Epiphenomenalism

[Titus Rivas]

The gap is too big

Dear Dr. Stupid,

Let's just leave it at that.

The reason why the first link may not have worked may be that I'm based at the Netherlands.

In my view, our standpoints are too different (at least on this subject) to make an interesting exchange possible.

Best wishes,

Titus

P.S.: I do have another thing in common with you, namely that I like Stimpson a lot (and Ren of course). But that's another subject

 

[Titus Rivas]

Interesting

This is really interesting stuff Titus. You certainly know what you're talking about. I hope you'll be sticking around! Incidentally I saw some of your contributions on the philosophy board in the NDE thread

Thanks a lot, Ian. I've been browsing through some of your own messages and they seem interesting alright. Ever heard of this other interesting Ian by the way?

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

In my view, our standpoints are too different (at least on this subject) to make an interesting exchange possible.

But, er, but, wait, ... this can't possibly be. In philosophy, you don't get to throw up your hands, do you?

From the article about Dr. Stevenson:

His strict methods systematically rule out all possible "normal" explanations for the child’s memories.

Wow! Imagine the Nobel prize this guy could win if he simply published a paper with the list of all possible normal explanations for this. It boggles the mind.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: The gap is too big

In my view, our standpoints are too different (at least on this subject) to make an interesting exchange possible.

Or indeed any meaningful exchange possible. I should have realised this a long time ago in my exchanges with Stimpson. How can you communicate with someone who denies that which is so obvious? ie our subjective experiences.

Ah! Just seen your reply to me. Yes I have heard of him. Which reminds me that I may as well order this from the library.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian asked:

How can you communicate with someone who denies that which is so obvious? ie our subjective experiences.

By explaining why it's so obvious in compelling terms that don't involve words like obvious, instinct, irreducible, by definition, and f*ckwit.

No wonder philosophy runs around in circles for millennia. Everything is obvious!

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Or indeed any meaningful exchange possible. I should have realised this a long time ago in my exchanges with Stimpson. How can you communicate with someone who denies that which is so obvious? ie our subjective experiences.

I do not deny the existence of our subjective experiences. I just deny that they are irreducibly subjective. In fact, the very fact that I claim that subjective experiences objectively exist means that I could not possibly be denying their existence.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian,



I do not deny the existence of our subjective experiences. I just deny that they are irreducibly subjective. In fact, the very fact that I claim that subjective experiences objectively exist means that I could not possibly be denying their existence.

Dr. Stupid

What does it mean to say they objectively exist if only ever one person can be acqauinted with such experiences? They are subjective by the very meaning of the term.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

What does it mean to say they objectively exist if only ever one person can be acqauinted with such experiences?

That they have an effect on the world, and that in principle, if science is valid, it should be possible to provide an explanation for them based on observation of those effects.

In other words, the exact same thing it means to say that anything is objective.

The fact that one person cannot experience another person's experiences, does not mean that they are not objective. Every brain is slightly different. It is not physically possible for your brain to perform the same processes that mine does. Does that mean that those processes are not objective?

They are subjective by the very meaning of the term.

Of course. But that doesn't mean that they do not objectively exist. To claim that something is irreducibly subjective is to claim that it cannot possibly have any observable effect on anything. In other words, epiphenomenalism. That is an incoherent and nonsensical position.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
What does it mean to say they objectively exist if only ever one person can be acqauinted with such experiences?
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Stimp
That they have an effect on the world, and that in principle, if science is valid, it should be possible to provide an explanation for them based on observation of those effects.

That's not what objective means. And I should point out that a conscious experience amounts to more than an effect on the world (even granted it does have an effect).

The fact that one person cannot experience another person's experiences, does not mean that they are not objective.

It's no good Stimp, going to have to use that in my sig!

Every brain is slightly different. It is not physically possible for your brain to perform the same processes that mine does. Does that mean that those processes are not objective?

These processes can be detected from a third person perspective. My raw experience of love cannot be.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
They are subjective by the very meaning of the term.
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Of course. But that doesn't mean that they do not objectively exist.

Objectively exist? I don't understand what you mean. Specify the differences between objective existence compared to non-objective existence. Come to that compare it to subjective existence as well.

To claim that something is irreducibly subjective is to claim that it cannot possibly have any observable effect on anything.

I'm baffled by this logic.

 

[Dancing David]

Objective experience: a photon enters the eye and reacts with a receptor

Subjective experience: I see red.

I can't have an experience without the objective world.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian, you're the one who has to define subjective existence. Really, I don't know what that means. What makes something subjective as opposed to objective? It appears that you use consciousness as an example, because no one can experience your consciousness except you. But that is true for almost everything else. No one can experience what it's like to be the weather, either, or a river.

There are virtually an infinite number of things we cannot experience. Yet you select one particular thing, your consciousness, and promote that to special status. In one sense, your consciousness is less special than the weather or a river, because at least I can experience my consciousness to get an idea of what yours is like. Neither of us can experience a river.

~~ Paul

 

[Dymanic]

Earlier in the thread (when the virtues of reductionist methods were being weighed) I mentioned that I liked the way this was put:

Originally posted by Titus

Within a rational context, one should only reduce something real to the extent that it doesn't lose its defining characteristics.

In other words, while reductionism will always be an indispensable tool, when applied to some things (such as consciousness) a point of diminishing returns is reached. This occurs before the final point of ultimate reducibility is reached. In my view, this failure of reductionist methods (which have served so well in other areas) is why an understanding of consciousness continues to elude us, and promises to continue to do so. We overrun the level at which our hope of understanding lies, proceed to the point of irreducibility, and, stubbornly clinging to our favorite tool, flail about there looking for answers. We are like the man who, having lost his keys in the darkness, looks for them under a street lamp "because the light is better there".

We need to devise new tools, and epiphenomenalism, though a failure, appears to be the result of efforts to do that.

As far as "Dr. Ian"'s site...I felt that some very dubious (and rather familiar) reasons for accepting his 'results' were being presented. I'm afraid I'd have to say it was Reader's Digest all the way.

 

[Loki]

(ApparentlySoberIan wrote) : What does it mean to say they objectively exist if only ever one person can be acqauinted with such experiences? They are subjective by the very meaning of the term.

Oh dear ... Ian appears to be channeling UCE! I fear a definitive definition approaching!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Dymanic said:

In other words, while reductionism will always be an indispensable tool, when applied to some things (such as consciousness) a point of diminishing returns is reached. This occurs before the final point of ultimate reducibility is reached.

Why do you say so?

It seems to me that people think reductionism can't explain consciousness because consciousness is an experiential thing. But no one is saying that reductionism will allow someone else to experience your consciousness. We are only saying that will explain how consciousness arises.

You will always be able to say "Science cannot describe what my consciousness feels like," but that doesn't mean that science won't be able to explain how consciousness arises in you. This is how consciousness is both objective and subjective.

It's important not to make a leap from the inherent uniqueness of individual consciousness to an assumption of incomprehensibility. Imagine I never allowed anyone else to observe my left foot. Does that elevate my left foot to the status of being something other than the rest of my body?

~~ Paul

 

[Dymanic]

I guess what I'm saying is simply that trying to explain the property of 'consciousness' at the level of potassium ions (or, worse, quantum effects) is sort of like trying to explain the property of 'wetness' by examining water molecules (and hydrogen atoms, and oxygen atoms, and their various sub-components, etc). In other words, while the necessary elements may indeed be present at that level, correlating them in a way that produces a useful model for understanding may turn out to be virtually hopeless at too low a level. I think consciousness is produced by a pattern of relationships, and like any pattern, the key to seeing it is finding the proper frame of reference.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I agree completely. We'll need many layers between atoms and consciousness to understand it, just as we need many layers between atoms and software applications to understand them. But I think we can build up these layers in a sort of counter-reductionist (increasonist?) way until we've built up to the origins of consciousness.

~~ Paul

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Paul

But I think we can build up these layers in a sort of counter-reductionist (increasonist?) way until we've built up to the origins of consciousness.

That is our great hope. I wish I could be more optomistic about our prospects, but I think it may depend a lot on something like luck.

Suppose we have some large and complicated piece of machinery of alien design, and when operating, it produces some behavior we wish to understand -- the result of some unknown property. We carefully disassemble the machine, placing the parts in order on a long bench as we remove them, and proceed to subject each of them to a painstaking process of microscopic examination and chemical analysis. We might learn a lot from this without coming any closer to understanding the particular behavior that most interests us, especially if the particular property that is most important in producing that behavior happens to be the machine's center of gravity. Once we know that this is the case, the results of our detailed examination suddenly become exponentially more useful; we can calculate with great precision the effects of a slight change here or there; but lacking that critical frame of reference is a major obstacle, and zeroing in on that key is something that might not easily emerge directly from our efforts.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But we don't just take the machine apart and poke around at the components. We do experiments with the machine. We move it around. We press buttons. We try it in the dark. We also poke at large subassemblies. It's like the way we learn about genetics. We don't just stare at chromosomes all day. We try all sorts of crazy experiments with flies and mice and men.

That said, I don't expect neurophysiology to turn into child's play any time soon.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

I agree completely. We'll need many layers between atoms and consciousness to understand it, just as we need many layers between atoms and software applications to understand them. But I think we can build up these layers in a sort of counter-reductionist (increasonist?) way until we've built up to the origins of consciousness.

~~ Paul

Two questions:
When the software assures you it is alive, is it?

Keeping the problem of consciousness simple -- alive vs not-alive -- how does one know that life was forced to emerge given the correct physical structure, or that life -- at it's whim -- chooses to "enliven" said structure?

There is no doubt that it is easier to force "life" to depart leaving an inert lump.

 

[Loki]

hammegk,

When the software assures you it is alive, is it?

No, but it may be conscious - but since you insist on defining any difference aaway then I guess you won't find my answer very acceptable?

Keeping the problem of consciousness simple -- alive vs not-alive -- how does one know that life was forced to emerge given the correct physical structure, or that life -- at it's whim -- chooses to "enliven" said structure?

Doesn't it follow from the assumptions?