Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

All righty then. I was asking whether we're also providing the BIV with non-neural inputs. For example, there is evidence that brain temperature affects circadian rhythm. We need to be careful to provide all inputs.

Just making sure the experimental setup is correct.

~~ Paul

 

[Z]

I think I prefer direct representationalism, myself. That is, we are directly, through complex causal chains, aware of environmental stimuli, but without requiring a 'watcher within' - it's simply directly there. I say direct representationalism, because what we perceive is merely part of the whole picture, of course. Since we don't have senses capable of detecting density, or non-visible light, or magnetism, we don't see the whole picture... only a small part of it.

We aren't directly aware of real things in the way Geoff seems to think is vitally necessary. But through confirmation via communication, we can be reasonably sure of the reality of things which we perceive.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Paul and all.....

You all seem to have arrived at an agreement that direct realism is either very hard or completely impossible to defend. In which case the real problem is the fact that indirect realism is absolutely impossible to defend. If we can only ever be indirectly aware of external reality then what right do we have to consider external reality to be anything like our mere representations? Indirect realism is hopeless.

I keep answering this and you keep ignoring it.

Firstly, is this a problem if we are happy to accept 99.999...9% certainty that our perceptions line up with an external reality, as opposed to absolute certainty?

Secondly, how are you going to get to 100% certainty in your proposed alternative system if it is based on quantum mechanics, which is a theory based upon a finite number of observations, which means we can never have 100% certainty in its correctness?

 

[Z]

I keep answering this and you keep ignoring it.

Firstly, is this a problem if we are happy to accept 99.999...9% certainty that our perceptions line up with an external reality, as opposed to absolute certainty?

Secondly, how are you going to get to 100% certainty in your proposed alternative system if it is based on quantum mechanics, which is a theory based upon a finite number of observations, which means we can never have 100% certainty in its correctness?

For that matter, how do we even observe quantum entanglement in the first place? We have some method for actually perceiving matter at the sub-atomic level, I know, but does that tell us which two bits are entangled, and how they've reacted during contact, etc?

I mean, c'mon, man, you're claiming that, since the accepted physicalist causal chain from object to subject isn't good enough for you, that we have to ADD a faintly possible mechanism which would still be another causal sensory chain? After all, in theory, isn't there a great chance that every particle in the entire universe is entangled? Isn't this more or less exactly what's been posited as (IIRC) Quantum Unification?

So, once again, how could we sense ANYTHING in this fashion?

Read the literature. Even the stuff that might support your worldview have one fatal flaw: EVERY particle is entangled. EVERY particle reacts the same. It's like flooding a scene with an over-bright white light straight into your eyes and asking us to use that light to differentiate between several objects a long, long way away. (Ever had a flashlight in the eyes? Hard to see who's holding it) Quantum entanglement can't be used for data transmission for precisely this reason... and therefore cannot be used for sensation (or even verification).

 

[Roboramma]

That's another variation on the argument against direct realism. But when I perceive a bent stick which is straight I am still percieving a stick; it just looks bent.

What about when I see a fire off in the distance through the trees, and later realise that I'm looking at a moonrise through the branches (later as in after talking to someone else about it and asking "What is that?")

What was the object of perception?

What if I look at a chair and think I'm seeing a person? What is the object of perception in that case?

What am I perceiving when I'm directly perceiving an object?
Is it the sense data? Is it my brain's interpretation of the object? Is it the physical object itself?
If the latter, how can I be mistaken about it if I'm directly perceiving it?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What about when I see a fire off in the distance through the trees, and later realise that I'm looking at a moonrise through the branches (later as in after talking to someone else about it and asking "What is that?")

What was the object of perception?

The moon.

What if I look at a chair and think I'm seeing a person? What is the object of perception in that case?

A chair.

What am I perceiving when I'm directly perceiving an object?
Is it the sense data? Is it my brain's interpretation of the object? Is it the physical object itself?
If the latter, how can I be mistaken about it if I'm directly perceiving it?

Many have asked this. Personally I see no reason why direct realism forbids people to be mistaken about what they've seen.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But through confirmation via communication, we can be reasonably sure of the reality of things which we perceive.

Indirect realism doesn't make sense. If we are only indirectly aware of something we have no way at all of knowing the true nature of the thing itself. It's not realism. That is not saying there is no external reality. But it *is* saying that external reality isn't made of the objects of perception.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Indirect realism doesn't make sense. If we are only indirectly aware of something we have no way at all of knowing the true nature of the thing itself. It's not realism. That is not saying there is no external reality. But it *is* saying that external reality isn't made of the objects of perception.

You have no way of knowing the true nature of the thing by collapse of quantum entanglement with it, either. To do so, you have to go way out on a limb and postulate all sorts of stuff that has to do with interpretation of quantum mechanics, not with the mathematics itself. How do you obtain information about the chair by collapse of entanglement with it?

Note that Penrose says nothing about entanglement with the chair. He is only using QM to get some baseline consciousness. Brain function does the rest.

~~ Paul

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Indirect realism doesn't make sense. If we are only indirectly aware of something we have no way at all of knowing the true nature of the thing itself.

That's only a problem if you think we must somehow be entitled to directly sense "the true nature of the thing itself". Maybe it is just the case that we can never directly know the true nature of the thing itself.

Personally I think that the very idea of a "true nature", beyond what can be detected, is unfalsifiable and therefore meaningless.

It's not realism. That is not saying there is no external reality. But it *is* saying that external reality isn't made of the objects of perception.

It certainly looks like realism to me, if the theory claims that it is 99.999...9% certain that reality corresponds to what we perceive. If it isn't realism then I cannot imagine a sensible theory which could be called realism.

 

[Roboramma]

A chair.

But I didn't percieve a chair, I percieved a person. That was as clear to me as that I'm percieving a monitor right now.
If I know that I am percieving a monitor, then I knew that I was percieving a person.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But I didn't percieve a chair, I percieved a person. That was as clear to me as that I'm percieving a monitor right now.
If I know that I am percieving a monitor, then I knew that I was percieving a person.

Then for you, direct realism cannot be defended. But since indirect realism cannot be defended either, you are left with anti-realism.

 

[Roboramma]

Then for you, direct realism cannot be defended. But since indirect realism cannot be defended either, you are left with anti-realism.

You haven't explained what indirect realism is, or why it can't be defended.

So forgive me for not immediately believing you when you say those are the only choises or that indirect realism is indefensible.

By the way, how is it possible for you to say, "I percieve a monitor" with certainty when it's also posible to believe you are percieving a monitor and later find that it was something else completely?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You haven't explained what indirect realism is, or why it can't be defended.

I've done that about fifteen times so far. Indirect or representational realism claims that we are indirectly aware of objects in an external world. In other words what we are directly aware of is a representation - the objects we perceive are mere representations of "real objects". The problem here is that we are claiming that "the world in itself" is the same as our representations. But why should the world-in-itself be anything like the representations of that world in the mind of a human? There's two problems actually - the first is it is inherently dualistic and the second is that if perception is indirect then we have no way of knowing what it is we are representing. We've got the representations mixed up with the things-in-themselves.

By the way, how is it possible for you to say, "I percieve a monitor" with certainty when it's also posible to believe you are percieving a monitor and later find that it was something else completely?

Provided what I was actually perceiving was an object in the external world it doesn't matter that I was wrong about the precise nature of that object.

 

[Upchurch]

I don't agree. Their position is the same as mind - that the brain experts have got their metaphysics confused.

Ah, cherry picking arguments from inappropriate authorities, then?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I've done that about fifteen times so far. Indirect or representational realism claims that we are indirectly aware of objects in an external world. In other words what we are directly aware of is a representation - the objects we perceive are mere representations of "real objects".

Except that we have already seen that some people believe that direct realism is perfectly compatible with perception via a long chain of causal links, each of which is in some sense a mere representation of the last. So either something is wrong with the definitions of direct realism we have seen or something is wrong with this definition of indirect realism.

The problem here is that we are claiming that "the world in itself" is the same as our representations.

I don't think we are. I think we are claiming that we are 99.999...9% certain that the world lines up with our perceptions, except for the times when we are dreaming, hallucinating, confronted with an optical illusion, being electrically stimulated in a vat or otherwise perceiving under abnormal circumstances.

But why should the world-in-itself be anything like the representations of that world in the mind of a human?

Why? Well, if you're asking why the world-in-itself closely corresponds to our sense impressions, the best answer is that organisms whose senses gave them data that was not anything like the world-in-itself would have gotten eaten or fallen off a cliff.

A better question is if the world-in-itself is anything like what we perceive, and I think we all act like that is 99.999...9% certain to be true.

There's two problems actually - the first is it is inherently dualistic

No.

and the second is that if perception is indirect then we have no way of knowing what it is we are representing.

Not for certain, no. So?

We've got the representations mixed up with the things-in-themselves.

No.

Provided what I was actually perceiving was an object in the external world it doesn't matter that I was wrong about the precise nature of that object.

So why did you harp on so about "I perceive a monitor", when what you actually meant was "I experience visual sensation"?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Kevin

I don't think we are. I think we are claiming that we are 99.999...9% certain that the world lines up with our perceptions....

But if our perceptions are only of human-assembled "representations" we have no justification for being 99.99% certain those representations are anything like what really exists. We are 0% certain of this. We have no idea what "reality in itself" is like. NONE. All we know is how it appears to us, and it appears to us as a blurry combination of material and mental. If you stopped getting reality-in-itself mixed up with your perceptions of it you would stop trying to explain mind in terms of matter and stop getting stuck in logical loops.

This is the whole point in Kant's philosophy. Noumena is noumena - NOT physical.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Indirect realism doesn't make sense. If we are only indirectly aware of something we have no way at all of knowing the true nature of the thing itself. It's not realism. That is not saying there is no external reality. But it *is* saying that external reality isn't made of the objects of perception.

We can't know the thing in itself. That sounds Kantian, and I thought you were Kant's admirer.

Why do you believe that it is not realism, if it accounts for an objective reality beyond observers? The name says it, its "indirect realism" but realism nevertheless.

Well, if the "objects of perception" are representations, it is assumed that they are representations of "the real thing". What does this have to do with "doesnt make sense"?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But if our perceptions are only of human-assembled "representations" we have no justification for being 99.99% certain those representations are anything like what really exists. We are 0% certain of this. We have no idea what "reality in itself" is like. NONE. All we know is how it appears to us, and it appears to us as a blurry combination of material and mental. If you stopped getting reality-in-itself mixed up with your perceptions of it you would stop trying to explain mind in terms of matter and stop getting stuck in logical loops.

But why does any of this matter? As Kevin said, our perceptions line up with the real nature of things well enough for us to survive, thrive, do science, write novels, fall in love, and so forth. In other words, our epistemological interaction with the world seems to work just fine. The actual ontology of the world is unknowable, but what practical difference does that make?

No one is mixing reality-in-itself with our perceptions. We all know there is ontology and epistemology.

And how does QM solve the problem any better than looking, poking, or smelling?

~~ Paul

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

This is the whole point in Kant's philosophy. Noumena is noumena - NOT physical.

And yet, Noumena, with a name, is physical. Taoism

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

And how does QM solve the problem any better than looking, poking, or smelling?

Ahhh a Zen Master in the making!!