Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I am personally defending direct realism because it helps me to communicate my own position. I do not believe the standard defences of direct realism work. I do not believe indirect realism is plausible at all. But I am fairly sure that most of the people on this site would naturally want to defend direct realism if they could - just like they'd want to defend physicalism. But I also knew those people would positively detest my own way of defending that position. So it lays down a challenge: Do you want to defend direct realism? If so, do you like my defence? If not, you'd best try to think of another one.

It's as if you are just not reading what we write. You've got an impenetrable bag over your head.

I might try defending direct realism if I knew what it was.

It doesn't matter how many times we ask, does it? You aren't going to answer, but you are going to challenge us to defend this undefined metaphysical concept. You need the game to continue, but you also need the game to be vague.

This is how philosophy is supposed to work. It's intellectual chess. Although I realise it tends to look more like intellectual mud-wrestling at this place.

I doubt it, but you sure do present a caricature of the hopeless philosopher.

~~ Paul

 

[Z]

I'd say there's neither a good defence of direct realism, nor a good defence of indirect realism. Both, for various reasons, are definitely woo-oriented, founded on faerie dust and wishful thinking.

But I won't get into THAT endless loop again - I'll retire from this thread until Geoff has something more to talk about than quantum connections and denials of the uncertainty of our perceptions.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Why isn't the problem solved by the fact that there is a complex pathway between the senses and my internal perception of the chair?

Because that would have to be indirect realism.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Because that would have to be indirect realism.

You do realise that contradicts previously posted definitions of direct realism?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It's as if you are just not reading what we write. You've got an impenetrable bag over your head.

I might try defending direct realism if I knew what it was.

It doesn't matter how many times we ask, does it? You aren't going to answer, but you are going to challenge us to defend this undefined metaphysical concept. You need the game to continue, but you also need the game to be vague.


I doubt it, but you sure do present a caricature of the hopeless philosopher.

~~ Paul

I've answered your question. Any theory which claims we can have direct perceptions of external objects is classed as direct realism. Any theory which claims we can have indirect perceptions of external objects is classed as indirect realism. If you have no perceptions of external objects at all then it is idealism with respect to external objects. Within those categories, there are many sub-theories. Why is this not an answer to your question?

 

[Roboramma]

What about theories that suggest that we have imperfect perception of external objects?

(by the way, I read your post about illusions, and intend to respond... because I don't really agree with your argument about the BIV not experiencing an illusion, but that'll have to wait until tomorrow.)

 

[hammegk]

It does provide an answer to the problem of hallucination, which means it provides at least one answer to a metaphysical problem. Your "no answers whatsoever" is absurd.

~~ Paul

BTW, that was me, not Geoff, you were answering.

It is not absurd. Objective idealism fully accepts all current behavioral/neurological interpretations of current science as can address human behavior, or the behavior of all systems we would perceive as a brain & body.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

http://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/EVENTS/EPIS2002/bonjour.pdf

IN SEARCH OF DIRECT REALISM
Laurence BonJour
University of Washington

It is fairly standard in accounts of the epistemology of perceptual knowledge
to distinguish three main alternative positions: representationalism (also called
representative realism or indirect realism), phenomenalism, and a third view that is
called either naïve realism (usually by its opponents) or direct realism (usually by
those who are more sympathetic to it). I have always found the last of these views
puzzling and elusive.

…

I begin with an elaboration and clarification of the contrast between direct
realism and representationalism [indirect realism]

…

What then does direct (or naïve) realism amount to? The direct realist
should, I suggest, be viewed as rejecting both of the characteristic theses of
representationalism, while still maintaining that perception is indeed a source of
justification for beliefs about the material world. This commits the direct realist to
holding both: (a) that in normal cases of perception, physical or material objects are,
in a sense admittedly still in need of clarification, directly or immediately perceived;
and (b) that the justification for beliefs about such objects that results from
perception does not depend on the sort of inference from the subjective character of
perceptual experience to which the representationalist appeals, but can be accounted
for in some other way.

It is obviously the former of these theses that gives direct
realism its label; but the latter thesis is far more important from an epistemological
standpoint and provides the main dialectical motivation for the view. For the main
alleged virtue of direct realism has been precisely that it avoids the need for the
allegedly difficult and perhaps even hopeless inference to which the
representationalist view appeals.

….

Thus the only way to adequately defend the second direct realist thesis is to actually give a competing account of how perceptual beliefs about material objects are justified…

…

From this perspective, it is a striking fact that many of the recent
proponents of direct realism offer little or nothing by way of a positive account of
how perceptual beliefs are justified according to their view…. [NOTE: Unlike Geoff, who has offered this]

….

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Is there any further direct realist alternative, one that avoids any claim that
perceptual experience has a content that plays a role in justification, while still
claiming that perception is somehow a source of justification? The obvious problem
is that it is extremely unclear where such justification is supposed to come from.

[Go go Penrose!! Go go Penrose!!]

Queen takes bishop. Check.

If you want to understand why I am taking the position I am taking then read that paper. The author isn't even willing to consider anti-realism (phenomenalism). But he cannot figure how to get to direct realism - it is like the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, and he's lost belief it even exists. So he is left defending indirect realism, and indirect realism doesn't make sense. But the title alone should indicate that you are not the only person who is wondering why people think direct realism is conceivably defendable at all.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What about theories that suggest that we have imperfect perception of external objects?

(by the way, I read your post about illusions, and intend to respond... because I don't really agree with your argument about the BIV not experiencing an illusion, but that'll have to wait until tomorrow.)

That's another variation on the argument against direct realism. But when I perceive a bent stick which is straight I am still percieving a stick; it just looks bent.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Because that would have to be indirect realism.

So you have finally taken a position and we do not need to squirm about any longer.

What exactly does the brain in your system do again? There is a brain, right, with neurons and everything? Those neurons have sodium channels and the whole shebang, whether or not they are physical or noumenal, right?

But you are defending direct realism? What are those neurons doing, then? Are they just scaffolding for neurotubules to perform their QM magic?

Or to sum it all up, you have a big fat homonculus sitting in the middle perceiving, right? Because direct realism requires a homonculus, right?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So you have finally taken a position and we do not need to squirm about any longer.

No way. The last thing I am is an indirect realist. I thought I'd made that abundantly clear.

What exactly does the brain in your system do again?

Exactly what it does in yours + Being.

There is a brain, right, with neurons and everything? Those neurons have sodium channels and the whole shebang, whether or not they are physical or noumenal, right?

Yes.

But you are defending direct realism?

Yes.

What are those neurons doing, then? Are they just scaffolding for neurotubules to perform their QM magic?

Processing information?

Or to sum it all up, you have a big fat homonculus sitting in the middle perceiving, right?

NO. The homonculus only exists for you. I'm not a physicalist. Most people defending direct realism are physicalists. I'm not.

Because direct realism requires a homonculus, right?

NO! Physicalism requires a homunculus, unless you wish to deny the existence of your mind! I think we've been here before.......

The homonculus is a NOTHING, remember?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Exactly what it does in yours

Then you have a causal chain of neurons involved in the process of perception. You have just identified this with indirect realism. How are you not an indirect realist?

Physicalism requires a homunculus

No it doesn't.

unless you wish to deny the existence of your mind

Only if you define mind the way that you do, as a thing. Sorry, a no-thing.

The homonculus is a NOTHING, remember?

Yeah, I remember. A nothing that does something. How does that work again? Function from nothing, that's a neat trick.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Then you have a causal chain of neurons involved in the process of perception. You have just identified this with indirect realism. How are you not an indirect realist?

http://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/EV...02/bonjour.pdf



IN SEARCH OF DIRECT REALISM
Laurence BonJour
University of Washington

It is fairly standard in accounts of the epistemology of perceptual knowledge
to distinguish three main alternative positions: representationalism (also called
representative realism or indirect realism), phenomenalism, and a third view that is
called either naïve realism (usually by its opponents) or direct realism (usually by
those who are more sympathetic to it). I have always found the last of these views
puzzling and elusive.

…

I begin with an elaboration and clarification of the contrast between direct
realism and representationalism [indirect realism]

…

What then does direct (or naïve) realism amount to? The direct realist
should, I suggest, be viewed as rejecting both of the characteristic theses of
representationalism, while still maintaining that perception is indeed a source of
justification for beliefs about the material world. This commits the direct realist to
holding both: (a) that in normal cases of perception, physical or material objects are,
in a sense admittedly still in need of clarification, directly or immediately perceived;
and (b) that the justification for beliefs about such objects that results from
perception does not depend on the sort of inference from the subjective character of
perceptual experience to which the representationalist appeals, but can be accounted
for in some other way.

It is obviously the former of these theses that gives direct
realism its label; but the latter thesis is far more important from an epistemological
standpoint and provides the main dialectical motivation for the view. For the main
alleged virtue of direct realism has been precisely that it avoids the need for the
allegedly difficult and perhaps even hopeless inference to which the
representationalist view appeals.

….

Thus the only way to adequately defend the second direct realist thesis is to actually give a competing account of how perceptual beliefs about material objects are justified…

…

From this perspective, it is a striking fact that many of the recent
proponents of direct realism offer little or nothing by way of a positive account of
how perceptual beliefs are justified according to their view…. [NOTE: Unlike Geoff, who has offered this]

….

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Is there any further direct realist alternative, one that avoids any claim that
perceptual experience has a content that plays a role in justification, while still
claiming that perception is somehow a source of justification? The obvious problem
is that it is extremely unclear where such justification is supposed to come from.

[Go go Penrose!! Go go Penrose!!]

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Nice little post.

NOw how about actually answering the questions?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Nice little post.

NOw how about actually answering the questions?

The post answered your question. How about replying to it?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why isn't the problem solved by the fact that there is a complex pathway between the senses and my internal perception of the chair?

Because that would have to be indirect realism.

You do realise that contradicts previously posted definitions of direct realism?

No way. The last thing I am is an indirect realist. I thought I'd made that abundantly clear.

Then you have a causal chain of neurons involved in the process of perception. You have just identified this with indirect realism. How are you not an indirect realist?

What then does direct realism amount to? ... (a) that in normal cases of perception, physical or material objects are, in a sense admittedly still in need of clarification, directly or immediately perceived; [emphasis mine]

We. have. no. idea. what. you. are. talking. about.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wow, who knew the sort of interesting stuff one would find when Googling for "units of consciousness"? From http://homepages.ihug.co.nz/~sai/fabriconsc_boyd.html:

The Hammeroff-Penrose microtubulin model utterly and completely fails when dealing with forms of consciousness other than human beings, such as rocks and clouds and stars and mountains, and so on. The most catastrophic failure of the microtubulin model is that it can never possibly deal with the various non-corporeal, energetic forms of consciousness.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

Why isn't the problem solved by the fact that there is a complex pathway between the senses and my internal perception of the chair?

If that were the only connection, this would have to be indirect realism. The same pathway exists in my system but so does another one. It's the QM connection that makes it direct. The pathway makes it realism.

Originally Posted by Geoff :
Because that would have to be indirect realism.

Originally Posted by Kevin :
You do realise that contradicts previously posted definitions of direct realism?

There are TWO causal factors. If this is the only one then it has to be indirect realism.

What then does direct realism amount to? ... (a) that in normal cases of perception, physical or material objects are, in a sense admittedly still in need of clarification, directly or immediately perceived; [emphasis mine]

Exactly. The QM connections provide a direct link to the external object. Penrose provides the missing clarification.

 

[chriswl]

The argument from illusion

Let’s suppose that instead of the BITV we have a person wearing perfect 3D goggles and is connected to an artificial reality, or a trainee pilot in a flight simulator. The pilot looks out of the cockpit and is convinced he is seeing London from 30,000 ft when what he is actually looking at is a projected reflection in a curved mirror about six feet in front of him. This would be the argument from illusion instead of the argument from hallucination, and with respect to direct realism it suffers from the same flaw: that it doesn’t matter for direct realism whether or not you perceive something correctly or not. Seeing a bent stick when the actual stick is straight does not deny that you are seeing a real object in the real world. You perceive a stick, it looks bent. Likewise, you can mistake a mirror for London from the air, but this does not mean you do not directly perceive an object in the real world. You perceive a mirror which looks like London. The only difference is the complexity of the illusion and the level of difference between what the subject thinks he perceives and what he actually perceives.

Agreed.

In the argument I have given what matters is not the subject’s belief about what he is seeing but instead the true source of the light – the actual object being perceived, and involved in the orchestrated collapse. One could object to this by claiming that even the brain in the vat (unlike the lucid dreamer) really does perceive something in the world – in this case it is the probe in its optic nerve. Isn’t this just an even more sophisticated illusion than the simulator? I don’t think so. The pilot veridically perceives a mirror/projector, even though he believes it to be something quite different, and there are superluminal connections between the mirror/projector and the pilot’s brain. Let’s say the illusion is shattered by a maintenance engineer walking between the pilot and the mirror. Now the pilot can perceive the mirror and projector as a mirror and projector. For the BITV, there is no circumstance under which he can perceive the probe as a probe. There may well have to be superluminal connections of some sort with the state of the probe and the computer driving it but there are no circumstances whereby the BITV can become veridically aware of these objects. It’s not an illusion because it cannot be shattered.

So the exact same simulation as the BIV but with your brain safely in your skull, the image sent to you by 3D goggles and your feedback registered by some kind of total immersion body suit (let's imagine one much better than we can actually build today) would merely be an illusion - we would be correctly perceiving the world around us. The fact that our physical surroundings were deliberately set up to give an appearance that did not reflect their true reality is not significant. We still appear to be correctly perceiving a real world that is presented to us.

But, the moment we bypass the sense organs, say, connect wires to the optic nerve rather than shine light onto the retina, the situation has suddenly changed. We are now, supposedly, perceiving something unreal. That doesn't seem defensible, to me. What is so special about sense organs? It is not as if anyone is suggesting that they are conscious, that they are anything other than essentially mechanical transducers of environmental stimuli into electrical nerve signals. For example, in the future we may be able replace damaged or lost eyes with artificial ones, devices that transduce optical signals to electrical signals which are sent down the optic nerve. Would the scenario change in any important way if we had someone who had artificial eyes wearing the 3D goggles? Surely we must say that he is merely experiencing an illusion, that he is correctly perceiving the image presented to him by the 3D goggles, in the same way that he correctly perceives the world around him in his everyday life. His eyes don't have to be made of biological material to perform their function in exactly the same way that ours do.

But if you accept this then we now have a scenario where the whole chain from the computer to the optic nerve is artificial, but we still believe the subject is perceiving an external, real world. How is this different from the perception of a supposedly unreal world in the case of the BIV (or even brain in the skull with wires attached)?

It seems that on your view, for visual perception to be perception of something real there needs to be a point in the chain of causation where light signals, corresponding to some kind of viewable image exist (potentially viewable by a human eye, that is). This is the only difference between the two cases - in the case of the BIV there are no light-emitting 3D goggles, it's electrical signals all the way from the computer to the brain. So, we can make the BIV perceive "real" objects simply by attatching the prosthetic eyes and 3D goggles (what a weird image) and hooking up the stimulus to the goggles rather than the optic nerve, which sems a little too easy. It is, after all, perceiving an identical virtual world in both cases.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Okay, so, reversing our previous decision, we say that direct realism requires a "direct connection" between the object and my internal experience of it; no complex causal sequence is allowed. From this, we conclude that indirect realism becomes much more reasonable, since it no longer requires a movie and homunculus in the brain, but merely a simple causal sequence. After all, direct and indirect realism exhaust all the possibilities.

Prediction: This isn't the final word.

Exactly. The QM connections provide a direct link to the external object. Penrose provides the missing clarification.

Not even close. Penrose is proposing an ensemble of tubulin molecules in a superimposed quantum state. The wave collapse triggers some unspecified "unit of consciousness" to stream into my brain. The wave collapse acts as a portal of some sort. But in order to have direct realism, the ensemble has to include the chair. In fact, it has to include all the objects involved in my perception, including my brain. And it has to account for all the other people looking at the chair at the same time, along with the cat and the mosquito. But some of these objects don't have tubulin, so it's more complicated then some sort of "tubulin coherency wave."

Penrose may be right, but he's got an awful long way to go to provide "clarification." So far, it's a god of the gaps argument.

~~ Paul