Epiphenomenalism

[Dymanic]

Titus, I found both of your articles to be fascinating (not the easiest of reading, but well worth the effort). I sincerely hope you will stick around, and look forward to more of your input. I didn't need much persuading of the worthlessness of epiphenomenalism, but your paper does an excellent job of exterminating any lingering doubt. I agree that some of your comments could be excellent thread topics in themselves; for instance, a couple of things that jumped out at me:

Originally posted by Titus Rivas

The brain can be reduced to its components, but the individual subject can only be himself and no one else.

What is your position on multiple personality disorder?

And, from your second article:

consciousness would have an impact upon the mind, but not upon the brain...

...during the mental conceptualisation of consciousness, the supposed neural processes (that would ‘support’ consciousness) or "substrates" cannot themselves be based upon any impact of consciousness.

What about neural plasticity? The structure of dendritic spines can change in a period of seconds.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

This is simply not true. First of all, there is a lot of evidence for PSI, but it is often dismissed because of the supposed improbable nature of its existence.

Just so we are clear, I am talking about reliable scientific evidence, not anecdotal evidence, or subjective interpretation of personal experiences.

Ever heard of the principle that extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence?

Of course.

In my opinion, there is rather strong evidence for PSI, but is dismissed all the same, because PSI would require more than just that.

No, that is exactly what it requires, no more and no less. Until such evidence is available, any rational skeptic will dismiss it.

If physicalism is wrong, we should leave this principle, as PSI would be just a particular instance of a more general principle of efficacy which should be accepted a priori.

The principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is simple logic. What makes a claim extraordinary? It is the fact that it contradicts other claims for which we already have substantial supporting evidence. Extraordinary evidence is required simply because we already have extraordinary evidence for claims which it contradicts.

Secondly, any causal impact of the mind upon the brain can be conceptualized as a special instance of the concept of PK (psychokinesis), one of the two components of PSI.

I am not interested in speculation about what causal impact of the mind on the brain would imply, under the assumption that the mind is irreducibly non-physical. Such an assumption is inherently anti-science, and would render any scientific explanation of the mind fundamentally impossible. So long as there is no reliable supporting scientific evidence for this view (and there is not), adopting it would be equivalent to simply giving up.

Perhaps I should have been more clear, and said scientific research. I don't consider unverifiable metaphysical speculation to be "research".
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That could be a matter of definition. But as a philosopher I consider no theoretical project within any given science as tenable if it is built on shaky metaphysical grounds.

All metaphysics are shaky. What science needs is a solid epistemological framework. It has that.

Rational metaphysics (meant here as a synonym of ontological theory) is largely about rational analysis of concepts -including the concepts used in scientific theorizing- rather than arbitrary speculation.

Great, because such rational investigation of concept quickly results in the conclusion that views like those presented by Chalmers are incoherent.

This is certainly not obvious to me. Perhaps you meant intuitively obvious? If so, there is nothing unscientific about rejecting something which is intuitively obvious, particularly when there is substantial scientific evidence to justify doing so.
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No, I did not mean intuitively obvious, I meant rationally obvious! What we know about consciousness by intro (- or retro)spection can never be reduced to anything else than that same consciousness, either by 'substantial scientific evidence' or by anything else. You cannot prove the incoherent, not even by scientific experimentation.

OK. Let's see your analytic derivation of the above claim. Why is it incoherent to claim that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain?

Referring to consciousness as an ontological existent is, itself, unscientific. Not only do ontology and metaphysics have no place in scientific research, but to assume that consciousness is ontologically distinct from the rest of reality is to assume, a-priori, that it cannot be a process of the brain. To then reject the scientific theory that it is a process of the brain on that basis, is simply begging the question.
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No scientific general theorizing can do without a basis of ontological analysis. So though metaphysics is not empirical science, it is indispensable, being located at its very basis. Only an early neopositivist would deny that.

Or somebody who sees the scientific worldview as an epistemological framework, rather than a metaphysical one, like me. Does that make me a neopositivist?

It is simply impossible to do research without metaphysical assumptions, without an (at least implicit) ontological framework. For example: reductionist ontology is just as much a form of ontology as dualism.

I have no idea what is meant by reductionist ontology. Scientific reductionism is epistemological. It claims only that one set of observed phenomena can be described in terms of another set of observable things. I have no interest in the unknowable underlying ontological relationships. I consider such concepts to be inherently meaningless.

Begging the question would be the rejection of a metaphysical theory, not on the basis of reasonable arguments, but just because that metaphysical theory turns out to be inconvenient for one's favourite empirical-theoretical project.

I reject it because speculation about the unknowable is completely and utterly pointless.

Can you justify this claim? Are you unaware that the scientific theory that consciousness is a set of physical brain processes is a very successful one, which has led to all sorts of insights into how the mind works, and a considerably better understanding of the nature of things like perception, cognition, memory, and mental illness?
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All this simply has no relevance to our question. Any sound interactionist theory would do the same (meaning any theory which would predict regular interactions between brain processes and mental processes without reduction).

Ever heard of the principle of parsimony?

If you define consciousness in terms of vague, inherently dualistic concepts like qualia, "raw feels", perceptual fields, etc..., then I am an eliminatist. I do not think those things exist, and I think that your intuitive notion that they do can be explained entirely in terms of brain processes.

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Okay, you're entitled to that position. It's a free world (or rather it should be). I'm not impressed, but that ought to have been clear all along
Would you agree if I categorized your stance with that of Dennett and Blackmore?

I don't know. I am a scientist, not a philosopher. My position is based on a logical understanding of the scientific method, how it works, and its epistemological basis.

Well, that is a different question. But we would need to postulate laws of nature that would causally link mental and physical processes. Not just in one direction as epiphenomenalism would have it, but in two directions. It would be a matter of natural laws of interaction. The impact of a non-physical entity on a physical one is certainly not any more mysterious than the impact of a physical entity upon a non-physical one.

This raises the obvious question of what you think the word "physical" means. If you are presupposing the claim that their are two distinct ontological "substances", physical and mental, then you are presupposing dualism. Under the scientific worldview, the word "physical" refers to anything which interacts with anything else in an observable way.

If consciousness and the physical interact, and natural laws are capable of describing that interaction, then by what reasoning does it make sense to postulate that they are irreducibly distinct "substances"? The distinction is completely arbitrary and meaningless.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Titus Rivas]

Epistemology and science

Dear Dr. Stupid,

Just so we are clear, I am talking about reliable scientific evidence, not anecdotal evidence, or subjective interpretation of personal experiences.

I did not assume you were talking about anything else. I was also talking about case studies, yes, but primarily about experimental studies, of which so called meta-analyses have been made with surprising results. See for example this article and this one . The main reason the results are often not accepted as interesting scientific evidence, is the supposed apriori improbability of PSI which would always carry more weight than any positive experimental outcome.

The principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is simple logic. What makes a claim extraordinary? It is the fact that it contradicts other claims for which we already have substantial supporting evidence. Extraordinary evidence is required simply because we already have extraordinary evidence for claims which it contradicts.

Oh, that's not what I have gathered from the literature. It's not a question of the evidence going against what we already know from other research. If that were the problem, PSI would be probably have been generally accepted a long time ago. What makes PSI so extraordinary is not that it would contradict existing evidence (By the way, what kind of evidence should that be? For instance, I don't see why PSI would 'contradict' evidence for neurological influences on the mind, as both types of evidence would fit perfectly within any interactionist theory), but that at a metaphysical level, consciousness is (apriori) not supposed to have any efficacy whatsoever.

I am not interested in speculation about what causal impact of the mind on the brain would imply, under the assumption that the mind is irreducibly non-physical. Such an assumption is inherently anti-science, and would render any scientific explanation of the mind fundamentally impossible. So long as there is no reliable supporting scientific evidence for this view (and there is not), adopting it would be equivalent to simply giving up.

I'm afraid you're begging the question here. It is only anti-science if you assume that 'real' science depends on physicalism. But that is a meta-scientific assumption, of the exact same kind we're discussing here. By the way, who's talking about 'giving up' science? Giving up physicalism does not equal giving up science, as science can also be interactionistic. Again, there IS scientific evidence for PSI, which you might find too weak, but which certainly shouldn't be dismissed as fundamentally unscientific.

Great, because such rational investigation of concept quickly results in the conclusion that views like those presented by Chalmers are incoherent.

Not quickly I'm afraid, but I agree that he's wrong on one point, namely his views on the impact of consciousness , as is shown in my first linked article. However, he's a very important and intelligent philosopher.

OK. Let's see your analytic derivation of the above claim. Why is it incoherent to claim that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain

Do I really have to repeat that again? Because of the irreducible subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness which you eliminate and which cannot be described in terms of matter (or physical reality) as a non-subjective, non-qualitative entity (or set of entities). However, this point is only interesting for someone who doesn't reject or 'eliminate' these aspects in the first place.

Or somebody who sees the scientific worldview as an epistemological framework, rather than a metaphysical one, like me. Does that make me a neopositivist?

I'm not sure about what you mean by 'the scientific worldview' (as there are several, including for example the epiphenomenalist worldview) nor what you mean "epistemological framework". Are you talking about epistemological reductionism which reduces scientific theories to physical theories? We were talking about a philosophicall theory here, physicalism, as an ontological framework for science.
So our discussion runs deeper than what exactly would count as scientific. It is about what types of causality exist, not just about what types of causality could in principle be accepted in scientific theory. In other words, according to your epistemological framework for science as I understand it, there could well be a lot of conscious efficacy out there, but it would simply by definition fall outside the scope of science and no evidence could ever change that -as evidence for conscious efficacy could never be scientific evidence (scientific theories having been defined already as theories which exclude conscious efficacy). Unless one would accept ontological analysis of the kind I have presented as an at least equally important source of rational knowledge (something you wouldn't find viable I understand), that would make one an agnostic about the ultimate reality of conscious efficacy, not an ontological physicalist. If so, adepts of this type of agnosticism should be frank about their position rather than pretending that the question of conscious efficacy can be solved 'scientifically' as defined by themselves.

don't know. I am a scientist, not a philosopher. My position is based on a logical understanding of the scientific method, how it works, and its epistemological basis.

Let's not forget that epistemology is philosophy, not science.

This raises the obvious question of what you think the word "physical" means. If you are presupposing the claim that their are two distinct ontological "substances", physical and mental, then you are presupposing dualism. Under the scientific worldview, the word "physical" refers to anything which interacts with anything else in an observable way.

Within an idealistic ontology, you would be right, as everything observed would be 'in the mind', and there would be no external physical reality. However, most scientists still mean by 'physical' something which exists in itself, independent of our observation of it. Thus there is nothing arbitrary about distinguishing subjective consciousness from a non-subjective outside world.

(By the way, there is a lot of confusion about the word 'substance' in a philosophical context. It usually means an independent entity which cannot be reduced to anything else.)

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Titus Rivas]

Substantialism, intraphysical physicalism

Dear Dymanic (not Dynamic, sorry )

I found both of your articles to be fascinating (not the easiest of reading, but well worth the effort).
I sincerely hope you will stick around, and look forward to more of your input. I didn't need much persuading of the worthlessness of epiphenomenalism, but your paper does an excellent job of exterminating any lingering doubt.

Thanks a lot

What is your position on multiple personality disorder?

Dualist substantialism (my position, also termed personalist dualism or dualist personalism) holds that the subject or self (the entity which undergoes subjectivity) is substantial in that it cannot be reduced to any other independent entity. I can only be me, I cannot be you, him or her. Now, personality is a mental structure I live in, but which doesn't equal my being this particular subject (my being me). My personality can change while I'm still me. My being myself does not depend on the integrity of my personality structures or on their constance. Thus, it is also conceivable that my personality becomes fragmented in more or less separate structures. They would still be MY separate or multiple personality structures, and would not affect my being myself in the sense of my being this particular irreducible subject rather than anyone else. So as long as multiple personalities or subpersonalities or whatever you would call them belong to me as this particular conscious subject, it is me (rather than anyone else) who 'lives' through those personalities.

And, from your second article:
consciousness would have an impact upon the mind, but not upon the brain...
...during the mental conceptualisation of consciousness, the supposed neural processes (that would ‘support’ consciousness) or "substrates" cannot themselves be based upon any impact of consciousness.
What about neural plasticity? The structure of dendritic spines can change in a period of seconds.

The point I tried to make in this context was not that the brain could as such never change because of an impact of consciousness, as I precisely believe that it certainly can and pretend to show that. The point was that within intraphysical physicalism as I call it there, there is no room for any response from the brain to consciousness. The brain could not respond to consciousness, as that would imply it would be affected by information about consciousness which is irreconcilable with intraphysical physicalism.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Well, because consciousness (subjectivity) does not fit in a definition of matter as a non-subjective, non-qualitative entity, so that it cannot be reduced to matter in any conceivable way.

What do you mean by "reduced to matter"? Are you saying that all emergent properties cannot be reduced to matter? If so, then what it is like to be a rock must be a separate kind of thing. And the macroscopic behavior of the weather must be a separate kind of thing. And the behavior of a computer. We cannot experience these things directly, so they are just as subjective as our own minds.

Now, you may choose to reject those examples and make a special case only out of consciousness. But it is a special case simply because it is the one emergent property that we can experience directly. I don't see why that makes it fundamentally different from everything else.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Several philosophers have indeed concluded that in order to understand the interaction of irreducible entities we require a system which encompasses those entities without reducing them to anything else. The system is not natural to the irreducible entities themselves, as that would make the system part of the entities. So it would seem the system is extra-natural or if you like supra-natural, which could (according to some) be seen as a socalled teleological argument for a created order. However, be this as it may, the problem arises in any context in which we have irreducible entities which interact with each other.

You've lost me. First of all, it sounds like you've introduced a third kind of entity: the system. How are you going to investigate the properties and workings of this system, if part of it interacts with consciousness, which is presumably outside the domain of scientific investigation?

We have matter, which is investigated with science, and consciousness, which is not matter, yet affects matter. In order to avoid the nexus problem (where consciousness would, by induction, become matter), you introduce an overarching system that is outside both. Yet somehow this system must affect matter, on command from consciousness or some such, without succumbing to the same induction problem. How does this improve the situation?

~~ Paul

 

[Lord Kenneth]

So, epiphenomenalism is basically the brain makes mental events but those events don't effect anything?

I don't really understand that. What is that trying to explain?

 

[Lord Kenneth]

Thanks, Yahweh and LMoG. Yes, it's incoherent.

There is something, call it consciousness, that is an epiphenomenon of the brain, but has no affect on the brain. Since it has no effect on the brain, we don't have any memories of the experience of it nor of anything else relating to it. Therefore we cannot think or talk about it. Therefore it is as good as nonexistent and there is no reason the concept of epiphenomenalism would ever have arisen.

~~ Paul

Wow, that view makes no sense at all. Why would someone hold such a position???

 

[Titus Rivas]

Good question

Hi Paul

You've lost me. First of all, it sounds like you've introduced a third kind of entity: the system. How are you going to investigate the properties and workings of this system, if part of it interacts with consciousness, which is presumably outside the domain of scientific investigation?

Good question. However, by what I've loosely termed the system , I don't mean another substantial, irreducible entity like matter or (individual) mind(s). I meant an order which makes interaction between the various substances possible, i.e. which links those substances to one another. So, it does not lead to an infinite regress. Perhaps the order I'm pointing at could be compared to one possible meaning of the ancient concept of Logos. As I have said before, even pluralistic idealism requires some laws of interaction between the irreducible individual minds.

Interactive laws would be part of reality and irreducible to the laws pertaining to the nature of the individual substances themselves. It does sound a bit mysterious, I admit, but so does for example non-locality in physics. Things seem to be linked to each other, even if they can't be reduced to each other. That's the main gist of what I'm trying to say.

Would you know another solution which would not take refuge in reductionism?

By the way, physical science cannot directly study consciousness, so much is correct. But it can to an important extent study interaction between consciousness and the physical world.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Lord Ken asked:

Wow, that view makes no sense at all. Why would someone hold such a position???

Because they are trying to support a belief about consciousness, but don't think too hard about the structure they created.

Titas said:

Good question. However, by what I've loosely termed the system , I don't mean another substantial, irreducible entity like matter or (individual) mind(s). I meant an order which makes interaction between the various substances possible, i.e. which links those substances to one another. So, it does not lead to an infinite regress. Perhaps the order I'm pointing at could be compared to one possible meaning of the ancient concept of Logos. As I have said before, even pluralistic idealism requires some laws of interaction between the irreducible individual minds.

But you said "... we require a system which encompasses those entities without reducing them to anything else." This means the system is either a chimera of both entities, or it is a third kind of thing. But let's forget about that. I do not see how these two kinds of entities are going to interact without a nexus that shares the properties of both entities. This means that the nexus is a third kind of thing, or that both entities already share common characteristics.

Would you know another solution which would not take refuge in reductionism?

Nope, and that is precisely the problem.

By the way, physical science cannot directly study consciousness, so much is correct. But it can to an important extent study interaction between consciousness and the physical world.

And how long should we maintain a dualistic view in light of the progress in neurophysiology? Let's revisit the quesiton in 100 years and see where we are.

I still think you are hoisting consciousness on a pedestal just because it happens to be the one emergent property you experience directly.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

...I don't really understand that. What is that trying to explain?

As I understand it, it's a mechanism to allow materialism/atheism to explain "consciousness". That could also be an out to explain "life" under their viewpoint, imo, although abiogenesis is sometimes explained as "whole is greater than sum of parts".

(I.E. reductionism fails in both cases.... )

 

[Titus Rivas]

Irreducibility excludes any reduction

And how long should we maintain a dualistic view in light of the progress in neurophysiology? Let's revisit the quesiton in 100 years and see where we are.

I still think you are hoisting consciousness on a pedestal just because it happens to be the one emergent property you experience directly.

Even if you were right in viewing consciousness as no more than an emergent property, you would still have to explain its impact on reality. As long as we don't eliminate consciousness (unlike for example Dr. Stupid) and acknowledge that we know that consciousness is real, we are inevitably faced with the question of interaction. The problem stands regardless of whether we conceive of consciousness as something basic or something emergent!
A nexus which would imply reduction would by definition not explain interaction between irreducible entities. Irreducibility simply implies reduction is impossible.
The only rational, coherent types of ontological reductionism are idealistic, not materialistic. See this paper of mine if you like: Kant's Error , relevant for anyone who still believes (materialist) identity theory would solve the problem. (Though I don't explicitly mention it in this paper, the argumentation also holds for neutral monism. )

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

Even if you were right in viewing consciousness as no more than an emergent property, you would still have to explain its impact on reality. As long as we don't eliminate consciousness (unlike for example Dr. Stupid) and acknowledge that we know that consciousness is real, we are inevitably faced with the question of interaction. The problem stands regardless of whether we conceive of consciousness as something basic or something emergent!

I don't understand the problem. Consciousness is my inner experience of the workings of my brain. I know I am conscious because some parts of my brain observe other parts. That's why I can talk about being conscious. You still haven't explained why consciousness cannot be an emergent property of the brain.

I don't believe Stimpson is eliminating consciousness.

A nexus which would imply reduction would by definition not explain interaction between irreducible entities. Irreducibility simply implies reduction is impossible.

I am using the term nexus to describe the interface between these two supposedly irreducible entities. If they affect each other, there must be an interface.

The only rational, coherent types of ontological reductionism are idealistic, not materialistic. See this paper of mine if you like: Kant's Error , relevant for anyone who still believes (materialist) identity theory would solve the problem. (Though I don't explicitly mention it in this paper, the argumentation also holds for neutral monism. )

I don't care to make any ontological assumptions. I don't know what stuff is really made out of, nor do I think the question is meaningful. As I've said before, I'd bet that if you could compose a coherent description of idealism and materialism/physicalism/whatever, you would find that they are equivalent. I'll take a look at your paper.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Don't leave the qualia out

Hi Paul,

I don't understand the problem. Consciousness is my inner experience of the workings of my brain. I know I am conscious because some parts of my brain observe other parts. That's why I can talk about being conscious. You still haven't explained why consciousness cannot be an emergent property of the brain.

That would leave out the irreducible qualia, which supposedly woud not exist (as such) according to reductionism.

I don't believe Stimpson is eliminating consciousness.

I meant he is reducing the so called qualia of consciousness to workings of the brain and eliminating them as such. See his own message about that within this thread.

I am using the term nexus to describe the interface between these two supposedly irreducible entities. If they affect each other, there must be an interface.

Maybe I misunderstood you on this.

I don't care to make any ontological assumptions. I don't know what stuff is really made out of, nor do I think the question is meaningful. As I've said before, I'd bet that if you could compose a coherent description of idealism and materialism/physicalism/whatever, you would find that they are equivalent. I'll take a look at your paper.

This is obviously not true as eliminative materialism for instance simply dismisses the reality of qualia. Again, talking about epiphenomenalism in the philosophical sense, means talking about ontology.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus said:

That would leave out the irreducible qualia, which supposedly woud not exist (as such) according to reductionism.

We've done qualia to death here, but I'd love to hear your definition. What exactly are qualia, and why are they irreducible? Again, please don't bring up the Knowledge Argument.

meant he is reducing the so called qualia of consciousness to workings of the brain and eliminating them as such. See his own message about that within this thread.

Eliminating what? He's only eliminating the unsupported claim that they cannot be workings of the brain.

This is obviously not true as eliminative materialism for instance simply dismisses the reality of qualia.

Well, if it dismisses that there is some sort of personal experience of sensory inputs, then it is silly. If it dismisses that these experiences must be some kind of separate existent, then fine. Anyway, when I say that idealism and materialism/whatever might be equivalent, I mean in way that we can test. Of course the ideas are still be different, but who cares?

Again, talking about epiphenomenalism in the philosophical sense, means talking about ontology.

I think we agree that epiphenomenalism is meaningless. So is ontology in general, although it might be more fun.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Little to add

We've done qualia to death here, but I'd love to hear your definition. What exactly are qualia, and why are they irreducible? Again, please don't bring up the Knowledge Argument.

Well, I'm afraid I find explaining what qualia are to someone who rejects their irreducibility a bit like explaining sight to a congenitally blind person. My energy resources are limited.

Of course the ideas are still be different, but who cares?

For one thing, a lot of philosophers like myself do.

I think we both have made our points by now. Unless you'd like to add something of course.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Titus, I don't reject their irreducibility out of hand. I simply have no idea what sort of thoughts should be in my head to lead me to the idea that they are irreducible. You speak as if it's obvious and only the uninitiated would be foolhardy enough not to see it.

For one thing, a lot of philosophers like myself do

But you can never answer the question.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Not my cup of tea

Titus, I don't reject their irreducibility out of hand. I simply have no idea what sort of thoughts should be in my head to lead me to the idea that they are irreducible. You speak as if it's obvious and only the uninitiated would be foolhardy enough not to see it.

Well, I just repeat my old tenet then:
the subjective and qualitative (sometimes summarized as qualia) by definition cannot be reduced to the non-subjective and non-qualitative.
Or as I said in my paper (written with Hein van Dongen) Exit Epiphenomenalism, footnote 9:
"We hope it is clear that apart from eliminationism we also discard the various types of identity theory, functionalism and emergence materialism. In practice all of these positions can from an ontological point of view be seen here as forms of materialism, as all of them hold that the mind does not constitute a separate domain of reality, but that it can be seen -and this sense be reduced to- an "interior side", "pattern" or "level" of matter.
However, matter can by definition never be subjective, neither in a special manifestation of it nor as some kind of mysterious level."
The subjective is not just some kind of computational self-reference of a purely physical system. In the brain there are only quantitative processes and structures, and there is no way such processes or structures could ever equal qualitative subjective feelings, thoughts, desires or perceptions. If there were, anything qualitative and subjective would basically just equal a quantity, i.e. a number. Apart from that number there would be nothing to it, as otherwise it couldn't be reduced to the number, to the quantitative process or structure.

To tell you the truth, I'm at a loss whenever I'm confronted with scholars who really take seriously the theory of materialist reductionism (meaning while they really understand what it boils down to). How on earth can anyone who's any bit intelligent believe such a theory? Or is it precisely reserved to people with exceptionally high intelligence to believe anything which strikes anyone else as plain nonsense? If only because it takes a lot of intellectual effort to defend the absurd?

Not meant to offend you personally by the way. Reductionism is simply not exactly my cup of tea.

You have the last say on this subject here, okay?

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Dualism and substantialism

You're mixing up two questions I'm afraid. Dualism literally means the current that states there are two irreducible (kinds of) entities, namely physical and non-physical entities. The reason for dualism is that a philosopher accepts the reality of a non-mental physical world (otherwise he or she would have become an ontological idealist) and thereby defines that physical world in such way that consciousness cannot fit in the definition of the physical world.
The other question is quite different, because some dualists may believe that there is a non-physical mind which is the product of a physical brain. In fact Karl Popper believed in this position which is known as emergent (semi-substantialist) dualism. To a certain extent all property dualists also support a variant of emergent (though non-substantialist) dualism.
My own main philosophical reason for believing that the emergentist theory in general is false, is that I hold that a mere material structure cannot be the source of a so called substantial entity which I hold a psyche (or 'self') to be. The brain can be reduced to its components, but the individual subject can only be himself and no one else. However, I believe this classical argument (already formulated by Plotin for example) should be reserved for a different thread. It even has consequences for the issue of life after death for one thing and therefore also for the theoretical bases of psychical research into this field.

Best wishes,

Titus

This is really interesting stuff Titus. You certainly know what you're talking about. I hope you'll be sticking around! Incidentally I saw some of your contributions on the philosophy board in the NDE thread

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Titus,

I was also talking about case studies, yes, but primarily about experimental studies, of which so called meta-analyses have been made with surprising results. See for example this article and this one .

Meta-analysis cannot be used for hypothesis testing. Any claim that meta-analysis of experiments provides evidence for PSI is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how statistical data analysis works.

As for you links, the first does not work, and the second seems to be claiming nothing more than that the meta-analysis seems to indicate that there may be something there. As I said above, that is not the same as saying that there is actually supporting evidence for PSI.

The main reason the results are often not accepted as interesting scientific evidence, is the supposed apriori improbability of PSI which would always carry more weight than any positive experimental outcome.

Can you back up that assertion?

The principle that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is simple logic. What makes a claim extraordinary? It is the fact that it contradicts other claims for which we already have substantial supporting evidence. Extraordinary evidence is required simply because we already have extraordinary evidence for claims which it contradicts.
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Oh, that's not what I have gathered from the literature. It's not a question of the evidence going against what we already know from other research. If that were the problem, PSI would be probably have been generally accepted a long time ago.

PSI will not be accepted until such time as there is reliable supporting evidence for it.

For instance, I don't see why PSI would 'contradict' evidence for neurological influences on the mind, as both types of evidence would fit perfectly within any interactionist theory),

The existence of PSI most definitely would imply that there are serious problems with the laws of physics as we currently understand them. That makes it an extraordinary claim, and one for which there is no reliable scientific evidence.

but that at a metaphysical level, consciousness is (apriori) not supposed to have any efficacy whatsoever.

Says who? That certainly isn't part of any scientific theory I know of.

I am not interested in speculation about what causal impact of the mind on the brain would imply, under the assumption that the mind is irreducibly non-physical. Such an assumption is inherently anti-science, and would render any scientific explanation of the mind fundamentally impossible. So long as there is no reliable supporting scientific evidence for this view (and there is not), adopting it would be equivalent to simply giving up.
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I'm afraid you're begging the question here. It is only anti-science if you assume that 'real' science depends on physicalism.

Who says I am defending physicalism at all? I don't subscribe to any metaphysical or ontological form of physicalism. I define the term "physical" the way science does. Anything which has an effect on something else, such that the effect can be detected and studied scientifically, is physical.

There is nothing metaphysical about that. Under that definition consciousness is either physical, or supernatural.

I have no interest in either ontological physicalism or interactionist dualism. If you accept the axioms of science, then they are observationally indistinguishable. The same goes for Idealism.

But that is a meta-scientific assumption, of the exact same kind we're discussing here. By the way, who's talking about 'giving up' science? Giving up physicalism does not equal giving up science, as science can also be interactionistic. Again, there IS scientific evidence for PSI, which you might find too weak, but which certainly shouldn't be dismissed as fundamentally unscientific.

I am confused. Are you claiming that the scientific community has acknowledged that there is reliable scientific evidence for psi, or are you disagreeing with the general consensus among the scientific community (including most parapsychologists) that there is not yet reliable scientific evidence for psi?

OK. Let's see your analytic derivation of the above claim. Why is it incoherent to claim that consciousness is a set of physical processes in the brain
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Do I really have to repeat that again? Because of the irreducible subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness which you eliminate and which cannot be described in terms of matter (or physical reality) as a non-subjective, non-qualitative entity (or set of entities).

Which aspects are you referring to? If you are referring to any aspects of consciousness which I could possibly know that I have, then those aspects clearly have an effect on the physical world. That means that either they can be explained scientifically, or science is invalid.

If they can be explained scientifically, then how are they irreducibly subjective? They could not possibly be so, because scientific explanations are by their very nature, objective.

In fact, the entire concept of irreducibly subjective aspects of consciousness is incoherent. If I am aware that I possess an aspect of consciousness, then that aspect of consciousness has an effect on the world. That means it objectively exists, and therefore cannot be irreducibly subjective. And if I am not aware that I have it, then why would I postulate that it exists at all?

However, this point is only interesting for someone who doesn't reject or 'eliminate' these aspects in the first place.

If by interesting you mean self-contradictory, then sure.

Or somebody who sees the scientific worldview as an epistemological framework, rather than a metaphysical one, like me. Does that make me a neopositivist?
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I'm not sure about what you mean by 'the scientific worldview' (as there are several, including for example the epiphenomenalist worldview) nor what you mean "epistemological framework".

By "scientific worldview" I mean any worldview that holds that the scientific method is valid.

Are you talking about epistemological reductionism which reduces scientific theories to physical theories?

I am talking about the epistemological basis of the scientific method itself.

We were talking about a philosophicall theory here, physicalism, as an ontological framework for science.

I don't think that ontological physicalism is a coherent position. I also doubt very much that you will find anybody here who does.

So our discussion runs deeper than what exactly would count as scientific. It is about what types of causality exist, not just about what types of causality could in principle be accepted in scientific theory. In other words, according to your epistemological framework for science as I understand it, there could well be a lot of conscious efficacy out there, but it would simply by definition fall outside the scope of science and no evidence could ever change that -as evidence for conscious efficacy could never be scientific evidence (scientific theories having been defined already as theories which exclude conscious efficacy). Unless one would accept ontological analysis of the kind I have presented as an at least equally important source of rational knowledge (something you wouldn't find viable I understand), that would make one an agnostic about the ultimate reality of conscious efficacy, not an ontological physicalist. If so, adepts of this type of agnosticism should be frank about their position rather than pretending that the question of conscious efficacy can be solved 'scientifically' as defined by themselves.

Where on Earth did you get the idea that science only allows certain metaphysical types of causality? That is nonsensical. Metaphysics is completely irrelevant to science. All that matters to science is that (1) Reality conforms to some set of logical consistent rules, and (2) Those rules can be determined through observation and the application of the scientific method.

As I said before, if consciousness can be explained scientifically, then there is absolutely no point in assuming that it is some irreducibly different substance than everything else. If the metaphysical difference is not detectable through observation, then there is no reason to believe it exists at all.

don't know. I am a scientist, not a philosopher. My position is based on a logical understanding of the scientific method, how it works, and its epistemological basis.
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Let's not forget that epistemology is philosophy, not science.

I know. The scientific method is derived from an epistemological philosophy. That epistemological philosophy is what most modern scientists are referring to when they talk about "physicalism", not the ontological physicalism you have been talking about. That idea was pretty much put to death when Quantum Mechanics and Special Relativity were discovered.

This raises the obvious question of what you think the word "physical" means. If you are presupposing the claim that their are two distinct ontological "substances", physical and mental, then you are presupposing dualism. Under the scientific worldview, the word "physical" refers to anything which interacts with anything else in an observable way.
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Within an idealistic ontology, you would be right, as everything observed would be 'in the mind', and there would be no external physical reality.

One need not assume any ontology. The definition of physical I gave does not require ontological assumptions.

However, most scientists still mean by 'physical' something which exists in itself, independent of our observation of it. Thus there is nothing arbitrary about distinguishing subjective consciousness from a non-subjective outside world.

Why assume that our subjective experiences are not part of the objective world? You seem to be claiming that scientists have the view that there is the objective world, and our minds which are not a part of it, observing it. This view was discredited long ago. Our minds are a part of the objective world. It does not exist independently of our subjective observations of it. Our subjective observations are a part of it.

As I said above, our subjective experiences objectively exist. The concept of something being irreducibly subjective is not coherent.

the subjective and qualitative (sometimes summarized as qualia) by definition cannot be reduced to the non-subjective and non-qualitative. The subjective is not just some kind of computational self-reference of a purely physical system.

So far you have offered no actual logical argument or evidence to back up this claim. You have merely asserted it as being obvious.

To tell you the truth, I'm at a loss whenever I'm confronted with scholars who really take seriously the theory of materialist reductionism (meaning while they really understand what it boils down to). How on earth can anyone who's any bit intelligent believe such a theory? Or is it precisely reserved to people with exceptionally high intelligence to believe anything which strikes anyone else as plain nonsense? If only because it takes a lot of intellectual effort to defend the absurd?

No, it is because people who are familiar with science, in particular, modern science like Quantum Mechanics and Relativity, realize how unreliable our intuitive preconceptions about things are. They have learned to rely on the actual evidence, and to not allow their intuitive preconceptions to bias their judgement. Unfortunately, many philosophers never seem to learn this lesson.


Dr. Stupid