Epiphenomenalism

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

I personally know of the case of an influential Dutch skeptic who is not a physicalist (I'm not allowed to reveal his name).

And??? I know plenty of skeptics who are not physicalists, and plenty who are. So what? I don't know of any skeptics who are epiphenomenalists.

Besides none other than Paul Kurtz has responded to an inquiry on my part saying that he was a "non-reductive physicalist" himself!

Does he call himself an eliminative physicalist? If so, are you aware that the distinction is purely semantic?

By the way, you're very wrong about 'most psychologists' being reductionists. I'm a graduate of theoretical psychology myself, and at the faculty I studied (not too long ago) most psychologists clearly seemed to agree that consciousness could not be reduced to the (non-conscious) workings of the brain.

Well, I find that very odd, given that all of the research currently being done towards trying to actually understand consciousness, is done from the perspective of it being a physical process of the brain.

Perhaps I'm being very naive about most (non-zetetic) skeptics. But most intellectuals I know (personally or through their works) don't find reductionism a scientific or even rational position at all, as it simply denies the obvious.

And what obvious thing is it denying? Why is reductionism unscientific? I assume that you are only referring to reductionism with respect to the consciousness problem? If not, how do you account for the fact that a considerable amount of science is, in fact, reductionist? Chemistry and Biology are both completely formed within the framework of reductionism.

That isn't acceptable science I would say. At least not in any definition I was taught.

Reductionism is a big part of science. It is all about explaining stuff you don't understand in terms of stuff you do. I see no reason why applying this principle to consciousness would be considered unscientific.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

Stimpson:


>And??? I know plenty of skeptics who are not physicalists, and plenty who are. So what? I don't know of any skeptics who are epiphenomenalists.< Not being a physicalist equals -in this context (of the articles I've linked to my original message)- the acceptance of an impact upon reality (often referred to as efficacy) of a non-physical consciousness. The rejection of physicalism is hard to reconcile with an overall skepticism towards for example PSI-phenomena, as any type of conscious efficacy is basically just as 'mysterious' as PSI.


>Does he [Paul Kurtz] call himself an eliminative physicalist? If so, are you aware that the distinction is purely semantic?< Of course he did not, how could he in this context?! He obviously meant he accepted consciousness cannot be reduced to physiology but does not have any impact on reality.
I've never encountered "eliminative" as a synonym for "non-reductive", though I have seen it as a synonym for reductive!

Besides epiphenomenalism, this position is also sometimes said to be held by identity theory (which by the way is incoherent for the very same analytical reason as epiphenomenalism, as pointed out in my first linked article).


>Well, I find that very odd, given that all of the research currently being done towards trying to actually understand consciousness, is done from the perspective of it being a physical process of the brain.< Perhaps you should surf the internet a bit more on this topic. See for example the websites by David Chalmers.


>And what obvious thing is it denying?< The non-reducible character of consciousness. Subjective, qualitative experiences cannot be reduced to anything non-subjective or merely quantitative.

>Why is reductionism unscientific?< Of course I was only referring to reductionism applied to the ontology of consciousness, according to which consciousness can be reduced to neurology or functional computation.

>I assume that you are only referring to reductionism with respect to the consciousness problem?< That's what I'm saying, yes.

>Reductionism is a big part of science. It is all about explaining stuff you don't understand in terms of stuff you do. I see no reason why applying this principle to consciousness would be considered unscientific.< The initial attempt at applying the principle in this case was not unscientific as such, but it became unscientific the very moment theorists stuck to it, eventhough it had become quite clear already that the principle could not possibly apply in this particular setting.
Within a rational context, one should only reduce something real to the extent that it doesn't lose its defining characteristics. Another example of the application of the principle of reduction which clearly goes too far is ontological nihilism: the reduction of everything to nothing.

Satisfied?

Titus

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

Some friendly advice: Your posts will be much easier to follow if you use the quote feature.

Not being a physicalist equals -in this context (of the articles I've linked to my original message)- the acceptance of an impact upon reality (often referred to as efficacy) of a non-physical consciousness. The rejection of physicalism is hard to reconcile with an overall skepticism towards for example PSI-phenomena, as any type of conscious efficacy is basically just as 'mysterious' as PSI.

This is a rather strange view of skepticism. Skeptics aren't skeptical of PSI because it is "mysterious", but simply because there is no supporting evidence for it.

Even if you (for whatever reason) believe that the mind has some sort of non-physical causally efficacious component, there is no reason to believe in PSI, because there is no evidence that it exists.

>Well, I find that very odd, given that all of the research currently being done towards trying to actually understand consciousness, is done from the perspective of it being a physical process of the brain.< Perhaps you should surf the internet a bit more on this topic. See for example the websites by David Chalmers.

Perhaps I should have been more clear, and said scientific research. I don't consider unverifiable metaphysical speculation to be "research".

>And what obvious thing is it denying?< The non-reducible character of consciousness. Subjective, qualitative experiences cannot be reduced to anything non-subjective or merely quantitative.

This is certainly not obvious to me. Perhaps you meant intuitively obvious? If so, there is nothing unscientific about rejecting something which is intuitively obvious, particularly when there is substantial scientific evidence to justify doing so.

>Why is reductionism unscientific?< Of course I was only referring to reductionism applied to the ontology of consciousness, according to which consciousness can be reduced to neurology or functional computation.

Referring to consciousness as an ontological existent is, itself, unscientific. Not only do ontology and metaphysics have no place in scientific research, but to assume that consciousness is ontologically distinct from the rest of reality is to assume, a-priori, that it cannot be a process of the brain. To then reject the scientific theory that it is a process of the brain on that basis, is simply begging the question.

>Reductionism is a big part of science. It is all about explaining stuff you don't understand in terms of stuff you do. I see no reason why applying this principle to consciousness would be considered unscientific.< The initial attempt at applying the principle in this case was not unscientific as such, but it became unscientific the very moment theorists stuck to it, eventhough it had become quite clear already that the principle could not possibly apply in this particular setting.

Can you justify this claim? Are you unaware that the scientific theory that consciousness is a set of physical brain processes is a very successful one, which has led to all sorts of insights into how the mind works, and a considerably better understanding of the nature of things like perception, cognition, memory, and mental illness?

Within a rational context, one should only reduce something real to the extent that it doesn't lose its defining characteristics. Another example of the application of the principle of reduction which clearly goes too far is ontological nihilism: the reduction of everything to nothing.

What do you consider to be the defining characteristics of consciousness? Remember when I said that reductionism and eliminatism only differ semantically? Depending on ho you define consciousness, I am either a reductionist or an eliminatist. If you define it to be those mental processes that we are aware of, and which clearly are causally efficacious, like thought, memory, perception, awareness, and emotions, then I am a reductionist, and that view is backed up by substantial scientific research.

If you define consciousness in terms of vague, inherently dualistic concepts like qualia, "raw feels", perceptual fields, etc..., then I am an eliminatist. I do not think those things exist, and I think that your intuitive notion that they do can be explained entirely in terms of brain processes.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas

The only logically coherent alternative to the rational acceptance of at least some kind of psychogenic influence is that taken by Daniel C. Dennett, namely reductionism (the denial that there is an irreducible conscious mind).

I haven't yet read everything Dennett has written, but I'm working on it. Perhaps that characterization of his position will emerge once I've read more, along with that definition of reductionism.

Dennett suggests that epiphenomenalism has a somewhat different meaning to cognitive scientists than it has to philosophers, that the term in its strongest philosophical sense is "of no utility whatsoever", and that cognitve scientists seem to be more cognizant of this than do philosophers.

I do like what you said here:

Within a rational context, one should only reduce something real to the extent that it doesn't lose its defining characteristics.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Ontological reductionism

Dr Stupid:

Some friendly advice: Your posts will be much easier to follow if you use the quote feature.

Thanks for the advice. I had no prior experience with this feature.

This is a rather strange view of skepticism. Skeptics aren't skeptical of PSI because it is "mysterious", but simply because there is no supporting evidence for it.

Even if you (for whatever reason) believe that the mind has some sort of non-physical causally efficacious component, there is no reason to believe in PSI, because there is no evidence that it exists.

This is simply not true. First of all, there is a lot of evidence for PSI, but it is often dismissed because of the supposed improbable nature of its existence. Ever heard of the principle that extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence? In my opinion, there is rather strong evidence for PSI, but is dismissed all the same, because PSI would require more than just that. If physicalism is wrong, we should leave this principle, as PSI would be just a particular instance of a more general principle of efficacy which should be accepted a priori.
Secondly, any causal impact of the mind upon the brain can be conceptualized as a special instance of the concept of PK (psychokinesis), one of the two components of PSI.

Perhaps I should have been more clear, and said scientific research. I don't consider unverifiable metaphysical speculation to be "research".

That could be a matter of definition. But as a philosopher I consider no theoretical project within any given science as tenable if it is built on shaky metaphysical grounds. Rational metaphysics (meant here as a synonym of ontological theory) is largely about rational analysis of concepts -including the concepts used in scientific theorizing- rather than arbitrary speculation.

This is certainly not obvious to me. Perhaps you meant intuitively obvious? If so, there is nothing unscientific about rejecting something which is intuitively obvious, particularly when there is substantial scientific evidence to justify doing so.

No, I did not mean intuitively obvious, I meant rationally obvious! What we know about consciousness by intro (- or retro)spection can never be reduced to anything else than that same consciousness, either by 'substantial scientific evidence' or by anything else. You cannot prove the incoherent, not even by scientific experimentation .

Referring to consciousness as an ontological existent is, itself, unscientific. Not only do ontology and metaphysics have no place in scientific research, but to assume that consciousness is ontologically distinct from the rest of reality is to assume, a-priori, that it cannot be a process of the brain. To then reject the scientific theory that it is a process of the brain on that basis, is simply begging the question.

No scientific general theorizing can do without a basis of ontological analysis. So though metaphysics is not empirical science, it is indispensable, being located at its very basis. Only an early neopositivist would deny that. It is simply impossible to do research without metaphysical assumptions, without an (at least implicit) ontological framework. For example: reductionist ontology is just as much a form of ontology as dualism. Begging the question would be the rejection of a metaphysical theory, not on the basis of reasonable arguments, but just because that metaphysical theory turns out to be inconvenient for one's favourite empirical-theoretical project.

Can you justify this claim? Are you unaware that the scientific theory that consciousness is a set of physical brain processes is a very successful one, which has led to all sorts of insights into how the mind works, and a considerably better understanding of the nature of things like perception, cognition, memory, and mental illness?

All this simply has no relevance to our question. Any sound interactionist theory would do the same (meaning any theory which would predict regular interactions between brain processes and mental processes without reduction).

What do you consider to be the defining characteristics of consciousness? Remember when I said that reductionism and eliminatism only differ semantically? Depending on ho you define consciousness, I am either a reductionist or an eliminatist. If you define it to be those mental processes that we are aware of, and which clearly are causally efficacious, like thought, memory, perception, awareness, and emotions, then I am a reductionist, and that view is backed up by substantial scientific research.

If you define consciousness in terms of vague, inherently dualistic concepts like qualia, "raw feels", perceptual fields, etc..., then I am an eliminatist. I do not think those things exist, and I think that your intuitive notion that they do can be explained entirely in terms of brain processes.

Okay, you're entitled to that position. It's a free world (or rather it should be). I'm not impressed, but that ought to have been clear all along
Would you agree if I categorized your stance with that of Dennett and Blackmore?

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

The frequency of epiphenomenalism

Dymanic,

Dennett suggests that epiphenomenalism has a somewhat different meaning to cognitive scientists than it has to philosophers,
that the term in its strongest philosophical sense is "of no utility whatsoever", and that cognitive scientists seem to be more cognizant of this than do philosophers.

The latter may well be what he suggests, but I'm not sure whether it is true, as the adoption of epiphenomenalism as a supposed reconciliation between introspection and physicalism also appears to be widespread among cognitive scientists. One might do a survey to find out exactly.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

No, I did not mean intuitively obvious, I meant rationally obvious! What we know about consciousness by intro (- or retro)spection can never be reduced to anything else than that same consciousness, either by 'substantial scientific evidence' or by anything else. You cannot prove the incoherent, not even by scientific experimentation

My consciousness is incoherent, and that's why it can't be a product of my brain?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Secondly, any causal impact of the mind upon the brain can be conceptualized as a special instance of the concept of PK (psychokinesis), one of the two components of PSI.

So the reason I know about my own consciousness is because it uses PK to store memories in my brain. Interesting. Is that falsifiable in any way?

Can you define psychokinesis? How does a nonphysical entity affect a physical one?

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

....How does a nonphysical entity affect a physical one?

~~ Paul

My question too; a good answer would give me the opportunity switch back to being a dualist.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Titus Rivas

the adoption of epiphenomenalism as a supposed reconciliation between introspection and physicalism also appears to be widespread among cognitive scientists.

Epiphenomenalism in the strong philisophical sense?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Hi Paul,

My consciousness is incoherent, and that's why it can't be a product of my brain?

I hope you haven't really misunderstood me like that, have you?
I obviously meant anything incoherent, in this case reductionism.

So the reason I know about my own consciousness is because it uses PK to store memories in my brain. Interesting.

I'm not primarily referring to memory here, but rather to any motor process which would reflect knowledge of consciousness, such as writing and talking about consciousness. See my papers linked in the original message I posted within this thread.

Is that falsifiable in any way?

We're talking about ontological analysis here, not about empirical theory. So the (empirical) falsifiability principle does not apply here, only the (analytical) coherence principle. It is a matter of logical entailment. Meaning that it follows from the fact that in order for us to speak about consciousness qua consciousness, consciousness must have had an impact on our speech, via one or more areas in the brain which are affected by our knowledge of consciousness (which in turn must be based on conscious efficacy).

Can you define psychokinesis?

Here a minimal definition would suffice: any psychogenic impact on the physical world, either on our own nervous system or on any other physical structure or process outside the nervous system.

How does a nonphysical entity affect a physical one

Well, that is a different question. But we would need to postulate laws of nature that would causally link mental and physical processes. Not just in one direction as epiphenomenalism would have it, but in two directions. It would be a matter of natural laws of interaction. The impact of a non-physical entity on a physical one is certainly not any more mysterious than the impact of a physical entity upon a non-physical one.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Philosophical epiphenomenalism

Epiphenomenalism in the strong philosophical sense?

Right, Dynamic.

Titus

 

[hammegk]

Here a minimal definition would suffice: any psychogenic impact on the physical world, either on our own nervous system or on any other physical structure or process outside the nervous system.

Idealism provides a mechanism for "any psychogenic impact on our own nervous system".

Impact elsewhere remains highly speculative imo.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

I hope you haven't really misunderstood me like that, have you? I obviously meant anything incoherent, in this case reductionism.

Yes, I did misunderstand you. Why is reductionism incoherent as far as consciousness is concerned?

Meaning that it follows from the fact that in order for us to speak about consciousness qua consciousness, consciousness must have had an impact on our speech, via one or more areas in the brain which are affected by our knowledge of consciousness (which in turn must be based on conscious efficacy).

And PK seems like a better explanation than that consciousness is a product of the brain?

Well, that is a different question. But we would need to postulate laws of nature that would causally link mental and physical processes. Not just in one direction as epiphenomenalism would have it, but in two directions. It would be a matter of natural laws of interaction. The impact of a non-physical entity on a physical one is certainly not any more mysterious than the impact of a physical entity upon a non-physical one.

They are both quite mysterious. I don't see how you're going to come up with laws of nature that allow a nonphysical entity to affect a physical one, without either (a) requiring that the nonphysical entity become physical; or (b) requiring a supernatural miracle. There is a serious problem of the nexus between the nonphysical and the physical.

~~ Paul

 

[Loki]

Paul,

Epiphenomenalism is true and correct because Win told me so. If you have any issue with this clear and accurate statement, I suggest you take it up with him (becuase I never could wrap my head around it).

 

[Titus Rivas]

Idealism provides a mechanism for "any psychogenic impact on our own nervous system".

Impact elsewhere remains highly speculative imo.

Well, in my article Exit Epiphenomenalism written with Hein van Dongen, I explicitly acknowledge that idealism is one of two coherent positions, together with interactionist dualism.
If one starts from the principle of parsimony, idealism seems to be preferable to dualism, at it makes laws of interaction between physical and non-physical entities superfluous. Philosophers such as John Foster and Lloyd explicitly hold this position in contemporary thought.
However, if parsimony were the only principle we should obey, solipsism would be even better, as it does not even necessitate laws of interaction between individual minds. So obviously apart from parsimony we may also take seriously the strong impression that there is a physical world even if that means postulating physical entities which are unnecessary within idealism.

The essential interaction problems of dualism are also not absent within idealism:
(1) though idealism does not face the problem of how two substantially different kinds of entities can influence one another, it still has to deal with a similar problem of how several kinds of consciousness (for example conscious feelings, conscious thoughts, conscious memories, conscious sensations, conscious perceptions, etc.) can influence each other, while they cannot be reduced to one and the same qualitative category.
(2) More importantly, pluralistic idealism which accepts several minds faces the problem of how different ontological domains or 'substances' (irreducible individual minds) affect each other.

So idealist interactionism and dualist interactionism only differ gradually. Add the strong impression that there is a non-mental, external physical world, and it becomes quite easy to understand why some people like myself are dualist interactionists. But you're right that the battle between idealism and dualism cannot be ended either by analysis or empirical evidence.
Perhaps if there is a God, that being may one day tell us who was right. Which would only be important if we believed he was not cheating on us in the first place (Descartes' reason by the way for believing in a physical world).
Either way, if we postulate the reality of the physical world and accept the existence of an irreducible conscious mind, psychokinesis is a logical consequence of the combination of both.

Best wishes,

Titus Rivas

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But why dualism at all, Titus? What are the compelling reasons why consciousness isn't just a product of the brain?

And please, don't mention the Knowledge Argument.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Riddles of pluralism

Hi Paul,

Yes, I did misunderstand you. Why is reductionism incoherent as far as consciousness is concerned?

Well, because consciousness (subjectivity) does not fit in a definition of matter as a non-subjective, non-qualitative entity, so that it cannot be reduced to matter in any conceivable way.

And PK seems like a better explanation than that consciousness is a product of the brain?

Huh? I don't get your point here These are two different issues. PK is not a concept of how consciousness arises, but simply of its impact on the physical world.

They are both quite mysterious. I don't see how you're going to come up with laws of nature that allow a nonphysical entity to affect a physical one, without either (a) requiring that the nonphysical entity become physical; or (b) requiring a supernatural miracle. There is a serious problem of the nexus between the nonphysical and the physical.

The first possibility is out of the question as soon as one rejects reductionism. Talking about a supernatural miracle sounds too much as if it were a unique event, whereas we need laws to explain regular mutual influences. Several philosophers have indeed concluded that in order to understand the interaction of irreducible entities we require a system which encompasses those entities without reducing them to anything else. The system is not natural to the irreducible entities themselves, as that would make the system part of the entities. So it would seem the system is extra-natural or if you like supra-natural, which could (according to some) be seen as a socalled teleological argument for a created order. However, be this as it may, the problem arises in any context in which we have irreducible entities which interact with each other. It does not matter whether those entities are irreducible individual spirits, or irreducible atoms (or quanta rather). The only way out would be a kind of idealistic quantitative monism, in other words solipsism. Not a very attractive alternative I would say.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by

the adoption of epiphenomenalism as a supposed reconciliation between introspection and physicalism also appears to be widespread among cognitive scientists.

Dennett:

According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the term "epiphenomenalism" first appears in 1706 as a term in pathology, "a secondary appearance or symptom." The evolutionary biologist Thomas Huxley (1874) was probably the writer who extended the term to its current use in psychology, where it means a nonfunctional property or byproduct. Huxley used the term in his discussion of the evolution of consciousness and his claim that epiphenomenal properties (like the "whistle of the steam engine") could not be explained by natural selection.

In other words, an effect which, while detectable, produces no effects on the system that produced it.

If I understand correctly, the philosophical sense is much stronger -- completely undetectable, therefore not useful for reconciliation or anything else; an effect which produces no effects whatsoever beyond its acting as a sort of philosophical black hole into which countless gigabytes of bandwidth have mysteriously disappeared.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Dualism and substantialism

But why dualism at all, Titus? What are the compelling reasons why consciousness isn't just a product of the brain?
And please, don't mention the Knowledge Argument.

You're mixing up two questions I'm afraid. Dualism literally means the current that states there are two irreducible (kinds of) entities, namely physical and non-physical entities. The reason for dualism is that a philosopher accepts the reality of a non-mental physical world (otherwise he or she would have become an ontological idealist) and thereby defines that physical world in such way that consciousness cannot fit in the definition of the physical world.
The other question is quite different, because some dualists may believe that there is a non-physical mind which is the product of a physical brain. In fact Karl Popper believed in this position which is known as emergent (semi-substantialist) dualism. To a certain extent all property dualists also support a variant of emergent (though non-substantialist) dualism.
My own main philosophical reason for believing that the emergentist theory in general is false, is that I hold that a mere material structure cannot be the source of a so called substantial entity which I hold a psyche (or 'self') to be. The brain can be reduced to its components, but the individual subject can only be himself and no one else. However, I believe this classical argument (already formulated by Plotin for example) should be reserved for a different thread. It even has consequences for the issue of life after death for one thing and therefore also for the theoretical bases of psychical research into this field.

Best wishes,

Titus