A'isha
Miss Schoolteacher
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Yes.
Ill prepared and poorly coordinated, the Arab armies were dragged into the war by popular pressure in their home states, and because their leaders each had his own agenda of territorial expansion. Securing the establishment of a Palestinian state along the lines of Resolution 181 was less a motive for the Arab leaders who sent their armies to Palestine than establishing their own territorial claims or thwarting those of their rivals in the Arab coalition.
Ben-Gurion's initial defensive strategy of containment in the face of the onslaught of local Arab militias against Jewish settlements and access roads during the first phase of the war could not be sustained for long. Plan D, launched in March 1948, was not the first time the forces of the Yishuv went on the offensive. The aggressive defense ordered in December 1947 in the wake of the initial, even spectacular, success of Abd'el Khadr el-Husseni's forces in defeating Haganah units and encircling Jerusalem, meant that the Haganah would now respond to Arab attacks with decisive blows against Arab villages and with the expulsion of their residents. High Commissioner Cunningham believed that it was this overreaction by the Yishuv that further escalated the conflict.
[...]
'What are the borders of the new state?' wondered one of the ministers, Pinhas Rosen, at a meeting of the People's Directory on 21 May 1948, that is, a week after the Declaration of Independence. Ben-Gurion's reply was that 'everything is possible ... there is nothing a priori'. As a matter of fact, when independence was declared on 15 May the borders of the new state were already well beyond those of partition. Four out of the five mixed Jewish-Arab cities (Tiberias, Haifa, Safed, and Jaffa) were by this time emptied of their Arab inhabitants, and more than a hundred Arab villages had been taken over.
[...]
The invasion by the Arab armies did not necessarily mean that the Jews now faced superior Arab forces. The invading Arab armies were ill prepared for battle, and poorly equipped; they suffered from a total lack of coordination and very low motivation. Moreover, flamboyant rhetoric apart, the Arab leaders did not send sufficient forces to Palestine as they needed the bulk of their armies to protect their regimes back home from popular revolution or military takeover. At practically every stage of the war, except during the first weeks of the Arab invasion until the first truce, Israel was able to put together forces far superior to those of its enemies. It was none other than Ben-Gurion himself who recognized in a meeting of the Israeli Cabinet by the end of the war (19 December 1948) that 'this is not true' that it was a war of the few against the many. 'Though it sounds somewhat strange, we had then an army that was bigger than theirs,' he acknowledged on more than one occasion.
[...]
A major strategic debate in late September 1948 between Ben-Gurion and his generals, and within the government itself, was to have a crucial impact on the future shape of the State of Israel and its relations with the Hashemite kingdom [of Jordan]. The debate was also important in the sense that it referred to an issue - that of the West Bank - that for years, until 1967, would remain in the minds of generals and politicians as 'unfinished business'. Ben-Gurion was never very happy with the understandings that had been reached with King Abdullah before the war and he pushed for the occupation of the West Bank, of biblical Eretz-Israel.
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It is not at all clear, as maintained by a conventional Israeli myth, that the Palestinian exodus was encouraged by the Arab states and by local leaders. Benny Morris found no evidence to show 'that either the leaders of the Arab states or the Mufti ordered or directly encouraged the mass exodus'. Indeed, Morris found evidence to the effect that the local Arab leadership and militia commanders discouraged flight, and Arab radio stations issued calls to the Palestinians to stay put, and even to return to their homes if they had already left.
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As a matter of fact, the leaders of the surrounding Arab states, who were reluctant to be drawn into the war, had no particular interest in the Palestinian exodus. For is was precisely that exodus that subjected them to an irresistible popular pressure for a war they were not exactly eager to join.
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This collective state of mind [referring to the "tendency inherited from the Yishuv years to ignore the existence of the Palestinians as a community and now to repress the memory of their plight"] can perhaps be best exemplified by the Israelis' conventional perception of the 1948 war. The first phase of the hostilities prior to the Arab invasion, the civil war between the Yishuv and the local Arab community, was probably the fiercest and the one that posed the most dramatic challenge to the survival of both communities. but the popular idea of Israel's War of Independence as cultivated over the years ignored that particular part of the struggle against the Palestinians fighting for their lands and rights. It focused instead on the heroic stand of the tiny Yishuv against the invading Arab armies. The Israelis chose to repress the memory of their war against a dispossessed authochthonous Palestinian community claiming national rights, and preferred the ethos of the struggle against foreign and supposedly superior invading Arab armies.
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Throughout 1948, however, King Abdullah gave a vivid demonstration of what would be in the years to come Jordan's strategic predicament. Jordan was torn by the difficult quest for balance between the temptation to come to an accommodation with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians and to have security guarantees against her enemies in the Arab world on the one hand, and the necessity not to lose her inter-Arab legitimacy by dissociating herself too openly from the Arab consensus on the other. This was certainly a most complex and dangerous exercise in in diplomatic and strategic acrobatics. Paradoxically, to protect his deal with the Zionists, King Abdullah had to become, as it were, the leader of the all-Arab invasion of Palestine. He knew, as he put it to the commander of army Glubb Pasha, that 'the Jews are too strong; it is a mistake to go to war'.
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