Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

Then you must reject direct realism.

I suppose so... I don't know exactly what 'direct realism' is supposed to mean. For that matter, I don't know what 'indirect realism' is supposed to mean, either. YOU certainly aren't making matters clear.
 
Well, let's hear these 'reasons'. I mean, other than vague ponderings by people who have no idea what 'quantum entanglement' actually means.

You mean apart from the person who discovered it, whose position on quantum mechanics I am currently defending? :oldroll:

Between them, David Bohm and John Bell are responsible for the theories now known as "quantum entanglement". Presumably, they had some idea what they were talking about.


What's the point of evolving senses, which perceive through a billiard-ball chain of events, if there's a direct method of sensing things? That makes no sense.

I just told you, BOTH causal factor are required.
 
You mean apart from the person who discovered it, whose position on quantum mechanics I am currently defending? :oldroll:

Between them, David Bohm and John Bell are responsible for the theories now known as "quantum entanglement". Presumably, they had some idea what they were talking about.

No reasons, then? Curious. Or are you simply unwilling to put forth those reasons?

Since it's already been pretty well universally accepted that quantum entanglement could not be used for data transmission, I wonder where such reasoning comes from.

I just told you, BOTH causal factor are required.

And I just asked you, WHY? Sensory-only sensation appears to work just fine; why invoke an additional, unnecessary 'direct-connect' bit of nonsense into it?

Oh, and just out of curiosity - what is it that the entanglement interacts with when we watch television or a movie, or view objects through a telescope or a computer imaging device? Indeed, what's the difference if the entanglement is there or not?

Meanwhile, a direct-connect form of sensory input would have vastly greater advantages over standard sensation, if it existed... In fact, I highly suspect if such a sensory system DID exist, we'd all know about it already.

Another question, out of curiosity: when a camera captures an image on film, is there some quantum-connect apparatus at work? Or does the film sense the image only indirectly? Would that be supporting a theory of both direct and indirect realism, then?
 
OK,

I think it is time to lay to rest once and for all a widely peddled myth about QM and consciousness. That myth is that the only people who think there is a connection between QM and consciousness are a bunch of new-age weirdos. The truth is that there has always been a connection between QM and consciousness and it came (and continues to come) straight from the physicists themselves. That includes not only Schroedinger, but Heisenberg, James Jeans, Planck and in particular Arthur Eddington. The same theme was later taken up by Bohm and Bell and most recently by Roger Penrose. Yes, some new-age people take their ideas and turn them into all sorts of theories about all sorts of things. That does not mean there is no connection between QM and consciousness. It just seems a bit ironic to me when I hear people saying quite confidently "There is no reason to believe there is a link between QM and consciousness." when those people usually have no idea what was written on the subject of ontology by the quantum physicists themselves.

Geoff
 
No reasons, then? Curious. Or are you simply unwilling to put forth those reasons?

Since it's already been pretty well universally accepted that quantum entanglement could not be used for data transmission, I wonder where such reasoning comes from.

No, it can't be used for data transmission by us. But it nevertheless makes sure everything "adds up properly", and what we are discussing now is of a similar theme.

And I just asked you, WHY? Sensory-only sensation appears to work just fine; why invoke an additional, unnecessary 'direct-connect' bit of nonsense into it?

In order to simultaneously explain why QM sounds weird and defend direct realism.


Oh, and just out of curiosity - what is it that the entanglement interacts with when we watch television or a movie, or view objects through a telescope or a computer imaging device?

The TV, rather obviously.

Indeed, what's the difference if the entanglement is there or not?

There will be a different brain state at the quantum level. Whether this leads to a different phenomenological state is unanswerable. We'd have to actually put a brain in a vat and ask it if the hallucinations felt real.

Meanwhile, a direct-connect form of sensory input would have vastly greater advantages over standard sensation, if it existed... In fact, I highly suspect if such a sensory system DID exist, we'd all know about it already.

I am not suggesting this as a mechanism for ESP.

Another question, out of curiosity: when a camera captures an image on film, is there some quantum-connect apparatus at work?

Cameras are not conscious.

Or does the film sense the image only indirectly? Would that be supporting a theory of both direct and indirect realism, then?

Cameras do not have objects of perception.
 
QM relates what "the world" does, and we are, in the deepest sense, inmerse in that world, part of it, whatever. Of course QM, and some mechanics, and electronics, and even other disciplines are related to us.

What is nonsense is to atribute the "consciousness act" to some strange, undefined, badly understood quantum theories. No wait. What is wrong is to asume that now "consciousness" has been explained. We are FAR from that moment.
 
No, it can't be used for data transmission by us. But it nevertheless makes sure everything "adds up properly", and what we are discussing now is of a similar theme.

Pretty vague.. can you elaborate?

In order to simultaneously explain why QM sounds weird and defend direct realism.

You don't need to explain that QM sounds weird. Even the physicists say that much.

The only thing you really need to defend direct realism is a discussion of the relevant research which shows shared ontology of sensory information, hallucinations, et. al. "Fatal for direct realism", I believe was the term used.

The TV, rather obviously.

Oh, so you don't perceive what goes on on the screen? Gee, those look like pretty real people to me.

There will be a different brain state at the quantum level. Whether this leads to a different phenomenological state is unanswerable. We'd have to actually put a brain in a vat and ask it if the hallucinations felt real.

It's an interesting hypothesis. Would make for interesting research.

I am not suggesting this as a mechanism for ESP.

Direct sensation without a causal chain of interaction... sure sounds psychic to me. I guarantee others (IAN) will take what you say as suggesting a mechanism for ESP.

Cameras are not conscious.

What does consciousness have to do with perception?

Cameras do not have objects of perception.

But photographs do have objects of perception... what a strange state!

After having just read a bit about direct realism, I have to wonder why anyone would BOTHER with it. It's pretty ludicrous. I'd say it's easier tackling the 'hidden homonculus' problem than trying to posit quantum entanglement senses and attempting to translate such senses in terms of illusions, images, etc.
 
Pretty vague.. can you elaborate?

Yes. When two particles are entangled the laws of QM intervene to make sure certain combinations of outcomes cannot occur. Penrose is proposing something similar governing the relationship between brains and percieved objects.

Oh, so you don't perceive what goes on on the screen? Gee, those look like pretty real people to me.

Really? They look like images on a screen to me.

Direct sensation without a causal chain of interaction... sure sounds psychic to me. I guarantee others (IAN) will take what you say as suggesting a mechanism for ESP.

No more psychic that quantum entanglement.

What does consciousness have to do with perception?

That is a very odd question. Seems pretty obvious to me.

But photographs do have objects of perception... what a strange state!

"What it is like to be a photograph?" No. I don't think so.

After having just read a bit about direct realism, I have to wonder why anyone would BOTHER with it. It's pretty ludicrous. I'd say it's easier tackling the 'hidden homonculus' problem than trying to posit quantum entanglement senses and attempting to translate such senses in terms of illusions, images, etc.

Many people have abandoned direct realism. The trouble is that indirect realism is as incoherent as reductive materialism, for the same reasons.
 
Hameroff explains it better:

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/

I spent twenty years studying how computer-like structures called microtubules inside neurons and other cells could process information related to consciousness. But when I read The emperor’s new mind by Sir Roger Penrose in 1991 I realized that consciousness may be a specific process on the edge between the quantum and classical worlds. Roger and I teamed up to develop a theory of consciousness based on quantum computation in microtubules within neurons. Roger’s mechanism for an objective threshold for quantum state reduction connects us to the most basic, “funda-mental” level of the universe at the Planck scale, and is called objective reduction (OR). Our suggestion for biological feedback to microtubule quantum states is orchestration (Orch), hence our model is called orchestrated objective reduction, Orch OR.

Consciousness can be viewed as the point where the quantum and classical worlds meet - which is exactly what schroedinger was trying to explain.
 
Yes. When two particles are entangled the laws of QM intervene to make sure certain combinations of outcomes cannot occur. Penrose is proposing something similar governing the relationship between brains and percieved objects.

He should win the million then, shouldn't he, if there is a quantum connection between brains and perceived objects that does anything?

I'm not saying I know this claim to be false, but if it means anything then it's testable. Show us the test results and we will have to take this seriously.

Many people have abandoned direct realism. The trouble is that indirect realism is as incoherent as reductive materialism, for the same reasons.

You mean it's incoherent if you have presupposed the existence of an immaterial woo-woo mind thingie? I don't follow the chain of reasoning that gets you to that conclusion, because you haven't explained the distinction between direct and indirect realism properly yet, but if that's the only problem indirect realism has then it must be in good shape.
 
Yes. When two particles are entangled the laws of QM intervene to make sure certain combinations of outcomes cannot occur. Penrose is proposing something similar governing the relationship between brains and percieved objects.

Anthropomorphisizing those laws just a bit, eh?

Rather, certain combinations of outcomes cannot occur, and the laws of QM describe this. That's no different from how the Newtonian mechanical laws say certain things cannot happen, really.

Really? They look like images on a screen to me.

You know, I never see the screen, even when the TV is off? I see empty space when it's off, and objects when it's on. Though, of course, it lacks three dimensions... other than that, those look like objects.

No more psychic that quantum entanglement.

Which isn't psychic at all, nor is it particularly strange, really...

That is a very odd question. Seems pretty obvious to me.

Are you claiming that consciousness is absolutely required for perception? I suppose that depends on your definitions of perception. And of consciousness. Since I assume that machines may also be conscious, I could conditionally agree, depending on the definition of perception.

"What it is like to be a photograph?" No. I don't think so.

So you see no objects at all when you look at a photograph, or a painting? What are they of, then, to you?

Many people have abandoned direct realism. The trouble is that indirect realism is as incoherent as reductive materialism, for the same reasons.

So far, I see little wrong with reductive materialism as it currently stands, save a general unwillingness to put forth ideas about things not currently known. As for indirect realism, it's just dualism in a pretty pink dress, really. So neither direct nor indirect realism are suitable.

And before you cry that it's either 'one or the other', remember that these viewpoints are not 100% diametrically opposed viewpoints. Neither are they mutually exclusive points of view. Blame language, but 'direct realism' and 'indirect realism' are both incoherent. Meanwhile, 'realism' refers to another incoherent theory altogether, while 'non-realism' is yet another incoherent theory.

It's amazing, really, that people can talk about black, white, non-black, etc. and never once describe either black or white... :)

Direct realism suffers because hallucinations, illusions, and artificially stimulated images are equally real to the perceiving brain as observations of real things, and we cannot in any way guarantee we are not BIVs ourselves. Indirect realism suffers because it posits a homonculus, a 'ghost in the machine', to observe the representations. Neither view is satisfactory, and quantum mechanics isn't going to rescue either one (both are currently being defended, unsuccessfully, using QM, btw).

Just goes to show - philosophers talk a lot but really say very little.
 
After carefully reading the Wikipedia entries (for whatever they're worth) on the subject of perception, I have to say I follow Skepticism. We just can't know what we're perceiving with absolute certainty. We can only make a 'best guess' and work with what we have.

It's safe enough (and necessary) to assume that what we perceive is as real as any believer in naive realism supposes; but we should keep in the (far) back of our mind that everything may or may NOT be what it seems.
 
Interesting thought... Geoff, please address each of the following in terms of the theory of perception you wish to propose:

binding, dreams, imaginings, hallucinations, illusions, the resolution of binocular rivalry, the resolution of multistable perception, the modelling of motion that allows us to watch TV, the sensations that result from direct brain stimulation, the update of the mental image by saccades of the eyes and the referral of events backwards in time

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_perception

Apparently, these are things compatible to indirect realism, which are either not addressed by direct realism, or redefined out of existence by direct realism.
 
OK,

I think it is time to lay to rest once and for all a widely peddled myth about QM and consciousness. That myth is that the only people who think there is a connection between QM and consciousness are a bunch of new-age weirdos. The truth is that there has always been a connection between QM and consciousness and it came (and continues to come) straight from the physicists themselves. That includes not only Schroedinger, but Heisenberg, James Jeans, Planck and in particular Arthur Eddington. The same theme was later taken up by Bohm and Bell and most recently by Roger Penrose. Yes, some new-age people take their ideas and turn them into all sorts of theories about all sorts of things. That does not mean there is no connection between QM and consciousness. It just seems a bit ironic to me when I hear people saying quite confidently "There is no reason to believe there is a link between QM and consciousness." when those people usually have no idea what was written on the subject of ontology by the quantum physicists themselves.

Geoff
So...anything by neurologists? Physiopsychologists? Neurophysiologists? Basically, anyone whose area of expertise includes functioning human brains? Physicists are wonderful in their areas of expertise, but physicists out of their area are ... human. Worse, "when all you have is a hammer..." applies to QM too. (This guy is a physicist...) Sorry, Geoff, but these people are the wrong experts.
 
Geoff, a few questions:

I still don't know what it means to directly perceive a chair. If I directly perceive a chair, is it possible to think it's a table?

What actually happens in the brain when we perceive something through quantum entanglement? Is it impossible to reproduce that same response with a different stimulus?
 
Rather, certain combinations of outcomes cannot occur, and the laws of QM describe this. That's no different from how the Newtonian mechanical laws say certain things cannot happen, really.

Apart from that the connection is direct.

Which isn't psychic at all, nor is it particularly strange, really...

So why be worried about it?

Are you claiming that consciousness is absolutely required for perception? I suppose that depends on your definitions of perception. And of consciousness. Since I assume that machines may also be conscious, I could conditionally agree, depending on the definition of perception.

If my theory was correct, the only way to build a concious machine would be to replicate whatever it is about brain tissue which allows these connections.
 
After carefully reading the Wikipedia entries (for whatever they're worth) on the subject of perception, I have to say I follow Skepticism. We just can't know what we're perceiving with absolute certainty. We can only make a 'best guess' and work with what we have.

It's safe enough (and necessary) to assume that what we perceive is as real as any believer in naive realism supposes; but we should keep in the (far) back of our mind that everything may or may NOT be what it seems.

Unless you are a philosopher, in which case you must bring it to the front of your mind.
 
Interesting thought... Geoff, please address each of the following in terms of the theory of perception you wish to propose:

.

Zaay, I have written quite extensively on some of these subjects. I am aware of all of them. But I do not have the time to investigate all of them right now. Direct realism can be defended against all these problems. My essay dealt with the two toughest problems - hallucination and illusion.

Most of the (other) problems with direct realism are rebutted here:

http://www.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/DR_web.pdf

Le Morvan provides good rebuttals of everything but the argument from hallucination. At that point his arguments fail.
 
Last edited:
So...anything by neurologists? Physiopsychologists? Neurophysiologists? Basically, anyone whose area of expertise includes functioning human brains? Physicists are wonderful in their areas of expertise, but physicists out of their area are ... human. Worse, "when all you have is a hammer..." applies to QM too. (This guy is a physicist...) Sorry, Geoff, but these people are the wrong experts.

I don't agree. Their position is the same as mind - that the brain experts have got their metaphysics confused.
 

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom