Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[UndercoverElephant]

But what does directly mean? This is what we keep asking you.

It is okay for there to be a complex sensory pathway between my sensory apparatus and my brain.

Is it okay for there to be transduction processes between the external chair and the signals reaching my sensory apparatus? I hope so, or this thought experiment is irrelevant.

Given this incredibly complex causal chain, I'm not sure what the word direct actually means.....

Some people have argued this. But I am directly aware of a monitor right now. The problem is how I justify my claim it is a real monitor given the BIV argument. The BIV also directly percieves a monitor, but we know it isn't real. So how can I claim the monitor I perceive right now is any different?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I think you may be confusing perception and imagination.

If someone is describing an ET craft to me, it involves both.

Some people have argued this. But I am directly aware of a monitor right now. The problem is how I justify my claim it is a real monitor given the BIV argument. The BIV also directly percieves a monitor, but we know it isn't real. So how can I claim the monitor I perceive right now is any different?

You can't. But direct realism holds that the monitor is an "external object." What does the word object mean? In particular, does it necessarily mean an external physical object?

Unless the inventor of direct realism was an idiot, direct realism allows for an arbitrarily complex sequence of events between the monitor and your internal picture of it. It is this sequence of events that gives us the flexibility to explain hallucinations and such. Furthermore, there is nothing about this sequence of events that means there has to be a one-to-one mapping between external objects and phenomenal experience. That is why the BIV and I can experience the same thing even though the external cause is different.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul,

We can know from a phenomenological point of view what we are directly aware of. We are aware of a world filled with objects. But if you have a billiard-ball concept of reality, it seems impossible that we could be directly aware of objects in an external world for all the reasons you are giving, and more. In order for it to qualify as direct realism there has to be some way in which we really are directly in contact with the objects of veridical perception that is not true of the BIV. If we can find a way to make this distinction, then we can claim the objects we are directly aware of really are external. A.D.Smith's solution provides half an answer.

Smith claims that the objects of immediate awareness during hallucinations are "merely intentional objects". This makes sense, but it leaves unspecified the mechanism by which we distinguish the merely intentional objects from real objects.

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/DRPC.htm

The phenomenal aspects of perceptual experience alone do not seem to derail either proposed metaphysical structure. At least, neither structure is obviously necessitated - and neither one is obviously ruled out - by perceptual phenomenology alone. If so, then so far as their metaphysical structures are concerned, both proposals are equally adequate to perceptual phenomenology, and considerations besides phenomenological ones would be needed if one had to choose between them.

If this is right, then phenomenological considerations do not provide positive support for indirect realism. But they do not provide positive support for direct realism either. If so, then ultimately the status of direct realism will have to be settled by drawing on something besides reflection on the nature of perceptual phenomenology

Smith has laid out the structure of the theory, but he needs something outside phenomenology to provide the final piece of the puzzle. Penrose's theory of consciousness is that puzzle piece. By linking QM and consciousness, Penrose has introduce an extra causal link - a similar sort of link that occurs with entangled particles. We can claim to be directly aware of external objects because there is a direct connections between the brain and the object, via quantum mechanics. If such a theory were true, we have our missing explanation of how to distinguish between the BIV case and the normal case. With the BIV, the QM connections are missing - making the objects "merely intentional". During veridical perception the quantum links qualify the objects as real.

 

[Mercutio]

Some people have argued this. But I am directly aware of a monitor right now. The problem is how I justify my claim it is a real monitor given the BIV argument. The BIV also directly percieves a monitor, but we know it isn't real. So how can I claim the monitor I perceive right now is any different?

But the BIV argument, in step two, assumes that the object is not real. So the one you perceive right now is no different. If you assume it is not real, you can conclude it is not real.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You can't. But direct realism holds that the monitor is an "external object." What does the word object mean? In particular, does it necessarily mean an external physical object?

No, you can have a "merely intentional object". Object refers to the things you percieve - the objects of perception.

Furthermore, there is nothing about this sequence of events that means there has to be a one-to-one mapping between external objects and phenomenal experience.
~~ Paul

No. So you need something else to guarantee the realness of the objects. You need a direct connection.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But the BIV argument, in step two, assumes that the object is not real.

Yes. Those are the conditions of the thought experiment. If they were not, it wouldn't be interesting.

So the one you perceive right now is no different. If you assume it is not real, you can conclude it is not real.

That is how the argument goes, yes.

 

[Mercutio]

Yes. Those are the conditions of the thought experiment. If they were not, it wouldn't be interesting.

And is it interesting now?

That is how the argument goes, yes.

If we assume other things about it, like that it is mental, or noumenal, or secretly purple when no one is watching, can we conclude those things as well?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And is it interesting now?

It looks like it falsifies direct realism.

If we assume other things about it, like that it is mental, or noumenal, or secretly purple when no one is watching, can we conclude those things as well?

No idea what you mean, or why it is relevant to this argument. Describing other thought experiments doesn't make any difference to this one.

 

[Mercutio]

It looks like it falsifies direct realism.

by assuming it false.

No idea what you mean, or why it is relevant to this argument. Describing other thought experiments doesn't make any difference to this one.

Circularity never sat well with me. Don't know why this circular argument is any better than any other.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Didn't understand this sentence.

The definition of direct realism that you have proposed requires a homonculus.

I do not need to know anything about neuroscience in order to be able to make the statement "I perceive a chair".

Who said you did? You surely need to know something about neuroscience to understand what the statement means, though. If you don't, then you will be forever lost. If you do not understand how perception works in the brain, you cannot decide arbitrarily what the brain can and cannot do with "percepts". Not knowing anything about how the brain works leads to simplistic definitions of "direct realism". Those simplistic definitions require a homonculus. A little guy sitting inside your head watching the Cartesian theatre screen.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The definition of direct realism that you have proposed requires a homonculus.

Why?

Who said you did? You surely need to know something about neuroscience to understand what the statement means, though. If you don't, then you will be forever lost. If you do not understand how perception works in the brain, you cannot decide arbitrarily what the brain can and cannot do with "percepts". Not knowing anything about how the brain works leads to simplistic definitions of "direct realism". Those simplistic definitions require a homonculus. A little guy sitting inside your head watching the Cartesian theatre screen.

The problem is metaphysical. All we need to know about the brain is that it is the last part in the empirical causal chain leading from object to experience. Exactly how the brain processes the sensory data isn't relevant to the argument. It doesn't make any difference.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

by assuming it false.

Where do you think the assumption took place? What assumption?

Circularity never sat well with me. Don't know why this circular argument is any better than any other.

Why is it circular?

What would be circular would be to either assume direct realism is true, or to assume it is false. We have done neither. All we have done is describe a hypothetical situation.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No. So you need something else to guarantee the realness of the objects. You need a direct connection.

How could we possibly guarantee anything, in an ontological sense?

The only difference I can see between direct and indirect realism is that indirect realism introduces some sort of movie in the brain, which some sort of homunculus watches. This happens after all the events that start at the chair and conclude at the doorway to my brain. So I do not see why the direct/indirect argument has anything to do with whether the external objects are in some sense "real."

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Where do you think the assumption took place? What assumption?

You knew in 433.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You knew in 433.

No, I think there's been some confusion.

You do not have to assume anything about direct realism for the argument to go through. It doesn't depend on any assumption. What you appear to be saying is "If I assume the objects of direct perception right now really are external objects, then they are." If so, that would be to assume one's conclusion. The fact of the matter is we are not in a position to assume anything at all about that. We simply cannot say whether the objects we percieve are real or not. The only thing which is assumed during the thought experiment is that the BIV percieves a chair and that there isn't a real chair present. That isn't the same as assuming direct realism isn't true. It just sets up a very difficult problem for defenders of direct realism to solve. The only avenue for blocking the argument along the lines you are trying to block it is to argue that there is something theoretically preventing the BIV from having an identical experience to a normal person. If so, you can argue that the thought experiment describes an impossible case. Do you think it is impossible? If so, why?

Geoff

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

BDZ,

A pattern of nerve inputs is NOT a real chair. It just isn't. This argument is a non-starter.

Geoff

Oh yes, it is a real chair, for every account conceivable. If you mean you know is not a real chair in the first place its irrelevant from the point of view of the one who is seeing it. If you mean is "less real" because its configuration is not related to "a real chair" (whatever that means) then you would have to argue in to why is different. In the end, the question is:

What is a "real chair"?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I do not need to know anything about neuroscience in order to be able to make the statement "I perceive a chair".

Exactly, and you dont need to know anything about "real chairs" in order to be able to say "I perceive a chair".

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The argument is not about whether or not an external reality exists. The argument is about whether we can directly perceive it.

Whats the difference between "directly perceive it" and just "perceive it"?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Some people have argued this. But I am directly aware of a monitor right now. The problem is how I justify my claim it is a real monitor given the BIV argument. The BIV also directly percieves a monitor, but we know it isn't real. So how can I claim the monitor I perceive right now is any different?

Again, you have the point right in front of you! You are "directly" (as others, I have no idea of what this word means in this context) aware of your monitor right now. How can you claim that it is "a real monitor"? Thats what your own last sentence asks!

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Again, you have the point right in front of you! You are "directly" (as others, I have no idea of what this word means in this context) aware of your monitor right now. How can you claim that it is "a real monitor"?

Me personally? post #430