I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

ok, so what set is what exists in?

Things that exist can be, hypothetically, shown to not exist, or shown to not be what we think they are. They are therefore falsifiable.

Of course, first they have to be literally shown. A claim, without evidence, that something new exists is worthless.
 
As this discussion is about alternative ontologies to the one humanity can scientifically derive, presumably the alternatives all fall in set X. So to state that set Y is the only set worth considering and set X is pie in the sky, is a slam dunk, or a checkmate.

It follows logically from our axioms and observations. I apologise if it shatters anyone's fantasies.
 
I will have look at my shortcomings later today. I am getting a some insight into your reasoning here, as you've stated this before.

So there are things which are falsifiable in principle (Y) and there are those things which can't be falsified in principle (X). Presumably there is a method of determining which set something is in?

Let me guess, set Y contains things humanity can directly interact with, or detect, or logically determine.

Set X contains everything else, what exists, the facts of existence, an almost infinite number of other things.

As this discussion is about alternative ontologies to the one humanity can scientifically derive, presumably the alternatives all fall in set X. So to state that set Y is the only set worth considering and set X is pie in the sky, is a slam dunk, or a checkmate.


I had to track down the Wiki link re 'falsified in principle' - and keep in mind that stating a claim is falsifiable does not alone add value to that claim, that does not mean the claim is worth serious attention. For example I could claim that 'All unicorns are pink' . . . and this is a falsifiable claim because all we'd have to find is one non-pink unicorn.
 
I had to track down the Wiki link re 'falsified in principle' - and keep in mind that stating a claim is falsifiable does not alone add value to that claim, that does not mean the claim is worth serious attention. For example I could claim that 'All unicorns are pink' . . . and this is a falsifiable claim because all we'd have to find is one non-pink unicorn.

You are correct that being falsifiable does not make a claim any more true. Being unfalsifiable, however, makes it less true.
 
You are correct that being falsifiable does not make a claim any more true. Being unfalsifiable, however, makes it less true.

I wouldn't say it makes it "less true" because that assumes that an unfalsifiable statement gets to play the game of investigation. An unfalsifiable statement cannot be investigated for its validity, in a strict interpretation of Russell's Teapot.
 
What evidence do you use to falsify subjective experience since you effectively have zero ability to objectively adjudicate it?

I'm really confused - I'm assuming you think there is some great revelation in your question but I'm blowed if I can see it.

And how would we falsify your statements, the same way we do for all such statements, we ask and we look at the evidence we have access to.
 
I'm really confused - I'm assuming you think there is some great revelation in your question but I'm blowed if I can see it.

And how would we falsify your statements, the same way we do for all such statements, we ask and we look at the evidence we have access to.

My initial interpretation is whether a subjective experience has a measurable process, rather than being a reported outcome.

Is there a measurable process in brain activity? I feel confident from the evidence that there is. Is that brain activity the process of experience, and how can we be confident in that may be the crux (or at least a crux) of his argument. It's a fair concern, but I believe the evidence adjudicates a brain process directly influencing experiences. That means a suggestive experience is attenuated by objective processes, and the classification of them being subjective is because we aren't investigating experiences as brain processes but as categories.

From a statistical standpoint this is now a data issue (and all its biases), not a philosophical one. But philosophers really love to consider experience to be illusory by definition, otherwise love and Shakespear won't be referenced in publications as much anymore, and who would want that?
 

I had found that earlier. It starts this way:
Falsifiability or refutability of a statement, hypothesis, or theory is an inherent possibility to prove it to be false. A statement is called falsifiable if it is possible to conceive an observation or an argument which proves the statement in question to be false. In this sense, falsify is synonymous with nullify, meaning not "to commit fraud" but "show to be false". Some philosophers argue that science must be falsifiable.[1]

It's a good start on what "falsifiable" means, but there's no "Principle of Falsifiability" on offer.

That's what I'm asking about. How does the idea of "falsifiable" lead anywhere and how can we use it to make statements about reality?

As a side note, I don't think this helps materialism much, since we'd expect anything which "falsified" something else, to be in its own turn falsifiable. The chain has no place to start, unless, as we actually do, we accept some original point of view, such as materialism or idealism.

Still, now that I have a good idea what falsifiable means, what principle is derived from it? Is this just Popper revisited and elevated from a claim about science to a full-on epistemology?
 
It's a good start on what "falsifiable" means, but there's no "Principle of Falsifiability" on offer.

It's a principle, therefore that's how I refered to it. If you say "that's the idea of marriage contracts", do you expect to find a wiki reference to "idea of marriage contracts" ?

That's what I'm asking about. How does the idea of "falsifiable" lead anywhere and how can we use it to make statements about reality?

I have already answered this: every true statement is falsifiable, so when something is not falsifiable, it's reasonable to dismiss it, or adjust it so that it is.
 
I have already answered this: every true statement is falsifiable, so when something is not falsifiable, it's reasonable to dismiss it, or adjust it so that it is.

Thank you. I will take this to be the "falsifiable principle," that every true statement is falsifiable.

In that light, I don't understand why it should be thought valuable at all. For certainly, we operate on axioms which cannot be falsified and we use those axioms to derive everything else we believe about the world around us.

I believe I am a thinking, living creature. I have no way to falsify this, and hence, according to the principle, it cannot be true. But I certainly believe it and can't imagine not believing it.

As principles go, I'm not thinking much of it. It might work as a principle used in a specific discipline, so we might say that things that are not falsifiable cannot be addressed by the scientific method, but even that weaker application has problems.
 
I'm really confused - I'm assuming you think there is some great revelation in your question but I'm blowed if I can see it.

And how would we falsify your statements, the same way we do for all such statements, we ask and we look at the evidence we have access to.


….perhaps you oughta actually read the thing before jumping to wrong conclusions.

Belz said nothing about statement’s. Belz said things that can’t be falsified don’t happen (in principle…of course…the usual cop-out).

I described a whole pile of things that happen. They’re all internal subjective experiences. When you, I, or any of the other 7 billion people on this planet engage in internal subjective experience, we do not vocalize every moment and detail. In fact…very little of it may ever be explicitly externalized. That is why they are described as internal subjective experiences. Not a single one of them can even come close to being falsified. Statements about anything have no bearing on the issue. Statements are simply other things that happen. Falsifying a statement is trivially easy.

What you people simply do not seem to understand…and Belz in particular with his pie-in-the-sky metaphysical garbage…are the actual implications of being able to explicitly and definitively adjudicate subjective human experience (a prerequisite for falsification of those events).

Besides the fact that there have been more than a few who have argued that it is simply impossible to achieve (for very good reasons which no one here seems to have any interest in exploring), one of the implications would be that it would be possible to establish a direct connection between mathematics…which is currently an exclusively abstract cognitive vocabulary… and the universe that it seems to so comprehensively represent. We would know what specific electro-bio-chemical activity generates what specific cognitive mathematical activity. And since electro-bio-chemical activity inevitably reduces to physics / mathematics…we would establish a direct connection between mathematics… and mathematics…perhaps even in real time (depending on the capacity of whatever one of Belz’s magical machines the mathematician is interacting with…at which point the mathematician so engaged might self-destruct or implode into a black hole).

Meaning…the age-old question of ‘does mathematics actually exist’ would finally be (conditionally) resolved.

…so yeah…you may lack the capacity to recognize the revelations inherent in these matters but, be assured, others do not.

My initial interpretation is whether a subjective experience has a measurable process, rather than being a reported outcome.

Is there a measurable process in brain activity? I feel confident from the evidence that there is. Is that brain activity the process of experience, and how can we be confident in that may be the crux (or at least a crux) of his argument. It's a fair concern, but I believe the evidence adjudicates a brain process directly influencing experiences. That means a suggestive experience is attenuated by objective processes, and the classification of them being subjective is because we aren't investigating experiences as brain processes but as categories.

From a statistical standpoint this is now a data issue (and all its biases), not a philosophical one. But philosophers really love to consider experience to be illusory by definition, otherwise love and Shakespear won't be referenced in publications as much anymore, and who would want that?


For one thing…whatever data issue it may eventually ‘be’ is a very very very long way from being effectively adjudicated. For another thing…there are two categories or activity occurring, both of which exhibit dimensions of complexity unique to science. The first is the brain…which has been described as the most complex object in the known universe (the internet is not a singular and therefore simply is a non-starter). The second (which is so often trivialized to the point of stupidity on these threads) is the thing we call a ‘you’. A ‘you’ is also a reality characterized by all-but infinite degrees of complexity and nuance (contrary to the Jack and Jill psychology that so many seem to think defines the entire human race). When you combine these two phenomenological categories…you get the result that Belz seems to think can be so easily adjudicated… for no other reason than his blind faith in the gospel of science.

Belz will insist that, in principle, science can deal with the issue. Besides the fact that such proclamations are all-but worthless (you may as well be arguing that, in principle, the flying spaghetti monster does, in fact, exist in one of the infinite number of universes that may, or may not, ever come to be) I would argue that there are substantial issues that make this problem not only unique in science (and thus not subject to conventional scientific philosophy) but may also make it insoluble.

…and it may eventually be a data issue (it already is). But when it comes right down to it, the only thing with the capacity to accurately adjudicate the data (IOW…understand), would be another human being (or some variety of advanced being). And in case it has escaped your attention…the process of adjudicating data IS philosophy. We exist as meaning…not data. And the varieties of meaning that resonate most profoundly are precisely those you just dismissed…love…and Shakespeare…and all that nonsense.

…so…if you, or anyone, ever achieves the capacity to collect all the data relevant to the human experience of love what you will discover is that the only way to accurately adjudicate that data is to experience the meaning of love. Otherwise…what are you processing? Just data.
 
It follows logically from our axioms and observations. I apologise if it shatters anyone's fantasies.
Except you can't assert that Y is valid and X isn't.
I don't want to shatter your illusions, but you didn't answer my question;

"presumably there is a method of determining which set something is in?"
 
Except you can't assert that Y is valid and X isn't.

All true statements are falsifiable.
All unfalsifiable statements are either false, or they have no truth value because they have no relation to reality.

So yes, we can assert that Y is valid and X is not.
 
Things that exist can be, hypothetically, shown to not exist, or shown to not be what we think they are. They are therefore falsifiable.
Yes that all sounds good and rational, but unfortunately it doesn't stand up to scrutiny. There are numerous problems with it, not least the arrogance to think that humans can determine what exists and its dimensional basis. Or presume to be able to determine principles about things beyond their understanding.

Perhaps an omniscient being might, hypothetically, be able to consider the principle.
Of course, first they have to be literally shown. A claim, without evidence, that something new exists is worthless.
This is putting the blinkers back on

So the saying goes; anything which is not supported by scientific evidence is worthless, meaningless, incoherent, irrational.

Anything which is does not have evidence which can be assessed to be either falsifiable in principle or not by a human is meaningless and should be cast aside as not existing(to avoid irrationality)

Its Blinkers all the way down.
 
All true statements are falsifiable.
All unfalsifiable statements are either false, or they have no truth value because they have no relation to reality.

So yes, we can assert that Y is valid and X is not.
Statements are things that people say. This is irrelevant as we are concerned both with what may or may not exist/be the case, outside the mind and what alternative philosophies to materialism can be considered in the light of what existence entails.
 
This is putting the blinkers back on

So the saying goes; anything which is not supported by scientific evidence is worthless, meaningless, incoherent, irrational.

Anything which is does not have evidence which can be assessed to be either falsifiable in principle or not by a human is meaningless and should be cast aside as not existing(to avoid irrationality)

Its Blinkers all the way down.

And yet without these supposed blinkers, what happens is that anyone can make up anything they want, claim it to be true, and everyone else has to accept it. Regardless of the clear fact that it's entirely made up and backed by nothing.

That invisible, incorporeal, heatless-fire breathing dragon in my garage? I don't need evidence. You simply have to agree with me that it's there. Otherwise I get to insult you with a claim that you're intentionally blinding yourself to the truth.
 
And yet without these supposed blinkers, what happens is that anyone can make up anything they want, claim it to be true, and everyone else has to accept it.

Anyone can make up anything they want.
Anyone can claim whatever they want to be true.
No one has to accept it though. They don't even have to accept it in the face of a mountain of evidence. They can always claim the opposite is true under the second statement.

Ain't freedom grand?
 
….perhaps you oughta actually read the thing before jumping to wrong conclusions.

I did and it would seem to be you that is jumping to conclusions not supported by actual evidence.
Belz said nothing about statement’s. Belz said things that can’t be falsified don’t happen (in principle…of course…the usual cop-out).

I used to "statements" to cover the list of behaviours you created.
I described a whole pile of things that happen. They’re all internal subjective experiences. When you, I, or any of the other 7 billion people on this planet engage in internal subjective experience, we do not vocalize every moment and detail. In fact…very little of it may ever be explicitly externalized. That is why they are described as internal subjective experiences. Not a single one of them can even come close to being falsified. ...snip...

Everyone of the statements you came up with can be falsified. Your mistake is in assuming your conclusion and then using your conclusion in your argument to support your conclusion - that is circular reasoning.

By the way all this is well and good but would you care to address the opening post? I would be interested in knowing your answer to the question that I started this thread with.
 
Yes that all sounds good and rational, but unfortunately it doesn't stand up to scrutiny. There are numerous problems with it, not least the arrogance to think that humans can determine what exists and its dimensional basis. Or presume to be able to determine principles about things beyond their understanding.
...snip...

Those are claims - have you evidence for any of those claims?
 

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