I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[Nonpareil]

I'm talking TV like when I was a kid . . . over the air

you can cut wires, add components, damage components, pull the plug and etc.

You do realize that such devices contain receivers, yes?

 

[LarryS]

yes

 

[dlorde]

... you can cut wires, add components, damage components, pull the plug and etc.

And does the displayed programme change mood from, say, a comedy, to a thriller? Does the newsreader become illiterate? does the documentary change subject?

These would be equivalent to what can happen when you damage the brain.

 

[Nonpareil]

yes

And this is the key difference.

There is no receiver in the brain.

 

[LarryS]

And does the displayed programme change mood from, say, a comedy, to a thriller? Does the newsreader become illiterate? does the documentary change subject?

Yes Yes Yes

some of the above I can do with a remote

 

[Nonpareil]

Yes Yes Yes

some of the above I can do with a remote

No. You can't.

 

[tsig]

I'm talking TV like when I was a kid . . . over the air
you can cut wires, add components, damage components, pull the plug and etc.

Did you ever wonder what the antennae did?

Cutting wires, damaging components and pulling the plug will make the TV not work so I don't understand your point.

 

[dlorde]

And does the displayed programme change mood from, say, a comedy, to a thriller? Does the newsreader become illiterate? does the documentary change subject?

Yes Yes Yes

some of the above I can do with a remote

 

[LarryS]

Did you ever wonder what the antennae did?

Cutting wires, damaging components and pulling the plug will make the TV not work so I don't understand your point.

Brain studies fall into 3 categories, 1)stimulation of brain regions, 2)correlation and 3)ablation . . . we can perform these same types of tests and conclude that a TV generates its own signal. Of course we know how a TV works, the theory is well understood. We don't have a working theory of brain activity as source of consciousness except in a most promissory way. I'm holding out for more research.

 

[Nonpareil]

Brain studies fall into 3 categories, 1)stimulation of brain regions, 2)correlation and 3)ablation . . . we can perform these same types of tests and conclude that a TV generates its own signal.

No, Larry. We can't.

Of course we know how a TV works, the theory is well understood. We don't have a working theory of brain activity as source of consciousness except in a most promissory way. I'm holding out for more research.

The research is conclusive. The brain is the source of consciousness.

The only question left is how, and even that is much less mysterious than you like to pretend. We know it's computational. We just don't know which specific computation results in the sense of self.

You can ignore this as much as you like, but it won't go away.

 

[tsig]

Brain studies fall into 3 categories, 1)stimulation of brain regions, 2)correlation and 3)ablation . . . we can perform these same types of tests and conclude that a TV generates its own signal. Of course we know how a TV works, the theory is well understood. We don't have a working theory of brain activity as source of consciousness except in a most promissory way. I'm holding out for more research.

Only if you ignore the antennae. Where is the brains' antennae?

 

[punshhh]

I think what Koch is attempting ( for example), is study human brain tissue to establish how it generates (some functions of) consciousness, then replicate that hardware synthetically. I think you're criticizing the approach of beginning with a set of (outward) behaviors associated with consciousness, then try to build a hardware/software appliance to 'mimic' those outward behaviors. I also would be suspicious of that approach, and I believe Koch would be as well.

Quite, the evidence suggests that consciousness is metabolic and emerges from the living tissues. Rather than the computational processing of sensory input and output.

 

[punshhh]

You do realize that such devices contain receivers, yes?

Yes and in idealism the brain(body) is a receiver of the monad.

 

[punshhh]

The research is conclusive. The brain is the source of consciousness.

Agreed, well self-consciousness to be more specific.

The only question left is how, and even that is much less mysterious than you like to pretend. We know it's computational. We just don't know which specific computation results in the sense of self.

Well your definition of computational, like your definition of behavioural, includes everything to begin with, all the neurochemistry, all the cellular metabolism. You're not actually saying anything specific, other than consciousness comes from the brain and it is computational in nature, just like any biological or chemical activity is computational in nature. Any puddle of water is computational in nature because it computes the shape of the ground and fits neatly into it. Indeed the universe is just one vast computer.

 

[Nonpareil]

Quite, the evidence suggests that consciousness is metabolic and emerges from the living tissues. Rather than the computational processing of sensory input and output.

No, it doesn't.

Yes and in idealism the brain(body) is a receiver of the monad.

Which is both incoherent, as "monad" is undefined and adds nothing to the equation that cannot be explained by purely physical mechanisms, and still entirely irrational.

 

[Nonpareil]

Well your definition of computational, like your definition of behavioural, includes everything to begin with, all the neurochemistry, all the cellular metabolism. You're not actually saying anything specific, other than consciousness comes from the brain and it is computational in nature, just like any biological or chemical activity is computational in nature. Any puddle of water is computational in nature because it computes the shape of the ground and fits neatly into it.

No, it doesn't, and no, that is not my argument.

The brain is a computer. Its computational processes are based on neurochemical hardware. Electrical signals and chemical states in the brain are the computations taking place. This is not assigning the word "computation" to something it does not apply to; it is literally computation, in the same way that ENIAC computed things via vacuum tubes.

This is not complicated. It is not contentious. It is not arguable. The brain is a computer, and it computes via neurochemical reactions.

 

[punshhh]

That means that you are, deliberately or not, trying to build a circular argument: The perfect mimic of a human being will, obviously, be indistinguishable from a human being. That would be very interesting if we could do that, but it would not tell us wether a biological entity is needed to attain self-awareness. It would also not tell us wether humans have a soul, since you could well argue that the artificial human also has one.

In the experiment I am proposing, both the object to be constructed and any mimics resulting from that are intentionally not biological, they are mechanical and artificial from the outset. The aim is to produce by trial and error or experiment, an object which behaves (initially) like a conscious person, like the control. Once it has been produced it will be attempted to determine if it is self-aware, or if that is impossible to determine.

First of all that is putting the cart before the horse: Obviously, if we have produced shuch an object we will know how to make it.

I should have been more specific here. I mean once we have constructed the object which appears on the surface to be conscious like a human being. We then experiment around its degree of self-awareness, consciousness, apparent self-consciousness etc, to help determine if it is self-aware etc, and if it is not, how to make it so, to adapt a mimic into a conscious object.

Secondly, you are missing the point: The question is wether an artificial entity can be self-aware. It does not have to be identical to a human consciousness, it just has to have something we can recognize as consciousness.

Yes.

Uhm, OK, but we already knew that.

Yes, which gives us dilemma of whether AI is conscious or not.

You have no way of claiming that something that fully mimicks a person is not a person and is not self-aware. THAT is the very point: Assuming a perfect mimick, you cannot point to anything that would not qualify the mimicka as a self-aware being.



However, if we were to produce a perfect mimick of a chainsaw; sound, weight, look, smell, fuel consumption, tree-cutting, etc, how would you distinguish it from a chainsaw? How might you claim that it was NOT a chainsaw?

Yes agreed, I was making a distinction between a perfect mimic which is atomically equivalent to the control and is obviously self-aware and and imperfect mimic, which only appears to be equivalent to the control, but is atomically distinctly different in its composition.
If we have an imperfect mimic, how do we know if it is self-conscious? This is the question I was addressing to Nonpareil. Which he was unable to answer.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

@punshhh: In trying to follow your argument, I do not see motive for the perfect/imperfect mimic distinction, especially atomic equality as criterion. Whatever mental activity is, that of the individual may be unique, but it is only a specific derivation of common processes. Nonidentical people already comprise the known sample of thinking biological entities, in other words.

The criteria for judging if an AI is self-aware require not only an examination of its behavior, but the intervention of the observer to state whether that behavior seems self-aware. Too subjective. So to debate something like this, you'd need to carefully define self-awareness and develop a set of tests which, if passed, indicate self-awareness has been demonstrated or falsified.

If you assume such a test might be passed by an AI, then there is no profit in wondering if it is "truly" self-aware or not, because inclusion of the "truly" proviso only means you simply have a bad test or bad criteria, or are working with fuzzy definitions.

To overcome these problems, one could also admit to functional comparisons; that is, if there are sub-components doing all the things other sentient biological entities do, and the whole professes to be aware and acts so, you have a better foundation for explaining how such awareness was achieved.

In fact, it's the same problem we have for defining whether we ourselves are indeed "aware." Terms such as 'consciousness' and 'awareness' describe a shared experiential gestalt we agree on, just as we agree 'red' is 'red'. If we can see the receptor cones in the eye and the rest of the wiring is functionally the same, we can posit the experience of 'red' is likely the same.

 

[punshhh]

No, it doesn't.

It depends perhaps on which evidence one favours. If one looks at the origins of self-consciousness, consciousness (awareness, experience) has been a feature of life for the majority of the evolutionary period, until in recent times larger brains developed which then began the sort of computing you are thinking of.

Which is both incoherent, as "monad" is undefined and adds nothing to the equation that cannot be explained by purely physical mechanisms, and still entirely irrational.

Again it depends on what one favours as defintions of things, or their coherence on addressing a phenomena. As I have pointed out the monad is entirely rational, just not rational within the materialist cannon.

 

[punshhh]

No, it doesn't, and no, that is not my argument.

Ok, you just seemed to be heading in that direction with your definition of required behaviour for something to be self-conscious.

The brain is a computer. Its computational processes are based on neurochemical hardware. Electrical signals and chemical states in the brain are the computations taking place. This is not assigning the word "computation" to something it does not apply to; it is literally computation, in the same way that ENIAC computed things via vacuum tubes.

Ok, what about electrical signals and chemical states within each neuron? Or do you treat a neuron as an on or off switch, or a positive or negative unit in the computation?

This is not complicated. It is not contentious. It is not arguable. The brain is a computer, and it computes via neurochemical reactions.

Yes, we are discussing things like consciousness, self, being and experience. Things which have some presence in animals with quite primitive brains, but which have little which could be called self-consciousness.