Dualism and Theism are Subsets of Materialism

[Robin]

Not unprepared, merely unwilling. Because it's neither appropriate nor necessary.

Robin : "Everything that exists is a whale -- my theory of whaleism encompasses everything!"
drkitten : "No, not everything is a whale. Roses aren't whales, for example."
Robin : "Oh, yeah? Give me an exact definition of a rose, down to the exact genetic sequence. If you don't know that, you don't know that a rose isn't a whale! My theory of whaleism remains proven because no one has sequenced the DNA of a rose! I am invincible! And I can fly! And I can divide by zero! And I will continue to make irrelevant and unreasonable demands, because otherwise I will be forced to admit that my theory has no actual support whatsoever! So, what's the DNA of a rose?"
drkitten : "Bite me."

Oh and another thing I noticed about your little comedy.

You are attempting to take your definition for Materialism, the one I said did not even make sense, and attribute it to me.

No thanks Doctor, you like it you keep it. Just try to lie a little less in future, I already provided my alternate definition and demonstrated that it was the one that actual Materialist philosophers use.

 

[Robin]

Sorry, need to jump in here.

Tarski does not define truth. He defines "True in language L".

(And as a consequence the answer to your question is no )
[/End Nitpick]

Carry on...

Not a nitpick at all, entirely relevant. It was drkitten who made the original claim.

We can now redefine omiscience to say that God knows all propositions that are true in language L.

 

[Thabiguy]

Godel showed that provability -- which is non-arbitrary -- is inaccesible to mathematics. Tarski showed that truth -- which is also non-arbitrary -- is inaccessible to mathematics. Turing showed that completion -- which is non-arbitrary -- is inaccessible to mathematics. Chaitin showed that existence -- which is non-arbitrary --- is inaccessible to mathematics. Cohen showed that size --- which is non-arbitrary --- is inaccessible to mathematics.

And now you're wondering why the mind of God is inaccessible to mathematics? That's an immediate consequence of the above. If God is in fact omniscient (as He is defined to be), then he knows the truth. SInce no algorithmic or mathematical process can establish that (Tarski again, as well as Chaitin and Turing), He must be out of reach of mathematics.

(emphasis mine)

You obviously have a very powerful definition of algorithm if it encompasses the undeciable (non recursively enumerable). I stand by what I wrote.

No algorithmic process can establish the truth. There are indeed theories that encompass the truth, but they are by definition not processes.

(emphasis mine)

Do not shift the goalposts. You did not talk just about algorithms. You talked about what was, in your opinion, inaccessible to mathematics, out of reach of mathematics, and impossible to establish by any algorithmic or mathematical process. Gödel, Tarski and Turing did not show that "no algorithmic or mathematical process can establish the truth", which is what you claimed and I pointed out as false.

If you reduce your position to mere "no algorithmic process can establish the truth", you do not stand by what you wrote, as that is a much weaker statement than those you made earlier - and also quite irrelevant to the very question you were supposed to address, i.e. why would God not be accessible to mathematics.

 

[Phaedrus74]

Not a nitpick at all, entirely relevant. It was drkitten who made the original claim.

We can now redefine omiscience to say that God knows all propositions that are true in language L.

At which point the question becomes "Which language?"

A dualist (a real one) would have to say that there are two mutually in-translatable ones, I think. Which would preclude the possibility of reducing all true statements of L (language about the "immaterial") to true statements of M (language about the "material") as suggested in the OP.

The reduction of theistic sentences to material ones seems to hinge on the nature of god and might very well be possible.

 

[rocketdodger]

Since you assert that there is no way even to assign meaning to the immaterial using a materialist framework, then dualism is not encompassed by materialism. You can't even ask the questions in materialism that dualism purports to answer.

You have it backwards -- my assertion is that one cannot assign meaning to the immaterial without using a materialist framework. This seems to me to be a trivial fact since we, our thoughts, and by extension everything we can think of are material.

A corollary of the OP would be that "immaterial" can't have the meaning to the human mind (in our current state) that dualists want it to have. It's like trying to make a fraction by adding integers or making green paint out of red and yellow pigment.

 

[rocketdodger]

At which point the question becomes "Which language?"

A dualist (a real one) would have to say that there are two mutually in-translatable ones, I think. Which would preclude the possibility of reducing all true statements of L (language about the "immaterial") to true statements of M (language about the "material") as suggested in the OP.

The reduction of theistic sentences to material ones seems to hinge on the nature of god and might very well be possible.

Right. But since no dualist has found a true statement of L that cannot be reduced to true statements of M (this observation is the entire basis of my argument), dualists are limited to falling back on magic.

My contention is that materialism also has magic -- it is simply the name we give to all the true statements of M that we cannot know (if there are any). Now, it may turn out in the future that there are true statements of L that cannot be reduced to true statements of M, but by definition they will be unknowable, and thus by definition there is no way for us to distinguish them from the unknowable statements of M (because the core element of "unknowable" is shared between them in our minds).

Hence, my claim that the core elements of dualism are encompassed by the core elements of materialism.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Um, no. Dualism is an ontologic position holding that there are two types of substances.

Its a bit of a silly position to take since the two "substances" would not be able to interact if they did not share some commonality -- i.e. they would fundamentally be the same "substance".

 

[Robin]

drkitten,

Since I am to be accused of claiming superpower I thought I would go back through the debate and see where I did. I fixed up your little comedy to better reflect the quality of the debate:

drkitten: Most Materialists claim that everything is shrdlu
robin: Can you give me an example of a Materialist who says that?
drkitten: Most of 'em
robin: And what does 'shrdlu' mean?
drkitten: It does not need a definition
robin: In that case the claim is meaningless
drkitten: No it is not, for example some things have relative, imprecise or ostensive definitions
robin: Any definition really will do
drkitten: For example a qwerty is by definition unshrdlu
robin: And a 'qwerty' is?
drkitten" You are making unreasonable demands for precise definition
robin: No, really, just some idea of what a shrdlu might be
drkitten: You are also claiming the ability to fly and divide by zero
robin: Wha..? When?
drkitten: bite me

 

[AkuManiMani]

drkitten,

Since I am to be accused of claiming superpower I thought I would go back through the debate and see where I did. I fixed up your little comedy to better reflect the quality of the debate:

drkitten: Most Materialists claim that everything is shrdlu
robin: Can you give me an example of a Materialist who says that?
drkitten: Most of 'em
robin: And what does 'shrdlu' mean?
drkitten: It does not need a definition
robin: In that case the claim is meaningless
drkitten: No it is not, for example some things have relative, imprecise or ostensive definitions
robin: Any definition really will do
drkitten: For example a qwerty is by definition unshrdlu
robin: And a 'qwerty' is?
drkitten" You are making unreasonable demands for precise definition
robin: No, really, just some idea of what a shrdlu might be
drkitten: You are also claiming the ability to fly and divide by zero
robin: Wha..? When?
drkitten: bite me

This post wins the Golden Cookie Award (#)

 

[jimbob]

There I was thinking that "materialism" is simply the viewpoint that everything is governed by physics, and dualism that there is "something" else.

Materialist: "Thoughts" are electrical signals in a neural net arranged in the brain. The "mind" is simply a consequence of this electrical activity.

Dualist: "Thoughts" originate in the "mind", which is located in the brain, but separate from it.


Or is that a wrong interpretation?

 

[Robin]

At which point the question becomes "Which language?"

A dualist (a real one) would have to say that there are two mutually in-translatable ones, I think. Which would preclude the possibility of reducing all true statements of L (language about the "immaterial") to true statements of M (language about the "material") as suggested in the OP.

The reduction of theistic sentences to material ones seems to hinge on the nature of god and might very well be possible.

But the idea of two mutually intranslatable languages is simply a non-starter, surely.

So either theistic sentences are reducible to material ones, or material sentences are reducible to theistic ones, or the languages are absolutely equivalent

 

[Robin]

There I was thinking that "materialism" is simply the viewpoint that everything is governed by physics, and dualism that there is "something" else.

Materialist: "Thoughts" are electrical signals in a neural net arranged in the brain. The "mind" is simply a consequence of this electrical activity.

Dualist: "Thoughts" originate in the "mind", which is located in the brain, but separate from it.


Or is that a wrong interpretation?

No I think you have summed the position up just nicely.

My only point is that if the mind is "something else" then it is not governed by the laws of physics then it must surely be governed by some other set of laws, or else be arbitrary.

So what distinguishes the mind laws from the material laws?

 

[hammegk]

No I think you have summed the position up just nicely.

My only point is that if the mind is "something else" then it is not governed by the laws of physics then it must surely be governed by some other set of laws, or else be arbitrary.

So what distinguishes the mind laws from the material laws?

See post #41.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There is a presumption in the classic example of a definition that the definiens can be stated. Wittgenstein argued that for some terms this is not the case.[21] The examples he used include game, number and family. In such cases, he argued, there is no fixed boundary that can be used to provide a definition. Rather, the items are grouped together because of a family resemblance. For terms such as these it is not possible and indeed not necessary to state a definition; rather, one simply comes to understand the use of the term.

Now the interesting thing here is the definition of definiens. Wikipedia defines it to mean the words used in a definition. Merriam defines it as a synonym of definition.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

My only point is that if the mind is "something else" then it is not governed by the laws of physics then it must surely be governed by some other set of laws, or else be arbitrary.

So what distinguishes the mind laws from the material laws?

And what in the name of all that is holy are the interaction laws that provide the material and immaterial a nexus?

~~ Paul

 

[articulett]

magic?

 

[hodgy]

Rocketdodger and Robin are right, ultimately 'the immaterial exists' is a logical contradiction. There is no reason why anything that exists cannot be described as material. If God and His angels do in fact exist then they are material. The reason that some folks would like to describe them as immaterial is to purely to obscure and / or avoid the argument (even if they do not realise this themselves).

It is revealing that religions and other forms of superstition lay great faith in the material insofar as it can be used to support their claims. Hence we hear 'how can you doubt God when you are surrounded by the wonders of nature' and 'the Red sea parted to let them pass' etc....

The point here is that if there were really a world of heaven and hell, salvation and damnation, to which our actual souls actually went and we suffered / enjoyed actual torment / eternal bliss - then that just means that there is a material heaven. Immaterial does not qualify for special logic.

 

[hodgy]

See post #41.

Please explain - how is 'free will' relevant here?

 

[jimbob]

Originally Posted by Robin
My only point is that if the mind is "something else" then it is not governed by the laws of physics then it must surely be governed by some other set of laws, or else be arbitrary.

So what distinguishes the mind laws from the material laws?
And what in the name of all that is holy are the interaction laws that provide the material and immaterial a nexus?

~~ Paul

These must be physical laws... and the dualist vanishes in a puff of logic?

 

[hodgy]

Oh - and in case its not obvious the same goes for thoughts, consciousness, etc.... Whatever they are, they are 'something' and there is no reason why you cannot ascribe the general label 'material' to them.