Yes. When two particles are entangled the laws of QM intervene to make sure certain combinations of outcomes cannot occur. Penrose is proposing something similar governing the relationship between brains and percieved objects.
Anthropomorphisizing those laws just a bit, eh?
Rather, certain combinations of outcomes cannot occur, and the laws of QM describe this. That's no different from how the Newtonian mechanical laws say certain things cannot happen, really.
Really? They look like images on a screen to me.
You know, I never see the screen, even when the TV is off? I see empty space when it's off, and objects when it's on. Though, of course, it lacks three dimensions... other than that, those look like objects.
No more psychic that quantum entanglement.
Which isn't psychic at all, nor is it particularly strange, really...
That is a very odd question. Seems pretty obvious to me.
Are you claiming that consciousness is absolutely required for perception? I suppose that depends on your definitions of perception. And of consciousness. Since I assume that machines may also be conscious, I could conditionally agree, depending on the definition of perception.
"What it is like to be a photograph?" No. I don't think so.
So you see no objects at all when you look at a photograph, or a painting? What are they of, then, to you?
Many people have abandoned direct realism. The trouble is that indirect realism is as incoherent as reductive materialism, for the same reasons.
So far, I see little wrong with reductive materialism as it currently stands, save a general unwillingness to put forth ideas about things not currently known. As for indirect realism, it's just dualism in a pretty pink dress, really. So neither direct nor indirect realism are suitable.
And before you cry that it's either 'one or the other', remember that these viewpoints are not 100% diametrically opposed viewpoints. Neither are they mutually exclusive points of view. Blame language, but 'direct realism' and 'indirect realism' are both incoherent. Meanwhile, 'realism' refers to another incoherent theory altogether, while 'non-realism' is yet another incoherent theory.
It's amazing, really, that people can talk about black, white, non-black, etc. and never once describe either black or white...
Direct realism suffers because hallucinations, illusions, and artificially stimulated images are equally real to the perceiving brain as observations of real things, and we cannot in any way guarantee we are not BIVs ourselves. Indirect realism suffers because it posits a homonculus, a 'ghost in the machine', to observe the representations. Neither view is satisfactory, and quantum mechanics isn't going to rescue either one (both are currently being defended, unsuccessfully, using QM, btw).
Just goes to show - philosophers talk a lot but really say very little.