I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[MRC_Hans]

Perhaps so. The materialist position is that all those abilities are possible via computation and consciousness as I am describing it doesn't exist other than as an emergent behaviour of a certain weight of computation.

Correct.

So from that position the device would have those abilities, at least in capacity, before the consciousness would emerge.

Not correct. If we use the entirely arbitrary definition of 'consciousness' that is "identical to a human consciousness", then yes. However, we don't. Instead, we are becoming more and more aware that different kinds and levels of consciousness exist.

From here they simply look at a human and say this is how you are self-conscious and how we can replicate the same experience in any other form in which an equivalent degree of computation occurs.

I cannot say if some hold that position, but it is not "the materialist position". A human consciousness is not hardware-independent. If you were to place a brain of human capacity in even another biological body, it would almost certainly be conscious, but it would not be a human consciousness. If we one day build a computer large and fuzzy enough to become conscious, it will most certainly not be a copy of a human consciousness.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

The opposing position is that the personal experience of being is caused only by the computation in the brain and not in the body.

And that seems to be suppported by empirical evidence: Whenever we encounter a person with a defunct brain, we find that the body can be kept alive for long periods, but there is no sign whatsoever of any kind of consciousness.

So you don't need the body, only the computer.

That is both right and wrong: If mature humans looses the use of its body (except as a life-support system for the brain) they continue to have a human consciouness, but since part of our consciousness is the sum of our experiences, it is hard to say what a disembodied brain would turn into without a body through which to experience.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Yes agreed, I was making a distinction between a perfect mimic which is atomically equivalent to the control and is obviously self-aware

Why is it 'obviously' self-aware? Yes, according to materialism it is, but materialism is, correct me if I'm mistaken, not your position, right?

and and imperfect mimic, which only appears to be equivalent to the control, but is atomically distinctly different in its composition.
If we have an imperfect mimic, how do we know if it is self-conscious? This is the question I was addressing to Nonpareil. Which he was unable to answer.

The question can only be answered if we have an unambiguous and operative definition of self-counsciousness. (And the result will depend entirely on what that definition is.)

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

It depends perhaps on which evidence one favours. If one looks at the origins of self-consciousness, consciousness (awareness, experience) has been a feature of life for the majority of the evolutionary period, until in recent times larger brains developed which then began the sort of computing you are thinking of.

During the evolutionary period, there seems (as far as we can infer about extinct creatures) to have been an almost perfect correlation between brain complexity and consciousness level. There still is among extant life-forms.

As I have pointed out the monad is entirely rational, just not rational within the materialist cannon.

My friend, The Lord of the Rings is entirely rational, just not within the cannon of the real world.

Hans

 

[Nonpareil]

If we have an imperfect mimic, how do we know if it is self-conscious? This is the question I was addressing to Nonpareil. Which he was unable to answer.

No, actually. I answered it multiple times. You simply ignored it.

We know if it is self-conscious by seeing if it meets the criteria for being labeled self-conscious. All you have to do is define it.

It depends perhaps on which evidence one favours. If one looks at the origins of self-consciousness, consciousness (awareness, experience) has been a feature of life for the majority of the evolutionary period, until in recent times larger brains developed which then began the sort of computing you are thinking of.

No, actually. Brains have existed for quite some time, albeit in more primitive forms. Those that do not have brains - some invertebrates, for example - have primitive nervous systems that do the computing instead. Those with neither brains nor central nervous systems are not conscious*.

You are also again attempting to impose a distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness where none exists. Again, this idea is incoherent. Experience cannot exist without something to do the experiencing; the idea of experience without an experiencer is self-contradictory.

Animals with less-developed brains are not as intelligent as we are, but they still have some sort of sense of self.

As I have pointed out the monad is entirely rational, just not rational within the materialist cannon.

No, it isn't. You have asserted this to be true. That doesn't make it so.

Ok, what about electrical signals and chemical states within each neuron? Or do you treat a neuron as an on or off switch, or a positive or negative unit in the computation?

Again, this is just part of the computation taking place. If you want to know more, read about neuroscience.

*: Jellyfish, sea cucumbers, and other similar organisms form an interesting but ultimately irrelevant (so far as this discussion goes) unknown quantity. They have neither brain nor what would be traditionally labeled as a central nervous system, but we don't know enough about what their primitive nervous systems actually do to know whether or not they are conscious. I believe they are, but, like other animals with such primitive brains, they are very, very dumb, and their capacity for experience is extremely limited.

 

[LarryS]

The research is conclusive. The brain is the source of consciousness.

The only question left is how, and even that is much less mysterious than you like to pretend. We know it's computational. We just don't know which specific computation results in the sense of self.

You can ignore this as much as you like, but it won't go away.

If a neuroscientist makes a claim like We know the brain is the source of consciousness, we just don't know how, and we don't have a theory how . . . you see that as certainty and I see such a statement as promissory. It seems to me that what's keeping the certainty alive is the everlasting 'hope' that some new form of matter will be found to explain consciousness . . . expressed cell proteins, quantum or whatever.

 

[Nonpareil]

If a neuroscientist makes a claim like We know the brain is the source of consciousness, we just don't know how, and we don't have a theory how . . . you see that as certainty and I see such a statement as promissory.

You don't have to know the intricacies of metallurgy, physics, and mechanics to know what a gun does.

 

[LarryS]

You don't have to know the intricacies of metallurgy, physics, and mechanics to know what a gun does.

. . . and this is supposed to be a useful analogy? We know how a gun works - that's the point.

 

[Nonpareil]

. . . and this is supposed to be a useful analogy? We know how a gun works - that's the point.

Do you, though? If you were handed a gun and asked to point out what every piece was for and how it worked, could you?

If you don't like the gun analogy, look at cars, or radios, or anything else. You do not need to know what every piece does in order to understand what it is for.

 

[LarryS]

Do you, though? If you were handed a gun and asked to point out what every piece was for and how it worked, could you?

If you don't like the gun analogy, look at cars, or radios, or anything else. You do not need to know what every piece does in order to understand what it is for.

I personally don't need to understand how a gun (or car/radio etc) works in order to state that we know how a gun works - I can rely on a body of knowledge acquired thru the peer reviewed scientific method/process. All the devices you list are well understood, there's no appeal to a promise of a theory down the road.

 

[Nonpareil]

I personally don't need to understand how a gun (or car/radio etc) works in order to state that we know how a gun works - I can rely on a body of knowledge acquired thru the peer reviewed scientific method/process. All the devices you list are well understood, there's no appeal to a promise of a theory down the road.

Which isn't what is being done. The brain is well-understood. We already know what a great deal of it does in relation to consciousness; the basal ganglia, for example, and the hypothalamus. We know where conscious decision-making happens, how it happens, and so on. The only thing we're missing is the specific function that creates the sense of self* - but we know that it's part of the brain and that it's computational in nature.

This is not "the promise of a theory down the road". This is an actual theory, right now, fully supported by every piece of evidence.

*: Which, as suggested by Koch, is possibly an emergent property and not a matter of pinpointing a specific area of the brain, but rather examining the system as a whole.

 

[LarryS]

Which isn't what is being done. The brain is well-understood. We already know what a great deal of it does in relation to consciousness; the basal ganglia, for example, and the hypothalamus. We know where conscious decision-making happens, how it happens, and so on. The only thing we're missing is the specific function that creates the sense of self* - but we know that it's part of the brain and that it's computational in nature.

This is not "the promise of a theory down the road". This is an actual theory, right now, fully supported by every piece of evidence.

*: Which, as suggested by Koch, is possibly an emergent property and not a matter of pinpointing a specific area of the brain, but rather examining the system as a whole.

That would be nice if it were true.

 

[Nonpareil]

That would be nice if it were true.

It is entirely true.

We know all sorts of things like this about the brain. We know where emotions come from (chemical secretions like dopamine, adrenaline, and so on). We know where our ability to understand and adhere to social norms comes from (the prefrontal cortex). We know what part of the brain is responsible for decision-making (prefrontal again). And on and on and on and on.

We know what the brain does, and we know that it is the source of the sense of self.

 

[turingtest]

Originally Posted by Nonpareil View Post
Which isn't what is being done. The brain is well-understood. We already know what a great deal of it does in relation to consciousness; the basal ganglia, for example, and the hypothalamus. We know where conscious decision-making happens, how it happens, and so on. The only thing we're missing is the specific function that creates the sense of self* - but we know that it's part of the brain and that it's computational in nature.

This is not "the promise of a theory down the road". This is an actual theory, right now, fully supported by every piece of evidence.

*: Which, as suggested by Koch, is possibly an emergent property and not a matter of pinpointing a specific area of the brain, but rather examining the system as a whole.

That would be nice if it were true.

The whole basis for woo is thinking it would be nicer if it weren't.

 

[LarryS]

The whole basis for woo is thinking it would be nicer if it weren't.

Actually I made the comment for the irony.

 

[punshhh]

And that seems to be suppported by empirical evidence: Whenever we encounter a person with a defunct brain, we find that the body can be kept alive for long periods, but there is no sign whatsoever of any kind of consciousness.

Yes agreed, this does not distinguish between a consciousness caused by metabolic life and one caused by computation though.

That is both right and wrong: If mature humans looses the use of its body (except as a life-support system for the brain) they continue to have a human consciouness, but since part of our consciousness is the sum of our experiences, it is hard to say what a disembodied brain would turn into without a body through which to experience.

I should point out that I regard the physical material of the brain as part of the body. So if consciousness requires a body it could be the physical brain, in a jar for example. I expect it would become confined to a dream world, or not even that if the sensory connections normally play some role.

 

[punshhh]

Why is it 'obviously' self-aware? Yes, according to materialism it is, but materialism is, correct me if I'm mistaken, not your position, right?

I am standing in for an idealist, I am a materialist but of a more comprehensive kind than usual, which includes the possibility of idealism of some kind. If an identical, atomically, mimic were alive, I am happy to conclude that it would be self-aware. If it were identical and not alive, I would not conclude it.
And if it were made of ropes and pulleys, while performing all the computation of the control, I would not conclude that it were self-aware either (even if it were alive).

The question can only be answered if we have an unambiguous and operative definition of self-counsciousness. (And the result will depend entirely on what that definition is.)

Well I look forward to that day. When also presumably we we will find out if life is a critical ingredient.

 

[punshhh]

During the evolutionary period, there seems (as far as we can infer about extinct creatures) to have been an almost perfect correlation between brain complexity and consciousness level. There still is among extant life-forms.

Agreed, it would be interesting to know where on that scale experience begins to occur. I wonder if a tree experiences anything.

My friend, The Lord of the Rings is entirely rational, just not within the cannon of the real world.

Yes and the real world contains things unknown to humanity and which are not explained by current scientist thinking.

 

[Nonpareil]

Yes agreed, this does not distinguish between a consciousness caused by metablolic life and one caused by computation though.

Because there is no distinction.

 

[punshhh]

No, actually. I answered it multiple times. You simply ignored it.

It is not an answer, it is a caricature of the issue.

We know if it is self-conscious by seeing if it meets the criteria for being labeled self-conscious. All you have to do is define it.

Go on then? Or don't you have sufficient data?

No, actually. Brains have existed for quite some time, albeit in more primitive forms. Those that do not have brains - some invertebrates, for example - have primitive nervous systems that do the computing instead. Those with neither brains nor central nervous systems are not conscious*.

Yes, so we are working from the position that each neuron is a bit in the computation.

You are also again attempting to impose a distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness where none exists. Again, this idea is incoherent. Experience cannot exist without something to do the experiencing; the idea of experience without an experiencer is self-contradictory.

It is you who is incoherent here. You are presuming that an organism requires a mind to have experience, because it must think in order to know it is experiencing something. This is hopelessly naive and outdated. So an ant does not have experience then?

Animals with less-developed brains are not as intelligent as we are, but they still have some sort of sense of self.

Does this require a mind?

No, it isn't. You have asserted this to be true. That doesn't make it so.

Welcome to the real world, a world where the reality is what it is whatever someone might say it is.

Again, this is just part of the computation taking place. If you want to know more, read about neuroscience.

So is the computation occuring inside each neuron or only at the interface between neurons?

This is critical to what I am proposing because if the seat of consciousness is in cellular metabolism, ie inside the cell, then it is a priori to the computation going on between the neurons. Which I have been pointing out repeatedly.

*: Jellyfish, sea cucumbers, and other similar organisms form an interesting but ultimately irrelevant (so far as this discussion goes) unknown quantity. They have neither brain nor what would be traditionally labeled as a central nervous system, but we don't know enough about what their primitive nervous systems actually do to know whether or not they are conscious. I believe they are, but, like other animals with such primitive brains, they are very, very dumb, and their capacity for experience is extremely limited.

So do you think sea cucumbers are conscious? You realise don't you that they don't have a nervous system, as generally understood?