Oh sure, it has its problems that kind of meshed with the Bedford two cases same/similar stuff, but it's definitely possible. And for simplicity I'll just agree it probably was so. PK1310A, PI-911, those other big chunks, and the floor beneath were all somehow protected well enough it could be 'about the same' and they could all be in contact, wherever the actual explosion was.
My explanation was the upper half of this secondary case, its contents, plus half the primary case above, is what shielded it. What aside from that would do so is a standing problem, but, eh...
I think we can rely on Sidhu not having moved the cases. It's not likely that a baggage handler in the sort of rush he was in would move luggage that didn't have to be moved, for a start. He was definite in all his statements and perfectly clear in the witness box at the FAI. He was even asked at the FAI if he had lifted a case out and replaced it with another one, and he said no, he hadn't. I also note from his statements that if he was asked something he wasn't sure about, he was perfectly willing to say he wasn't sure or didn't remember. He comes over a
lot brighter than Sulkash Kamboj.
I also think we can rely on there not having been anything in the vicinity of the explosion that wasn't either the bomb suitcase or legitimate, identified passenger luggage. They went through all the debris very carefully, and they simply don't have a candidate. That in effect rules out
both the two front suitcases as being non-explosive but still unaccounted-for luggage.
As far as the forensics goes, they want to say the explosion was on the second layer, and they have some observations that suggest that, but if the luggage wasn't moved then they have the problem of there being a non-existent case underneath it.
There are only two solutions to this. Either the luggage was moved in spite of everything Sidhu said, or the explosion was on the bottom layer in spite of the forensic opinion.
On balance I'd put Sidhu's clear and consistent statements at a higher level of reliability than the forensic conclusions, but then I could be biassed on that one which is why I wanted your opinion. But the other problem for the decision to go with the second-layer explosion and the shuffled luggage is that you still have an apparently rogue suitcase among the Heathrow-origin stuff.
Bedford's evidence in this context isn't conclusive, but it's very suggestive. If there was no funny stuff going on at Heathrow, where did the
two front-loaded items come from? They aren't a fit for Bernstein's luggage, and why would someone be randomly rearranging the luggage in the container at that point anyway? To make it look pretty? We have to confront the fact that the trial loading exercises provided strong evidence there was one more case in there than there should have been, and that Bedford's description of that bloody case was an
absolute dead ringer for the known appearance of the bomb suitcase. If you go for the "Sidhu was mistaken" explanation and insist that all the Heathrow stuff was innocent, you have to hand-wave all that away.
That's why I think an even-handed examination of this evidence comes down solidly on the side of the forensics being mistaken about the second-layer part, and the Bedford case being the bomb. And that's why I think the prosecution didn't dare allow all the evidence to be heard. They only presented evidence for the explanation they wanted, and stuffed the rest of it down the back of the sofa.
I actually think they were prepared to lose the case on the basis of the Bedford suitcase being so bloody suspicious that even if Sidhu had moved the luggage the probability was that he just put the Bedford case back on top of Patricia's. I think they simply saw that as preferable to losing the case because it was demonstrable with pretty much mathematical certainty that the Bedford case was the bomb. In the former case, it would be possible to go on insisting they were right but they lost on the basis that the defence managed to establish reasonable doubt. In the latter case, it would be clear to the world's press that the Lockerbie investigation had let the real culprits escape because they overlooked the clue of the century in the first few weeks on the inquiry.
This may explain the intensity of the high-fives and so on when the verdict was announced.
Rolfe.