Dualism and Theism are Subsets of Materialism

[Phaedrus74]

Right. But since no dualist has found a true statement of L that cannot be reduced to true statements of M (this observation is the entire basis of my argument), dualists are limited to falling back on magic.

If that observation is the basis of your argument you are setting yourself up for an induction fallacy: That we have not observed any swans that are not white does not imply that there exist no swans that are black.

Be careful, or logic will bite you in the [rule-10]

My contention is that materialism also has magic -- it is simply the name we give to all the true statements of M that we cannot know (if there are any). Now, it may turn out in the future that there are true statements of L that cannot be reduced to true statements of M, but by definition they will be unknowable, and thus by definition there is no way for us to distinguish them from the unknowable statements of M (because the core element of "unknowable" is shared between them in our minds).

First off, am correct in assuming that by "unknowable" sentences you mean that these sentences are true but that we can offer no satisfactory justification regarding why they should be true (Following the notion that knowledge is justified true belief)?

You are right in stating that unknowable true sentences in M are indistinguishable from unknowable true sentences in L if and only if there are no other distinguishing factors that would serve the classify these sentences as belonging to different languages. This is not trivial since for instance the inclusion of a concept like "will" or "thought" in a sentence would pretty much exclude the possibility of the sentence in question being expressed in language M. So the statement that all unknowable true sentences of M are indistinguishable from unknowable true sentences in L is difficult to prove.

Hence, my claim that the core elements of dualism are encompassed by the core elements of materialism.

I appreciate what you are trying to say and do in this thread, but you must remember that dualism and materialism are by definition irreducible. Either the one is true or the other. [And for the record: I am not a dualist.]

 

[Phaedrus74]

But the idea of two mutually intranslatable languages is simply a non-starter, surely.

Not necessarily, but I mostly offered it a an illustration of a mistake Rocketdodger made in the OP: dualism is by definition irreducible to materialism (or any other monism for that matter).

So either theistic sentences are reducible to material ones, or material sentences are reducible to theistic ones, or the languages are absolutely equivalent

That is correct.

 

[Robin]

See post #41.

I know I seem to have been ignoring it, but it is at the back of my mind. If libertarian free will were logically possible then it would probably provide a defeater for Materialism, at least as I understand it.

At the moment I don't really understand the term but as has been pointed out a few times it would entail that something could be neither deterministic nor random.

 

[Robin]

magic?

I have heard it seriously argued - gigantic coincidence.

Or that God keeps them in synch.

 

[Robin]

Not necessarily, but I mostly offered it a an illustration of a mistake Rocketdodger made in the OP: dualism is by definition irreducible to materialism (or any other monism for that matter).

But as dualists define Materialism, not as Materialists define Materialism. Note as I said earlier that Materialism is rarely explicitly defined as a Monism by Materialists themselves, although that would seem to be implicit. Dualists always seem to talk substances and never physical laws.

 

[Robin]

If that observation is the basis of your argument you are setting yourself up for an induction fallacy: That we have not observed any swans that are not white does not imply that there exist no swans that are black.

The "never having visited Western Australia" fallacy. But still my original point stands that if in any case statements about God's truth are equivalent to statements about truth in any of these languages then we are probably not talking about what most people think of as God.

 

[Phaedrus74]

But as dualists define Materialism, not as Materialists define Materialism. Note as I said earlier that Materialism is rarely explicitly defined as a Monism by Materialists themselves, although that would seem to be implicit. Dualists always seem to talk substances and never physical laws.

I would consider non-monistic materialism to be a contradiction in terms. But I agree with you that debates regarding substances are basically irrelevant for our current understanding of the world. In that sense dualists are a bit of a throwback, somehow they haven't gotten the memo regarding ontology.

 

[Phaedrus74]

The "never having visited Western Australia" fallacy. But still my original point stands that if in any case statements about God's truth are equivalent to statements about truth in any of these languages then we are probably not talking about what most people think of as God.

Exactly right!
What is referred to by the concept God might not be what people in general assume it refers to.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And what in the name of all that is holy are the interaction laws that provide the material and immaterial a nexus?

magic?

Apparently so.

These must be physical laws... and the dualist vanishes in a puff of logic?

And there you have it, my friends.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I know I seem to have been ignoring it, but it is at the back of my mind. If libertarian free will were logically possible then it would probably provide a defeater for Materialism, at least as I understand it.

Unless the new thing that is required---neither determinism nor randomness---turns out to have a logical place in the material world. However, if it does not, then I agree that physicalism has a problem. But then again, so does logic, which is a much bigger problem.

~~ Paul

 

[Beerina]

Materialism certainly views 'the mind' as encompassed within a monistic position. But dualism does not. It posits mind as a completely separate type of substance. That it doesn't make sense is completely beside the point.

It would just be a different type of physics. I view the claim there is something inherently non-understandable about the "spirit world" to mortal humans is a cop-out.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It would just be a different type of physics. I view the claim there is something inherently non-understandable about the "spirit world" to mortal humans is a cop-out.

Of course it's a cop-out. That's the only way that could possibly hold onto it. If it were a different type of physics, then it would simply be incorporated into the Standard Model or the Standard Model would morph into something new -- then it would be materialism.

With adavances in physics, I'm afraid they're stuck with 'it's magic'. I don't see how they can say anything else. Most of what they seem to actually say rests on ignorance.

 

[rocketdodger]

If that observation is the basis of your argument you are setting yourself up for an induction fallacy: That we have not observed any swans that are not white does not imply that there exist no swans that are black.

Be careful, or logic will bite you in the [rule-10]

That doesn't apply in this case -- It isn't a question of whether black swans exist. It is a question of whether "black swan" can be defined without using "white swan," and it clearly cannot.

The inductive observation I made is merely that all existing definitions dualists use are completely dependent upon material, and statements in L like "mind is a different substance from matter," or whatever, when reduced fully will be a set of true statements in M. This implies that such statements in L, when reduced, end up with a meaning dualists do not expect, but that is what happens when you try to define things precisely -- nonsense gets dropped.

This is not trivial since for instance the inclusion of a concept like "will" or "thought" in a sentence would pretty much exclude the possibility of the sentence in question being expressed in language M. So the statement that all unknowable true sentences of M are indistinguishable from unknowable true sentences in L is difficult to prove.

But it is trivial, because "will" and "thought" are only meaningful (to us) when they are defined using M. That is the main thrust of my OP -- the mental vocabulary of humans (or as drkitten would want me to say, all the 'core elements' of thought we can use) is restricted to a subset of M. So we end up with dualist concepts being expressed using axioms of M along with unknowable true sentences that by definition we can't pinpoint the source language of and ... you arrive at the OP.

I appreciate what you are trying to say and do in this thread, but you must remember that dualism and materialism are by definition irreducible. Either the one is true or the other. [And for the record: I am not a dualist.]

Well yes, I have heard this many times before. My contention is that if dualism is defined as such, then that is all it can be -- as soon as dualists try to make it more by adding anything[i/] else, it becomes a subset of materialism.

So if dualists (and theists) are content with that vacuous definition that has no meaning whatsoever, yes my OP is incorrect. If they want to profess that "mind" is a separate substance, then they are in fact simply naive materialists.

 

[Phaedrus74]

<snip>

But it is trivial, because "will" and "thought" are only meaningful (to us) when they are defined using M. That is the main thrust of my OP -- the mental vocabulary of humans (or as drkitten would want me to say, all the 'core elements' of thought we can use) is restricted to a subset of M. So we end up with dualist concepts being expressed using axioms of M along with unknowable true sentences that by definition we can't pinpoint the source language of and ... you arrive at the OP.

<snip>

From Wikipedia:

"Thought is a mental process which allows beings to model the world, and so to deal with it effectively according to their goals, plans, ends and desires."

Do you agree that this is a meaningful definition of thought?

If so, this sentence should be a true statement in language M according to the claim you make. Please show me how the concepts used are consistent with materialism.

 

[Robin]

From Wikipedia:

"Thought is a mental process which allows beings to model the world, and so to deal with it effectively according to their goals, plans, ends and desires."

Do you agree that this is a meaningful definition of thought?

If so, this sentence should be a true statement in language M according to the claim you make. Please show me how the concepts used are consistent with materialism.

I am puzzled at what you think the inconsistencies might be.

 

[Phaedrus74]

[DP]

 

[Phaedrus74]

I am puzzled at what you think the inconsistencies might be.

Define "goal" materialistically, and I'll get back to you.

[Note, what I'm trying to get at is not showing that rocketdodger (and you) are wrong, or mistaken. I'm merely trying to convey the fact that there is a possibility that (s)he (and by extention you) is overstating his/her case.

In other words my beef is not so much with the argument itself (as I understand it) it is with the general sloppiness with which it is formulated.
A badly argued point serves only its detractors.]

 

[rocketdodger]

Define "goal" materialistically, and I'll get back to you.

Just off the top of my head,

goal == 'desired world state'

desire == 'emotion resulting from expecting a reward'

emotion == 'neurological phenomenon that can affect decisions"

 

[Phaedrus74]

Just off the top of my head,

goal == 'desired world state'

desire == 'emotion resulting from expecting a reward'

emotion == 'neurological phenomenon that can affect decisions"

Good effort so far!

Now for a definition of decision in the final clause.

 

[rocketdodger]

decision == many-to-one function that selects a single state from a group of possible states

Note that 'function' implies the selection is done using a material process.