Is the swine flu going to be pandemic?

Anyone who dares, as both of us have now done, to predict the outcome of an influenza-related event had better damned well be prepared to be wrong. That doesn't seem to be your strong suit, but for my part, if it turns out that I guessed wrong I'll take the hit and offer no excuses at all.
I would like to remind the class that I have refrained from making predictions until we know more about the attack rate. I personally find speculation without evidence foolish.
My own review of past and present literature on flu has led me to strongly suspect that this H1N1 will not be "it", although, who knows?

Flu is weird. Like quantum physics weird.
 
Anyone who dares, as both of us have now done, to predict the outcome of an influenza-related event had better damned well be prepared to be wrong. That doesn't seem to be your strong suit, but for my part, if it turns out that I guessed wrong I'll take the hit and offer no excuses at all. I didn't actually put any "IF"s in my original prediction the way you did ("IF the current contagion pattern holds"). I phrased it as "the interventions WILL be be enough to keep the R0 down" (to somewhere around 1, or lower). That consideration of the current trend is implicit in that seemed too obvious to require stating.
Sounds to me like you are backing down from your prediction. Here's what you said, for the record:
Dymanic said:
Ok, here's mine:
We continue to see new cases and new clusters here and there throughout the summer, but interventions (both pharmacological and non-pharmacological) are sufficient to keep the R0 at a low enough level that it fails to produce community-wide outbreaks... until the onset of the regular flu season, when all bets are off.
And:
Dymanic said:
My "prediction" is that if the current trend in the contagion pattern holds (and if intervention is not relaxed prematurely due to complacency) this thing will not escalate to community level outbreaks in the Northern Hemisphere before fall. It IS a guess (sorry about that), but it isn't an entirely blind guess. I base it largely on what I've read about what is known (hypothesized is more like it) about the seasonal nature of influenza. Pandemic flu can break the rules, but this virus doesn't look like it's getting enough traction to do that at this point.
Oh wait, you are already wrong. Community level outbreaks are occurring in several states already and more seem to be following the same pattern. Did you miss the fact I already posted a report that NY City was experiencing a community level outbreak? So is Texas and California. For that matter, King County where I live reports: "circulating widely."



The "current contagion pattern" reflects a lot more than the transmissibility of the virus, agreed? Whether or not schools are closed or public gatherings cancelled (and the timing of the implementation of those measures) also makes a difference in the R0, agreed? Availability of antivirals? Mask wearing? Hand washing? Cough-and-sneeze training? Do you not advocate all of these? If so, is it because you believe that they can be effective, or do you see them as good ideas that just can't work against this virus, or what?
Actually I don't agree. The epidemic is already past the point closing schools is going to be effective. Antiviral stockpiles are too low to use to stop the epidemic and are now being conserved for only very severe cases and high risk people.

King County also just announced they were no longer recommending school closures because it wasn't expected to be effective at this point.
Sunday, May 3, 2009 - Flu strain continues to appear no more severe than a typical flu season, and policy for schools modified to reflect this
"We know that the H1N1 virus is circulating widely and the disease has proven to be relatively mild, so we believe that many cases are not being formally diagnosed," said Dr. David Fleming, Director & Health Officer for Public Health - Seattle & King County. "We need to find new ways to reduce infections besides focusing on diagnosed, probable cases. We will no longer recommend school closure when we have just one or two probable cases in a school. Instead, we will recommend symptom checks at home and school."



It's not entirely clear to me whether you really think receptor binding specificity is the basis for subtype classification or if that just happened to be the focus of the first article you Googled up. DO you think that?
I don't know what you are talking about. Are you talking about the hemagglutinin which identifies the the subtype or the strain which is identified by the nomenclature of the date and location it was first isolated from? Are you asking what the difference is between H1, H2 and so on? That's what the article I linked to explained. Or are you asking what has to differ before a new strain is delineated?

Maybe this is what you are looking for? It's the full classification scheme for viruses. Note the sections in the table of contents at the left.



Never even occurred to you to wonder about it? Personally, I've always though it would be nice to have a better feel for the chances of success with one class of antiviral versus the other, but with one strain resistant to one class, and the other strain resistant to the other, and with all those unsubtyped samples in the surveillance data, it's pretty much a crap shoot unless you have the luxury of submitting samples for sophisticated laboratory testing (and waiting for the results).
I have to be frank here, you are talking through your ass.

If I have a patient with influenza symptoms during flu season, I, like every other prescribing clinician use an algorithm decision making process. You use the tests and data you have to decide the best course of treatment be it one drug, two or neither. What is prevalent in the community given the age and circumstances of the patient affects the predictive value of your tests and of your specific diagnostic symptoms.

Do you think health care providers make sloppy unsupported guesses what to prescribe for infections or do you suppose their success rate suggests there is solid science behind their decisions?


For a person thoroughly familiar with discussions on pandemic response measures to have never encountered the term cordon sanitaire seems as unlikely as it would be for a person thoroughly familiar with the "science of consciousness" to have never encountered the name David Chalmers.
Well, I must be a fake for sure. :rolleyes:


But no matter. My recollection is that you advocated a containment strategy, and I argued that in the face of an aggressive flu virus, it would be a joke. That has been my opinion for a long time, and I don't see anything in this event to persuade me that it needs changing. Interventions at this point are about slowing the spread of the virus. Containment was never on the table. Do we agree on this now?
Care to find this imaginary post of mine you are referring to? It's pretty crappy to argue this kind of straw man without a link to what was said, let alone if any such post exists at all. But it's even worse to lie about your own position in doing so.
 
Are you trying to say that influenza type B is more potentially deadly than the new 2009 swine origin H1N1?

If so, why do you think that?
If the experts in charge of deciding that are not sure at this point, I'm certainly not confident to think I know the answer.

We still have a flu strain that seems to be infecting a large swath of the population. By just the numbers game, the strain that is going to infect the most people wins. But how many people will be left to be infected come next Jan?

I do think we are now getting enough numbers of people infected outside of Mexico to determine the rate of severe disease is going to be low. It also appears the attack rate in people over 50 is significantly underrepresented which might account for the appearance of a milder virulence. 90% of the expected fatalities would be in people over age 65.
 
Round 2?

Human-to-swine transmission escalates mutation risk

ANDRÉ PICARD
From Monday's Globe and Mail May 3, 2009 at 9:25 PM EDT

News that pigs contracted swine influenza A H1N1 virus from a human on a central Alberta farm should not alarm consumers of pork because the virus is not food-borne, food safety experts say.
But the unusual development creates a whole new series of challenges for public-health officials trying to limit the spread of the new form of flu in humans and swine alike.

“It happened once, it could happen again elsewhere,” said Peter Ben Embarek, a food-safety scientist at the World Health Organization.
As the virus jumps from pigs to humans and back again it risks mutating and becoming more dangerous to both species. And there is an added concern now that swine flu has been reported in parts of Asia where avian influenza is already present, and the pandemic strains could mix into a lethal cocktail.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090503.wflumain04/BNStory/Front

and

China banned all imports of Alberta pork yesterday, according to the Canadian Pork Council, and farmers speculate that their major export market, the United States, may follow suit this week. Both countries have expressed concern that the flu strain – originally termed swine flu by health officials because its genetic code shows porcine origins – will contaminate domestic herds.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090503.wflupork04/BNStory/National/home

interesting times..:garfield:
 
And here's one of the latest news stories:

Flu, Mostly Mild, Has Spread Across U.S., Officials Say
Swine flu has become widespread in the United States, with 226 cases in 30 states and more expected to turn up in additional states in the next few days, federal health officials said Sunday.

“I think it’s circulating all over the U.S.,” Dr. Anne Schuchat, the interim deputy director for science and public health at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, said in a news conference. “The virus has arrived, I would say, in most of the country now.”


And as for predictions, it remains consistent with what I've been posting:
But Dr. Schuchat said, “I don’t think we’re out of the woods yet.”

She said the virus, called H1N1 by scientists, had a number of unusual features that were cause for concern. It has flared up at a time of year when the flu season is normally ending. It is new, so people probably have little or no resistance to it.

And unlike the common types of seasonal flu, it appears to infect an unusually high percentage of young people. The median age of patients is 17.

“Very few confirmed are over 50,” Dr. Schuchat said. “They tend to be younger. Whether it will pan out in the weeks ahead we don’t know, but it is a pattern that looks different from seasonal influenza.”

Of 30 people hospitalized in this country, she continued, a high proportion are older children and younger adults, a big change from the age groups that generally have the highest risk of needing hospital care for flu: the elderly and the very young.
 
Flu virus mutations are big concern for H1N1 experts
Updated Sat. May. 2 2009 11:08 AM ET

Angela Mulholland, CTV.ca News

While fears about the H1N1 virus that we used to call swine flu are abating somewhat, virologists say we shouldn't let our guard down yet. The virus could undergo genetic changes and perhaps even return with a vengeance in the fall.

Influenza viruses are notorious for their ability to mutate. No one can predict what this virus will do, but we can look to past pandemic-type strains for guidance.

The 1918 Spanish flu first emerged in early summer, then went quiet, only to cause a severe pandemic in the fall. The same pattern occurred in 1957 and 1968, when flu strains emerged first in Asia then re-emerged in North America and Europe in the fall, though with less virulence than the 1918 strain.

more

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20090501/virus_strain_090502/20090502?hub=Health

and snip

Preliminary research suggests people 60 and older may already have some protection against the new swine flu, possibly because of vaccines they've received in the past.

Dr. Nancy Cox, the head of the influenza division at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control says work being done in the Atlanta labs shows older people have some antibodies that may offer protection against the swine H1N1 virus.

Cox says her team is seeing higher levels of antibodies against the virus in people starting at about age 50, but the rise is more noticeable in people 60 and older. She says the pattern of disease spread seems to support the idea, because most of the cases are in young people.

or because we've had a variation of this flu....
I can only recall one really bad bout and it was a nightmare as my wife and I both had it and despite being young and fit at the time we literally staggered into the doctors office after a week of trying to deal with it ourselves.
We were very ill and because of our isolation in an old farmhouse not easily accessed likely at more risk than we knew.
I still recall it decades later.....:boggled:

••
Just in

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17072-first-genetic-analysis-of-swine-flu-reveals-potency.html
 
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Doesn't it ever bug you when looking at the CDC's weekly surveillance data that most of the isolates tested are in the "not subtyped" category? If we encountered an "H17" subtype, how would we know? It's just something I've wondered about, and I've researched it, and I've asked virologists, but I've never found an answer. Is the "subtype" essentially an artifact of the methodology? Is it taxonomic? Structural? All three? I wasn't merely challenging you; I really hoped you might know.

One reason not everything is subtyped is because the public health labs are running over capacity just trying to keep up with the screening volume.
 
Community level outbreaks are occurring in several states already and more seem to be following the same pattern.
I have to admit, I'm not quite sure if the WHO presently has a very strict definition for "community level outbreak". Another chance to play "quiz the expert" then. Five percent or more of a population affected?

Actually I don't agree. The epidemic is already past the point closing schools is going to be effective.
I suppose it depends a lot on what you're looking for in an "effective" mitigation strategy. Stop the virus in its tracks? No. Slow the spread? Sure.

Antiviral stockpiles are too low to use to stop the epidemic and are now being conserved for only very severe cases and high risk people.
You say. Seattle & King County Public Health say: "While there is plentiful supply of Tamiflu in King County, distribution may be slightly backlogged." The CDC's interim guidance recommendations still include antiviral chemoprophylaxis for household contacts and health care workers.

For that matter, King County where I live reports: "circulating widely."
But is it circulating densely? By the way: get a lot of sunshine up there this time of year do you?

King County also just announced they were no longer recommending school closures because it wasn't expected to be effective at this point.
I'm not going to presume to be able to peek inside the heads of the folks at King County Public Health who made that tough call, but it seems reasonable to expect that they are familiar with the historical data which strongly indicate that the timing of measures such as school closures can significantly impact pandemic outcomes. Sounds to me like the observation that "the disease has proven to be relatively mild" had as much to do with it as anything.

Are you asking what the difference is between H1, H2 and so on?
Yes. What exactly is the difference? Receptor binding specificity? So how is it that when that changes, permitting a virus to cross a species barrier, the virus remains a member of the same subtype?

If I have a patient with influenza symptoms during flu season, I, like every other prescribing clinician use an algorithm decision making process. You use the tests and data you have to decide the best course of treatment be it one drug, two or neither. What is prevalent in the community given the age and circumstances of the patient affects the predictive value of your tests and of your specific diagnostic symptoms.
You're trying hard to make the process sound more sophisticated than it really is. If you know flu is circulating in a community, it doesn't take a genius to figure out that a person presenting with classic flu symptoms probably has the flu (which makes it an especially bad time to come down with one of the other jillion things that present with similar symptoms). Are you going to tell me that you have data on which specific strains are most widespread in your community at a given time during the course of the season? If a high risk patient had presented with flu sypmtoms in, say, February, what antiviral therapy would you have most likely favored?
 
This depends on what you mean by, not "the next spanish flu".

If we hadn't had the incredible science and world public health infrastructure to respond, it very well could have been. In terms of how deadly, it was immensely more lethal that the 1918 flu. The fatality rate for SARS was over 40%. Compare that to the 1918 pandemic which had a final fatality rate averaging less than 3%.

37% of SARS survivors had residual lung damage a year after being infected in one followup study. I don't think there were any mild cases identified during the outbreak.

In terms of how contagious, there were super-spreaders but not everyone infected shed such high volumes of virus. Initial health care worker protection of wearing mask gown and gloves failed in Canada. It turned out that just reusing the gowns to enter the room, despite keeping the contaminated side of the gown contained when handling them, allowed the infection to spread.

Rather than not living up to the hype, a better analogy is, we dodged an RPG.

My mistake, I must have under/overrated the containment efford/virus.
 
Well dodged the first salvo.....it's far from over.

That is one of the more sensible ways of looking at it that I've seen so far, although I hear there's a young girl in Edmonton in intensive care today?
 
One reason not everything is subtyped is because the public health labs are running over capacity just trying to keep up with the screening volume.
Actually, I think he was talking about how many cases of seasonal flu we don't bother to subtype. But he's wrong about that too.

There's been a bit of praise for the sentinel flu monitoring program in the US for the very reason it did detect the newly circulating swine strain. Mexico didn't know what they had until the US picked up the fact a new strain showed up in two unrelated cases both with connections to Mexico. That was the first Texas and California cases of the new strain.

Sentinel flu monitoring is a program that has been successful for years. Instead of testing everyone, people with flu symptoms are sampled in a systematic way, just like a poll samples opinions.
 
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I have to admit, I'm not quite sure if the WHO presently has a very strict definition for "community level outbreak". Another chance to play "quiz the expert" then. Five percent or more of a population affected?
They seem to be ignoring a couple European 'outbreaks' at the moment. I doubt that will work for long.

I suppose it depends a lot on what you're looking for in an "effective" mitigation strategy. Stop the virus in its tracks? No. Slow the spread? Sure.
Effective in this sense includes 'practical'. You can slow the spread by doing what Mexico did as well. It is not practical or called for.

You say. Seattle & King County Public Health say: "While there is plentiful supply of Tamiflu in King County, distribution may be slightly backlogged." The CDC's interim guidance recommendations still include antiviral chemoprophylaxis for household contacts and health care workers.
And this is exactly why drawing conclusions without expertise is a problem. King county has enough Tamiflu to treat very sick people, but not enough to give prophylaxis to people exposed unless they have medical risks.

And private clinics cannot purchase Tamiflu right now. Distributors don't have any and Roche isn't selling to anyone but the CDC. So, your patient has the flu, needs Tamiflu, you have to send them to the ED which is the only place King County has so far offered to supply the Tamiflu to.

Should we just send every patient with flu to the ED? No. The ED is already overtaxed. So the patient exposes twice as many people and traipses all over while ill because of the process.

Suppose you have mild flu the first 2 days but develop complications? You were not a candidate for Tamiflu the first 2 days and by day 3, Tamiflu has little to no effect. Because we don't have enough, we have to guess on the first day of symptoms whether or not your case is going to be severe. It would be nice to be able to treat everyone.

There are many problems here one does not see from reading a rosy news report.

....By the way: get a lot of sunshine up there this time of year do you?
Rainy and windy at the moment and it's been rain/Sun/rain/Sun several days running.

I'm not going to presume to be able to peek inside the heads of the folks at King County Public Health who made that tough call, but it seems reasonable to expect that they are familiar with the historical data which strongly indicate that the timing of measures such as school closures can significantly impact pandemic outcomes. Sounds to me like the observation that "the disease has proven to be relatively mild" had as much to do with it as anything.
Absolutely. But as I said before, to have made that call before you had enough cases to actually know would have been negligent.

Yes. What exactly is the difference? Receptor binding specificity? So how is it that when that changes, permitting a virus to cross a species barrier, the virus remains a member of the same subtype?
I suggest you read a little in the area of genetics and evolution, not of the flu virus, but read about the similarities between species. You might be surprised to find out how similar different species can be, depending on the genes and proteins involved. The divisions between subtypes do not exclude receptor binding in different species because the same or similar receptors are not confined to single species.

Nor are all receptors the same within a species. The CCR5 deletion is a genetic variation that changes the receptor sites on human white blood cells for example. If you have 2 copies of the gene, your white blood cells have different receptors than a person with no copy of the mutation.


You're trying hard to make the process sound more sophisticated than it really is. If you know flu is circulating in a community, it doesn't take a genius to figure out that a person presenting with classic flu symptoms probably has the flu (which makes it an especially bad time to come down with one of the other jillion things that present with similar symptoms). Are you going to tell me that you have data on which specific strains are most widespread in your community at a given time during the course of the season? If a high risk patient had presented with flu sypmtoms in, say, February, what antiviral therapy would you have most likely favored?
So you think doctors and nurse practitioners are over rated? Heck, you could do the same thing, you've been reading about flu. :rolleyes: You and Ivor should open up your own clinic. (See post 227)
 
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They seem to be ignoring a couple European 'outbreaks' at the moment. I doubt that will work for long.

Are you accusing the WHO and CDC of ignoring significant person-to-person transmission outside of the US, Mexico, and Canada?
 
I suggest you read a little in the area of genetics and evolution, not of the flu virus, but read about the similarities between species.
Oh, I've done plenty of that, but I don't see any of it helping me to understand just exactly what a subtype is.

You might be surprised to find out how similar different species can be, depending on the genes and proteins involved.
LOL. A new classic Skeptigirl quote.

The divisions between subtypes do not exclude receptor binding in different species because the same or similar receptors are not confined to single species.
Suppose we do confine it to a single species. Do you believe that, say, seasonal H1N1 and H3N2 have preferences for different receptors? Assuming that your answer is no, why the need for both the H1 and the H3? See what I mean? It can't be just about receptor binding specificity. Seems like it must have something to do with structures other than the binding sites. It drives me crazy.

So you think doctors and nurse practitioners are over rated?
Some are. Tell me you don't agree with that.

Heck, you could do the same thing, you've been reading about flu.
As you've just pointed out, that's probably my best bet:

"Suppose you have mild flu the first 2 days but develop complications? You were not a candidate for Tamiflu the first 2 days and by day 3, Tamiflu has little to no effect. Because we don't have enough, we have to guess on the first day of symptoms whether or not your case is going to be severe."

For me, that last one is a no-brainer. My FEV1's are below thirty percent on a good day. If I require antiviral therapy, the one making the call will be ME.
 

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