I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[Nonpareil]

your 'sandwich' image doesn't explain or say anything.

That's good. It's not meant to. It's an illustration of how I felt reading such a nonsensical post.

Koch has flat out said he's a panpsychist

As has been pointed out in this and other threads, this is untrue. Koch is not a panpsychist in the traditional sense. He is a proponent of a modernized, scientific variant of panpsychism, which proposes that consciousness is present in more systems than we currently realize - but, critically, not in all systems.

And he thinks consciousness is fundamental to matter, and therefore not all human consciousness is computational.

Consciousness being fundamental does not mean that it is not computational. In fact, Koch believes that consciousness is entirely computational - specifically, that it is based on computation in integrated systems. This is, in fact, the basis for his variant of panpsychism; under his model, any integrated computational system must be conscious, however dimly.

 

[punshhh]

That's what being conscious means.

Yes I understand your point. But what words mean does not dictate what is out there in the external world. We might have any number of so called (by words) conscious robots, computers, toasters etc around us, all fulfilling the definition or meaning of what a human thinks consciousness is. And be entirely deluded and surrounded by the automatons which we have fashioned to fit, to act out our ideas about our world. We might aswell stare up our own(polite version) our own navel.

Yes.

Your definition of self-conscious is morphing again. Does an ant think, " I think therefore is am"?

That is also not what "precursor" means, and it is irrelevant anyway, since it is still computation.

Precursor is adequate to express the possibility. Ah, so we have computation inside the cell wall now?

The means by which the hardware computes is irrelevant; it can still be done by another computer with different hardware.

This is your assumption, how do you know that there isn't a quality to the phenomenon of consciousness which is intrinsic to the biological hardware? Where is your example (to compare with the control)?

No, actually. The fact that you think this matters indicates that you still don't understand what is actually being said.

So I did point it out then. I fully understand your position and I have pointed out the assumptions implicit, to reach that lofty place.

No, I'm not. Because your definition is nonsensical.

What could be more sensible than to consider that consciousness is a part of, a product of, life?

 

[punshhh]

Obviously not. And?

A person with a defunct brain is non functional, an organism appears to need to be fully functional to be conscious, or move etc. this example does not distinguish between my position and Nonpareil's. And my position rests on the possibility that consciousness is intrinsic to the physical living body, rather than the processing which goes on in the brain.

Ehr, yes. What else could it be?

it is necessary to distinguish between the physical brain and the effects of its processing, such as mind.

I did not imply that. Only that human consciousness requires a human body. Otherwise it would not be a human consciousness.

Yes, I see no reason why a brain kept alive in a jar would not have human consciousness.

A brain that never experienced any sensory input would certainly evolve a very different consciousness. And, we would not likely be able to communicate with it.

Agreed.

How would you conclude the latter?

Can you be more specific?

Why?

if it were not modelling in its computation all the metabolism in the neurons in the brain, I would consider its computation to be incomplete. As such I would want to examine an example to determine if it were conscious.

If your answer to the above is not clearly different than "because it is not alive", then you are entertaining a circular argument.

Yes there is a bit of circularity there, my argument does not rest on that though. As we do not understand how to make living things we aren't in a position to know if life could be fashioned with ropes and pulleys.

 

[MuDPhuD]

Punshhh attempts to differentiate between "consciousness" as "the ability to have experience" and "self-consciousness" as "the sense of self". He further asserts that the latter is metabolic in nature and requires organic life.

.

Perhaps punshhh could clarify this as your explanation of his position is still not clear to me.

 

[Nonpareil]

Yes I understand your point. But what words mean does not dictate what is out there in the external world.

Which doesn't matter, and is the complete opposite of what I am arguing for.

Drop your straw men.

Your definition of self-conscious is morphing again.

No, it isn't.

Does an ant think, " I think therefore is am"?

Self-consciousness does not necessarily entail a particularly advanced intellect.

This is your assumption

No. We've been over this. Turing completeness is not an assumption. The Church-Turing thesis is not an assumption. The brain being Turing equivalent is not an assumption.

how do you know that there isn't a quality to the phenomenon of consciousness which is intrinsic to the biological hardware? Where is your example (to compare with the control)?

Where is your evidence that any part of the hardware must be biological?

What could be more sensible than to consider that consciousness is a part of, a product of, life?

Looking at the actual evidence in hand.

Yes there is a bit of circularity there, my argument does not rest on that though.

Yes, it does.

As we do not understand how to make living things we aren't in a position to know if life could be fashioned with ropes and pulleys.

No one has ever claimed organic life can be fashioned from ropes and pulleys. What was said was that a computer can be fashioned from ropes and pulleys - which is true, albeit difficult, since the hardware involved does not affect the limits of the computation in terms of power.

Perhaps punshhh could clarify this as your explanation of his position is still not clear to me.

That would be because it's incoherent.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

Yes, I see no reason why a brain kept alive in a jar would not have human consciousness.

And be totally insane from sensory deprivation.

***

I suspect the qualia of consciousness to be a function of the entire, two-way feedback loop of the nervous system. Whereas the brain processes, "feeling alive" actually requires the rest of the n.s., I'd posit.

Playback of powerful, traumatic, or exhilarating memories causes physical responses; we re-feel events to relive them. The earliest evolutionary sense, smell, is still seemingly hard-wired and can evoke powerful recall that other methods may fail at.

My guess is that this is all just a fantastically complex version of a simple single cell organism that uses chemotaxis to avoid danger and find food. I think of the n.s. as specialized cells now doing the sensing part of what the single one did, and neurons and so on specializing in the processing and storage. To get the "whole shebang" of consciousness, we need more than just a brain.

[Speculation, but I am finding stuff that allows some confidence so far this is the case.]

 

[MRC_Hans]

And my position rests on the possibility that consciousness is intrinsic to the physical living body, rather than the processing which goes on in the brain.

OK, so that's your position. I must admit I cannot imagine why. However, I/we now await any evidence or arguments you can present in support of that position.

it is necessary to distinguish between the physical brain and the effects of its processing, such as mind.

Is it? Why?

Yes, I see no reason why a brain kept alive in a jar would not have human consciousness.

Well, our human consciousness is a product of our brain function and our experiences as humans. Take away the experiences, and who knows what we will get? The question is, of course, largely hypothetical....

if it were not modelling in its computation all the metabolism in the neurons in the brain, I would consider its computation to be incomplete.

Mmm, I will grant you that apart from the raw computing, there is a lot of hormone stuff going on in the brain, but we must assume that the "perfect mimic" somehow takes that into account as well.

Yes there is a bit of circularity there, my argument does not rest on that though. As we do not understand how to make living things we aren't in a position to know if life could be fashioned with ropes and pulleys.

Actual ropes and pulleys are unlikely to be useful to fashion a sufficiently complex system, but I assume you are only using the expression metaphorically.

Hans

 

[Nonpareil]

Mmm, I will grant you that apart from the raw computing, there is a lot of hormone stuff going on in the brain, but we must assume that the "perfect mimic" somehow takes that into account as well.

The hormones are part of the computation. They are released as a result of signals being passed by neurons, and they affect the computation by enhancing or inhibiting certain signals to and from various areas of the brain.

 

[MRC_Hans]

The hormones are part of the computation. They are released as a result of signals being passed by neurons, and they affect the computation by enhancing or inhibiting certain signals to and from various areas of the brain.

I quite agree. Just pointing out that there is more to it than X number of neurons firing: The brain has a number of internal feed-back systems; it produces a set of its own experiences.

Hans

 

[punshhh]

Perhaps punshhh could clarify this as your explanation of his position is still not clear to me.

Yes it is unclear and incorrect.
I differentiate between consciousness and self-consciousness*, to illustrate the over simplification in the hard materialist interpretation. It appears that by reducing the whole phenomena to one event, computation(Turing equivalence), this intepretation glosses over all considerations of the self, the nature of experience and existence which have been and still are a part of human culture. In preference for a science based physicalist reduction to physical matter and its observed effects. From there explanations of phenomena can be given because they can only be physical processes as described by science and assumptions are not required, indeed they can be dispensed with, as it has all been understood and explained, end of story. Anything else is incoherent and irrational.


*my position is that there is an intrinsic quality of a living organism which results in a living, animated conscious experience as experienced by a human, along with all other lifeforms in more simplified forms depending on their complexity.

That this quality results from a metabolic process which cannot be reduced to the mechanical interaction of the particles found in the cell, in the absence of the entire mix of electrochemical homeostasis within the cell.

This reduces consciousness to a physical chemical process, which probably can't be simulated sufficiently to create the same quality as experienced by a living organism.

Self-consciousness is a quality of complex nervous systems like that in primates, which requires a computation in a mind(reason) which works in a logical way rather like the processing performed by computers.

 

[MRC_Hans]

I differentiate between consciousness and self-consciousness*, to illustrate the over simplification in the hard materialist interpretation. It appears that by reducing the whole phenomena to one event, computation(Turing equivalence), this intepretation glosses over all considerations of the self, the nature of experience and existence which have been and still are a part of human culture. In preference for a science based physicalist reduction to physical matter and its observed effects.

Is there anybody here who claims that experience and our very nature as humans do not form part of our human consciousness? I certainly haven't.

*my position is that there is an intrinsic quality of a living organism which results in a living, animated conscious experience as experienced by a human, along with all other lifeforms in more simplified forms depending on their complexity.

However, there is no reason to make this disctinction: It is far from contrary to the materialist position to assume that our entire being plays part in forming the consciousness. You are kicking in an open door here.

Where the 'pure computation' claim comes in is that IF we were to make an exact replica of a developed human consciousness, THEN it would very likely be conscisous and indeed indistinguishable from the original.

That does not, however, in any way imply that if we were to build a suitably wired and sufficiently complex computer to become conscious, it would even resemble a human consciousness.

Hans

 

[turingtest]

What happened to Doronshadmi? I kind of miss the colorful diagrams and pictures; now the only entertainment here is a Punshhh and Larry Show.

 

[LarryS]

What happened to Doronshadmi? I kind of missed the colorful diagrams and pictures; now the only entertainment here is a Punshhh and Larry Show.

I don't know, I think Nonpareil has been pretty entertaining with his that's the definition of "is" and its all "computation"

 

[Hlafordlaes]

.... *my position is that there is anintrinsic quality of a living organism which results in a living, animated conscious experience as experienced by a human, along with all other lifeforms in more simplified forms depending on their complexity.

That this quality results from a metabolic process which cannot be reduced to the mechanical interaction of the particles found in the cell, in the absence of the entire mix of electrochemical homeostasis within the cell.

That's as you say, a statement of position. You'll need to justify that by stating how other explanations fail, or yours succeeds or discovers more. If it is an irreducible metabolic process, which one of those found in the cell is it, and why can it not be reduced?

This [materialism?] reduces consciousness to a physical chemical process, which probably can't be simulated sufficiently to create the same quality as experienced by a living organism.

Why not? Is this because of a defect stemming from insufficient knowledge about the brain, or do we need special sauce that is immaterial or spiritual in nature?

Self-consciousness is a quality of complex nervous systems like that in primates, which requires a computation in a mind(reason) which works in a logical way rather like the processing performed by computers.

So the mirror test differentiates between those species that have this form of processing, and those that don't? The European magpie passes, but other corvidae that don't are tool users. Explain.

 

[LarryS]

That's as you say, a statement of position. You'll need to justify that by stating how other explanations fail, or yours succeeds or discovers more. If it is an irreducible metabolic process, which one of those found in the cell is it, and why can it not be reduced?


Why not? Is this because of a defect stemming from insufficient knowledge about the brain, or do we need special sauce that is immaterial or spiritual in nature?



So the mirror test differentiates between those species that have this form of processing, and those that don't? The European magpie passes, but other corvidae that don't are tool users. Explain.

since there are no other explanations which succeed, his claim that consciousness requires biologic metabolism is reasonable - until some such other explanation is developed

 

[Nonpareil]

It appears that by reducing the whole phenomena to one event, computation(Turing equivalence), this intepretation glosses over all considerations of the self, the nature of experience and existence which have been and still are a part of human culture.

"The nature of experience and existence" is a useful phrase. Entirely meaningless, but it sounds impressive.

In preference for a science based physicalist reduction to physical matter and its observed effects. From there explanations of phenomena can be given because they can only be physical processes as described by science and assumptions are not required, indeed they can be dispensed with, as it has all been understood and explained, end of story. Anything else is incoherent and irrational.

Why, yes. Making up things that don't exist and pretending that things can't be explained is irrational.

And usually incoherent.

*my position is that there is an intrinsic quality of a living organism which results in a living, animated conscious experience as experienced by a human, along with all other lifeforms in more simplified forms depending on their complexity.

That this quality results from a metabolic process which cannot be reduced to the mechanical interaction of the particles found in the cell, in the absence of the entire mix of electrochemical homeostasis within the cell.

And you have no basis for this.

I don't know, I think Nonpareil has been pretty entertaining with his that's the definition of "is" and its all "computation"

I do my best.

You're still refusing to accept the basic definition of a word, though. That's rather worrying.

since there are no other explanations which succeed

Except computation.

 

[punshhh]

The hormones are part of the computation. They are released as a result of signals being passed by neurons, and they affect the computation by enhancing or inhibiting certain signals to and from various areas of the brain.

Quite and presumably the homeostasis, the millions of chemical reactions in the cell and the 3 dimensional structure of the atoms present is simulated too.

 

[punshhh]

Is there anybody here who claims that experience and our very nature as humans do not form part of our human consciousness? I certainly haven't.

By referring to a glossing over of these issues, I don't mean they are not considered a part of human consciousness. But rather that their philosophical implications, such as the possibility of idealism, or a soul or a god, are simply dismissed as fairy tales, as all is physical matter as described by science now and all the fairy tales and nonsense such as philosophy are now obsolete.

However, there is no reason to make this disctinction: It is far from contrary to the materialist position to assume that our entire being plays part in forming the consciousness. You are kicking in an open door here.

I make it because, "entire being" includes a living organism. If it is in any way not functioning as a living organism, there is no way it can be conscious.

Where the 'pure computation' claim comes in is that IF we were to make an exact replica of a developed human consciousness, THEN it would very likely be conscisous and indeed indistinguishable from the original.

Or an automaton, cleverly designed (by us) to entertain us and create the illusion in our minds that it is conscious.

That does not, however, in any way imply that if we were to build a suitably wired and sufficiently complex computer to become conscious, it would even resemble a human consciousness.

Agreed.

 

[punshhh]

What happened to Doronshadmi? I kind of miss the colorful diagrams and pictures; now the only entertainment here is a Punshhh and Larry Show.

Sorry, I would happily bring you a Truman Show on a plate, but if I step out of line at all I will be jumped on by a proportion of the members.

 

[punshhh]

That's as you say, a statement of position. You'll need to justify that by stating how other explanations fail, or yours succeeds or discovers more. If it is an irreducible metabolic process, which one of those found in the cell is it, and why can it not be reduced?

I am referring to cellular life, specifically. Look at all living things on the planet (except for a few very primitive "living" things like viruses), they are all cells and groups of cells cooperating, they may even have, all come from one cell, in the beginning.

Why not? Is this because of a defect stemming from insufficient knowledge about the brain, or do we need special sauce that is immaterial or spiritual in nature?

This brings us to another issue I have not raised yet. That consciousness is produced by a physical material and its electrochemical interactions in three dimensional space. Whereas to simulate this interaction, firstly would require a three dimensional modelling and secondly would probably require some kind of simulation of an existence.

So the mirror test differentiates between those species that have this form of processing, and those that don't? The European magpie passes, but other corvidae that don't are tool users. Explain.

One would be required to define self-consciousness precisely before being able to determine which advanced animals have it.