but I should read them some time.

Well, Baz was also right about O'Connor's suitcases being left behind, and although both his cases were found, it is also stated by Pan Am lead Agent Richard Miller (DOC 219 / S1273A) that he checked in Mr O'Connor (and Rubin and Stow) and said he only checked 1 bag in. A few other statements clearly imply that there were two bags, and the two were referred to by Lynette Maxwell (Doc 202 / S2896) as part of three bags found on the 22nd Dec tagged for 103 the previous evening.

Now you're confusing me. I had gone straight to Henderson's summary document, which seems clear enough. According to that, O'Connor had only one case, and it was indeed one of the three which didn't travel on 103. The memo I have only says it "travelled to the USA on another flight" though - not why, or which flight.

There should have been only two bags found tagged for 103 but left behing - O'Connor's, and one belonging to Peter Peirce. The third misdirected bag belonged to Nicola Hall, who arrived from Johannesburg in the early hours of the morning, and it appears someone just shoved it on 101 because it was going to New York anyway and it was making the place look untidy.

Arnaud Rubin had one bag which travelled on 103, but it wasn't in AVE4041 because his flight didn't land until 16.15 which was too late for it to have got to the interline shed before the container was towed over to Walker's office. That item, plus Curry's two bags and Peirce's other two bags, were recovered with no explosives contamination, in a different area from the contents of AVE4041. It was established that these five items were loose-loaded into the rear of the plane along with the eight items Sidhu couldn't squeeze into the container from the Frankfurt batch.

Stow didn't check in any luggage. Neither did LaRiviere, Fuller, Marengo, Kosmowski, Fortune, Stratis or Cawley. It's surprising how many people were setting off across the Atlantic with only cabin baggage, but I suppose it depends on the length of their trip, and of course cabin baggage allowances were quite generous in these days.

I have a table summarising the Heathrow interline passengers, which I'll try to reproduce.

As an aside, I've also been browsing that document/newpaper viewer I can get access to of lots of the early - Jan '89 thru Sep '89 - articles to see, with our new information, anything now stands out. Again, that's been pretty fruitless. Except for one article from the first week of February '89 which relates to the investiagtion looking for asssistance from various govts, groups and organisations. One being the PLO, and a long article of Yasser Arafat's condemnation and offer to help track down the culprits.

In the middle of the long piece on him, it refers to a meeting in which Arafat is in possession of a substantial dossier on the 103 bombing, and he states that he has some clues and is already sure that the bomb was in a brown samsonite suitcase that came from Frankfurt. However, in context, this seems to clearly imply that his sources mean it was one of the bombs constructed near Frankfurt, not neccessarily loaded there.

But I found Arafat's dossier reference, coming only 5/6 weeks into the investigation, talking about a brown samsonite quite curious.

That's interesting. The earliest reference I've found to a brown Samsonite is dated 15th February, and it's a memo from Hayes which is marked secret or confidential or something like that. He says brown (not bronze or maroon), and hardshell, and suggests simulated leather. It reads as if it's the first intimation of this finding. The word Samsonite is not mentioned, and given the fragmented nature of what they were picking up I'd be surprised if they'd identified the maker as early as that.

If you really have a reference to a brown Samsonite dated earlier than this, that's quite an eye-opener. If correct, it indicates Arafat really did know something about the plot.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

There seem to be two Henderson reports. One is the report into everything that was in AVE4041, which John sent me. He says the Crown originally intimated to the defence it was going to lead that evidence, then back-tracked and said it wasn't going to do that after all. (Actually he said that at the meeting in Glasgow I think, and I pricked up my ears and went "ah-hah!". He gave me a bit more detail later.) He said the Crown then claimed there were mistakes in Henderson's reconciliation, and they weren't going to rely on it at all. The defence requested the document anyway for information purposes, and after resisting for a bit the Crown handed it over, with a whole lot of caveats about taking it with a pinch of salt. John says he can't see any mistakes, but can we spot anything.

My first thought is that Henderson reconciles Khaled Jaafar's two checked-in items as being the two small holdalls everyone (OK, Coleman) believes were his carry-on luggage. I think there's a very good case to be made that Jaafar was indeed couriering heroin from the Bekaa Valley to Detroit, and that the DEA knew about it, and that this was what Jimmy Wilson found on Tundergarth Mains and called the cops over, and later clammed up about. I think these cases (or that one anyway) were disappeared, because they were just too bloody embarrassing. I also think it's got bugger-all to do with the bombing. I'm a bit reticent to tell John this, because he seems to have spent literally 20 years believing the bomb was in Jaafar's luggage.

My second point is that Henderson seems to be reconciling the carton Maier thought was wine bottles to Walker. It that was Walker's, then it sure as hell wasn't wine. I've seen no source for this explanation though, and Sidhu doesn't remember a carton among the things he loaded into the container. This is important because it affects the reconciliation of the 25 Frankfurt transfer trays with the 13 x-rayed items, so I hope we can find some more detail about it.

My third point is that the full reconciliation of the entire container is next to meaningless. All it can show is that all the known checked-in luggage from the Frankfurt transfer passengers is accounted for, and none of these items is the bomb. (And not even that if you're going to "mistake" carry-on bags for checked-in luggage.) It can't show that there was an illegitimate item from the Frankfurt flight. There are six trays among the 25 which we have no freaking clue what was in them. But we can't know that any of these items was loaded into AVE4041. They could all have been off-loaded at Heathrow. Sidhu didn't count the luggage he loaded, so there's no way to know if he loaded one more than can be accounted for or not.

There's at least one document where the cops try to figure out how many items were in the container. They add up all the known luggage (including Costa, Weinacker and Hubbard), and then say, and the "primary suitcase". But there's no chain of logic says that was among the Frankfurt items at all. It actually all comes down to whether or not the primary suitcase was above or below what Jim Swire called the "Frankfurt line", and the forensic evidence never answered that for certain. (Then if they decide Sidhu moved the Heathrow luggage, even that doesn't matter any more. Why would the Crown want to go that route? See email.)

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

Henderson's other report is the one dealing only with the Heathrow interline luggage, and it seems to be quite simple. I constructed it into this table.

Passenger | Flight | From | Landed | No of items
Nicola Hall||Johannesburg |06.46|1*
Bernt Carlsson|BA391|Brussels|11.06|1
James Fuller||Hannover|14.31|0
Louis Marengo||Hannover|14.31|0
Charles McKee|CY504|Larnaca|14.34|2
Matthew Gannon|CY504|Larnaca|14.34|1
Ronald LaRiviere|CY504|Larnaca|14.34|0
Gregory Kosmowski |BD777|Birmingham|15.07|0
Robert Fortune||Amsterdam|15.18|0
Elia Stratis||Amsterdam|15.18|0
Michael Bernstein|BA701|Vienna|15.35|2
Arnaud Rubin|BA395|Brussels|16.15|1
Joseph Curry|BA603|Pisa|16.21|2
Peter Peirce|BA603|Pisa|16.21|3*
Daniel O'Connor|CY1354 |Larnaca|16.43|1*
James Stow||Geneva|16.34|0
Richard Cawley||Dusseldorf|16.57|0

That's 14 items in total from the 17 passengers. However, three of these items (asterisked) weren't on 103. Nicola Hall's case was sent on 101, because it was there so early and the baggage handlers just wanted shot of it. Daniel O'Connor's case "travelled to the USA on another flight", but that's all they say about it. One of Peter Peirce's items was also left behind and found at Heathrow later.

That leaves 11 items which actually went on the plane. However, anything arriving on a flight landing later than about 16.00 was unlikely to have made it to the interline shed to be loaded into the container before Bedford towed it away. The five items belonging to Rubin, Curry and Peirce are believed to have shown up later than this. There is witness testimony to a bunch of stuff that had to be taken out separately to the plane at the last minute, and was loose-loaded at the back. This seems to have been a bit of a scramble, and it's how the two O'Connor and Peirce items were left behind.

The recovery details appear to back this up, in that the six Carlsson/McKee/Gannon/Bernstein items were all found with explosives damage or contamination, in the area where stuff from AVE4041 fell. The five Rubin/Curry/Peirce items were found with no explosives involvement, in the area where stuff from the tail of the plane landed. I believe they were able to tell which eight Frankfurt items were also loaded in the tail by the location where they were recovered - I haven't looked into that in detail.

Actually, that table is a bit of a compilation. It's based on Henderson, but added to and corrected from a BKA document. The BKA document doesn't have flight numbers, but it does include the passengers with no checked-in luggage, which is why some flight numbers are missing. Importantly, it seems to have the landing times correct. The Scottish document gives different times, nice round figures, and some significantly earlier. These seem to have been taken from the timetable. The BKA document seems to be the times the planes actually landed, and something in John's book confirms this.

Bernstein's flight was 20 minutes late, and from the timings given by Bedford it's a toss-up whether his luggage would have got to the shed before 16.15 or not. However, the rest of the evidence suggests it did (see email). The evidence points to his two items having been in the row at the back.

Rubin's case just might have made it there while Bedford was on his break if Whytes really got the finger out, but it was found with no explosives contamination so it wasn't one of the two front items.

Really, that's it. It's not that complicated. There are only six cases to worry about. I can't see anyone doing anything more than matching them to items recovered on the ground, and saying, no, not the bomb. I can't see anyone trying to reconcile these six items and their descriptions and arrival times to Bedford's statement, and asking, which were the two items that appeared at the front of the container. Only Helge Tepp asked that, and the person he asked had no idea what he was talking about, and Harry Bell just sent him a list of the 11 interline transfer items with no further comment.

Isn't it just FREAKING INSANE that none of this was presented at the trial? We spent literally years trying to glean the data from various books and articles, but there was no way to obtain it because it was never in the public domain. I think it's scandalous, and heads should roll, but obviously they won't.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

Statement by Lynette Maxwell, Pan Am lead agent.

S2143 / 11011989 / Doc 147

I was off duty on 21st Dec 1988 but the following day I came in early at approx. 0630 and being aware of the disaster at Lockerbie I realised the ramifications for the baggage service dept.

At about 0730 on 22/12/88 I telephoned using our internal system the Pan Am hut in the interline baggage area. I can’t remember who I spoke to but I know it was a Pan Am employee and I asked him if there were any bags off flight PA103 on 21/12/88 that had mis-connected. He went to check and advised me that there were - I don’t think he said how many – and I advised him to put them in the Customs Hall. I can’t recall if he gave me the names on the bags. […] I had nothing further to do with these bags other than one piece belonging to Peirce which I helped forward to Toledo on 24/12/88. I assisted by placing the Rush Tag which Simi Ghandi had set down onto the bag belonging to Peirce. I then took the bag our(sic) of the customs hall having previously obtained Customs clearance and handed it to Peter Hawkins the baggage coordinator. Peter took Peirce’s bag and put it on PA101.

[…] In conclusion, the only other aspects concerning baggage that I can remember are that on 22/12/88 I was informed that there were three (3) pieces of baggage in HM Customs Hall, all with PA103 tags for New York. Two (2) pieces were for passengers O’Connor and Peirce which should have travelled on PA103 and the third was for a passenger on PA103 on 22/12/88. Obviously this last passenger had arrived into Heathrow on 21/12/88 as an interline passenger and his baggage had been checked through to New York. On checking the DCS mode on the Pan American computer it established that the passenger was listed for PA103 on 22/12/88 which is contrary to our regulations as we allow no more than eight (8) hour layover between the connecting flights. If the layover is longer the passenger should be checked to Heathrow only, thereby causing the passenger to collect and later check his baggage. I cannot remember the passenger’s name.

My apologies. I had read that to be two bags belonging to Mr O'Connor and one to Mr Peirce. That's probably what I get for trawling over statements into the early hours!

You're right also about the late arrival of of 5 items which were likely the items that came in after 1600. Kamboj refers to 5 items that arrived at the Interline shed after Bedford had finished and had taken AVE4041 over to the build-up shed Kamboj then states that driver Gill collected these items which were then taken out to PA103.

I think the last two entries on your listing above of flight and passengers, as documented by Henderson, should relate to BA729 arr. 1634 and BA941 arr. 1657. Evidence of this was provided by Michael Higgs (S4325 / Doc 082) 'Aprons Manager' who listed all the flights arriving at Heathrwo on the 21st that were carrying interline passengers bound for 103.

 

[Rolfe]

That all computes, certainly.

I was going over it all trying to find candidates for one or both of the two mystery items, but I can't find a thing. Even Hubbard's cases, if they went via Hamburg, would have arrived well before three o'clock. And even if Fortune or Stratis (for example) had luggage that wasn't recorded in the baggage records but got loaded into the container, there would have been bits of that found on the ground - and there weren't. The killer point is that once you know Sidhu didn't move these suitcases, then we're talking about things that were involved in the explosion.

The forensics guys collected together every scrap of blast-damaged luggage they could find. The result was a mix of bits of everything that was in the radius of the explosion. There's no way a single item in the middle of that was magically going to fail to contribute any debris to that mix - not when you look at what they found of the bomb suitcase itself, and Patricia's case. So the 25 items that were identified as being within the radius of the explosion, represent that block of luggage loaded into that corner of the container. All of it.

The only unidentified item in that mix was the bomb suitcase itself. All the others were matched to their owners. So, if the bomb suitcase was on the second layer, which was the one that was under it? According to Sidhu, it was one of the Heathrow items. But it wasn't. We know where all the six identified Heathrow items were, and none of them were under the bomb. And there was no debris indicating another suitcase we didn't know about that was under the bomb.

No wonder they had to drop Sidhu's evidence.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

.... one article from the first week of February '89 which relates to the investiagtion looking for asssistance from various govts, groups and organisations. One being the PLO, and a long article of Yasser Arafat's condemnation and offer to help track down the culprits.

In the middle of the long piece on him, it refers to a meeting in which Arafat is in possession of a substantial dossier on the 103 bombing, and he states that he has some clues and is already sure that the bomb was in a brown samsonite suitcase that came from Frankfurt. However, in context, this seems to clearly imply that his sources mean it was one of the bombs constructed near Frankfurt, not neccessarily loaded there.

But I found Arafat's dossier reference, coming only 5/6 weeks into the investigation, talking about a brown samsonite quite curious.

Can you possibly transcribe the relevant passage, and supply the reference with date? Who is the journalist?

I think that 15th February memo that I have is the first time the words "brown" and "hardshell" appeared in relation to the bomb suitcase. However, even if there was an earlier one, it wouldn't have been a lot earlier. The stuff had to be collected off the fields and sorted and sent to RARDE (or maybe Hayes was in Scotland at that time, whatever), and examined. Not only that, the 15th February memo is marked up as secret. That designation isn't removed until the following year. I'm pretty sure nobody was showing Yasser Arafat secret internal documents from the Lockerbie investigation within six weeks of the disaster.

So if Arafat knew that much, he surely was on the right track. Official Theory proponents might say he knew about the Libyan plot. But he said Frankfurt. The alleged Libyan plot had bugger-all to do with Frankfurt. That was all supposed to have happened at Malta, with the bomb merely passing silently through the baggage transfer system at Frankfurt.

This is quite intriguing, and I'd just like to have chapter and verse on it.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

Here the article about Arafat which, in passing and no doubt given its relevance at the time, briefly mentions discussions around the Lockerbie disaster. However, once again, I'm slightly wrong.

The article is dated early February, but is compiled by the writer over the course of a series of meetings with Arafat that took place in late January '89. Arafat mentions Samsonite, although not brown as I thought I'd remembered. Still, the fact that Arafat's sources are telling him 'samsonite' and from Frankfurt after only 4 weeks, is notable.

(My bolding throughout)

Los Angeles Times
February 12, 1989, Sunday, Home Edition

SUDDENLY, AN AUDIENCE FOR ARAFAT

BYLINE: By Tad Szulc, Veteran foreign correspondent Tad Szulc travelled with Yasser Arafat at the end of January.

SECTION: Opinion; Part 5; Page 1; Column 1; Opinion Desk

LENGTH: 2610 words

DATELINE: TUNIS, TUNISIA


A one-time world pariah has become a would-be peacemaker. Yasser Arafat now works at "a great historical opportunity" -- the first such opportunity in 40 years, he says -- to settle the future fate of Palestinians through negotiations. The chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, during three days of in-depth conversations in Tunis and Algiers at the end of January, talked about the United States being in a position to play a "decisive role" in this process. [...]

Arafat said his immediate contribution to the peace process is a "major effort" to obtain release of American hostages as soon as possible. He called the taking of hostages a violation of "humanitarian principles" and indicated that he had a general idea who was holding the Americans although he refused to elaborate.

During a dinner meeting, Arafat opened his files on the Pan Am 103 sabotage investigation. There were pages in Arabic script, including a sketch of the Boeing 747 after the crash, its cockpit detached from the rest of the fuselage. He had ordered his intelligence experts to launch their own investigation -- in response to a U.S. request -- and had received the first clues.

The bomb, he said, was inside a Samsonite suitcase and had been traced back to Frankfurt. Arafat, an engineer by training, had no doubt that the jet was blown up by radicals determined to derail the Palestinian "peace process" and, specifically, the new PLO-U.S. dialogues.

Arafat refused to place blame but other PLO leaders said they strongly suspect the Iranian-directed Hezbollah guerrilla movement in Lebanon. They talked about hard-line factions in Iran that oppose all dialogue with the West.

 

[Rolfe]

I suppose that's less striking. Samsonite is a big luggage manufacturer, so that hit isn't that unlikely just by coincidence. And "Frankfurt" was an easy guess at that stage. I think the suspected role of the PFLP-GC was quite widely known by late January.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I think it's an enormous pity the defence didn't spot this. Taylor was evidently content to leave it as "maybe" that suitcase was moved, presumably to get the best of both worlds and let him waffle on. However, leaving the whole thing vague allows the prosecution to take the focus off the Heathrow luggage and emphasise its own narrative.

There wouldn't have been a down side to making this case. It's simple. If Sidhu didn't move the Heathrow luggage, the Bedford suitcase was the bomb. And Sidhu testified that he didn't move the Heathrow luggage. I see no reason at all to imagine he would have retracted that statement if the defence had called him at Zeist. This would have placed enormous pressure on the prosecution to prove that he must have moved that case, despite his protestations. I don't see how they could have done it.

However, supposing they had done it? Supposing they persuaded the judges that Cullis and Claiden and the rest of them had really left no possible room for the bomb to have been on the bottom layer. So, logically, Sidhu was just wrong. (But which suitcase was on top of the bomb, chaps?)

Even in that case, the detailed analysis of the baggage handlers' and Henderson's evidence indicates extremely strongly that there were seven suitcases in that container before five o'clock, and that the Bedford suitcase wasn't any of the six legitimate items. (You could just about spin a line that the two front items were McKee's two cases, which somehow took nearly two hours to make it to the interline shed from their incoming flight, but when you spell it out in detail it's pretty serious special pleading.) That being so, the case that the bomb was still the Bedford suitcase, simply replaced back on top of the Coyle suitcase, is strong and easy to make.

I don't think you have to be a £3,000-a-day QC to point out that this howlingly suspicious suitcase at Heathrow, which can only be explained away by a flight of pure imagination involving Tiny McKee's luggage, is a far far stronger candidate for the bomb than something-or-other that was presumably in one of seven unidentifiable trays in the impenetrable muddle that was the Frankfurt transfer baggage records - and which could well have been unloaded at Heathrow. So even if, somehow, Sidhu's evidence was over-ruled, the defence still win.

Taylor didn't spot it. Keen (blackhearted unionist bastard and alleged legal genius) didn't spot it. Megrahi's appeal team didn't spot it. Megrahi didn't spot it, and he was latterly said to be the foremost expert in his own case. I think it's obvious. What's wrong with people?

I may have to write this up for publication somewhere. I don't think I'm getting it over to the casual reader. Where's Paul Foot when you need him?

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

I have been, throughout the trial, constantly bemused or utterly gobsmacked at the lack of witnesses called by the defence, and even those that were called, the absence of any substantive cross-examination by the defence.

While we had a litany of passengers whom travelled on KM180 on the stand, for weeks on end, and an array of Frankfurt airport employees, some of the most crucial witnesses were never called. Those important witnesses who were called, like Sulsash Kamboj and Betty Horton, faced no cross examination or scant questioning despite their significance to the whole 'case' or the testimony just provided to Zeist.

While on the stand at Zeist Mrs Horton, who it was claimed had recovered the incriminating 'Toshiba Manual' booklet cover, rasied some matters while under questioning by the Crown, that gave rise to clear concerns over the forensic evidence she was presented with. So, while she questioned the evidence presented, the defence sat idly and offered no further questions.

Around the issues and the clear attempts by the crown to withhold absolutely devastating evidence that was contained in the CIA cables relating to the US's informant Giaka, the defence team, despite their insistance that the evidence be disclosed, seemed to play down the misleading of the court. Why? I think they thought that the destroying of Giaka as a credible witness would perhaps suffice as a fatal blow to the crowns case.

Indeed, perhaps in any other circumstance or court, that may well have been reasonable to assume. Nevertheless, the excitement and obvious delight at the defnece discrediting the 'star witness', overshadowed the far worse element that had just occurred: not that the crown had produced some money-grabbing fantasist, but that the Crown prosecution team, to a man, had conspired in an attempt to corrupt the whole court proceedings - right in front of the judges, reporters, those family members attending, and the whole of Megrahi's defence team.

The brazen attitude of the crown in this matter is shocking in its explicitness, and lack of criticism by the defence and judges only serves to undermine the whole judicial and court process.

Kamboj, the man whom, even if he denied saying to John Bedford that he had placed the two suitcases in the position noted, was still the only worker who was in the Interline shed when the mysterious brown samsonite was introduced. Here, once again, there is scant cross examination by the defence of a potentially critical witness. Indeed, if the defence really did believe that the suitcase witnessed by Bedford was the bag that contained the bomb, then this is perhaps the only man who could shed some light on how this bag came to be in AVE4041. If Kamboj really didn't put the bag there, then who did? Because it certainly occurred while Bedford wasn't there. So, did Kamboj see anyone; talk to anyone; see anything odd at all?

No, nothing like that. He merely repeats what he has said on many previous occassions, with some more ambiguity given the time that has lapsed between 1988 and 2001. But he is never pressed to think, and think hard Mr Kamboj, do you remember anyone or anything who may have had the opportunity to introduce this bag without your knowledge? Had he noticed anything unusual over the weeks or months before the 21st Dec?

And that's if you accept that he didn't put the bags there and Bedford is mistaken about Kamboj even saying this!

If you accept, like the court did, that Bedford was correct in his recollection, then Kamboj is not recalling the day and the events accurately. In which case, well there's is even more reason to press Kamboj on who it was that gave him this bag(s) to x-ray and load into 4041.

And of course, as we now know, the last baggage loader to see 4041 before the Frankfurt luggage went into 4041, Sidhu who was never called. I appreciate the defence's perhaps slight concern over his testimony, given this may go some way to rule out the Bedford bag as the bomb, but the questions Sidhu's evidence would throw over the whole prosecution theory and the forensic assertion of Ms Coyles bag on the bottom, must outweigh the risks by quite some measure.

Then there also Vincent Vassallo, whom while on the stand at Zeist, also told the court quite openly, that DCI Bell had intimated and offered inducement for particular testimony during interviews aimed at linking Megrahi to a brown samsonite suitcase at Malta.

We don't need to start on the Gauci brothers or the unfit for purpose 'forensic sceintists' employed by the prosecution, to be in a position to accuse the defence team of monumental incompetence.

 

[Rolfe]

What can I say. Other than, yes, quite.

Well, one interesting point is the number of witnesses who should have been defence witnesses who were called by the prosecution. Bedford, Borg, Maier, Talb, just to name the first few that spring to mind. Was this a spoiler operation? It wouldn't be the first time.

Then as you say we get the absolutely mind-numbing detail of the entire 38 minutes of the doomed flight, every handover between ATCs, the lot. And various witnesses on the ground describing the crash - dammit, nobody was contesting any of that, and it went on for ages. Then the equally mind-numbing detail of every bloody one of the KM180 passengers explaining their mundane little journeys that day (except Saviour Mallia, dearie dearie me), all to what effect? To show that all 55 legitimate items on that plane were kosher, and nothing went astray. So what? They certainly didn't find any sign of a 56th. That could have been defence case too.

But then when it comes to the important stuff, the audience is left heckling impotently. What WERE the other 24 items on Bogomira's printout, if you're so damn sure 8849 was the bomb? Why spend hours speculating what the guy who loaded the Frankfurt luggage did, rather than just ASKING HIM? If the Bedford suitcase wasn't the bomb, what the hell was it? Surely you've at least THOUGHT about that? By the time I got to that stage, I was sure they were hiding something.

A couple of points. Kamboj wasn't alone in the shed for that half hour. Parmar was with him. Parmar wasn't even called. (His statements don't add a great deal, but if you put his and Kamboj's together you can pretty much see the six interline items coming in - each of them remembered different details that tie up with the known luggage.) Nobody asked either of them what they were doing for that half hour. (I suspect a pack of cards might have made an appearance, or maybe a copy of the Sun, but that's just me.) Nobody asked either of them whether they were in a position to say whether anyone else could have approached the container at that time. Nobody even asked them whether they saw it as part of their duties to keep the containers under observation. (Since they all cheerfully agreed that security was pathetic and anyone could more or less come and go as they pleased so long as they more or less blended in, you'd kind of think, wouldn't you....) Since both of them were employees of Alert Security, and it was the deficiencies in Alert Security that caused Pan Am to be blamed for the crash, forced to pay many millions in damages, and go bankrupt, I have no sympathy at all for Pan Am. Just every sympathy for Kurt Maier, who took the blame instead of these three dozy characters (I include Bedford in that).

The other point is this one.

I appreciate the defence's perhaps slight concern over his testimony, given this may go some way to rule out the Bedford bag as the bomb,

If you still think that, I have failed and failed utterly. I need to try again to explain this, but I've just about had it up to here trying. (I'm not getting at you, I'm just alarmed, and worried about my own powers of explanation.)

If Sidhu did not move the Heathrow luggage, then the Bedford suitcase was the bomb. For absolute definite certain sure.

I agree it's possible that the defence didn't figure this out, but there's rather a lot the defence don't seem to have figured out. Please tell me that's all you meant, or I may go and slit my wrists now....

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

And on a slightly different note, are you busy next Tuesday morning (25th)? If not, could you be in central Edinburgh for 10 o'clock?

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

No, no, sorry, I completely understand. With the relatively straightforward process of elimination and accounting for all the legitimate bags that were in 4041, then Bedford's bag was the bomb. The legitimate bags were adequetely accounted for, therefore none were the bomb, none received damage that would allow it to possibly be the bag Bedford saw, and the damage sustained by some bags corresponds to the loading as described, and reconstructed, by all those who were involved with loading 4041 before and after the Frankfurt flight.

The defence however had not achieved this point - either by lack of proper examination of Henderson's reconcilliation, which should have meant they were able to assign each bag to the Heathrow passengers, or by sheer ineptitude. Whichever it was, together with Sidhu's statements, they apparently never spotted the method of deduction that would leave beyond any reasonable doubt Bedford's bag as undeniably the primary suitcase that contained the bomb.

I'll check for next Tues and let you know.

 

[Rolfe]

I try to figure out some way the Bedford case isn't the bomb, from the full evidence set, and it pretty much can't be done.

We know the arrangement of the Heathrow luggage at 4.45 is definite, because it was confirmed by both Sahota and Sidhu as well as being described by Bedford. There was definitely a suitcase in the crucial position at that time, even though Bedford is the only person who said it was a brown Samsonite. We thus know that if Sidhu didn't move that item, it was either the bomb or it was under the bomb.

We know that none of the six legitimate Heathrow-origin items was under the bomb, based on the degree of damage sustained, and in the case of Carlsson's suitcase, it's already-established position immediately behind the bomb.

We know that the mix of blast-damaged luggage fragments was composed of the known Heathrow items, items known to have come off the feeder flight, and the bomb suitcase itself. There was no debris from an innocent unidentified item which might have been loaded at Heathrow and found itself under the bomb.

Ergo, if Sidhu didn't move that suitcase, it was the bomb. There is simply no other possible explanation.

Sidhu said he didn't move the suitcase. Clearly, repeatedly, and eventually in the witness box under oath. What compelling evidence is there to override that and declare that after all that, he must have been mistaken? As far as I can see, none. The forensics guys said the bomb was probably on the second layer, which would mean that something from Frankfurt had to be under it as none of the Heathrow items was, but because the point was obfuscated it was never really clarified. I believe that if the evidence had been clearly set out, the conclusion would have been that in fact the bomb suitcase could have been on the bottom, therefore in view of Sidhu's evidence, it was.

However, suppose Sidhu lost that argument? Where does that leave us? It means that we can't use the severity of the blast damage to rule the legitimate items out from being the bomb. It still leaves it quite difficult to see how any of these could have been the two items at the front, on other grounds. Bear in mind that if the bomb came off the feeder flight there was no sinister activity at Heathrow, so no justification for speculating that some unknown party came along and rearranged the luggage in Bedford's absence just to make it look pretty or something.

Carlsson's case: A case was present by the x-ray machine at 2 o'clock, already screened and security-tagged. The only case this could have been is Carlsson's as Nicola Hall's case definitely flew on PA101 which had already taken off by then and the Larnaca flight didn't land until half past two. This case was placed upright at the back left of the container. So, not one of the front items seen at 4.45.

The Larnaca luggage: Kamboj and Parmar's evidence seems to imply this showed up when it should have done, but as they weren't asked to say whether any particular item had got in before or after Bedford went on his break, it's not completely impossible that two of the items were delayed and took two hours to get to the shed. In that case, you could speculate that the Bedford suitcase was McKee's American Tourister, which Sidhu moved far enough that it acquired no more than explosives contamination (no damage). However, points against that are that Bedford's evidence indicated that he loaded between five and seven items before he went on his break. If two of the Larnaca items were delayed in this way, he would only have loaded four. Also, the evidence from the reconstructions indicates there were seven items in the container and by this scenario there were only six.

This is still the best scenario possible as far as I can see, though. You could try adding Hubbard's stray case to the row at the back to make up the numbers, but that falls down because that case was found with no explosion contamination. While one might suggest Sidhu forgot he'd moved that single front case, if he'd undertaken major rearrangement of the row at the back, I can't see that he'd have forgotten.

Bernstein's two cases: The timing fits, because these could easily not have got to the shed until after 4.15. However, the same bag-counting argument applies as for Carlsson's cases. Also, Bernstein's luggage doesn't match either Bedford's or Sidhu's description of the two front iems. Also, at least one of Bernstein's cases was in the row at the back, because the bomb suitcase lock was blasted into it. It's not reasonable to imagine Sidhu messed around with the row at the back and then forgot all about it.

Hubbard's case: This would help the numbers game, but if that case was loaded in the interline shed it should have appeared before 4.15. Suppose it didn't, and was loaded after that. What was the second front-loaded item? Bernstein's larger case (which was a soft-shell)? (I don't know which of his cases had the bomb suitcase handle blasted into it.) See what I mean by special pleading?

Something completely different: Some piece of legitimate unaccompanied re-booked or misrouted luggage which was never identified as heading for the interline shed, and never identified from lost luggage reports, and not identified by being recovered on the ground. Plus somehow one of the legitimate items got itself put flat on the front as well. This is getting beyond tenuous, although it seems to be what the court finally decided had happened. It's silly.

If we knew for a fact that the bomb had been on the feeder flight, then obviously something like one of these scenarios would have had to have happened. But when you have to dream that sort of story up as your only hope of rescuing your case when in fact there was no evidence of the bomb anywhere else in the baggage system, frankly you're screwed.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I have been, throughout the trial, constantly bemused or utterly gobsmacked at the lack of witnesses called by the defence, and even those that were called, the absence of any substantive cross-examination by the defence.

I'm being told something about £3,000 per day. I thought that was the fee being paid to each defence advocate, but it's so OTT I wonder if I picked it up wrong. On the other hand, look at the coat. http://news.bbc.co.uk/olmedia/1135000/images/_1136744_billtaylor150.jpg

(I see from that web page that Taylor used to be a city councillor in Edinburgh. Well well. Politically active chap, then. I wonder which party?)

I also hear about total consternation abroad when Bill Taylor was announced as Megrahi's defence advocate. At least Richard Keen (the black-hearted unionist bastard) is reputed to be a formidable intellect (and besides he won his case for Fhimah), but Taylor has no such reputation. To be polite about it and avoid saying anything actionable about a QC, that is. Megrahi's solicitor appears never to have given a satisfactory explanation for appointing Taylor, make of that what you like. Why didn't he get Joe Beltrami or someone of similar stature?

Taylor's strategy seems to have been almost entirely reactive. Just sit back and watch the prosecution fail to make their case beyond reasonable doubt, then point it out. As far as I can see, he only exerted himself twice - once when demolishing Giaka, which was classic fish-in-a-barrel, and secondly with the Damascus theory for 8849. That latter argument was simply lifted wholesale from the BKA Fuhl report, and typical of Fuhl's analysis, it was deeply flawed and he'd have been better not adopting it.

He seems to me to have been afraid of cross-examination in case the witness said something he didn't want to hear, which the prosecution might then use against him. He was inclined not to intervene, then in summing up to say, well maybe that comment implied this, or that. To which the response was, well but you didn't ask the witness. For example, Gauci wouldn't have thought 7th December was a midweek day because 8th December was a public holiday, to which the bench replied, well that point was never put to the witness. Or for example, maybe Koca did this or that, to which the bench replied, Koca was available to be called if you wanted. (Funny nobody ever said, Sidhu was available to be called if wanted!)

The three defence witnesses spoke to very particular points. Mifsud just said it rained on 23rd November but not on 7th December - but then got too scientific and left open the theoretical possibility of a few drops on 7th December, which allowed the judges to say, oh well it rained that day too. Whittaker said he saw someone put a single item on the belt at 206 and code it into the computer without making a note on the worksheet - then said, well he wasn't that close, he couldn't swear under oath that he knew no note had been made. Marshman gave the allowed hearsay evidence regarding Khreesat. I don't think Taylor handled any of them particularly well.

I think he simply relied on the self-evident fact that the prosecution hadn't proved their case beyond reasonable doubt. He didn't bargain on the judges turning round and saying, well you haven't proved the prosecution case didn't happen, so guilty.

He didn't think he had to challenge the Crown case actively, for example by dissecting the baggage evidence. So he didn't. He just saw it was unclear and confusing and didn't prove a damn thing, and thought that was good enough. Oh dear.

Then he completely ballsed-up the appeal. I mean, seriously and totally, appealling on the wrong grounds. If he hadn't done that, he'd have won that appeal, 9/11 or not.



Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

Kamboj [....] was still the only worker who was in the Interline shed when the mysterious brown samsonite was introduced.

Actually that's not true, twice over. Not only was Parmar with Kamboj, there were other workers employed by various other airlines. Although PA103 was the only remaining Pan Am flight still to go after 2 o'clock, there were multiple flights by other airlines. Each airline had its own staff in the interline shed, pulling their luggage from the carousel and getting it into their own containers or whatever it was they did with it.

So it wasn't just this empty great shed with only Kamboj and Parmar in it, there were other people around doing various other things. Someone else moving around nearby wouldn't necessarily have been anything to remark on.

I note this snippet from the extract you posted of Lynette Maxwell's statement.

At about 0730 on 22/12/88 I telephoned using our internal system the Pan Am hut in the interline baggage area.

That suggests the airlines had their own little offices within the shed. I don't recall any of the baggage handlers mentioning this, but it makes sense. They'd need a base for a telephone and whatever, and since that big shed couldn't be heated in winter they'd need somewhere they could go to be warm when they weren't actively heaving cases. And this was winter.

It beggars belief that neither Kamboj nor Parmar was asked where they were or what they were doing while Bedford was off on that break. Or if they noticed anyone else at or near the container. Or even if they would have been keeping an eye on the container as a general rule. I'll just bet they were in that hut, and wouldn't necessarily have remarked on someone else moving around outside.

I also haven't seen any statements from any of the employees of the other airlines who were in the shed at that time. It's possible I've overlooked this of course. However, it's an obvious area for an investigation to cover. I don't see any sign that their "extensive investigation at Heathrow airport" even considered the possibility of a terrorist infiltration and a rogue bag. It seems to have been entirely confined to checking off the legtimate passenger items and confirmiong that none of these was the bomb.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

Actually that's not true, twice over. Not only was Parmar with Kamboj, there were other workers employed by various other airlines. Although PA103 was the only remaining Pan Am flight still to go after 2 o'clock, there were multiple flights by other airlines. Each airline had its own staff in the interline shed, pulling their luggage from the carousel and getting it into their own containers or whatever it was they did with it.

So it wasn't just this empty great shed with only Kamboj and Parmar in it, there were other people around doing various other things. Someone else moving around nearby wouldn't necessarily have been anything to remark on.

You're right. I knew that the Interline shed was used by other airlines, but going on various statements there seemed a general consensus that everything tailed-off at around 1400. This was, however, obviously mainly the Pan Am flights they were referring to, and clearly other airlines would not necessarily be all finished by then too. I think it was also Parmar who stated that by the afternoon the Interline Shed was "very, very quiet". Perhaps though he was merely referring to the amount of Pan Am baggage to be dealt with as oppose to the hectic mornings. I had also thought that Kamboj had stated that Parmar had taken a break around the time that Bedford did, 1600 approx, but thinking about it I think it was actually Kamboj who was questioned about him taking a break at some point.

I note this snippet from the extract you posted of Lynette Maxwell's statement.




That suggests the airlines had their own little offices within the shed. I don't recall any of the baggage handlers mentioning this, but it makes sense. They'd need a base for a telephone and whatever, and since that big shed couldn't be heated in winter they'd need somewhere they could go to be warm when they weren't actively heaving cases. And this was winter.

It beggars belief that neither Kamboj nor Parmar was asked where they were or what they were doing while Bedford was off on that break. Or if they noticed anyone else at or near the container. Or even if they would have been keeping an eye on the container as a general rule. I'll just bet they were in that hut, and wouldn't necessarily have remarked on someone else moving around outside.

I also haven't seen any statements from any of the employees of the other airlines who were in the shed at that time. It's possible I've overlooked this of course. However, it's an obvious area for an investigation to cover. I don't see any sign that their "extensive investigation at Heathrow airport" even considered the possibility of a terrorist infiltration and a rogue bag. It seems to have been entirely confined to checking off the legtimate passenger items and confirmiong that none of these was the bomb.

Rolfe.

Indeed. That would make sense, although to see an actual picture or diagram of the interline shed, to make clear in the mind, would be extremely helpful. All this was provided at Zeist to the court of course, but I don't think anyone was provided with all this stuff. Parmar and Kamboj started around the same time and seemingly finished together too. Did they take breaks together too, and if not when would they normally take their breaks on such shifts. It certainly seems that the Wednesday 21st Dec was another routine day, and also in terms of the shift patterns for the Pan Am baggage and security staff, so what were the usual routines for tea, lunch and toilet breaks.

On reflection, it seems that either Kamboj or Parmar could well have thrown the bag that appeared while Bedford was on a break, and neither might pay any great attention to this. What seems to be the standard procedure is that a suitcase tagged for PA103 which would come into the Interline shed on the conveyor belt wouldn't just be ignored because the loader (Bedford) wasn't there. Kamboj or Parmar would see this, and as was done on such occassions, one of the other guys would lift it off, x-ray it, security sticker it, and as Parmar said, 'perhaps just throw it into the tin' that was about 20-25ft away.

If a Pan Am tagged suitcase comes through that has missed its earlier flight, or has arrived too early to be assigned to a specific baggage tin, it is left beside the x-ray machine with its security tag until the loader has appeared and marked the tin. The overriding implication from all the baggage and security employee statements is that if the baggage tin was marked and available, even where the loader was not around, that bag would be put into the appropriate baggae tin by the other workers for that airline or flight.

Another point I noted while looking at some of the Heathrow statements may well dispell the old myth that Iran Airlines were situated next to the Pan Am gates. Michael O'Leary Pan Am loader in the build-up shed, states that on occassions, Iran Air would use the same conveyor belt around the build-up shed that was used by Pan Am before loading the bags into luggage tins. It's all underlined in the statetments, presumably because 4041 was left outside the Build-up shed for 45mins. That's about it though.

On Megrahi's defence again. Regardless of whether you think Sidhu did or didn't move the bags that were initially loaded, the theory that Ms Coyles bag was on the bottom layer and the primary suitcase the second layer, Sidhu testifies that AVE4041 was completely full, and indeed about 10 items of luggage from 103A remained on the rocket when 4041 was full. Given that would only naturally be the case to fill each container, then what bag was immediately above the primary suitcase? Because there sure as hell must have been one.

Only one bag was in immediate contact with the bomb bag you say? Well, yes, that makes complete sense if Ms Coyles was on top of the bomb bag and this itself was situated on the bottom layer. Which matches exactly what Sidhu claims the position the Bedford bag would be and thus only one bag would be intimately and directly in contact with the primary case: Ms Coyles.

 

[Rolfe]

The Kamboj/Parmar line seems to be that their normal job was to x-ray the luggage and then just leave it by the x-ray machine for Bedford. They were continually pressed about whether they might put something in the container, and they both agreed it wasn't a complete impossibility. Kamboj agreed he'd do it "to help out a friend" who had gone to the toilet or something, and Parmar also said if they were very busy they might lend a hand.

But both of them really said quite consistently that they didn't remember doing that on the 21st, and Parmar (who had overestimated the amount of luggage in the container at 10 to 12 cases) said even that was so low a workload that he wouldn't normally pitch in. Kamboj is a bit like "not my job, mate", but then doesn't quite take the absolute union hard-line demarcation stance when pressed.

I think there is a plan of the interline shed somewhere in that evidence bundle.

It was made absolutely clear at Zeist that there was only one suitcase recovered in a condition consistent with its having been "in intimate contact with" the bomb suitcase. That appears to mean lying flat against it. That suitcase was Patricia's. I was quite startled when I read that in the transcript, because I see no sign that anyone made anything of it in the closing statements. It's a good pointer to the likelihood that the bomb suitcase was indeed on the bottom of the container.

In my personal opinion, the investigators were keen from the get-go that the bomb should be on the second layer, for whatever reason. I think the RARDE personnel in particular were co-operating by putting the most "second-layer" spin they could on the findings. I think if any or all of these guys had been pinned to the wall by the defence and asked whether they were saying it was a rank impossibility for the bomb to have been on the bottom, they would have had to concede not.

If the explosion had been a couple of feet up, it would be a no-brainer. We'd expect the Crown to trot Sidhu up as the star witness to rule out the Heathrow-origin luggage (which was exactly the role he was used in, at the FAI). Sometimes we lose sight of the fact that we're arguing inches either way, about the very corner of the container where the explosion was situated, and where this mysteriously-appearing, untraceable BROWN OR MAROON SAMSONITE HARDSHELL was described.

Rolfe.