Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh yes, it is a real chair, for every account conceivable. If you mean you know is not a real chair in the first place its irrelevant from the point of view of the one who is seeing it. If you mean is "less real" because its configuration is not related to "a real chair" (whatever that means) then you would have to argue in to why is different. In the end, the question is:

What is a "real chair"?

Good question.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Exactly, and you dont need to know anything about "real chairs" in order to be able to say "I perceive a chair".

Correct. But how do you qualify it as real?

Whats the difference between "directly perceive it" and just "perceive it"?

That is what you have got to explain if you are going to defend direct realism.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That is what you have got to explain if you are going to defend direct realism.

Uh, erm, isn't it the job of the inventor(s) of direct realism to explain what they mean by direct?

At the risk of speaking for others, I think many of us have clearly stated that we do not understand what direct realism is. I think it's safe to assume we aren't defending it. Likewise, we aren't defending it against indirect realism. Some of us might be willing to defend a third type of realism, if such a concept were allowed in the conversation.

In summary: It's a hay ride all the way down.

~~ Paul

 

[Q-Source]

(For the third time)


Geoff,

Can you rephrase the question of this thread?:

"Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?"

Do you mean the world as itself? or do you mean the external world that is still not perceived or reachable to be perceived?

 

[Roboramma]

Good question.

It is, and I think you would find the answer very informative.

When I say, I am sitting on a real chair, what am I actually saying about the chair?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Uh, erm, isn't it the job of the inventor(s) of direct realism to explain what they mean by direct?

Anyone who proposes a form of direct realism is going to have explain what they mean by direct, yes. "Direct realism" is a class of theories.

At the risk of speaking for others, I think many of us have clearly stated that we do not understand what direct realism is.

Direct realism is what it say it is! It is any theory that claims that the direct objects of perception are real objects. Precisely what that is supposed to mean, and how you justify it is part of the problem.

I think it's safe to assume we aren't defending it.

No, but I suspect most of you would like to.

Likewise, we aren't defending it against indirect realism. Some of us might be willing to defend a third type of realism, if such a concept were allowed in the conversation.

As I've already explained, any theory of perception you can invent is going to fall into one of these three categories. You are allowed to invent new concepts for perception but there is no logical possibility of inventing a form of realism which is neither direct nor indirect.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It is, and I think you would find the answer very informative.

When I say, I am sitting on a real chair, what am I actually saying about the chair?

"I am sitting on it."

 

[UndercoverElephant]

(For the third time)


Geoff,

Can you rephrase the question of this thread?:

"Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?"

Do you mean the world as itself? or do you mean the external world that is still not perceived or reachable to be perceived?

Your questions presuppose the answers. The question is about whether it is possible to directly percieve objects in an external world. This issue is about "What do we mean by real". As soon as you start talking about "world as it is in itself", you are imposing metaphysical systems on the question. I can't answer your question without bypassing the need for YOU to answer my questions.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Anyone who proposes a form of direct realism is going to have explain what they mean by direct, yes. "Direct realism" is a class of theories.
...
Direct realism is what it say it is! It is any theory that claims that the direct objects of perception are real objects.
[emphasis mine]

All righty then. I'm still confused, and now I'm bored, too.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

For Q-source, Paul and all

You all seem to be saying "But what could you mean by real?" or "What could you mean by direct?" But that is exactly the problem. That is the question you are supposed to be answering. I've given you my answer - and it's an argument from quantum mechanics.

How can I claim this monitor in front of me is real? My answer is that there are Penrose-style psycho-physical laws in play and these guarantee that the monitor is real. Without them, I'm no different to the BIV. If you are going to reject my solution, you have to find another way to distinguish the obviously non-real objects experienced by the BIV from the objects you are perceiving right now.

 

[Roboramma]

"I am sitting on it."

Okay, what does it mean to be sitting on it? What is sitting?

We all have an image in our minds of what it means to be sitting on a chair. This is very different, for instance, from what it means to dream about sitting on a chair.

But that's all as relates to the "real" world. I would define as real that set of things which can interact with one another. I'm just making this up as I go along, trying to get across my view, but I think that works relatively well.

The chair interactes with my bum and keeps it off the floor. But these things can only really be spoken of in relation to each other.

I think I'm saying all this really poorly, but it's 1:45 am, and I need to get some sleep.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I started out by saying that direct realism was very hard to defend. It's very easy to claim we are directly aware real objects if you are hammegk, because for hammegk, objects are things which exist in minds. But for hammegk, there is no external world. But everybody starts out as a naive realist - which is in effect a claim of direct realism. So the question is "how can we philosophically justify naive realism?" And it's not easy, which is why many people have abandoned direct realism in favour of indirect/representational realism. The trouble with that is that indirect realism is incoherent for precisely the same reason that reductive materialism is incoherent. Indeed they go together - the same people who talk about minds but can't explain how to reduce them to material are the people who try to defend indirect realism with regard to objects but can't explain how, if the perception is indirect, we could possibly know what it is we are indirectly aware of.

Any of that make sense?

Indirect realism is as implictly dualistic as reductive materialism is.

 

[Q-Source]

For Q-source, Paul and all

You all seem to be saying "But what could you mean by real?" or "What could you mean by direct?" But that is exactly the problem. That is the question you are supposed to be answering. I've given you my answer - and it's an argument from quantum mechanics.

I don´t know others, but it is difficult to comment on your essay until it is clear what the question is or what the experiment is about.

If a vat can touch, smell and see the object that he is perceiving via a computer, then the object is real FOR HIM.

We are the architects of our reality. I don´t think for a second that there is an absolute reality for everybody.

How can I claim this monitor in front of me is real?

It is real for you. Just because we cannot perceive it does not make it unreal.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

How can I claim this monitor in front of me is real? My answer is that there are Penrose-style psycho-physical laws in play and these guarantee that the monitor is real. Without them, I'm no different to the BIV. If you are going to reject my solution, you have to find another way to distinguish the obviously non-real objects experienced by the BIV from the objects you are perceiving right now.

Hello?

First of all, how does any QM begging guarantee that the monitor is real, for whatever meaning of real you're using? Second, why doesn't the QM begging pertain to the BIV? It's supposed to be occuring in neurons, which the BIV has. The BIV is conscious, too.

The only way I can distinguish my situations from the BIV's is because I set up the vat myself. If the BIV contacted me via telepathy and we started chatting, there would be no way I could detect that he was Roy G. BIV. He wouldn't know either. The only way to distinguish the two situations is to know the difference in the first place.

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Why?

If you don't allow a causal chain of neurons to process the information in ghe brain in direct realism then the only other mechanism to perceive is through a homonculus.

If you allow a causal chain of neurons to process information, then the hallucination problem, illusion problem, and BIV problem become non-existent. They are not problems. The stimulus for perception simply becomes something different within the brain (or outside in a different way for the BIV) and that is merely an epistemic issue. It says nothing whatever about ontology.

All we need to know about the brain is that it is the last part in the empirical causal chain leading from object to experience.

The reason why it is relevant is precisely because it constitutes that causal chain and may very well be the end cause. To understand how it works is to understand perception itself potentially. And many of the statements that people make about perception, such as awareness is one particular "thing" or "being" seems to be completely wrong when you examine what we know about brains working and not-working. This information is very pertinent.

I am not speaking about following the causal chain from photoreceptor to line detector on up. I am speaking of the higher cortical areas where the info is put together. We can make huge mistakes not taking info into account that may very well impact what perception is.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hello?

First of all, how does any QM begging guarantee that the monitor is real, for whatever meaning of real you're using?

Paul, please stop using the word "begging" where it does not belong.

It's real because it stipulates a direct connection between the perception and the object, a connection which the BIV lacks.

Second, why doesn't the QM begging pertain to the BIV?

Because in the case of the BIV there is no real chair for the quantum connections to connect to.

It's supposed to be occuring in neurons, which the BIV has. The BIV is conscious, too.

Correct, but my argument leads to a claim that whatever the BIV would be experiencing it would not be the same as a veridical experience. I am denying that the same brain state is achievable in hallucinations because there are two causal factors of the brain state: one empirical, one quantum. No quantum links --> no identical brain state --> BIV-argument collapses.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don´t know others, but it is difficult to comment on your essay until it is clear what the question is or what the experiment is about.

If a vat can touch, smell and see the object that he is perceiving via a computer, then the object is real FOR HIM.

We are the architects of our reality. I don´t think for a second that there is an absolute reality for everybody.

Then you aren't a direct realist.

 

[hammegk]

... for hammegk, there is no external world. ...

I'd rather say there is 'world' and the internal/external distinction is the problem. Although I'm not sure how anyone but maybe BDZ will take that.

Again, what moves? Flag, Wind, or Mind?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you don't allow a causal chain of neurons to process the information in ghe brain in direct realism then the only other mechanism to perceive is through a homonculus.

Why? I still have no idea what you are saying or why you are saying it.

If you allow a causal chain of neurons to process information, then the hallucination problem, illusion problem, and BIV problem become non-existent. They are not problems. The stimulus for perception simply becomes something different within the brain (or outside in a different way for the BIV) and that is merely an epistemic issue. It says nothing whatever about ontology.

EXACTLY. You are saying nothing whatsoever about ontology. You aren't engaging with the argument at all. The things you are describing have nothing to do with this argument. I keep telling you this.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

OK, I'll try one more time. There is an object out there. Photons bounce off object and hit retina. Retina sends axons from ganglion cells to lateral geneiculate nucleus, then to occipital cortex, etc.

That constitutes a causal chain of neruons that process visual information.

If you confuse the processing of information within that causal chain with indirect realism (formation of percepts through neural processing) and do not allow the causal chain to explain perception, then direct realism is only possible through one other approach -- a homonculus. Does that make sense?

Visual information is processed throughout that causal chain, but the process is still compatible with direct realism for some definitions of direct realism. It depends on precisely what definition you use. The early implication you cited of "immediate awareness" as part of direct realism is not comapatible with neural processing, but only with a homonculus model. Only a homonculus could be immediately aware of anything. A brain takes time to make sense of sensory data.

You are saying nothing whatsoever about ontology. You aren't engaging with the argument at all. The things you are describing have nothing to do with this argument. I keep telling you this.

No, the brain in a vat example says nothing about ontology. It is an exercise in epistemology. If we assume a particular metaphysical position -- say materialism -- and agree that direct realism can account for our means of perception (agreeing that this simply means that there is a causal chain of neurons that results in our ability to perceive the world), then the BIV example shows only that something can intervene within that causal chain to fool us. It means that even with direct realism we can be fooled. Unless you define direct realism to mean that we always have perfect fidelity in our perceptions, which doesn't make any sense to me. That we can be fooled with hallucinations does not imply that there is some other intermediate form of perception that we perceive through a higher-order homonculus (indirect reality), but that there is an intervening chain of neurons which can be accessed and fooled through some intervening means. But we still perceive the world directly through that causal chain.