Is the swine flu going to be pandemic?

Hmm..

The CDC's FluView site is down now, but the JFS blog writer apparently saw the early mid April reports before they shut it down.

http://junkfoodscience.blogspot.com/2009/04/swine-flu-update-april-29-2009.html

Every week, the CDC reports the number of confirmed cases and this month, in just one week (April 12-18, 2009), for example, the CDC confirmed 25,925 cases of influenza in the United States and 55 child deaths.

She didn't compare that to the previous weeks, tho.
You can see some of the past reports here:
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/fluactivity.htm

They've taken the week April 12-18 down, and the most recent report you can find now is this:

http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives2008-2009/weekly14.htm

April 5-11. The season total at that time for pediatric deaths was just 53, with 8 that week.

I wonder if she misread the report before they yanked it?


ETA:
I found a PDS of week 15, April 12-18 . Yeah, she misread the season total for the week's total, it appears. Pshew.
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/pdf/External_F0915.pdf
 
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Well, flunk might be the wrong word.

We got little paper masks to hand out to everyone coming onboard in Hong Kong, and it were made up to be the next spanish flu.
It was loose in Hong Kong, a very densely populated place with poor hygiene.
How many died from regular flu in the same time period?

I would not call that succeding as the next great plague.
This depends on what you mean by, not "the next spanish flu".

If we hadn't had the incredible science and world public health infrastructure to respond, it very well could have been. In terms of how deadly, it was immensely more lethal that the 1918 flu. The fatality rate for SARS was over 40%. Compare that to the 1918 pandemic which had a final fatality rate averaging less than 3%.

37% of SARS survivors had residual lung damage a year after being infected in one followup study. I don't think there were any mild cases identified during the outbreak.

In terms of how contagious, there were super-spreaders but not everyone infected shed such high volumes of virus. Initial health care worker protection of wearing mask gown and gloves failed in Canada. It turned out that just reusing the gowns to enter the room, despite keeping the contaminated side of the gown contained when handling them, allowed the infection to spread.

Rather than not living up to the hype, a better analogy is, we dodged an RPG.
 
would the regular flu be considered pandemic if a vaccine was not available? because that is how I view the swine flu currently.
 
would the regular flu be considered pandemic if a vaccine was not available?
No, because the vaccine is not the only means of aquiring immunity. But you're pointed in the right direction; it's easy to assume that virulence, attack rate, etc, are properties of the virus, when in fact, they are properties which emerge out of the complex interaction between virus and host.
 
Ok, here's mine:
We continue to see new cases and new clusters here and there throughout the summer, but interventions (both pharmacological and non-pharmacological) are sufficient to keep the R0 at a low enough level that it fails to produce community-wide outbreaks... until the onset of the regular flu season, when all bets are off.
Define "new cases and new clusters here and there" and I'll take you up on that bet. What are you going to give me when I win? :)

Because I don't concur with all of your conclusions? That's an interesting metric. Do you often find that the epidemiologists themselves are always in firm agreement? Because I don't.
If your conclusion was supportable, it would be a different story here. But 'guessing' is not a credible opinion one need entertain.

Woah, woah. You're talking about antigens. But each subtype is capable of shifting its antigens across a wide enough range that you can have one virus (swine H1N1) which is so antigenically different from another (seasonal H1N1) that we call it a "novel" virus. But it's still the same subtype. Understand the question now?

Of course. I love that video. But don't talk down to me. My idea of a good time is to step up to a chalkboard and diagram the structure and functions of the hemagglutinin, neuraminidase, and M2 proteins for a rapt audience (which I find to be rather few and far between, for some strange reason).
"Woah whoah...understand the question now?" :rolleyes:

Do you have a point here? A pissing contest perhaps? A simple, "I was speaking more specifically about ....." would have been a more productive response.

I'm well aware I don't coddle people pretending to be knowledgeable in a science they aren't, and the result is my posts can seem condescending. And sometimes I sound condescending by accident (or rather because I was not born with the skill of social correctness). I just don't beat around the bush when someone doesn't know what they are talking about. It's not intended to insult anyone.

I would not seem to be talking down to you had you not been defensive of the fact your knowledge of epidemiology was being challenged. You are challenging the field I know my :rule10 in. I think if you go back and see what I've posted and what's happened since, you'll find evidence I do know what I'm talking about when it comes to the epidemiology of infectious disease. I make a successful living selling my expertise in this field.

That doesn't mean I am always right. Of course I'm not. But I most certainly recognize when someone doesn't know some of the most basic science involved.

No one should be insulted by the fact they don't know as much as they thought they did about a subject. Nor should anyone be insulted by the fact they don't have expertise in a particular field. I'm sure you have all kinds of expertise in lots of things that I don't. Being defensive when you are wrong is a barrier to learning. And if you are going to act as if you are for certain correct, you better be correct. You haven't been and I am certain.


Maybe you have or maybe you haven't read more about the genetics and molecular structure of the influenza virus than I have. You can't possibly know from the discussions we've had so far. I certainly don't know your level of expertise at this point. I am an avid reader on the subject and have been following the genetic research on the HPAI H5N1 since 1997 when it first emerged in Hong Kong and killed 17 people. While I know the subject very well, I don't claim to be a molecular biologist or a viral geneticist.

However, if you want to have a discussion about the topic, start a new thread and rephrase your question to be more specific. My interest has been in watching the evolution of the H5N1 strain as it continues to smolder in SE Asia and northern Africa. We all want to know the path it will mutate in, how it is or is not similar to the 1918 H1N1, and if it will jump species. Having this new swine flu strain emerge too rapidly to have been seen early enough to stop is a wake up call. Running out of N95 and local Tamiflu stockpiles is a wake up call. It will add volumes to the research we're all depending on to avert another 1918 pandemic.
 
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A pissing contest perhaps?
you can't do THAT ur a gurl.....;)

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Question.....because this has avian, human and pig components is it a more likely "gene mixer" with say H5? ...thinking particularly of SE Asia
 
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would the regular flu be considered pandemic if a vaccine was not available? because that is how I view the swine flu currently.
Seasonal flu strains aren't worldwide at the same time. A pandemic means worldwide.

Seasonal epidemics of flu are characterized by exceeding the endemic threshold. When the threshold is exceeded it is considered an epidemic. Endemic is the baseline rate of something. With flu the endemic rate varies over the year. With other infections there would be a range that represented the endemic level and exceeding that range would define an epidemic.

With things like measles that we've eliminated through vaccinations, a couple cases would be considered sporadic, a number of cases in a single area would be called an outbreak and a large number of cases in different areas would be an epidemic.

It's a bit subjective but essentially just divides a continuum of case counts.


The vaccine could indeed avert an epidemic. It's no guarantee, and we wouldn't always have epidemic levels of disease without a vaccine, but vaccines absolutely can and do prevent pandemics and epidemics.


BTW, hi. Were you gone for a while? I believe it was noted in a "Where's Nails?" thread, or maybe someone inquired in a thread asking about more than one member.
 
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Question.....because this has avian, human and pig components is it a more likely "gene mixer" with say H5? ...thinking particularly of SE Asia

No, the avian part is probably a leftover from when it was in birds, before crossing over into either pigs or humans. All flu comes from birds.
 
There's a new dilemma being discussed about the vaccine for this strain. In the US our seasonal vaccine is about finished. That will free up production capacity to make a swine flu vaccine. But elsewhere they have to choose between allocating capacity to one vaccine or the other. Not too good when there's no good way to predict which will be more important to make.
 
Define "new cases and new clusters here and there" and I'll take you up on that bet.
My "prediction" is that if the current trend in the contagion pattern holds (and if intervention is not relaxed prematurely due to complacency) this thing will not escalate to community level outbreaks in the Northern Hemisphere before fall. It IS a guess (sorry about that), but it isn't an entirely blind guess. I base it largely on what I've read about what is known (hypothesized is more like it) about the seasonal nature of influenza. Pandemic flu can break the rules, but this virus doesn't look like it's getting enough traction to do that at this point.

I'm well aware I don't coddle people pretending to be knowledgeable in a science they aren't, and the result is my posts can seem condescending.
Yeah, you sure didn't coddle me when you schooled me on the science of consciousness recently. LOL. I'm sorry, Skeptigirl, but I spend a lot of time reading what real epidemiologists and virologists say about this, and there are just too often discrepancies between what you say and what they say. In particular, I often find some of your knowledge to be a bit dated; it smells of textbooks, but old textbooks. If you didn't come off with so much attitude, it wouldn't be hard to overlook; the science of influenza is advancing rapidly, and nobody has time to read all of the literature on the subject -- and, as I've mentioned, different experts can draw different conclusions from the same data. I think you might benefit from taking more of your own words to heart.

While I know the subject very well, I don't claim to be a molecular biologist or a viral geneticist.
Doesn't it ever bug you when looking at the CDC's weekly surveillance data that most of the isolates tested are in the "not subtyped" category? If we encountered an "H17" subtype, how would we know? It's just something I've wondered about, and I've researched it, and I've asked virologists, but I've never found an answer. Is the "subtype" essentially an artifact of the methodology? Is it taxonomic? Structural? All three? I wasn't merely challenging you; I really hoped you might know.

Having this new swine flu strain emerge too rapidly to have been seen early enough to stop is a wake up call. Running out of N95 and local Tamiflu stockpiles is a wake up call. It will add volumes to the research we're all depending on to avert another 1918 pandemic.
I agree with all of that. I still swear I recall a much older discussion we had in which you advocated the cordon sanitaire (and, naturally, I took issue). I could be remembering wrong. Whatever else, this virus has surely revealed the futility in giving that idea a central role in pandemic response planning.
 
No, the avian part is probably a leftover from when it was in birds, before crossing over into either pigs or humans. All flu comes from birds.
Because all versions of H and N exist in avian flu strains that is evidence the virus originated in birds.

But as for the genetics of the current swine flu, it's really made up of genes that all have been circulating in pigs since about 1998 I think. I'll edit in a link to the information in a minute.
 
My "prediction" is that if the current trend in the contagion pattern holds (and if intervention is not relaxed prematurely due to complacency) this thing will not escalate to community level outbreaks in the Northern Hemisphere before fall. It IS a guess (sorry about that), but it isn't an entirely blind guess. I base it largely on what I've read about what is known (hypothesized is more like it) about the seasonal nature of influenza. Pandemic flu can break the rules, but this virus doesn't look like it's getting enough traction to do that at this point.
Too many caveats just give you an excuse to say you were wrong because of [X]. Make a prediction that includes what interventions you expect to see.

Yeah, you sure didn't coddle me when you schooled me on the science of consciousness recently. LOL.
You had a magical conception of consciousness and I have a neurobiological one that doesn't include anything 'special'. End of unrelated thread discussion.

I'm sorry, Skeptigirl, but I spend a lot of time reading what real epidemiologists and virologists say about this, and there are just too often discrepancies between what you say and what they say. In particular, I often find some of your knowledge to be a bit dated; it smells of textbooks, but old textbooks. If you didn't come off with so much attitude, it wouldn't be hard to overlook; the science of influenza is advancing rapidly, and nobody has time to read all of the literature on the subject -- and, as I've mentioned, different experts can draw different conclusions from the same data. I think you might benefit from taking more of your own words to heart.
You're just putting your foot in your mouth here not recognizing your limits in this scientific field. Suit yourself.

Doesn't it ever bug you when looking at the CDC's weekly surveillance data that most of the isolates tested are in the "not subtyped" category?
No because I understand what sentinel surveillance is all about. CDC is sampling the circulating specimens in a systematic way from sentinel sites.

If we encountered an "H17" subtype, how would we know? It's just something I've wondered about, and I've researched it, and I've asked virologists, but I've never found an answer. Is the "subtype" essentially an artifact of the methodology? Is it taxonomic? Structural? All three? I wasn't merely challenging you; I really hoped you might know.
And here you pretended to know this stuff a post or two ago. See what you can get out of this article. It has a nice bit of useful background on the subject:

Sialobiology of Influenza - Molecular Mechanism of Host Range Variation of Influenza Viruses
The gene pool of influenza A viruses in aquatic birds provides all of the genetic diversity required for human and lower animals. Host range selection of the receptor binding specificity of the influenza virus hemagglutinin occurs during maintenance of the virus in different host cells that express different receptor sialo-sugar chains. In this paper, functional roles of the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase spikes of influenza viruses are described in the relation to 1) host range of influenza viruses, 2) receptor binding specificity of human and other animal influenza viruses, 3) recognition of sialyl sugar chains by Spanish influenza virus hemagglutinin, 4) highly pathogenic and potentially pandemic H5N1, H9N2, and H7N7 avian influenza viruses and molecular mechanism of host range variation of influenza viruses, 5) role of the neuraminidase spike for the host range of influenza viruses, and 6) Development of anti-influenza drugs.

If it isn't what you are looking for, refine your question and I'll find you more.

I agree with all of that. I still swear I recall a much older discussion we had in which you advocated the cordon sanitaire (and, naturally, I took issue). I could be remembering wrong. Whatever else, this virus has surely revealed the futility in giving that idea a central role in pandemic response planning.
I didn't know what a cordon sanitaire was without looking it up so there is no way I would have posted about it using that term. If you recall the thread let me know. If it was about quarantine during a flu pandemic I have posted about the unrealistic docudrama version.
 
There's a new dilemma being discussed about the vaccine for this strain. In the US our seasonal vaccine is about finished. That will free up production capacity to make a swine flu vaccine. But elsewhere they have to choose between allocating capacity to one vaccine or the other. Not too good when there's no good way to predict which will be more important to make.

Why not just nix the B strain to make room for the other A strain? The B strain doesn't do a lot compared to A, anyway?
 
Paul Offit (a friend and great admirer of Hilleman) on swine flu:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/health/01flu.html?ref=us

Dr. Paul Offit, chief of infectious diseases at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, said the death of a 23-month-old Mexican child in Texas did not mean that the outbreak was extraordinarily dangerous.

“Every year we see between 75 and 150 children die of flu, most of whom were previously healthy,” Dr. Offit said.

Recent improvements to the nation’s flu surveillance system led officials to notice the swine flu outbreak, he said, when just a few years ago it would have been lost among the sea of routine sicknesses.

“We’re very quick now to identify new strains of the flu,” Dr. Offit said. “The question is what we should do with that.”
 
Who is Dr Salpeter?

http://www.theage.com.au/national/flu-alert-higher-than-needed-20090503-arf0.html

THE World Health Organisation has "cried wolf"' over swine flu, a leading US researcher says.
In terms of the death rate, Dr Salpeter said swine flu "is just like an ordinary flu. There is nothing fancy about it in terms of its mortality."
Dr Salpeter said too many alerts caused confusion. If the WHO was too trigger-happy, when there was an aggressive disease outbreak, people might not take it seriously.



PS Isn't anyone ever going to fix the annoying quote function?
 
Too many caveats just give you an excuse to say you were wrong because of [X].
Anyone who dares, as both of us have now done, to predict the outcome of an influenza-related event had better damned well be prepared to be wrong. That doesn't seem to be your strong suit, but for my part, if it turns out that I guessed wrong I'll take the hit and offer no excuses at all. I didn't actually put any "IF"s in my original prediction the way you did ("IF the current contagion pattern holds"). I phrased it as "the interventions WILL be be enough to keep the R0 down" (to somewhere around 1, or lower). That consideration of the current trend is implicit in that seemed too obvious to require stating.

The "current contagion pattern" reflects a lot more than the transmissibility of the virus, agreed? Whether or not schools are closed or public gatherings cancelled (and the timing of the implementation of those measures) also makes a difference in the R0, agreed? Availability of antivirals? Mask wearing? Hand washing? Cough-and-sneeze training? Do you not advocate all of these? If so, is it because you believe that they can be effective, or do you see them as good ideas that just can't work against this virus, or what?

See what you can get out of this article. It has a nice bit of useful background on the subject:
It's not entirely clear to me whether you really think receptor binding specificity is the basis for subtype classification or if that just happened to be the focus of the first article you Googled up. DO you think that?

No because I understand what sentinel surveillance is all about. CDC is sampling the circulating specimens in a systematic way from sentinel sites.
Never even occurred to you to wonder about it? Personally, I've always though it would be nice to have a better feel for the chances of success with one class of antiviral versus the other, but with one strain resistant to one class, and the other strain resistant to the other, and with all those unsubtyped samples in the surveillance data, it's pretty much a crap shoot unless you have the luxury of submitting samples for sophisticated laboratory testing (and waiting for the results).

I didn't know what a cordon sanitaire was without looking it up
For a person thoroughly familiar with discussions on pandemic response measures to have never encountered the term cordon sanitaire seems as unlikely as it would be for a person thoroughly familiar with the "science of consciousness" to have never encountered the name David Chalmers. But no matter. My recollection is that you advocated a containment strategy, and I argued that in the face of an aggressive flu virus, it would be a joke. That has been my opinion for a long time, and I don't see anything in this event to persuade me that it needs changing. Interventions at this point are about slowing the spread of the virus. Containment was never on the table. Do we agree on this now?
 
Why not just nix the B strain to make room for the other A strain? The B strain doesn't do a lot compared to A, anyway?
That's not a bad idea. They're scrambling to clear the decks for production of the pandemic vax, and my understanding is that while things are moving smoothly with the A strain batches of the seasonal vax, problems with the B strains could hold up the works. Hell with the B strain anyway.
 
Why not just nix the B strain to make room for the other A strain? The B strain doesn't do a lot compared to A, anyway?
B flu strains not only contributed to a lot of disease this year, they've changed the strain in the vaccine because it was a poor match.

Update: Influenza Activity --- United States, September 28, 2008--April 4, 2009, and Composition of the 2009--10 Influenza Vaccine
The relative proportion of influenza B viruses increased during February and March, and since the week ending March 14, 2009, >50% of the positive influenza specimens have been influenza B....

...Only the influenza B component represents a change from the 2008--09 vaccine formulation.
 
Well if the story reports her position accurately, I'd say she's full of it. That's some pretty extensive concluding she's drawing on the flimsiest of evidence. But time stands to have her guessing look right and give a false impression she properly assessed the situation or she's going to look like a fool but no one will be paying attention to her by then. It's a safe bet for her.







PS Isn't anyone ever going to fix the annoying quote function?
What is the problem? I type in the code and have had no problems.
 

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