Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, a few questions:

I still don't know what it means to directly perceive a chair. If I directly perceive a chair, is it possible to think it's a table?

Yes. Your question is the main thrust of the argument from illusion against direct realism.

From my essay:

The argument from illusion

Let’s suppose that instead of the BITV we have a person wearing perfect 3D goggles and is connected to an artificial reality, or a trainee pilot in a flight simulator. The pilot looks out of the cockpit and is convinced he is seeing London from 30,000 ft when what he is actually looking at is a projected reflection in a curved mirror about six feet in front of him. This would be the argument from illusion instead of the argument from hallucination, and with respect to direct realism it suffers from the same flaw: that it doesn’t matter for direct realism whether or not you perceive something correctly or not. Seeing a bent stick when the actual stick is straight does not deny that you are seeing a real object in the real world. You perceive a stick, it looks bent. Likewise, you can mistake a mirror for London from the air, but this does not mean you do not directly perceive an object in the real world. You perceive a mirror which looks like London. The only difference is the complexity of the illusion and the level of difference between what the subject thinks he perceives and what he actually perceives. In the argument I have given what matters is not the subject’s belief about what he is seeing but instead the true source of the light – the actual object being perceived, and involved in the orchestrated collapse. One could object to this by claiming that even the brain in the vat (unlike the lucid dreamer) really does perceive something in the world – in this case it is the probe in its optic nerve. Isn’t this just an even more sophisticated illusion than the simulator? I don’t think so. The pilot veridically perceives a mirror/projector, even though he believes it to be something quite different, and there are superluminal connections between the mirror/projector and the pilot’s brain. Let’s say the illusion is shattered by a maintenance engineer walking between the pilot and the mirror. Now the pilot can perceive the mirror and projector as a mirror and projector. For the BITV, there is no circumstance under which he can perceive the probe as a probe. There may well have to be superluminal connections of some sort with the state of the probe and the computer driving it but there are no circumstances whereby the BITV can become veridically aware of these objects. It’s not an illusion because it cannot be shattered. The same would apply to lucid dreams.

The only way there can be light arriving at ones eyes which result in a hallucination and not an illusion is if the light came from nowhere at all – it just appeared out of thin air. But that would describe a situation to which the argument from QM I have given still applies (the same brain state can’t be produced), with the additional complication of being physically impossible for a second reason. Light cannot come from nowhere.

What actually happens in the brain when we perceive something through quantum entanglement?

Unknown. I need somebody like Stuart Hameroff to answer that one.

Is it impossible to reproduce that same response with a different stimulus?

My defence of direct realism depends on answering no to that question.

So my conclusion is that all descriptions of hallucinations (where this means “experiences of objects which are indistinguishable from those occurring during veridical perception but concern completely non-existent objects”) are descriptions of situations which cannot occur, either because the correct neural state in unachievable, and thus no identical experience occurs, or because they stipulate physically impossible conditions of one sort or another.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

ZD

I rushed that last post....

What you listed was a load of arguments given by indirect realists against direct realism. I already provided a knock-down rejection indirect realism on the grounds that if perception is indirect then we have no way of knowing what it is we are indirectly percieving. It's very unlikely to be the same things as our representation.

So how would my theory deal with your list?

binding - this is dealt with by Penrose/Hameroff. Orch-OR accounts for the binding problem. Neutral monism solves the binding problem because its monistic and non-physicalist.

dreams, imaginings - are phenomenologically different to veridical perception

hallucinations, illusions - dealth with in my essay,

the resolution of binocular rivalry, the resolution of multistable perception, the modelling of motion that allows us to watch TV, the sensations that result from direct brain stimulation, - these I have not even thought about

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Are you claiming that consciousness is absolutely required for perception? I suppose that depends on your definitions of perception. And of consciousness. Since I assume that machines may also be conscious, I could conditionally agree, depending on the definition of perception.

We know that's not the case, as with blindsight. Unless, of course, perception is defined to mean conscious perception.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So how would my theory deal with your list?

binding - this is dealt with by Penrose/Hameroff. Orch-OR accounts for the binding problem. Neutral monism solves the binding problem because its monistic and non-physicalist.

dreams, imaginings - are phenomenologically different to veridical perception

hallucinations, illusions - dealth with in my essay,

the resolution of binocular rivalry, the resolution of multistable perception, the modelling of motion that allows us to watch TV, the sensations that result from direct brain stimulation, - these I have not even thought about

I don't understand the goal of the defense of direct realism. Is it to be able to show that a person can tell he's having a direct experience by metaphysical analysis alone? The problem disappears once we realize there is a complex pathway from senses to brain, but apparently that's not considered a solution to the problem.

~~ Paul

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

That's why I asked Geoff to explain what he meant by the two positions again, paying specific mind to the role of the homonculus if any is assumed.

I suspect Geoff is pulling one of his trademark fast ones in his supposed disproof of indirect realism, but not being completely clear on what indirect realism is supposed to be to Geoff I cannot say for sure.

Similarly, I could look at on-line dictionaries of philosophy for what other people think direct and indirect realism are, but given Geoff's track record I think it's reasonably likely he is using assumptions or definitions that we won't find in such resources.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't understand the goal of the defense of direct realism.

You are in a hall of mirrors. Nothing is what it seems to be.

A.D.Smith spent the entire term attacking direct realism. But he wrote a book defending it. You might well have expected somebody like me to attack it too, but here I am also defending it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Kevin,

People who defend indirect realism are closet dualists. People who defend reductive materialism are closet dualists. I do not understand what indirect realism is supposed to be claiming. Why assume our "mental representations" should be the same as external reality? In other words - if it's indirect then it isn't realism at all - it's wallpapering over the cracks just like reductive materialism is.

Geoff

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Geoff, you didn't address my question. Note particularly the second sentence:

I don't understand the goal of the defense of direct realism. Is it to be able to show that a person can tell he's having a direct experience by metaphysical analysis alone? The problem disappears once we realize there is a complex pathway from senses to brain, but apparently that's not considered a solution to the problem.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Let's not forget modal realism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_realism

Geoff might enjoy Max Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimate_ensemble

~~ Paul

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Kevin,

People who defend indirect realism are closet dualists.

I will have to take your word for that, because I have no clear idea what you mean by indirect realism and you don't seem interested in explaining it.

People who defend reductive materialism are closet dualists.

Whatever you say, Geoff. I think we established fairly clearly that this "problem" was a result of you assuming dualism to be true, not a problem with reductive materialism as anybody but you defined it.

I think you just got your terms wrong. Reductive materialism never assumed the existence of spooky immaterial stuff, and eliminative materialism never denied the existence of all of the objects of folk-psychological description. Straw on the left and straw on the right.

I do not understand what indirect realism is supposed to be claiming.

That makes two of us. If even you don't understand it, how can you be certain that between direct and indirect realism all possibilities are covered? We keep asking you why various other stories, like long-chain-causal semi-skeptical realism, are not allowed on the table and you have not explained why you think they should not be.

Why assume our "mental representations" should be the same as external reality? In other words - if it's indirect then it isn't realism at all - it's wallpapering over the cracks just like reductive materialism is.

You call it wallpapering over the cracks. I call it the simple fact that we cannot get to 100% certainty of non-tautological claims based on any amount of evidence. 99.999...9% is all that is ever given to us. Complaining that a theory does not give you 100% certainty is as silly as complaining that your car engine is not 100% efficient.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Whatever you say, Geoff. I think we established fairly clearly that this "problem" was a result of you assuming dualism to be true.......

Only in Kevinworld, where it is OK to go round in logical loops like a dog driving itself insane chasing it's own tail.

You made the same error six times. Had I continued posting in that thread you would have made it another six times. Maybe you should learn from your mistakes?

 

[hammegk]

Kevin concludes 99.999=1 ignoring the dualistic remainder; objective idealists conclude 99.999 of things perceived do not, as macro objects "think", +.001 (all the same stuff) =1.

The 99.999% do have their own levels of perception.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, you didn't address my question. Note particularly the second sentence:

I don't understand the goal of the defense of direct realism. Is it to be able to show that a person can tell he's having a direct experience by metaphysical analysis alone?

No. It's much more complicated than that. It is impossible for me to answer this question. There's too much history I'd have to explain.

The problem disappears once we realize there is a complex pathway from senses to brain, but apparently that's not considered a solution to the problem.

It's got nothing to do with the problem.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Only in Kevinworld, where it is OK to go round in logical loops like a dog driving itself insane chasing it's own tail.

You made the same error six times. Had I continued posting in that thread you would have made it another six times. Maybe you should learn from your mistakes?

Why don't you head back to that thread and start answering the host of serious problems with your position there that I, and many others, have presented you with?

If you make a fair showing at that, I'll explain why your "logical loop" argument is, in Mercutio's terms, a pantsload. Deal?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The problem disappears once we realize there is a complex pathway from senses to brain, but apparently that's not considered a solution to the problem.

It's got nothing to do with the problem.

In other words, neurophysiology shall not be allowed to interfere with metaphysics.

Geoff, I just don't get it. Why is there a problem of hallucination, what is the point of solving it, what is the solution, and why can't the solution involve neuroscience?

Why are you being so vague? Are you trying to frustrate all of us, even though we are honestly participating in the conversation?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

In other words, neurophysiology shall not be allowed to interfere with metaphysics.

It can inform metaphysics, but it cannot replace it.

Geoff, I just don't get it. Why is there a problem of hallucination, what is the point of solving it, what is the solution, and why can't the solution involve neuroscience?

The solution can involve neuroscience - and mine does involve tentative neuroscience, disputed though it may be. But there is no way that materialistic neuroscience on it's own can solve this problem - especially not if what you are calling neuroscience involves a presupposition of physicalism. It's the wrong level of description.

Why there is a problem of hallucination is no different to the argument we had in the monster thread. All that has changed is the question has been turned around and attacked from the other end.

Why are you being so vague? Are you trying to frustrate all of us, even though we are honestly participating in the conversation?

~~ Paul

I am not trying to frustrate you - I am trying not to mislead you. This argument is the sharp end of the one that had been played out on this site many times over. I don't think I am being vague. What have I not explained?

 

[hammegk]

In other words, neurophysiology shall not be allowed to interfere with metaphysics.
~~ Paul

You are correct that neurophysiology provide no answers whatsoever on the mind/body problem, cartesian dualism, and metaphysics per se.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

Perhaps this might help:

I am personally defending direct realism because it helps me to communicate my own position. I do not believe the standard defences of direct realism work. I do not believe indirect realism is plausible at all. But I am fairly sure that most of the people on this site would naturally want to defend direct realism if they could - just like they'd want to defend physicalism. But I also knew those people would positively detest my own way of defending that position. So it lays down a challenge: Do you want to defend direct realism? If so, do you like my defence? If not, you'd best try to think of another one.

This is how philosophy is supposed to work. It's intellectual chess. Although I realise it tends to look more like intellectual mud-wrestling at this place.

Geoff

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

The solution can involve neuroscience - and mine does involve tentative neuroscience, disputed though it may be. But there is no way that materialistic neuroscience on it's own can solve this problem - especially not if what you are calling neuroscience involves a presupposition of physicalism. It's the wrong level of description.

What exactly is the problem again?

Why there is a problem of hallucination is no different to the argument we had in the monster thread. All that has changed is the question has been turned around and attacked from the other end.

What exactly is this problem you refer to again?

I am not trying to frustrate you - I am trying not to mislead you. This argument is the sharp end of the one that had been played out on this site many times over. I don't think I am being vague. What have I not explained?

You haven't explained the difference between direct and indirect realism, including the roles homonculi play if any, you have not explained why you think 99.999...9% certainty is a problem, nor have you explained how you plan to get to an alternative position which has 100% certainty. In fact, if you plan on invoking quantum mechanics as a vital component at some point, it being a theory we arrived at from a finite number of observations, I feel very comfortable in saying that your theory is never going to be 100% certain.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The solution can involve neuroscience - and mine does involve tentative neuroscience, disputed though it may be. But there is no way that materialistic neuroscience on it's own can solve this problem - especially not if what you are calling neuroscience involves a presupposition of physicalism. It's the wrong level of description.

Why isn't the problem solved by the fact that there is a complex pathway between the senses and my internal perception of the chair?

You are correct that neurophysiology provide no answers whatsoever on the mind/body problem, cartesian dualism, and metaphysics per se.

It does provide an answer to the problem of hallucination, which means it provides at least one answer to a metaphysical problem. Your "no answers whatsoever" is absurd.

~~ Paul