Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[Q-Source]

In the argument I have given what matters is not the subject’s belief about what he is seeing but instead the true source of the light – the actual object being perceived, and involved in the orchestrated collapse.

I think the point is we can never know the true source of the light. It could be another hologram and so at infinitum.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you confuse the processing of information within that causal chain with indirect realism (formation of percepts through neural processing) and do not allow the causal chain to explain perception, then direct realism is only possible through one other approach -- a homonculus. Does that make sense?

No. It only makes sense if you are a physicalist. The homunculus is implied because you've assumed physicalism. No physicalism --> no homunculus.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wasp,

All your descriptions start with physicalism. Because of this, the only way direct realism can make sense to you is if you add a homonculus. But direct realism and physicalism are not the same thing. If you do not start with the physical description of an empirical causal process then there are other ways of looking at this. We are not supposed to be starting with physicalism assumed. We are starting with the objects of perception. It was your choice to impose a physicalist interpretation on this and the result is you can't see how direct realism could be true without inventing a homonculus.

Geoff

 

[Z]

Some people have argued this. But I am directly aware of a monitor right now. The problem is how I justify my claim it is a real monitor given the BIV argument. The BIV also directly percieves a monitor, but we know it isn't real. So how can I claim the monitor I perceive right now is any different?

You can't - that's the point. You are a BIV, though your vat is considerably different from the one posited in the T.E.

 

[hammegk]

.. There is an object out there. Photons bounce off object and hit retina. Retina sends axons from ganglion cells to lateral geneiculate nucleus, then to occipital cortex, etc.

That constitutes a causal chain of neruons that process visual information.

True under any ontology that accepts science and an objective reality, as does objective idealism as well as physicalism. The question here is what is the ontological basis of that reality.

You will come to different, logical, problems under either scenario.

Does that make sense?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You can't - that's the point. You are a BIV, though your vat is considerably different from the one posited in the T.E.

Yes, this correct, so.....?

 

[Z]

Smith has laid out the structure of the theory, but he needs something outside phenomenology to provide the final piece of the puzzle. Penrose's theory of consciousness is that puzzle piece. By linking QM and consciousness, ----

Sorry, there's no reason to suspect any connection between the brain and the objects being perceived via quantum entanglement. You've just been snagged by Woo Terminology 101. After all, if this were true, then why bother evolving senses at all?

 

[Z]

For Q-source, Paul and all

You all seem to be saying "But what could you mean by real?" or "What could you mean by direct?" But that is exactly the problem. That is the question you are supposed to be answering. I've given you my answer - and it's an argument from quantum mechanics.

How can I claim this monitor in front of me is real? My answer is that there are Penrose-style psycho-physical laws in play and these guarantee that the monitor is real. Without them, I'm no different to the BIV. If you are going to reject my solution, you have to find another way to distinguish the obviously non-real objects experienced by the BIV from the objects you are perceiving right now.

Or we can just accept that you have no clue when it comes to QM and the brain, and that there IS no way to distinguish between objects experienced by a BIV and objects we experience in 'reality', if all perceivable qualities and behaviors are the same. In other words, there are no guarantees with perception.

 

[Z]

True under any ontology that accepts science and an objective reality, as does objective idealism as well as physicalism. The question here is what is the ontological basis of that reality.

You will come to different, logical, problems under either scenario.

Does that make sense?

Hammy, you've made more sense in the last week than I've ever imagined possible. Even under objective idealism, there's no real difference between the perception of things in a BIV and a person in 'reality'. Maybe even LESS difference than under materialism...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Sorry, there's no reason to suspect any connection between the brain and the objects being perceived via quantum entanglement.

That's not quite true. There's plenty of reason to suspect such a connection but no proof.

You've just been snagged by Woo Terminology 101. After all, if this were true, then why bother evolving senses at all?

To enhance survival chances. This makes no difference to evolutionary theory at all. You still need to evolve senses. Both causal factors are neccesary.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Or we can just accept that you have no clue when it comes to QM and the brain, and that there IS no way to distinguish between objects experienced by a BIV and objects we experience in 'reality', if all perceivable qualities and behaviors are the same. In other words, there are no guarantees with perception.

Then you must reject direct realism.

 

[chriswl]

But direct realism and physicalism are not the same thing. If you do not start with the physical description of an empirical causal process then there are other ways of looking at this. We are not supposed to be starting with physicalism assumed. We are starting with the objects of perception.

The BIV thought experiment is described in physical terms - physical computers, physical chairs and physical brains. It pre-supposes the existence of a physical world. Only we're not supposed to look too closely at what is physically going on in the brain, on the grounds that Husserl didn't and so this would risk getting the "wrong" answers (i.e. answers different from the approved ones Husserl gives us). Physicalist or not, your phlosophy still has to be compatible with the observed facts of the physical world, including neurology. The facts of neurology challenge your rather simplistic notion of what perception actually is. At best you are describing what perception subjectively feels like, but how can this be the basis for deciding what things in our experience are actually real?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The BIV thought experiment is described in physical terms - physical computers, physical chairs and physical brains. It pre-supposes the existence of a physical world.

But it does not presuppose physicalism. Do you think hammegk lives in a world where there are no physical chairs? You do not presuppose physicalism by giving a physical description any more than you presuppose idealism by giving a mental description.

Only we're not supposed to look too closely at what is physically going on in the brain, on the grounds that Husserl didn't.....

Erm.....what's this got to do with Husserl?

and so this would risk getting the "wrong" answers (i.e. answers different from the approved ones Husserl gives us).

Err....eh?

Physicalist or not, your phlosophy still has to be compatible with the observed facts of the physical world, including neurology.

Yes, it does.

The facts of neurology challenge your rather simplistic notion of what perception actually is.

No, they don't.

At best you are describing what perception subjectively feels like, but how can this be the basis for deciding what things in our experience are actually real?

It must be accounted for, that is all.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

To Chris and Wasp

You are trying to have it both ways. One the one hand you are arguing that neuroscience challenges this metaphysical argument, on the other you are stating that the physical descriptions you are giving say nothing about metaphysics. Your second claim, which is correct, invalidates the first. If the neuroscience says nothing about metaphysics then it cannot invalidate my argument.

Geoff

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

But everybody starts out as a naive realist - which is in effect a claim of direct realism. So the question is "how can we philosophically justify naive realism?" And it's not easy...

As I have stated before, this "naive realism" works, we do not need to mess with things unless we are philosophers (with or without a title). This is why we (as a society) use it all the time.

Now, it is our language the one that carries this implicit "naive realism". This is a point I have been stressing, without apparent aknowledge from your part. You seem to believe (correct me if Im wrong) that language itself do not impose certain assumptions (like "real" monitors in front of "real" us).

Without language, such a frase could not be uttered, and the very concepts that are behind it (naive realism) would be rendered irrelevant.

Now, I continue to note that no one in this forum is willing to accept, much less justify, that naive realism. So why are we discussing the subject??

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The reason why it is relevant is precisely because it constitutes that causal chain and may very well be the end cause. To understand how it works is to understand perception itself potentially. And many of the statements that people make about perception, such as awareness is one particular "thing" or "being" seems to be completely wrong when you examine what we know about brains working and not-working.

(pause)

I hope Ian is reading from time to time, I have pointed this to him everytime and he is completely unable to understand it)

(please continue)

 

[UndercoverElephant]

As I have stated before, this "naive realism" works, we do not need to mess with things unless we are philosophers (with or without a title). This is why we (as a society) use it all the time.

But we are doing philosophy.

Now, it is our language the one that carries this implicit "naive realism". This is a point I have been stressing, without apparent aknowledge from your part. You seem to believe (correct me if Im wrong) that language itself do not impose certain assumptions (like "real" monitors in front of "real" us).

Language is part of it, sure. But it's not that simple. You can't just say "it's a language problem". You have to explain exactly what that language problem actually is.

Without language, such a frase could not be uttered, and the very concepts that are behind it (naive realism) would be rendered irrelevant.

Now, I continue to note that no one in this forum is willing to accept, much less justify, that naive realism. So why are we discussing the subject??

Because we are discussing ways of providing a logically coherent philosophical basis for naive/direct realism.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I'd rather say there is 'world' and the internal/external distinction is the problem. Although I'm not sure how anyone but maybe BDZ will take that.

Yes! When the "external" is confronted (like tackling the "naive realism") the distinction (between internal and external) should be questioned too. It is the conjunction of both "objects" and "observers" what compose the world. They cant be separated. Dualism is a weird idea, but this is no news for the respected members of this forum

Oh, a more extreme way to put it: When the objects dissapear, the subjects are gone too. And Im not talking about we need to be dead for that to happen This is a way to embrace/understand monism that goes beyond thinking about monism.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Language is part of it, sure. But it's not that simple. You can't just say "it's a language problem". You have to explain exactly what that language problem actually is.

Yep, but thats a complex subject. The best way to do it is to stand in a place where language becomes useless. There is such a place, but I guess it is not relevant for the discussion at hand.

Because we are discussing ways of providing a logically coherent philosophical basis for naive/direct realism.

I dont think anyone can do it. Do you? I bet you dont. It is interesting to try, but obviously you want to advance to somewhere else, am I right?

 

[chriswl]

It must be accounted for, that is all.

But you are trying to do more than that. You are starting from what perception subjectively feels like, the way things seem to be ("I see a tree") and then illustrating, by imagining other physical stuff (computers, wires connecting into our brains) how we can be mistaken (there is no chair, just a computer program). You are using a physical fact, the non-existence of a physical chair, to show that direct realism is false.

You think this is important, because you think our subjective sense of perceiving objects is well founded so this result challenges what we seem to know about experience. Which is why you are shortly going to explain how your philosophy rescues us from this conundrum. But we could easily answer that we don't need you to rescue us - we have no problem admitting that our naive notions of what perception is might not fit in with the way the physical world really works. In that case we would revise our definition of what perceoption really is, rather than change our whole view of the world to save some cherished philosophical concept.