I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[MuDPhuD]

In the experiment I am proposing, both the object to be constructed and any mimics resulting from that are intentionally not biological, they are mechanical and artificial from the outset. The aim is to produce by trial and error or experiment, an object which behaves (initially) like a conscious person, like the control. Once it has been produced it will be attempted to determine if it is self-aware, or if that is impossible to determine.



I should have been more specific here. I mean once we have constructed the object which appears on the surface to be conscious like a human being. We then experiment around its degree of self-awareness, consciousness, apparent self-consciousness etc, to help determine if it is self-aware etc, and if it is not, how to make it so, to adapt a mimic into a conscious object.

Yes.





Yes, which gives us dilemma of whether AI is conscious or not.





Yes agreed, I was making a distinction between a perfect mimic which is atomically equivalent to the control and is obviously self-aware and and imperfect mimic, which only appears to be equivalent to the control, but is atomically distinctly different in its composition.

If we have an imperfect mimic, how do we know if it is self-conscious? This is the question I was addressing to Nonpareil. Which he was unable to answer.

I think I understand what you are saying.

Your "perfect mimic" is an atomic replica, therefore identical in every way including the appearance of consciousness.

Your "imperfect mimic" is designed to act in every way like the original, and may or may not be conscious. I agree with you that theoretically a robot could be designed with behavioral responses indistinguishable from the original (human) using a complex detailed scheme of programmed responses, similar to an expert system. To be virtually indistinguishable from the original, this system would be terrifically complex with so many possible stimulus-response pairings that it seems impossible on the practical level. Granting that such a non biological robot were constructed, it would most likely NOT exhibit consciousness.
I say this based on the current best guess as to how the brain generates consciousness, IIT.
http://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588

According to this theory, which is based on the actual studies of what the brain is doing which is likely to be the origin of our conscious awareness, it is the pattern of interconnections and information integration which produces consciousness.

Thus it should be possible to construct a conscious machine, not by mimicking every stimulus-response (behavior), but by mimicking the inter connectedness of the cortico-thalamic systems which are thought to produce consciousness.
This theory also addresses the questions which are arising in the thread regarding how much of a nervous system is required to generate some form of conscious awareness. Certainly it does not appear that cellular level activity is responsible. It appears to require multiple ensembles of simultaneously active neurons with rich interconnections.
I suggest reading the article I linked above, as it offers a better and more detailed description.

 

[Nonpareil]

Go on then? Or don't you have sufficient data?

You keep doing this, and you keep missing the point.

I do not claim to have a definition, just that, once you have one, the screening process is trivial.

Yes, so we are working from the position that each neuron is a bit in the computation.

Several thousand bits, actually. Neurons are exceptionally complicated. But yes, that is the essential part of it.

It is you who is incoherent here. You are presuming that an organism requires a mind to have experience, because it must think in order to know it is experiencing something. This is hopelessly naive and outdated. So an ant does not have experience then?

Of course it does. Ants have minds. Individual minds, not the hive mind nonsense popular in fiction.

So is the computation occuring inside each neuron or only at the interface between neurons?

Read a textbook.

This is critical to what I am proposing because if the seat of consciousness is in cellular metabolism, ie inside the cell, then it is a priori to the computation going on between the neurons.

"A priori to the computation going on between the neurons" is a nonsense phrase, and it still doesn't help your position that consciousness is dependent on biological life. It's still just computation.

Which I have been pointing out repeatedly.

No, you haven't, and it's wrong-slash-nonsensical anyway.

So do you think sea cucumbers are conscious? You realise don't you that they don't have a nervous system, as generally understood?

Yes, they do. They just don't have a centralized nervous system.

So yes, they are conscious. Just not particularly bright.

 

[Nonpareil]

Thus it should be possible to construct a conscious machine, not by mimicking every stimulus-response (behavior), but by mimicking the inter connectedness of the cortico-thalamic systems which are thought to produce consciousness.

And this is punshhh's constant misunderstanding in a nutshell.

When I say that a system exhibits all behaviors of consciousness, this includes the behaviors of interconnectivity. That is, if you open up the shell and look at the wiring, you can watch as the computations follow the necessary pattern to verify that they are integrated.

If you look at the computations and they don't exhibit integration, then there is a behavior of the system that is inconsistent with it being conscious. Therefore, it isn't.

 

[tsig]

There's a thread that is quite active I challenge you: your best argument for materialism that is - as you can probably guess - all about the best arguments for why materialism is "correct". There have been several members that have posted who have argued by assertion that there is an alternate to materialism that is as successful (or more so) at predicting and describing the reality we exist in.

Rather than derailing that thread I'd thought I'd start this one so they can put forward their alternate (or alternates).

Anyone willing to kick this thread off?

The only alternative to materialism is making it up as you go along.

 

[Dancing David]

If a neuroscientist makes a claim like We know the brain is the source of consciousness, we just don't know how, and we don't have a theory how . . . you see that as certainty and I see such a statement as promissory. It seems to me that what's keeping the certainty alive is the everlasting 'hope' that some new form of matter will be found to explain consciousness . . . expressed cell proteins, quantum or whatever.

Ah yes the Pope of Neuroscience made a declaration and so you can...

 

[MRC_Hans]

Yes agreed, this does not distinguish between a consciousness caused by metabolic life and one caused by computation though.

Obviously not. And?

I should point out that I regard the physical material of the brain as part of the body.

Ehr, yes. What else could it be?

So if consciousness requires a body it could be the physical brain, in a jar for example.

I did not imply that. Only that human consciousness requires a human body. Otherwise it would not be a human consciousness.

I expect it would become confined to a dream world, or not even that if the sensory connections normally play some role.

A brain that never experienced any sensory input would certainly evolve a very different consciousness. And, we would not likely be able to communicate with it.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

I am standing in for an idealist, I am a materialist but of a more comprehensive kind than usual, which includes the possibility of idealism of some kind. If an identical, atomically, mimic were alive, I am happy to conclude that it would be self-aware. If it were identical and not alive, I would not conclude it.

How would you conclude the latter?

And if it were made of ropes and pulleys, while performing all the computation of the control, I would not conclude that it were self-aware either (even if it were alive).

Why?

If your answer to the above is not clearly different than "because it is not alive", then you are entertaining a circular argument.

Hans

 

[LarryS]

The only alternative to materialism is making it up as you go along.

materialism, idealism and any other ism theory that tries to explain the full domain of human experience are at very best convincing intellectually, and are speculative in nature, and (hopefully) we remember these speculations are done for the fun

 

[Nonpareil]

materialism, idealism and any other ism theory that tries to explain the full domain of human experience are at very best convincing intellectually, and are speculative in nature

Only if you stretch the definition of "speculative" so far that it loses all meaning.

 

[LarryS]

Only if you stretch the definition of "speculative" so far that it loses all meaning.

your fast-as-lightening certainty notwithstanding

 

[punshhh]

I think I understand what you are saying.

Your "perfect mimic" is an atomic replica, therefore identical in every way including the appearance of consciousness.

Your "imperfect mimic" is designed to act in every way like the original, and may or may not be conscious. I agree with you that theoretically a robot could be designed with behavioral responses indistinguishable from the original (human) using a complex detailed scheme of programmed responses, similar to an expert system. To be virtually indistinguishable from the original, this system would be terrifically complex with so many possible stimulus-response pairings that it seems impossible on the practical level. Granting that such a non biological robot were constructed, it would most likely NOT exhibit consciousness.

Yes and it could even simulate the integration, or why not carry it out anyway and still be unconscious? Where in all this is there a requirement for it to be conscious?

I say this based on the current best guess as to how the brain generates consciousness, IIT.
http://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588

Thanks for the illustration. I was already bearing in mind such ideas, it gives a possible explanation for the phenomena. Again it is only mechanical and it is an assumption that an example would be conscious and not just putting on a show for us, ie giving us what we want, what we are looking for(a self fulfilling prophecy).

According to this theory, which is based on the actual studies of what the brain is doing which is likely to be the origin of our conscious awareness, it is the pattern of interconnections and information integration which produces consciousness.

Self-consciousness.

Thus it should be possible to construct a conscious machine, not by mimicking every stimulus-response (behavior), but by mimicking the inter connectedness of the cortico-thalamic systems which are thought to produce consciousness.

Yes it is probably something that would be required. I don't see any limit to the mimicking as you seem to be suggesting. All that inter connectedness can be acted out and more, or simulated.

This theory also addresses the questions which are arising in the thread regarding how much of a nervous system is required to generate some form of conscious awareness. Certainly it does not appear that cellular level activity is responsible. It appears to require multiple ensembles of simultaneously active neurons with rich interconnections.

Self-consciousness, I feel it is necessary in order to account more thoroughly for what is going on in an organism to make the distinction between a base organic/metabolic consciousness and an aware, or self-conscious form of consciousness. We as humans are familiar with the latter and may ignore the former, which is more applicable to simpler life forms.

I suggest reading the article I linked above, as it offers a better and more detailed description.

Yes I did thanks.

 

[punshhh]

I do not claim to have a definition, just that, once you have one, the screening process is trivial.

Oh yes I forgot, it's that simple. Well nothing to worry about then.

Several thousand bits, actually. Neurons are exceptionally complicated. But yes, that is the essential part of it.

So external to the cell wall then?

Of course it does. Ants have minds. Individual minds, not the hive mind nonsense popular in fiction.

Are they self-conscious? You know around here when someone says conscious they actually mean self-conscious. We wouldn't want to conflate the two would we.

Read a textbook.

I already know what it says in the text book. Is computation, as you define it, going on inside the neuron, or not?

"A priori to the computation going on between the neurons" is a nonsense phrase, and it still doesn't help your position that consciousness is dependent on biological life. It's still just computation.

Alright a precursor then. If it is a precursor, then it is essential.

No, you haven't, and it's wrong-slash-nonsensical anyway.

I assure you you had the phrase "cellular metabolism" ringing in your ears before this post.

Yes, they do. They just don't have a centralized nervous system.

So yes, they are conscious. Just not particularly bright.

Yes, I was thinking of sponge when I said that. A sponge doesn't have a nervous system, well not as generally understood anyway.
Also you are using consciousness more as my definition here, rather than the dictionary defintion, we wouldn't want to be misleading.

 

[Nonpareil]

Yes and it could even simulate the integration, or why not carry it out anyway and still be unconscious? Where in all this is there a requirement for it to be conscious?

That's what being conscious means.

Are they self-conscious?

Yes.

I already know what it says in the text book. Is computation, as you define it, going on inside the neuron, or not?

Alright a precursor then. If it is a precursor, then it is essential.

That is also not what "precursor" means, and it is irrelevant anyway, since it is still computation. The means by which the hardware computes is irrelevant; it can still be done by another computer with different hardware.

I assure you you had the phrase "cellular metabolism" ringing in your ears before this post.

No, actually. The fact that you think this matters indicates that you still don't understand what is actually being said.

Also you are using consciousness more as my definition here, rather than the dictionary defintion, we wouldn't want to be misleading.

No, I'm not. Because your definition is nonsensical.

 

[LarryS]

That is also not what "precursor" means, and it is irrelevant anyway, since it is still computation. The means by which the hardware computes is irrelevant; it can still be done by another computer with different hardware.

Do you have a working theory of mind as computation you'd like to share, or a link to one you think works or has merit, or, when you suggest that consciousness is a computation, do you mean it in the sense of that is the definition of "is"?

 

[Nonpareil]

Do you have a working theory of mind as computation you'd like to share, or a link to one you think works or has merit, or, when you suggest that consciousness is a computation, do you mean it in the sense of that is the definition of "is"?

We have already been over this. Read the previous posts in this thread regarding Christof Koch and integrated information theory.

 

[LarryS]

We have already been over this. Read the previous posts in this thread regarding Christof Koch and integrated information theory.

and as we've been over this, Koch is an example of someone who is not sure that computation/information theory is sufficient to explain consciousness.

 

[Nonpareil]

and as we've been over this, Koch is an example of someone who is not sure that computation/information theory is sufficient to explain consciousness.

You have said this before.

It was explained to you, quite clearly, that you were wrong.

 

[MuDPhuD]

Also you are using consciousness more as my definition here, rather than the dictionary defintion, we wouldn't want to be misleading.

Could you clarify for me the difference between "your" definition of consciousness, and the typical definition which you seem to refer to as "self-consciousness"?

 

[Nonpareil]

Could you clarify for me the difference between "your" definition of consciousness, and the typical definition which you seem to refer to as "self-consciousness"?

Punshhh attempts to differentiate between "consciousness" as "the ability to have experience" and "self-consciousness" as "the sense of self". He further asserts that the latter is metabolic in nature and requires organic life.

Which is nonsensical on top of being unsupported by any evidence. It is equivalent to claiming that you can have experience without an experiencer.

 

[LarryS]

You have said this before.

It was explained to you, quite clearly, that you were wrong.

your 'sandwich' image doesn't explain or say anything. Koch has flat out said he's a panpsychist, and he thinks consciousness is fundamental to matter, and therefore not all human consciousness is computational.

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/is-consciousness-universal/
quote from this article . . . and he's speculating.

"Consciousness comes with organized chunks of matter. It is immanent in the organization of the system. It is a property of complex entities and cannot be further reduced to the action of more elementary properties. We have reached the ground floor of reductionism. "