Dualism and Theism are Subsets of Materialism

[hammegk]

.... I have always asked what property immaterial things are supposed to have that makes them inaccessible to mathematical description.

Libertarian free will.

 

[drkitten]

My assertion is that all of the core elements dualists and theists use in the generation of their names and subsequent extension of those names to cover their novel and hypothetical entities are in fact completely encompassed by materialism.

Well, this is better -- but still unworkable.

We have, for example, no clear-cut evidence that "matter" is capable of intelligence, sensation, self-awareness, or emotion. Indeed, we don't even have clear-cut evidence that pure material can have referentiality (can be "about" something; a book is not "about" anything if there is no reader, for example). Our experiments in artificial intelligence have at best been tantalizing failures, and at worst have been un-tantalizing failures, despite more than fifty years of research (and hundreds of years of philosophical musing).

The traditional theist explanation for this is that "mind" is a core element of the supernatural; minds exist only as a consequence of "soul" or something similar, which divides God and his angels from humans from animals (which have a weakened form of "soul") from the inanimate, which has no "soul" at all.

I specifically deny that "mind" is in any way novel or hypothetical; it's quite real. I similarly deny that emotion, sensation, representation, or self-awareness are hypothetical. But these concepts are not "in fact completely encompassed by materialism"; we have ab best some controversial and highly speculative theories about how existing scientific materialism might be extended to encompass them --- and these theories are in fact demonstrably inadequate. Or if you think that they are adequate --- well, that's you're claim. The burden of proof is upon you; show me a machine that "feels" (and demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it does) and I'll happily accept that "feeling" is a consequence of the material and not of the "mind."

But otherwise you are way overstating your case. And the OP remains wrong. Unless you can prove that "mind" is an element of the material -- or even demonstrate such a sequence to be credible --- then your statement that the dualistic is a subset of the materialistic is just as unproven and just as incredible.

And, of course, "mind" is just one of the core elements of the non-material. As I pointed out, "eternal" is another one (nothing material will last forever, but God and his angels presumably will), as is "infinite" (nothing save God is infinitely knowledgable). So there are three other core aspects of the immaterial tha can serve to separate them from the material.

Of course, the "real" core aspect of the supernatural is God Himself. If God exists, then He is supernatural by definition and hence materialism is false. SInce it is well known that materialistic processes cannot disprove God, the OP is wrong from the start -- theism is not a subset of materialism. Now, if God does not exist, then theism is WRONG.... but it's still not a subset of materialism. And, of course, if theism is right, then materialism is WRONG.... and theism is still not a subset.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, this is better -- but still unworkable.

We have, for example, no clear-cut evidence that "matter" is capable of intelligence, sensation, self-awareness, or emotion. Indeed, we don't even have clear-cut evidence that pure material can have referentiality (can be "about" something; a book is not "about" anything if there is no reader, for example). Our experiments in artificial intelligence have at best been tantalizing failures, and at worst have been un-tantalizing failures, despite more than fifty years of research (and hundreds of years of philosophical musing).

The traditional theist explanation for this is that "mind" is a core element of the supernatural; minds exist only as a consequence of "soul" or something similar, which divides God and his angels from humans from animals (which have a weakened form of "soul") from the inanimate, which has no "soul" at all.

I specifically deny that "mind" is in any way novel or hypothetical; it's quite real. I similarly deny that emotion, sensation, representation, or self-awareness are hypothetical. But these concepts are not "in fact completely encompassed by materialism"; we have ab best some controversial and highly speculative theories about how existing scientific materialism might be extended to encompass them --- and these theories are in fact demonstrably inadequate. Or if you think that they are adequate --- well, that's you're claim. The burden of proof is upon you; show me a machine that "feels" (and demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it does) and I'll happily accept that "feeling" is a consequence of the material and not of the "mind."

But otherwise you are way overstating your case. And the OP remains wrong. Unless you can prove that "mind" is an element of the material -- or even demonstrate such a sequence to be credible --- then your statement that the dualistic is a subset of the materialistic is just as unproven and just as incredible.

And, of course, "mind" is just one of the core elements of the non-material. As I pointed out, "eternal" is another one (nothing material will last forever, but God and his angels presumably will), as is "infinite" (nothing save God is infinitely knowledgable). So there are three other core aspects of the immaterial tha can serve to separate them from the material.

Of course, the "real" core aspect of the supernatural is God Himself. If God exists, then He is supernatural by definition and hence materialism is false. SInce it is well known that materialistic processes cannot disprove God, the OP is wrong from the start -- theism is not a subset of materialism. Now, if God does not exist, then theism is WRONG.... but it's still not a subset of materialism. And, of course, if theism is right, then materialism is WRONG.... and theism is still not a subset.

Granted, case not proved. But, to be fair, there is clearly substantial evidence for a material explanation of 'mind' since disruption of brain function results in perturbations or silencing of those traditional features of 'mind'.

I still find it fascinating how the terms of the debate have shifted in our age. In the past it was reason and logic that were presumed to be the proper aspects of human thought ('mind') that could never be explained by materialism while 'emotion' was assumed to be purely animal, and, hence, mechanical.

Since computers can perform astounding feats of calculation, emotion/feeling has become the unexplainable core of humanity.

 

[drkitten]

Granted, case not proved. But, to be fair, there is clearly substantial evidence for a material explanation of 'mind' since disruption of brain function results in perturbations or silencing of those traditional features of 'mind'.

Oh, of course. There's a substantial track record in cognitive science as well as in science in general of pushing the boundaries of the "supernatural' back further and further as we find better and more detailed explanations for things that were previously thought to be explanable only by the Hand of God. Much of dualism and/or theism turns out to be based upon a lack of contradictory evidence coupled with an argument from ignorance (although, of course, the same is true for the law of conservation of momentum; we postulate that momentum is conserved because we've never seen it violated. Someone won a Nobel prize for showing that parity was not conserved, despite the same argument from Emmy Noether's ignorance.)

But it's clearly out of line to claim, as the OP does, that materialism somehow encompasses or includes the immaterial. The immaterial may not exist, which would make dualism a false theory -- but it's not a materialistic one. Similarly, Ptolemaic geocentrism is not simply an alternative cosmological view, but an actively false one (the earth can be proven to rotate, for example, via Foucault's pendulum). It would be correct to say that (to the best of our current knowledge, &c. &c.) Ptolemaism is false and Copernicanism is true. It would not be correct to say that Copernicanism encompasses Ptolemaism. And this would have been true even in 1700, before Foucault ran his experiment; a smart philosopher could have pointed out that Copernicus and Ptolemy made different claims w.r.t. the motion of the earth, which made the two theories incompatible, even if no one knew how to run an experiment to distinguish them.

We're at that point w.r.t. immaterialism, dualism, theism, and so forth. If an immaterial, supernatural God exists, then even if His existence can never be demonstrated "scientifically", materialism is false. If God does not exist, even if that negation can never be proven "scientifically, then theism is false. If vitalism or Cartesian dualism is true, then materialism is false, regardless of our inability to test it. We will simply remain in perpetual ignorance about the actual state of the universe.

Which, of course, is no great change from our current understanding, since science is always a series of provisional best guesses.

 

[rocketdodger]

I can see that you are refusing to accept the broader definition of material that Robin suggested ("based on underlying order"). In another thread someone suggested a definition of "material" as "scientifically observable." Both of these definitions are equivalent, and they are the definition I am using in the context of this thread. If you don't want to accept this definition, then fine, but arguing with the OP using a different definition to begin with is pointless as you well know.

Well, this is better -- but still unworkable.

We have, for example, no clear-cut evidence that "matter" is capable of intelligence, sensation, self-awareness, or emotion. Indeed, we don't even have clear-cut evidence that pure material can have referentiality (can be "about" something; a book is not "about" anything if there is no reader, for example). Our experiments in artificial intelligence have at best been tantalizing failures, and at worst have been un-tantalizing failures, despite more than fifty years of research (and hundreds of years of philosophical musing).

Yes, we do, because everything we know about intelligence, sensation, self-awareness, emotion, and even referentiality is completely dependent upon the material.

we have ab best some controversial and highly speculative theories about how existing scientific materialism might be extended to encompass them --- and these theories are in fact demonstrably inadequate. Or if you think that they are adequate --- well, that's you're claim. The burden of proof is upon you; show me a machine that "feels" (and demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it does) and I'll happily accept that "feeling" is a consequence of the material and not of the "mind."

Can our feelings be observed? Do they affect the material? Then they must also be material, according to the broad definition I am using.

But otherwise you are way overstating your case. And the OP remains wrong. Unless you can prove that "mind" is an element of the material -- or even demonstrate such a sequence to be credible --- then your statement that the dualistic is a subset of the materialistic is just as unproven and just as incredible.

I already admitted it was wrong in a response to wasp. What I can show, however, is that as far as we know, as far as we can know, the core elements of dualism and theism are encompassed by the core elements of materialism. The proof is trivial -- if we can think of a thing, the thing is necessarily material.

And, of course, "mind" is just one of the core elements of the non-material. As I pointed out, "eternal" is another one (nothing material will last forever, but God and his angels presumably will), as is "infinite" (nothing save God is infinitely knowledgable). So there are three other core aspects of the immaterial tha can serve to separate them from the material.

Can mind, eternal, infinite, and most of all god, be defined (or given meaning, whatever) without resorting to material core elements? I claim not. Until someone provides a counterexample my claim stands.

 

[rocketdodger]

double post

 

[rocketdodger]

Oh, of course. There's a substantial track record in cognitive science as well as in science in general of pushing the boundaries of the "supernatural' back further and further as we find better and more detailed explanations for things that were previously thought to be explanable only by the Hand of God. Much of dualism and/or theism turns out to be based upon a lack of contradictory evidence coupled with an argument from ignorance (although, of course, the same is true for the law of conservation of momentum; we postulate that momentum is conserved because we've never seen it violated. Someone won a Nobel prize for showing that parity was not conserved, despite the same argument from Emmy Noether's ignorance.)

But it's clearly out of line to claim, as the OP does, that materialism somehow encompasses or includes the immaterial. The immaterial may not exist, which would make dualism a false theory -- but it's not a materialistic one. Similarly, Ptolemaic geocentrism is not simply an alternative cosmological view, but an actively false one (the earth can be proven to rotate, for example, via Foucault's pendulum). It would be correct to say that (to the best of our current knowledge, &c. &c.) Ptolemaism is false and Copernicanism is true. It would not be correct to say that Copernicanism encompasses Ptolemaism. And this would have been true even in 1700, before Foucault ran his experiment; a smart philosopher could have pointed out that Copernicus and Ptolemy made different claims w.r.t. the motion of the earth, which made the two theories incompatible, even if no one knew how to run an experiment to distinguish them.

We're at that point w.r.t. immaterialism, dualism, theism, and so forth. If an immaterial, supernatural God exists, then even if His existence can never be demonstrated "scientifically", materialism is false. If God does not exist, even if that negation can never be proven "scientifically, then theism is false. If vitalism or Cartesian dualism is true, then materialism is false, regardless of our inability to test it. We will simply remain in perpetual ignorance about the actual state of the universe.

Which, of course, is no great change from our current understanding, since science is always a series of provisional best guesses.

Perhaps I worded the OP badly and you think I mean something I don't, drkitten.

I am not saying that dualism being true is encompassed by materialism. I am only saying that all the irreducible elements of dualism are already present in materialism.

Mind, eternal, infinte, and god are not irreducible -- they are dependent upon our experience and knowledge of the world around us, which is necessarily material. If you reduce those dualistic/theistic elements fully, you end up with simple materialistic elements pluse some unknowable "magic" thrown in to make it work.

You might claim that unknowable magic is not encompassed by materialism, but my opinion is that in fact it is -- a true materialist must admit that they cannot be sure the unknowable does not exist. Hence my position in the OP.

 

[drkitten]

Perhaps I worded the OP badly and you think I mean something I don't, drkitten.

I am not saying that dualism being true is encompassed by materialism. I am only saying that all the irreducible elements of dualism are already present in materialism.

But that's clearly impossible.

If the irreducible elements of dualism are present in materialism, then it is not possible for the truth of dualism and of materialism to be independent.

Mind, eternal, infinte, and god are not irreducible -- they are dependent upon our experience and knowledge of the world around us, which is necessarily material.

Clearly false. As a simple example --- if "we" somehow eliminated ourselves in a nuclear firestorm, God would still have exactly the same ontological status He currently holds. His existence is not dependent upon ours. SImilarly, an "eternal" object, by definiton, would still persist long after our experience and knowledge of the world had faded.

Similarly, God (presumptively) existed before we existed to have an experience and knowledge of the world.

Even when there's nobody in the forest, the trees still fall..... The perception of sound may be observer-dependent, but the trees are not.

Or as Ronald Knox put it,

There was a young man who said "God
Must find it exceedingly odd
To think that the tree
Should continue to be
When there's no one about in the quad."

"Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd;
I am always about in the quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by, Yours faithfully, God."

 

[rocketdodger]

But that's clearly impossible.

If the irreducible elements of dualism are present in materialism, then it is not possible for the truth of dualism and of materialism to be independent.

No it isn't! The conclusion dualists think they have reached is not present in materialism. The elements they use to reach it, however, are.

My argument is that in fact they haven't reached the conclusion they think they have.

Clearly false. As a simple example --- if "we" somehow eliminated ourselves in a nuclear firestorm, God would still have exactly the same ontological status He currently holds. His existence is not dependent upon ours. SImilarly, an "eternal" object, by definiton, would still persist long after our experience and knowledge of the world had faded.

Similarly, God (presumptively) existed before we existed to have an experience and knowledge of the world.

Even when there's nobody in the forest, the trees still fall..... The perception of sound may be observer-dependent, but the trees are not.

I don't think so. If we ceased to be, then whatever is external to us will continue, but the word "exist" will not. Thus, nothing will "exist."

You see, I am trying to say that regardless of the true extent of our environment, we are currently limited to dealing with material for everything, including thought. All of our ideas, and the elements of those ideas, are completely dependent upon material.

As such, when dualists and theists make assertions about the immaterial, they can rely only on the material to do so. If an immaterial element in one's mind consists entirely of material elements, then it really isn't immaterial -- it is just a collection of material elements that don't mean what the name suggests. It is entirely equivalent to the collection of words "I do not exist."

You might be thinking that I am saying "the external reality posited by materialism encompasses that posited by dualism and theism." I am most definitely not making that claim. I am making a claim about the collections of ideas in human minds we call materialism, dualism, and theism.

 

[Robin]

Or as Ronald Knox put it,

There was a young man who said "God
Must find it exceedingly odd
To think that the tree
Should continue to be
When there's no one about in the quad."

"Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd;
I am always about in the quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by, Yours faithfully, God."

Why are you putting an iconic Idealist argument in an argument about Dualism?

In Dualism the "tree in the quad" is not a sensa independently maintained by God as it is in the Berkeleyan poem, it is a material thing in it's own right.

 

[Robin]

Perhaps I worded the OP badly and you think I mean something I don't, drkitten.

I am not saying that dualism being true is encompassed by materialism. I am only saying that all the irreducible elements of dualism are already present in materialism.

Your OP is true inasmuch as "Materialism", "Dualism" and "Theism" have any actual meaning.

Unlike drkitten I am prepared to put my cards on the table and give a meaningful definition of "Materialism" and also to show that this accords with mainstream philosophical Materialism since d'Holbach.

I doubt drkitten can name any philosopher that means by Materialism what he means by Materialism.

In the sense that Materialist philosophers mean it, Theism and Dualism are indeed subsets of Materialism, or are at least claims on top of the assumptions that Materialism adds to philosophic first principles.

If, as drkitten suggests, "material" and "immaterial" might just be concepts that are amenable only to relative, imprecise or ostensive definitions then your claim is still true since immaterial entities will either be relative to material entities, or be on a continuum with material entities, or, if they are a referrent in an ostensive definition will be concrete entities, or they will be abstract.

If on the other hand we are just in the realms of word-game philosophy then all three are simply subsets of language.

 

[Robin]

Of course, the "real" core aspect of the supernatural is God Himself. If God exists, then He is supernatural by definition and hence materialism is false.

But of course you are still unprepared to say what this mysterious definition is.

 

[Thabiguy]

Godel showed that provability -- which is non-arbitrary -- is inaccesible to mathematics. Tarski showed that truth -- which is also non-arbitrary -- is inaccessible to mathematics. Turing showed that completion -- which is non-arbitrary -- is inaccessible to mathematics. Chaitin showed that existence -- which is non-arbitrary --- is inaccessible to mathematics. Cohen showed that size --- which is non-arbitrary --- is inaccessible to mathematics.
...
If God is in fact omniscient (as He is defined to be), then he knows the truth. SInce no algorithmic or mathematical process can establish that (Tarski again, as well as Chaitin and Turing), He must be out of reach of mathematics.

I must speak out against this gross misinterpretation of Gödel's, Tarski's and Turing's results. Their results do not show that "no algorithmic or mathematical process can establish the truth".

It is a common misconception that Gödel's first incompleteness theorem shows that any "sufficiently powerful" theory must be incomplete (i.e. that some true statements in it are not provable). But that is not the case. What Gödel's theorem says, and philosophers conveniently ignore, is that any "sufficiently powerful", recursively enumerable theory must be incomplete. That's something entirely different.

In fact, it can be proved that every consistent theory, including all "sufficiently powerful" theories, can be made complete (Lindenbaum's lemma). The important thing that Gödel has shown is that such complete extension is not recursively enumerable. But this in no way means that it doesn't exist, or even worse, that it would be "inaccessible to mathematics".

Similarly, Tarski's undefinability theorem does not show that truth is undefinable. It shows that truth of statements in first-order arithmetic can't be defined using first-order arithmetic - but it can be defined using second-order arithmetic, and that is not "inaccessible to mathematics".

Similarly, Turing did not show that the halting problem was undecidable - he has shown that it is recursively undecidable. It is in fact decidable - by a function which is not Turing-computable, but this doesn't make such function "inaccessible to mathematics".

There is a whole section of mathematical logic called arithmetical hierarchy that deals with the very concepts that you would have "inaccessible to mathematics".

 

[drkitten]

But of course you are still unprepared to say what this mysterious definition is.

Not unprepared, merely unwilling. Because it's neither appropriate nor necessary.

Robin : "Everything that exists is a whale -- my theory of whaleism encompasses everything!"
drkitten : "No, not everything is a whale. Roses aren't whales, for example."
Robin : "Oh, yeah? Give me an exact definition of a rose, down to the exact genetic sequence. If you don't know that, you don't know that a rose isn't a whale! My theory of whaleism remains proven because no one has sequenced the DNA of a rose! I am invincible! And I can fly! And I can divide by zero! And I will continue to make irrelevant and unreasonable demands, because otherwise I will be forced to admit that my theory has no actual support whatsoever! So, what's the DNA of a rose?"
drkitten : "Bite me."

 

[Robin]

I must speak out against this gross misinterpretation of Gödel's, Tarski's and Turing's results. Their results do not show that "no algorithmic or mathematical process can establish the truth".

It is a common misconception that Gödel's first incompleteness theorem shows that any "sufficiently powerful" theory must be incomplete (i.e. that some true statements in it are not provable). But that is not the case. What Gödel's theorem says, and philosophers conveniently ignore, is that any "sufficiently powerful", recursively enumerable theory must be incomplete. That's something entirely different.

In fact, it can be proved that every consistent theory, including all "sufficiently powerful" theories, can be made complete (Lindenbaum's lemma). The important thing that Gödel has shown is that such complete extension is not recursively enumerable. But this in no way means that it doesn't exist, or even worse, that it would be "inaccessible to mathematics".

Similarly, Tarski's undefinability theorem does not show that truth is undefinable. It shows that truth of statements in first-order arithmetic can't be defined using first-order arithmetic - but it can be defined using second-order arithmetic, and that is not "inaccessible to mathematics".

Similarly, Turing did not show that the halting problem was undecidable - he has shown that it is recursively undecidable. It is in fact decidable - by a function which is not Turing-computable, but this doesn't make such function "inaccessible to mathematics".

There is a whole section of mathematical logic called arithmetical hierarchy that deals with the very concepts that you would have "inaccessible to mathematics".

I must admit that I will have to take your word for this.

Really it was just scare maths, not intended to make sense. Gödel and Turing are regularly dragooned for this purpose, but to my knowledge Chaitin and Tarski have been previously unmolested in this respect.

And even if the maths were right the claim they are intended to support would be risible.

 

[drkitten]

I must speak out against this gross misinterpretation of Gödel's, Tarski's and Turing's results. Their results do not show that "no algorithmic or mathematical process can establish the truth".

It is a common misconception that Gödel's first incompleteness theorem shows that any "sufficiently powerful" theory must be incomplete (i.e. that some true statements in it are not provable). But that is not the case. What Gödel's theorem says, and philosophers conveniently ignore, is that any "sufficiently powerful", recursively enumerable theory must be incomplete. That's something entirely different.

You obviously have a very powerful definition of algorithm if it encompasses the undeciable (non recursively enumerable). I stand by what I wrote.

No algorithmic process can establish the truth. There are indeed theories that encompass the truth, but they are by definition not processes.

 

[drkitten]

Can mind, eternal, infinite, and most of all god, be defined (or given meaning, whatever) without resorting to material core elements? I claim not.

That's the best argument you've yet presented about the fundamental difference between materialism and theories that posit the immaterial.

If you can't define construct X within framework Y, then X is incompatible with Y.

Whether or not X exists, and whether or not Y is true. If my theory of penguin anatomy does not permit me to define "flight speed," then my theory is incompatible with flying penguins. If it is not possible to define infinite quantities within the framework of first-order logic (which it is, see Manzano's textbook on higher order logics for proof), then first-order logic is incompatible with infinite quantities.

Since you assert that there is no way even to assign meaning to the immaterial using a materialist framework, then dualism is not encompassed by materialism. You can't even ask the questions in materialism that dualism purports to answer.

 

[Robin]

Not unprepared, merely unwilling. Because it's neither appropriate nor necessary.

Robin : "Everything that exists is a whale -- my theory of whaleism encompasses everything!"
drkitten : "No, not everything is a whale. Roses aren't whales, for example."
Robin : "Oh, yeah? Give me an exact definition of a rose, down to the exact genetic sequence. If you don't know that, you don't know that a rose isn't a whale! My theory of whaleism remains proven because no one has sequenced the DNA of a rose! I am invincible! And I can fly! And I can divide by zero! And I will continue to make irrelevant and unreasonable demands, because otherwise I will be forced to admit that my theory has no actual support whatsoever! So, what's the DNA of a rose?"
drkitten : "Bite me."

Oh dear, you really are becoming increasingly shrill and absurd in your excuses for failing to define the concept on which your argument depends.

You claim that Materialism means something that no actual Materialist philosopher would mean by it. You base your definition on a term "material" and when I make the entirely relevant and reasonable request for some sort of a definition, any sort of a definition, be it imprecise, relative or ostensive and you start abusing innocent mathematicians and spouting bilge of the sort above.

There is some sensible and common advice for you in this sort of situation. When you are in a hole, stop digging.

 

[Robin]

You obviously have a very powerful definition of algorithm if it encompasses the undeciable (non recursively enumerable). I stand by what I wrote.

No algorithmic process can establish the truth. There are indeed theories that encompass the truth, but they are by definition not processes.

Well as I said, even if you are right your claim leads to theologically risible conclusions.

Do you really think that you can equate the terms "truth" in the statement "God knows all truth" and the term truth as defined by Tarski?

More word games really.

 

[Phaedrus74]

Well as I said, even if you are right your claim leads to theologically risible conclusions.

Do you really think that you can equate the terms "truth" in the statement "God knows all truth" and the term truth as defined by Tarski?

More word games really.

Sorry, need to jump in here.

Tarski does not define truth. He defines "True in language L".

(And as a consequence the answer to your question is no )
[/End Nitpick]

Carry on...