Dualism and Theism are Subsets of Materialism

[Phaedrus74]

decision == many-to-one function that selects a single state from a group of possible states

Note that 'function' implies the selection is done using a material process.

So summing up a goal is (materialistically defined):

goal == desired world state

desire == neurological phenomenon that can affect many-to-one functions that select a single state from a group of possible states resulting from expecting a reward

Sorry, to be a nag but how do we get from "desire" to "desired"?

[Aside, I am impressed by your definition of decision, truly! The way this is going I will have to concede your point. Excellent, I love to be proven wrong.]

 

[rocketdodger]

So summing up a goal is (materialistically defined):

goal == desired world state

desire == neurological phenomenon that can affect many-to-one functions that select a single state from a group of possible states resulting from expecting a reward

Sorry, to be a nag but how do we get from "desire" to "desired"?

Well that is just the adjective form of desire, right? I am not a linguist, but I would assume something like "the attribute of being the object of a desire" or something like that. So if a state is "desired" that just means something has desire for it.

[Aside, I am impressed by your definition of decision, truly! The way this is going I will have to concede your point. Excellent, I love to be proven wrong.]

Thanks As an A.I. programmer I am getting used to realizing that the basic processes of our mind are not that magical at all. It also makes me realize, more and more, that the consciousness resulting from the sum of those processes really is magical, as an emergent entity -- much more magical, in my opinion, than any religion could ever hope to portray it.

 

[Phaedrus74]

Well that is just the adjective form of desire, right? I am not a linguist, but I would assume something like "the attribute of being the object of a desire" or something like that. So if a state is "desired" that just means something has desire for it.

That would probably do it, yes.

Thanks As an A.I. programmer I am getting used to realizing that the basic processes of our mind are not that magical at all. It also makes me realize, more and more, that the consciousness resulting from the sum of those processes really is magical, as an emergent entity -- much more magical, in my opinion, than any religion could ever hope to portray it.

You find me in complete agreement here, I have been thinking about these notions in course of my studies in epistemology, and were definitely getting closer to an all causal formulation of these processes. Some of the stuff that is going on in cognitive neuro-psychology is extremely exiting, and as an avid gamer I can see the A.I. progressing each year...

We live in interesting times

 

[Robin]

Define "goal" materialistically, and I'll get back to you.

I can see nothing intrinsically non-materialistic about the concept "goal". With respect to the brain a goal is simply a mental representation of some possible state that can be achieved through action.

 

[Phaedrus74]

I can see nothing intrinsically non-materialistic about the concept "goal". With respect to the brain a goal is simply a mental representation of some possible state that can be achieved through action.

It can be argued (and has been argued by for instance Wittgenstein) that the notion "goal" includes a crucial intentional component that is traditionally taken to be incompatible with strict materialism.

In the light of the efforts of rocketdodger (see preceding posts) in defining this notion I find myself in a position where I need to retract my earlier statements.

I cannot make the case for the irreducibility of these concepts.

 

[Robin]

It can be argued (and has been argued by for instance Wittgenstein) that the notion "goal" includes a crucial intentional component that is traditionally taken to be incompatible with strict materialism.

In the light of the efforts of rocketdodger (see preceding posts) in defining this notion I find myself in a position where I need to retract my earlier statements.

I cannot make the case for the irreducibility of these concepts.

Well goal does have a crucial intentional component when used in the context of the mind. I still don't see what incompatibility that could have with materialism. I am unaware of any tradition that makes intention incompatible with materialism, and don't understand why it should be. Under materialism an intention is a state or process of the brain.

I would be interested in following up the Wittgenstein reference if you have it to hand, I would have thought that he would have considered any statement regarding Materialism as being meaningless.

 

[Phaedrus74]

Well goal does have a crucial intentional component when used in the context of the mind. I still don't see what incompatibility that could have with materialism. I am unaware of any tradition that makes intention incompatible with materialism, and don't understand why it should be. Under materialism an intention is a state or process of the brain.

I would be interested in following up the Wittgenstein reference if you have it to hand, I would have thought that he would have considered any statement regarding Materialism as being meaningless.

Donald Davidson tries to make the case for intranslatability, he has (famously) shown that there is no problem redescribing reasons as causes in the article "Actions, Reasons, Causes" from 1963. He then goes on to argue in "Mental Events" (1970) that there are no strict laws relating mental and physical events. And that therefore sentences about mental events cannot be losslessly translated into sentences of neuro-physiology. It is crucial to note that he nowhere denies that the mind is in essence a property of a physical system. What he argues is that the way the language we use to refer to mental events evolved has given rise to conceptual structures that cause problems for a strict reduction of true statements about mental events into physical ones. Generalisations are possible, just not strict laws. It is this latter sense in which I have problems with the suggested possibility for reduction, though not redescription.

With regards to Wittenstein I would hazard a guess to say that he would argue that the grammar (see for instance Philosophical Investigations par. 371/373) of the term goal (the way we use the term on a day-to-day basis) carries with it a set of implicit assumptions (certainties he calls them in "On Certainty") that are incompatible with strict materialism. For instance the fact that people in general are presumed to be free to act and could have chosen a different goal. Under a materialistic rediscription the notion "choice" would (maybe) be unrecognizable as choice. In other words while we may redescribe "choice" as "the process by which our brains are caused to select a course of action" the fact that the latter phrase uses the passive mode belies the idea that choice is active, is causative not caused. [Note however that I don't think Wittgenstein ever explicitely argues this particular point, but it follows from his (later) works.]

Wittensteins view on the debate on materialism would (following the Tractatus) in all likelyhood not be that it is meaningless, but that it is non-sense.

All references are courtesy of the Stanford Ecyclopedia of Philosophy. (My books are at home)

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Can I nominate this exchange as a model of civility and intelligence -- the best of what this forum is supposed to be? Outstanding, all of you.

 

[hammegk]

Wittensteins view on the debate on materialism would (following the Tractatus) in all likelyhood not be that it is meaningless, but that it is non-sense.

To paraphrase Wittgenstein for you atheists and Materialists; "If language can't describe it, it doesn't exist."

God is Dead, as is libertarian free will. Long live ????.

 

[Phaedrus74]

Can I nominate this exchange as a model of civility and intelligence -- the best of what this forum is supposed to be? Outstanding, all of you.

Thanks Ichneumonwasp...

(Where's that thumb-twiddling blushing smiley when you need it)

 

[Radrook]

Dualism isn't necessary for theism. As a theist I believe that mind is generated by the materrial brain via its neurotransmitter activities. Shut off the neural activity and mind disappears.

 

[rocketdodger]

Dualism isn't necessary for theism. As a theist I believe that mind is generated by the materrial brain via its neurotransmitter activities. Shut off the neural activity and mind disappears.

Start with dualism, replace "mind" with "soul/spirit," and you have theism.

 

[Robin]

Donald Davidson tries to make the case for intranslatability, he has (famously) shown that there is no problem redescribing reasons as causes in the article "Actions, Reasons, Causes" from 1963. He then goes on to argue in "Mental Events" (1970) that there are no strict laws relating mental and physical events. And that therefore sentences about mental events cannot be losslessly translated into sentences of neuro-physiology. It is crucial to note that he nowhere denies that the mind is in essence a property of a physical system. What he argues is that the way the language we use to refer to mental events evolved has given rise to conceptual structures that cause problems for a strict reduction of true statements about mental events into physical ones. Generalisations are possible, just not strict laws. It is this latter sense in which I have problems with the suggested possibility for reduction, though not redescription.

If he has not denied that the mind is a property of a physical system then his argument cannot be used to demonstrate intention is incompatible with Materialism. In fact, although Donaldson self describes as an Anomalous Monist, I am pretty sure I have read him say "... if Materialism is true, as I believe it is ..."

Also note that "reduction" means different things in different Materialist positions.

But here is a consideration. Any intention relies on a number of things, knowledge, perception, imagination, manipulation of environment and so on. Just taking one of them - perception is in itself a pretty complex process.

Is is really plausible that intention could be irreducible either in the linguistic sense or in the sense of understanding something in terms of its parts?

With regards to Wittenstein I would hazard a guess to say that he would argue that the grammar (see for instance Philosophical Investigations par. 371/373) of the term goal (the way we use the term on a day-to-day basis) carries with it a set of implicit assumptions (certainties he calls them in "On Certainty") that are incompatible with strict materialism. For instance the fact that people in general are presumed to be free to act and could have chosen a different goal. Under a materialistic rediscription the notion "choice" would (maybe) be unrecognizable as choice. In other words while we may redescribe "choice" as "the process by which our brains are caused to select a course of action" the fact that the latter phrase uses the passive mode belies the idea that choice is active, is causative not caused. [Note however that I don't think Wittgenstein ever explicitely argues this particular point, but it follows from his (later) works.]

Wittensteins view on the debate on materialism would (following the Tractatus) in all likelyhood not be that it is meaningless, but that it is non-sense.

I am pretty sure Witty rejected metaphysics both in the Tractatus and the Investigations period.

 

[Robin]

To paraphrase Wittgenstein for you atheists and Materialists; "If language can't describe it, it doesn't exist."

God is Dead, as is libertarian free will. Long live ????.

Hmm. I cannot recall him saying that. He did say "Of that which you cannot speak, you should be silent"

 

[Robin]

Start with dualism, replace "mind" with "soul/spirit," and you have theism.

But Radrook, if I understand him, believes in a physical resurrection. Mind you, that still makes his Theism a claim within the Materialist framework.

 

[Radrook]

But Radrook, if I understand him, believes in a physical resurrection. Mind you, that still makes his Theism a claim within the Materialist framework.

I do believe in spirit creatures, a spririt realm, and a ressurection of some individuals into that spirit realm via being given spirit bodies. What I don't believe is that the human mind in the human material context is independent of the material human brain. I believe mind is merely a byproduct of brain activity and that when the brain ceases to function, mind also ceases to exist within the material human parameters or the material realm. In short, I see no problem whatsoever in the interaction between mind and brain.

 

[Phaedrus74]

If he has not denied that the mind is a property of a physical system then his argument cannot be used to demonstrate intention is incompatible with Materialism. In fact, although Donaldson self describes as an Anomalous Monist, I am pretty sure I have read him say "... if Materialism is true, as I believe it is ..."

Also note that "reduction" means different things in different Materialist positions.

Until now I took the term "incompatible" to mean somehing along the lines of "leading to inconsistencies". I understand that this is not the way you meant the term (am I correct?). Under that, less strict, interpretation "intention" or "mind" are in no way incompatible with materialism. What Davidson tries to show is that there exists no function that provides a one-to-one mapping true sentences about "minds" to true sentences about "things". It is this, rather strict sense, in which he argues that reductionism is false.

So while it may be possible that different notions of reductionism exist, this is the sense in which Davidson uses the term (and the sense I attached to it when I started posting in this thread).

What do you mean with reduction in this context?

But here is a consideration. Any intention relies on a number of things, knowledge, perception, imagination, manipulation of environment and so on. Just taking one of them - perception is in itself a pretty complex process.

Is is really plausible that intention could be irreducible either in the linguistic sense or in the sense of understanding something in terms of its parts?

Yes, I believe it is entirely possible that the concept "intention" is irreducible in those senses.

The question then becomes: What would this entail?

I personally believe (but this is no more than a hunch) that, if we are correct in presupposing materialism as a starting point for scientifc enquiry, the concept "intention" will go the way of the concept "phlogiston". This in the sense that it is a concept that had a certain use during a certain period of history but that it has successfully been supplanted (as a concept that helps us to understand the world around us) by a different notion.

I am pretty sure Witty rejected metaphysics both in the Tractatus and the Investigations period.

He was an engineer, what do you expect?

 

[hammegk]

Hmm. I cannot recall him saying that. He did say "Of that which you cannot speak, you should be silent"

I think, therefore I am. Your turn.

 

[Robin]

Until now I took the term "incompatible" to mean somehing along the lines of "leading to inconsistencies". I understand that this is not the way you meant the term (am I correct?).

No, I meant leading to inconsistencies. I don't see the inconsistencies.

What Davidson tries to show is that there exists no function that provides a one-to-one mapping true sentences about "minds" to true sentences about "things". It is this, rather strict sense, in which he argues that reductionism is false.

So while it may be possible that different notions of reductionism exist, this is the sense in which Davidson uses the term (and the sense I attached to it when I started posting in this thread).

What do you mean with reduction in this context?

You are talking about linguistic reductionism as I mentioned earlier. Davidson is saying nothing startling or new, Carnap said much the same thing back in the 1950's. It was a bit of a blow for Logical Positivism but I don't think it really said anything about Materialism.

Yes, I believe it is entirely possible that the concept "intention" is irreducible in those senses.

The question then becomes: What would this entail?

In the second sense it would mean that something could be meaningfully termed an 'intention' and yet be a metaphysical primitive, not dependent on any underlying complexity. But I have shown quite a lot of underlying complexity in the term without even going to a biophysical level or beyond. I think that any intention (whether or not it resided in a brain) would necessarily be dependent on quite considerable underlying complexity.

I personally believe (but this is no more than a hunch) that, if we are correct in presupposing materialism as a starting point for scientifc enquiry, the concept "intention" will go the way of the concept "phlogiston". This in the sense that it is a concept that had a certain use during a certain period of history but that it has successfully been supplanted (as a concept that helps us to understand the world around us) by a different notion.

Presupposing Materialism as a starting point for scientific enquiry is as unhelpful as presupposing God for the same purpose.

Strict Empiricism is the only rigorous starting point for scientific enquiry. No assumptions.

I think intention can already be supplanted by other terms. We can think of intention in terms of perceiving a situation having reasons to alter that situation and forming a perceptual projection of a new situation and the steps required to move from one to the other. We can see that this is likely to have been true of even the most primitive types of brain.

 

[Phaedrus74]

Robin, before I respond to your questions I need to ask what philosophical works you have read regarding these matters? I might be able to tailor my answers to your specific background.